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This paper shows how both the characteristics and the accuracy of the point and density forecasts from a well-known panel data survey of households' inflationary expectations -- the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations -- depend on the tenure of survey respondents. Households' point and density forecasts of inflation become significantly more accurate with repeated practice of completing the survey. These learning gains are best identified when tenure-based combination forecasts are constructed. Tenured households on average produce lower point forecasts of inflation, perceive less forecast uncertainty, round their uncertainty but not their point forecasts, report unimodal densities, and provide internally consistent point and density forecasts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of OECD Statistics Working Papers is the property of Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In standard macroeconomic models, the costs of inflation are tightly linked to the price dispersion of identical goods. Therefore, understanding how price dispersion empirically relates to inflation is crucial for welfare analysis. In this paper, I study the relationship between steady-state inflation and price dispersion for a cross section of U.S. retail products using scanner data. By comparing prices of items with the same barcode, my measure of relative price dispersion controls for product heterogeneity, overcoming an important challenge in the literature. I document a new fact: price dispersion of identical goods increases steeply around zero inflation and becomes flatter as inflation increases, displaying a Y-shaped pattern. Current sticky-price models are inconsistent with this finding. I develop a menu-cost model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks and sequential consumer search that reproduces the new fact and exhibits realistic price-setting behavior. In the model, inflation-induced price dispersion increases shoppers' incentives to search for low prices and thus competition among retailers. The positive welfare-maximizing inflation rate optimally trades off the efficiency gains from lower markups and the resources spent on search. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a semi-structural model to jointly estimate "stars" - long-run levels of output (its growth rate), the unemployment rate, the real interest rate, productivity growth, price inflation, and wage inflation. It features links between survey expectations and stars, time-variation in macroeconomic relationships, and stochastic volatility. Survey data help discipline stars' estimates and have been crucial in estimating a high-dimensional model since the pandemic. The model has desirable real-time properties, competitive forecasting performance, and superior fit to the data compared to variants without the empirical features mentioned above. The by-products are estimates of various objects of great interest to the broader profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the impact of two fiscal programs, the Economic Impact Payments and the Paycheck Protection Program, on vehicle purchases and relates our findings to post-pandemic price pressures. We find that receiving a stimulus check increased the probability of purchasing new vehicles. In addition, the disbursement of funds from the Paycheck Protection Program was associated with a rise in local new car registrations. Our estimates indicate that these two programs account for a boost of 1 3/4 million units--or 12 percent--to new car sales in 2020. Furthermore, the induced boost in sales coincided with the presence of significant production constraints and exacerbated an inventory drawdown, thereby contributing to the rapid increase in new vehicle prices that prevailed in the subsequent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose an empirical framework in which shocks to worker reallocation, aggregate activity, and labor supply drive the joint dynamics of labor market outcomes and inflation, and where reallocation shocks take two forms depending on whether they result from quits or from job loss. In order to link our approach with previous theoretical and empirical work, we extend the procedure for estimating a Bayesian sign-restricted VAR so that priors can be directly imposed on the VAR’s impact matrix. We find that structural shocks that shift the Beveridge curve have different effects on inflation. Our model allows us to fully decompose movements of or along the empirical Beveridge curve in terms of the contribution of each shock and also allows us to estimate the Phillips correlation associated with each shock; our results imply that observed Beveridge and Phillips correlations can change over time depending on what types of structural shocks predominate in a given period. Applying our model to the pandemic-related recession and recovery, we find that reallocation shocks were a key source of labor market dynamics during this period and explain how a post-pandemic “soft landing,” in which inflation declined without a significant rise in unemployment, was possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review recent developments in the estimation and identification of the Phillips curve and its slope. We have three main objectives. First, we describe the econometric challenges faced by traditional approaches of estimating the Phillips curve, explain how new approaches address those challenges, and assess which limitations still remain. Second, we review the findings of those new approaches and examine the evidence regarding a potential flattening of the Phillips curve in the pre-pandemic period. Third, we provide an account of inflation dynamics in the post-pandemic period with a particular emphasis on the role of nonlinearities [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We develop a model of the individual term structure of inflation expectations across forecasting horizons. Using the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we