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This study sets out to see if the Western media frames of China change over time and how the dominant ideology emerges in the representations. It investigates how the Tibet-China conflict was portrayed and represented in the British national daily newspapers across four research periods from 1949 to 2009. It examines the frames chosen by the press and the influence of the sources (especially external journalistic influence) reflected on the frame-building process. In this research, both content analysis and qualitative frame analysis were used to analyse 955 news articles from ten newspapers. The present study shows that the British media frames of the Tibet-China conflict evolved over the period of fifty years. During the Cold War period, the coverage reflected the ideology of anti-Communism and during the post-Cold War period, it presented China as a human rights violator in Tibet. The changes in frames can be attributed to the external reality of the Cold War, the constantly changing international relations, and other internal or external journalism factors. It indicates that the frame-building process not only reflects news frames as tools used by journalists to construct reality, but also explains which external journalistic factors influence this evolving process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the South Korean scholarship on modern Chinese history since 1945 can be characterized as apolitical with its objectivism, positivism, liberalism, and anti-communist nationalism. This characteristic is a product of not only the Cold War and the military regimes of South Korea but also the political orientation and stance of the senior historians who played an initial and decisive role in determining the goal, direction, and research methods of South Korean studies concerning modern China. The South Korean perspective they promoted usually meant the study of liberal, apolitical topics in Chinese history from a nationalist perspective without any political/ideological influences. The utility of modern Chinese history has mainly lain in helping to construct an anti-socialist, modern Korean nation–state through modernization. South Korean historians of modern China, the paper argues, have not been able to induce a meaningful, broad discussion of critical historical issues in modern China as they might pertain to South Korean society, thus failing to utilize them to help challenge and transform the undemocratic South Korean society and regimes. Hence, the future success of new academic undertakings since the 1990s by South Korean historians will be determined by whether or not they are able to make a radical break from the previous scholarship, in particular, from its objectivism and nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The China Hands -- the US Foreign Service officers who served in China during the second world war -- have been portrayed as both villains and tragic heroes of US diplomatic and Cold War history. As villains, they deliberately 'lost' China to the communists in 1949. As tragic heroes, they proposed wise alternatives to US policy in Asia: alternatives that might have pre-empted the war in Vietnam. Rather than render judgment on the recommendation to cooperate with the Chinese communists, this article considers instead the medium through which this recommendation was made, namely diplomatic reporting. A focus on the two most vilified and heroized of the China Hands, Jack Service and John Davies, demonstrates the importance of the evolving tradition of Foreign Service reporting to the rise of the China Hands during the war . It also reveals how, after 1949, the anti-communist attack on the China Hands focused not only on the immediate recommendations of the China Hands, but also on the tradition and practice of diplomatic reporting, thereby suggesting that the medium was itself associated with communism. The effects of this conflation outlasted the internal policy debate to which the China Hands' reports properly belonged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article shares the author's insights on the prospects and problems encountered in the disarmament effort of implemented by the U.S. The author sights that the most frustrating aspect of the efforts to stop the arms race is the inability to create pressures which will weaken the pressures that keep it going. Anti-communism has been virulent in the U.S. that it would lead to self-destructive act, while many false images of the U.S. have guided Soviet policy The author further asserts that achieving limitations on conventional weapons, particularly the more costly and sophisticated variety is another problem that affects nations. He proposed that the U.N. should increase its membership which will include all the nations of the world particularly the Chinese People's Republic.

As a highly influential political figure in the Second Phibun era (1948-57), Sang Phatthanothai charted unique paths for the Thai nation-state in the emerging Cold War. In multifarious roles -- as labour organizer, newspaper editor and back-channel diplomat -- Sang orchestrated Thai connections with both the People's Republic of China and transnational anti-communist organizations like the spiritual Moral Re-Armament movement in the 1950s. An intellectual and political history of his career reveals a flexible and adaptive vision of Thailand's relationship with international developments in the post-war world. Governing this vision was Sang's dynamic assessment of what best protected the Thai nation's identity and independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On December 27, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent John F. Dulles a letter that explained 'Counter Infiltration" against China. Yoshida thought the best way to wean Chinese from the Communist regime was by sending people into China through trade activities and encouraging an anticommunist movement in China. He believed that Japan could have a major role in such an operation. The purpose of this paper is to examine Yoshida's 'Counter Infiltration" plan against China from the standpoint of intelligence. Yoshida, taking a special interest in intelligence, established intelligence organs such as the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet Research Office (CRO) in quick succession soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. Worried about indirect aggression from communist countries, Yoshida concentrated his efforts on developing an interior intelligence framework. At the same time, he tried to foster the growth of a Japanese intelligence organization that could gather information and perform covert operations in Mainland China.This study shows that Yoshida proactively tried to strengthen intelligence cooperation with governments of both Taiwan and the United States. Yoshida appointed Ogata Taketora Chief Cabinet Secretary and made him supervisor of Japanese intelligence organs. Ogata urged the Nationalist government on Taiwan to cooperate in establishing a Communist information exchange organ, and asked the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assistance in creating a Japanese CIA. On the other hand, Yoshida let retired lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi recruit ex-military personnel for service in the CRO. With the assistance of Tatsumi, the CRO started actual intelligence activity against China after January 1953. The CRO interrogated repatriates from China, and proposed a joint operation with the CIA to send Japanese agents into Macao. Thus Yoshida tried to establish a Japanese intelligence system and backed U.S. strategy against China in the intelligence field.Yoshida's idea, however, was frustrated by rapid changes at home and abroad. After the Peace Treaty came into force, Yoshida couldn't maintain a firm hold on power. Not only the opposition parties but also the media criticized Ogata's plan to launch a Japanese CIA. In the end, Ogata had no choice but to downscale his ambitious plans, and eliminate overseas covert operations. Moreover, Yoshida's confrontational approach against the Chinese government was criticized for being behind the times after the Indochina armistice in 1954. In the last days of his ministry, Yoshida encouraged both Britain and U.S. to set up a 'high command" on China in Singapore. His aim was to use overseas Chinese based in Southeast Asia to infiltrate Mainland China, but his idea wasn't put into practice because he was unable to gain the support of either Britain and the United States or even his own entourage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the Malayan deportation regime by looking at the banishment of two categories of deportees to Formosa, who could not be deported to mainland China due to their anti-communist outlook. It aims to: 1) analyse an alternative solution to sending alien Chinese to Formosa instead of mainland China, 2) the shifting policy of the British in facilitating the banishment of anti-communist alien Chinese to Formosa, and 3) the attitude of the Federation government in threatening (both the British and Formosa) to send the Chinese to China, if the British consul failed to persuade Formosa to accept them. It asks how the relationship between Malaya, the British and Formosa shaped Malayan banishment practices. This article suggests that the practices were hampered by the absence of diplomatic channels between Malaya and Formosa and the reluctance of Malaya to deal on a non-official basis through the Free China Relief Association. This, then presented the British with the dilemma of whether or not they had a special responsibility to resolve the issue on behalf of its former colony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the history of the intelligence community in China and the modern capabilities of the intelligence agencies in the country in terms of collecting against foreign targets. The intelligence community focused on preventing perceived security threats from anti-communist groups after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. A gradual restoration of normality after 1976 coincided with the opening-up to the outside world, which started with U.S. President Richard Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972. It was mentioned that foreign intelligence requirements in China in the field of science and technology were formed under Plan 863 in 1986.