decompose disagreement about inflation expectations into individuals' long-term beliefs, private information, and public information. We find that in normal times, long-horizon disagreement is predominantly driven by individuals' long-term beliefs, while short-horizon disagreement stems from private information. During economic downturns, heterogeneous reactions to public information become a key driver of disagreement at all horizons. When forecasters disagree about public information, monetary policy exhibits a delayed response and a price puzzle emerges, underscoring the importance of anchoring inflation expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is inflation (still) a global phenomenon? We study the international co-movement of inflation based on a dynamic factor model and in a sample spanning up to 56 countries during the 1960-2023 period. Over the entire period, a first global factor explains approximately 58% of the variation in headline inflation across all countries and over 72% in OECD economies. The explanatory power of global inflation is equally high in a shorter sample spanning the time since 2000. Core inflation is also remarkably global, with 53% of its variation attributable to a first global factor. The explanatory power of a second global factor is lower, except for select emerging economies. Variables such as a broad dollar index, the US federal funds rate, and a measure of commodity prices positively correlate with the first global factor. This global factor is also correlated with US inflation during the 70s, 80s, the GFC, and COVID. However, it lags these variables during the post-COVID period. Country-level integration in global value chains accounts for a significant proportion of the share of both local headline and core inflation dynamics explained by global factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the forecasting efficacy and implications of the recently popular breakdown of core inflation into three components: goods excluding food and energy, services excluding energy and housing, and housing. A comprehensive historical evaluation of the accuracy of point and density forecasts from a range of models and approaches shows that a BVAR with stochastic volatility in aggregate core inflation, its three components, and wage growth is an effective tool for forecasting inflation’s components as well as aggregate core inflation. Looking ahead, the model’s baseline projection puts core inflation at 2.6 percent in 2026, well below its 2023 level but still elevated relative to the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent objective. The probability that core inflation will return to 2 percent or less is much higher when conditioning on goods or non-housing services inflation slowing to pre-pandemic levels than when conditioning on these components remaining above the same thresholds. Scenario analysis indicates that slower wage growth will likely be associated with reduced inflation in all three components, especially goods and non-housing services, helping to return core inflation to near the 2 percent target by 2026. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy rate increases have anchored inflation expectations and modulated aggregate demand, generating disinflationary responses [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the predictive relationship between the distribution of realized inflation in the US and measures of inflation expectations from households, firms, financial markets, and professional forecasters. To allow for nonlinearities in the predictive relationship we use quantile regression methods. We find that the ability of households to predict future inflation, relative to that of professionals, firms, and the market, increases with inflation. While professional forecasters are more accurate in the middle of the inflation density, households' expectations are more useful in the upper tail. The predictive ability of measures of inflation expectations is greatest when combined. We show that it is helpful to let the combination weights on different agents' expectations of inflation vary by quantile when assessing inflationary pressures probabilistically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The provision of bank credit to firms and households affects macroeconomic performance. We use survey measures of changes in bank lending standards, disaggregated by loan category, to quantify the effect of changes in banks’ attitudes toward lending on aggregate output, inflation, and interest rates. Bank lending to businesses is particularly important for macroeconomic outcomes, with peak effects on output of around half a percentage point after four quarters of the initial shock. These effects depend on the stage of the business cycle and the proximity of the short-term interest rate to its effective lower bound. The effects are larger when output is growing below trend and when the interest rate is away from its lower bound. We also find that the response of the economy to lending-standards shocks is asymmetric, with tightening shocks having larger effects on output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inflation Expectations with Finite Horizon Planning. Under finite horizon planning, households and firms evaluate a full set of state-contingent paths along which the economy might evolve out to a finite horizon but have limited ability to process events beyond that horizon. We show{analytically and empirically{that such a model accounts for an initial underreaction and subsequent overreaction of in ation forecasts. A planning horizon of four quarters can account for the evidence on the predictability of in ation forecast errors and macroeconomic data. Our identification and estimation strategies combine full-information methods based on aggregate data with regression-based estimates that directly use in ation expectations data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By examining statements made by the Federal Reserve leadership since the early 1950s, we establish that there has been considerable continuity in policymakers' perceptions of the benefits of price stability. Policymakers have consistently contended that deviations from price stability give rise to greater cyclical instability, and they have also frequently suggested that potential output is significantly lowered by inflation. The recurrent support for price stability that comes through in these statements implies that it is invalid to take periods in the U.S. record of deviations from price stability as indicating a policymaker belief in the desirability of inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Working Papers (Croatian National Bank) is the property of Croatian National Bank and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The past 15 years have been eventful. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) reminded us of the importance of a stable financial system to a well-functioning economy, one with low and stable inflation and maximum employment. Given the recent banking stress, we ponder this issue again. The pandemic was a huge shock surrounded by much uncertainty, making precise forecasts within traditional models difficult. And more recently, there has been continuous talk of a soft landing and recession risks. In this paper, I focus on some of the lessons we have learned over the years: (i) uncertainty and tail risk have cyclical variation; (ii) financial shocks can have a significant effect on macroeconomic outcomes; (iii) the impact of shocks is stronger in periods of high volatility. These lessons have important implications for policymakers in today's environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (FRBC) has produced median and trimmed-mean consumer price index (CPI) measures. These have proven useful in various contexts, such as forecasting and understanding post-COVID inflation dynamics. Revisions to the FRBC methodology have historically involved increasing the level of disaggregation in the CPI components, which has improved accuracy. Thus, it may seem logical that further disaggregation would continue to enhance its accuracy. However, we theoretically demonstrate that this may not necessarily be the case. We then explore the empirical impact of further disaggregation along two dimensions: shelter and non-shelter components. We find that significantly increasing the disaggregation in the shelter indexes, when combined with only a slight increase in non-shelter disaggregation, improves the ability of the median and trimmed-mean CPI to track the medium-term trend in CPI inflation and marginally increases predictive power over future movements in CPI inflation. Finally, we examine the practical implications of our preferred degree of disaggregation. Our preferred measure of the median CPI suggests that trend inflation was lower pre-pandemic, while both our preferred median and trimmed-mean measures suggest a faster acceleration in trend inflation in 2021. We also find that higher disaggregation marginally weakens the Phillips curve relationship between median CPI inflation and the unemployment gap, though it remains statistically significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We set- up a two-sector New Keynesian model with input-output linkages to study the persistently high inflation during the post-COVID-19 period. We include multiple shocks as well as several amplification channels of these shocks in a parsimonious model to quantify the relative importance of each factor. We calibrate the model to match the pre-COVID-19 data and alter parameters governing 1) the fiscal rule, 2) inflation feedback in the monetary policy rule, 3) elasticity of substitution among intermediary inputs in production, and 4) the size of a sectoral demand shift shock to explain the post-COVID-19 data. We obtain estimates of shocks in the model to fit goods inflation data during the post-COVID-19 period and use aggregate inflation to test the model’s ability to explain the recent inflationary episode. Although aggregate demand shocks and a sectoral demand shift shock have played a significant role in the initial inflation surge during 2021, the propagation of these shocks into the persistently high aggregate inflation was also helped by lower inflation feedback in the monetary policy response relative to the pre-COVID-19 period. Compared with other changes in parameters, this alteration of the monetary policy rule best fits the level and persistence of the post-COVID-19 aggregate inflation. While lowering the elasticity of substitution among intermediary inputs can match the level of inflation, it does a poorer job of explaining the persistence of inflation compared with allowing changes in the monetary policy rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In theory, the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can generate substantial downward pressure on longer-term inflation expectations. We use data on interest rate options and inflation compensation to estimate the degree to which the probability that the zero lower bound binds in the future has weighed on inflation expectations in the United States. Over the 2008-2019 period, we estimate that the zero lower bound imparted only a small drag on longer-term inflation expectations of around 10 basis points. We argue that the Federal Reserve's use of forward guidance and largescale asset purchases largely offset the potential disinflationary effects of the zero lower bound, even prior to formally adopting an average inflation targeting framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the positive and normative implications for inflation of employer-to-employer (EE) worker transitions by developing a heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model featuring a frictional labor market with on-the-job search. We find that EE dynamics played an important role in shaping the differential inflation dynamics observed during the Great Recession and COVID-19 recoveries. Despite both recoveries sharing similar unemployment dynamics, the recovery from the Great Recession exhibited subdued EE transitions and inflation dynamics. In our model, the optimal monetary policy involves a strong positive response to EE fluctuations, suggesting that central banks should distinguish between recovery episodes with different EE dynamics even if they have similar unemployment rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate the causal effects of a shift in the expected future exchange rate of a local currency against the US dollar on a representative sample of firms in an open economy. We survey a nationally representative sample of firms and provide the one-year-ahead nominal exchange rate forecast published by the local central bank to a random sub-sample of firm managers. The treatment is effective in shifting exchange rate and inflation expectations and perceptions. These effects are persistent and larger for non-exporting firms. Linking survey responses with administrative census data, we find that the treatment affects the dynamics of export and import quantities and prices at the firm level, with differential effects for exports to destination countries that use the US dollar as their currency. We instrument exchange rate expectations with the variation induced by the treatment and estimate a positive elasticity of a future expected depreciation in import expenditures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using recently available daily S&P 500 index option expirations, we examine the ex ante pricing of uncertainty surrounding key economic releases and the determinants of risk premia associated with these releases. The cost of insurance against price, variance, and downside risk is higher for options that span U.S. CPI, FOMC, Nonfarm Payroll, and GDP releases compared to neighboring expirations. We calculate release-driven forward equity and variance risk premia and find that premia vary considerably across economic releases and increase with risk aversion as well as with monetary policy and real economic uncertainty. The empirical framework presented in this paper can be used to examine the ex ante pricing of a wide variety of events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differences in consumption patterns across demographic groups mean that international price shocks differentially affect such groups. We construct import price indexes for U.S. consumer groups that vary by age, race, sex, education, and urban status. Black consumers and college graduates experienced significantly higher import price inflation from 1996-2018 compared to other groups, such as high school dropouts, rural consumers, and consumers over 60. Sensitivity to international price shocks varies widely, implying movements in exchange rates and foreign prices, both during our sample and during the Covid-19 pandemic, drove sizable differences in import price inflation - and total inflation-across groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that inflation expectations are heterogeneous and depend on past individual experiences. We propose a diagnostic expectations-augmented Kalman filter to represent consumers' heterogeneous inflation expectations-formation process, where heterogeneity comes from an anchoring-to-the-past mechanism. We estimate the diagnosticity parameter that governs the inflation expectations-formation process and show that the model can replicate systematic differences in inflation expectations across cohorts in the US. We introduce this mechanism into a New Keynesian model and find that heterogeneous expectations anchor aggregate responses to the agents' memory, making shocks more persistent. Central banks should be more active to prevent agents from remembering current shocks far into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Working Papers (Croatian National Bank) is the property of Croatian National Bank and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Canonical menu cost models, when parameterized to match the micro-price data, cannot reproduce the extent to which the fraction of price changes increases with inflation. They also predict implausibly large menu costs and misallocation in the presence of strategic complementarities. We resolve these shortcomings by extending the multiproduct menu cost model along two dimensions. First, the products sold by a firm are imperfect substitutes. Second, strategic complementarities are at the firm, not product level. In contrast to standard models, the fraction of price changes increases rapidly with the size of monetary shocks, so our model implies a non-linear Phillips curve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not in standard models. With conventional pricing frictions, imposing a flat Phillips curve also imposes a price level that is rigid with respect to supply shocks. In the New Keynesian model, price markup shocks need to be several orders of magnitude bigger than other shocks in order to fit the data, leading to unreasonable assessments of the magnitude of the increase in costs during inflationary episodes. To account for the facts, we propose a strategic microfoundation of shock-dependent price stickiness: prices are sticky with respect to demand shocks but flexible with respect to supply shocks. This friction is demand-intrinsic, in line with narrative accounts for the imperfect adjustment of prices. Firms can credibly justify a price increase due to a rise in costs, whereas it is harder to do so when demand increases. Inflation from supply shocks is efficient and does not justify a monetary policy response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, we document a significant negative association between consumer sentiment and inflation expectations, controlling for prevailing inflation in the economy. We further show that consumer sentiments of homeowners and stockowners are more sensitive to expected inflation than those of other consumers, a disparity at odds with the notion that owning such assets provides hedges against inflation. Leveraging data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations, we find three factors that help account for this difference. First, assets owners' outlook for the broad economy seems to be more sensitive to their inflation expectations than other consumers' outlook. Second, assets owners appear to expect income growth to lag spending growth by a wider margin than other consumers and that margin widens with inflation expectations. Third, homeowners' inflation expectations tend to be less variable and less volatile than those of renters, which may allow the former to have a greater bearing on consumer sentiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We implement a novel nonlinear structural model featuring an empirically-successful frequency-dependent and asymmetric Phillips curve; unemployment frequency components interact with three components of core PCE - core goods, housing, and core services ex-housing - and a variable capturing supply shocks. Forecast tests verify model's accuracy in its unemployment-inflation tradeoffs, crucial for monetary policy. Using this model, we assess the plausibility of the December 2022 Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). By 2025Q4, the SEP projects 2.1 percent inflation; however, conditional on the SEP unemployment path, we project inflation of 2.9 percent. A fairly deep recession delivers the SEP inflation path, but a simple welfare analysis rejects this outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers purchase energy in many forms. Sometimes energy goods are consumed directly, for instance, in the form of gasoline used to operate a vehicle, electricity to light a home, or natural gas to heat a home. At other times, the cost of energy is embodied in the prices of goods and services that consumers buy, say when purchasing an airline ticket or when buying online garden furniture made from plastic to be delivered by mail. Previous research has focused on quantifying the pass-through of the price of crude oil or the price of motor gasoline to U.S. inflation. Neither approach accounts for the fact that percent changes in refined product prices need not be proportionate to the percent change in the price of oil, that not all energy is derived from oil, and that the correlation of price shocks across energy markets is far from one. This paper develops a vector autoregressive model that quantifies the joint impact of shocks to several energy prices on headline and core CPI inflation. Our analysis confirms that focusing on gasoline price shocks alone will underestimate the inflationary pressures emanating from the energy sector, but not enough to overturn the conclusion that much of the observed increase in headline inflation in 2021 and 2022 reflected non-energy price shocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the latest economic trends and indicators, providing a comprehensive overview of various economic statistics for the U.S., Eurozone, and South Africa. It highlights key developments such as the Federal Reserve's unexpected 50 basis point rate cut amid rising inflation and unemployment rates in the U.S., as well as moderating growth and inflation trends in the Eurozone.

The article presents statistical data on economic trends in South Africa. It reports the gross domestic product (GDP) growth, employment and unemployment rates, consumer inflation and price increases in the second quarter of 2024. Economic indicators include exports, imports, balance of payments, production volume and sales, interest rates, exchange rates, share prices, consumer prices, producer prices, business cycles and employee earnings.

The paper considers a New Keynesian framework in which agents form expectations based on a combination of mis-specified forecasts and myopia. The proposed expectations formation process is found to be consistent with all three empirical facts on consensus inflation forecasts, namely, that forecasters under-react to ex-ante forecast revisions, that forecasters over-react to recent events, and that the response of forecast errors to a shock initially under-shoots but then over-shoots. The paper then derives the general equilibrium solution consistent with the proposed expectations formation process and estimates the model with likelihood-based Bayesian methods, yielding three novel results: (i) The data strongly prefer the combination of autoregressive mis-specified forecasting rules and myopia over other alternatives; (ii) The best fitting expectations formation process for both households and firms is characterized by high degrees of myopia and simple AR(1) forecasting rules; (iii) Frictions such as habit in consumption, which are typically necessary for models with Full-information Rational Expectations, are significantly less important, because the proposed expectations generate substantial internal persistence and amplification to exogenous shocks. Simulated inflation expectations data from the estimated general equilibrium model reflect the three empirical facts on forecasting data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the theoretical literature at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance to draw lessons on the connection between vulnerabilities in the financial system and the macroeconomy, and on how monetary policy affects that connection. This literature finds that financial vulnerabilities are inherent to financial systems and tend to be procyclical. Moreover, financial vulnerabilities amplify the effects of adverse shocks to the economy, so that even a small shock to fundamentals or a small revision of beliefs can create a self-reinforcing feedback loop that impairs credit provision, lowers asset prices, and depresses economic activity and inflation. Finally, monetary policy may affect the buildup of vulnerabilities, but the sign of the impact along some of its transmission channels is theoretically ambiguous and may vary with the state of the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the theoretical literature at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance to draw lessons on the connection between vulnerabilities in the financial system and the macroeconomy, and on how monetary policy affects that connection. This literature finds that financial vulnerabilities are inherent to financial systems and tend to be procyclical. Moreover, financial vulnerabilities amplify the effects of adverse shocks to the economy, so that even a small shock to fundamentals or a small revision of beliefs can create a self-reinforcing feedback loop that impairs credit provision, lowers asset prices, and depresses economic activity and inflation. Finally, monetary policy may affect the buildup of vulnerabilities, but the sign of the impact along some of its transmission channels is theoretically ambiguous and may vary with the state of the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a new approach to combining the information in point and density forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and assesses the incremental value of the density forecasts. Our starting point is a model, developed in companion work, that constructs quarterly term structures of expectations and uncertainty from SPF point forecasts for quarterly fixed horizons and annual fixed events. We then employ entropic tilting to bring the density forecast information contained in the SPF's probability bins to bear on the model estimates. In a novel application of entropic tilting, we let the resulting predictive densities exactly replicate the SPF's probability bins. Our empirical analysis of SPF forecasts of GDP growth and inflation shows that tilting to the SPF's probability bins can visibly affect our model-based predictive distributions. Yet in historical evaluations, tilting does not offer consistent benefits to forecast accuracy relative to the model-based densities that are centered on the SPF's point forecasts and reflect the historical behavior of SPF forecast errors. That said, there can be periods in which tilting to the bin information helps forecast accuracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several Phillips curves based on sticky information and sticky prices are estimated and compared using Bayesian VAR-GMM. This method derives expectations in each Phillips curve from a VAR and estimates the Phillips curve parameters and the VAR coefficients simultaneously. Quasi-marginal likelihood-based model comparison selects a dual stickiness Phillips curve in which, each period, some prices remain unchanged, consistent with micro evidence. Moreover, sticky information is a more plausible source of inflation inertia in the Phillips curve than other sources proposed in previous studies. Sticky information, sticky prices, and unchanged prices in each period are all needed to better describe inflation dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes new measures of the effectiveness of inflation targeting (IT) and evaluates its main drivers in a (large) sample of advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Using synthetic control methods, we find that IT has heterogeneous effects on inflation across countries. The gains shifting the level of inflation (generally downwards) are modest and smaller in AEs than are those in EMDEs. All such gains are statistically significant in one out of three economies approximately. Second, statistically significant differences in keeping inflation close to target under IT (compared with estimated counterfactuals) can be detected more broadly in nearly half of the economies. Third, IT can be a source of economic resilience that helped cushion inflation fluctuations during the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis with statistically significant gains mostly found among EMDEs (in two out of three of these economies). Finally, we find that IT effectiveness-measured by the dynamic treatment effect and the absolute deviations of both observed and synthetic inflation from target-is significantly correlated with indices of exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence, especially among EMDEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accurate rent measurement is essential for constructing a consumer price index (CPI) and for measuring household welfare. Late payment fees and nonpayment of rent are common components of rental expenditures and thus belong in CPIs. Late payment fees are often excluded; we offer a novel critique. In the US CPI, nonpayment is ostensibly included, but, we show, severely undermeasured. Moreover, the manner of its inclusion renders the CPI extremely sensitive to nonpayment variations; we show how to fix this. Nonpayment undermeasurement suggests at least a +1 ppt overestimate in 2020 CPI shelter inflation. Timely nonpayment and late fee measurement is challenging; we offer a practical solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a multisector, open economy, New Keynesian framework to evaluate how potentially binding capacity constraints, and shocks to them, shape inflation. We show that binding constraints for domestic and foreign producers shift domestic and import price Phillips Curves up, similar to reduced-form markup shocks. Further, data on prices and quantities together identify whether constraints bind due to increased demand or reductions in capacity. Applying the model to interpret recent US data, we find that binding constraints explain half of the increase in inflation during 2021-2022. In particular, tight capacity served to amplify the impact of loose monetary policy in 2021, fueling the inflation takeoff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a two-country macroeconomic model that we fit to a set of aggregate prices and quantities for the U.S. and the rest of the world. In addition to a standard array of shocks, the model includes time variation in agents' preference for safe bonds. We allow for a component of this time variation to be common across countries and biased toward dollar-denominated safe assets, and refer to this component as global flight to safety (GFS). We find that GFS shocks are the most important shocks driving world business cycles, and are also important drivers of activity in the U.S. and especially abroad. An adverse GFS shock lowers global GDP and inflation, widens global corporate credit spreads, and appreciates the dollar. These effects are very close to those obtained from a structural VAR which uses the excess bond premium (Gilchrist and Zakraj?sek, 2012) as proxy for global flight to safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a two-country macroeconomic model that we fit to a set of aggregate prices and quantities for the U.S. and the rest of the world. In addition to a standard array of shocks, the model includes time variation in agents' preference for safe bonds. We allow for a component of this time variation to be common across countries and biased toward dollar-denominated safe assets, and refer to this component as global flight to safety (GFS). We find that GFS shocks are the most important shocks driving world business cycles, and are also important drivers of activity in the U.S. and especially abroad. An adverse GFS shock lowers global GDP and inflation, widens global corporate credit spreads, and appreciates the dollar. These effects are very close to those obtained from a structural VAR which uses the excess bond premium (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012) as proxy for global flight to safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on a framework of memory and recall that accounts for social networks, we provide conditions under which social networks can amplify expectations. We provide evidence for several predictions of the model using a novel dataset on inflation expectations and social network connections: Inflation expectations in the social network are statistically significantly, positively associated with individual inflation expectations; the relationship is stronger for groups that share common demographic characteristics, such as gender, income, or political affiliation. An instrumental variable approach further establishes causality of these results while also showing that salient information transmits strongly through the network. Our estimates imply that the influence of the social network overall amplifies but does not destabilize inflation expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the forecasting performance of inflation swaps and survey-based expectations for one-year inflation. Conducting this exercise helps determine if one set of expectations can provide a cleaner signal about future inflation. The study finds that, overall, inflation swaps more frequently provide better forecasts of future inflation. Previous studies that found poor performance of swaps were strongly influenced by liquidity issues during the financial crisis and the pandemic. When these periods are excluded, swaps have superior predictive ability. Our analysis suggests that combining the two expectations can lead to even better forecasts. The optimal static combination is roughly an equal weighting of swaps and surveys. Alternatively, a dynamic smooth-transition regime switching model can also lead to superior performance and provide a clearer signal on expectations of future inflation. Recently, this measure has implied the Federal Reserve is expected to be closer to its inflation target over the next year than the surveys would suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pickup in the U.S. inflation rate to its highest rates in forty years has led to renewed attention being given to the Great Inflation of the 1970s. This paper asks with regard to the Great Inflation: "How did it happen?" The answer offered is the fact that, in both the United Kingdom and the United States, monetary policy and other policy instruments were guided by a faulty doctrine-a nonmonetary view of inflation that perceived the concerted restraint of aggregate demand as both ineffective and unnecessary for inflation control. In the paper's analysis, the difference in the economic policy doctrine in the 1970s from that prevailing in more recent decades is represented algebraically, with this representation backed up by documentation of policymakers' views. A key conclusion implied by the analysis is that the fact that a nonmonetary perspective on inflation is no longer prevalent in policy circles provides grounds for believing that monetary policy in the modern era is well positioned to prevent the recurrence of entrenched high inflation rates of the kind seen in the 1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This chapter summarizes the mixed-frequency methods commonly used for nowcasting inflation. It discusses the importance of key high-frequency data in producing timely and accurate inflation nowcasts. In the US, consensus surveys of professional forecasters have historically provided an accurate benchmark for inflation nowcasts because they incorporate professional judgment to capture idiosyncratic factors driving inflation. Using real-time data, we show that a relatively parsimonious mixed-frequency model produces superior point and density nowcasting accuracy for headline inflation and competitive nowcasting accuracy for core inflation compared with surveys of professional forecasters over a long sample spanning 1999--2022 and over a short sample focusing on the period since the start of the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented shift of consumption from services to goods. We study this demand reallocation in a multi-sector model featuring sticky prices, input-output linkages, and labor reallocation costs. Reallocation costs hamper the increase in the supply of goods, causing inflationary pressures. These pressures are amplified by the fact that goods prices are more flexible than services prices. We estimate the model allowing for demand reallocation, sectoral productivity, and aggregate labor supply shocks. The demand reallocation shock explains a large portion of the rise in U.S. inflation in the aftermath of the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]