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Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Developing and developed nations face demographic challenges in the coming decades. Aging populations are expected to strain health resources and social safety nets. Smart home technology (SHT) is touted as a means for simultaneously improving quality of life and independence, while also reducing the long‐term costs of caring for an aging population. SHT also presents myriad governance and policy challenges, especially the protection and use of vast amounts of patient data. Alas, the governance and policy aspects of SHT research have been largely peripheral. The aims of this review are to cogently present the governance benefits and challenges of SHT and prompt greater engagement by policy scholars in myriad unanswered research questions. Specifically, it uses the collaborative governance framework to identify opportunities for, and barriers to, forward‐thinking public and private collaboration. Research engagement by policy researchers is vital for effective governing of this burgeoning sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The internationalization of science has prompted major science funding agencies to seek to further international cooperation in basic research through the use of outposts based outside of the agency's home country. While these offices are all international in scope, the strategies and utilization of these offices vary. This paper begins by outlining the motivations and theoretical framework for international offices, drawing specifically from a proximity theory of relationships. Subsequently the paper presents a typology of activities that fall under the rubric of international engagement in science. We will then critically examine the international offices of four leading basic research funding agencies and attempt to characterize and describe the distinct models that these agencies employ. Building from the models of organization, the paper closes with a discussion of the impacts of these overseas offices as well as other policy implications from the use of different engagement strategies in fostering international collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governments of Britain, France, and the United States are seeking to promote renewed investment in nuclear power through metagovernance. Metagovernance describes the way governments can leverage state power and resources to shape the behavior of networked actors to advance policy goals. To metagovern, governments use a variety of policy tools but the factors shaping the design of these policy tools remains unclear. Grid-group cultural theory is used to show that the design of the policy tools used in metagovernance reflects both an underlying cultural bias within government and prevailing institutional circumstances. The paper demonstrates the utility of cultural theory in the study of metagovernance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The transformation of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) into a preservationist regime met with extremely fierce opposition from the prowhaling countries and created an unprecedented and famous polarization of the IWC parties into pro and antiwhaling camps, which can be observed even today. In such a bipolar and harsh process, it would be typically argued that scientific advice would be powerless because it would become subject to heightened scrutiny from both camps resulting in endless technical debate. Our case shows that, on the contrary, the advisory scientists learned to successfully develop a scientific management procedure that was accepted by both the pro and antiwhaling camps. The objective of this paper is to explain this process and examine to what extent collective learning in the assessment process affected the political effectiveness of the management procedure and, more broadly thereby, to contribute to the groundwork of analyzing how the scientists participating in the scientific assessments collectively learn. With a view to cross-fertilization between institutionalism and science and technology study ( STS) approaches, we develop an analytical framework and apply it to the international whaling regime to examine the usefulness of it and provide some general lessons to be learned for making learning assessments more effective. The framework was capable of showing that path dependency and paradigm shift were among the key factors of the scientific assessment's increased effectiveness. Overall, the cross-fertilization between institutionalism and STS appears to be a fruitful way forward for the next generation of scientific assessment studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of Policy Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Over the past three decades, those advocating for arts funding have shifted their arguments. When the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) was created in 1965, its supporters praised arts and culture for their uplifting qualities, and for their ability to counterbalance trends toward materialism and militarism. By the 1990s, arts advocates were far more likely to use instrumentalist arguments, showing that investment in arts and culture produce other desirable benefits, most notably economic development advances. This article reviews the changing discourse of arts advocacy in several ways: (1) by reviewing and coding Congressional debates on arts funding from 1965–2000, (2) reviewing arts coverage in the New York Times and selected arts periodicals during this same time period. Comparing this case to others in the literature on policy redefinition, the paper argues that cultural advocates have consciously reframed their arguments to broaden their appeal in the face new and more threatening opposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the European renewable energy industry's capacity for pressure-based and information-based lobbying and its strategies in two lobbying efforts: for a legally binding target of 20 percent renewable energy by 2020 (a proposal adopted by the European Council in March 2007) and for binding interim targets as a means to secure effective implementation of the 2020 target (a proposal that was not adopted). It finds that the industry has the capacity for information-based lobbying but very limited capacity for pressure-based lobbying. The article also discusses the effectiveness of the two lobbying types. It argues that information-based lobbying is particularly effective early in the decision-making process, and hypothesizes that early information-based lobbying may compensate for limited capacity for pressure-based lobbying and for information-based lobbying that takes place later in the decision-making process, but concludes that this strategy would have been unlikely to be effective in the second case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To help explain the role scientists play in policy change, concepts such as coproduction, boundary-work, and pollution and purity claims as they are used in science studies should be incorporated into policy theory. Moreover improved policy theory should specify the kinds of boundary-work that can occur and the kinds of values and beliefs that drive boundary-work, explaining how boundary-work leads to policy change. The cultural theory (CT) developed by Mary Douglas, Michael Thompson, Aaron Wildavsky, and others can help specify conditions for coproduction and change in science, institutions, and policy when recast as a theory involving three critical institutional boundaries. This theory-development article uses this recast version of CT to help explain the most recent dramatic shift in federal land and wildlife management policy in the Pacific Northwest. The article illustrates how cultural combatants use boundary-work including pollution and purity claims to align themselves and the domain of authoritative science with scientists whose constructs of nature and policy prescriptions are functional for their preferred institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concepts of 'boundary organization' and 'boundary work,' borrowed from science and technology studies (STS), are now commonly used in International Relations to analyze organizations providing a science-policy interface. This article critically examines these concepts, with close attention to specific insights from the STS literature, for their added value in understanding the interactions between knowledge production processes on the one hand and policy making at the global level on the other. It lays the basis for two critiques: (1) an institutionalist critique of the use of these metaphors highlighting the mismatch between the interplay of relevant actors-scientists, policy makers, and stakeholders-via the social spaces they occupy and international organizations; (2) on weak assumptions on coproduction. The authors argue that the true challenge for science-policy interfaces is to generate politically 'usable knowledge' and conditions for social learning, thus recognizing that politicization of science is more likely than the scientification of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technological innovations are by no means Pareto-improving. I build on the argument that incumbent innovators can use political means to block rival innovations by emphasizing that the competitiveness of political system and some political institutions may diminish their ability to do so. I specify an institutional mechanism of agenda power, which provides newcomers with an improved ability to enter the game. The number of agenda power holders varies significantly among political systems, electoral systems, and administrative structures. With a sample of about 100 countries and across 20 years I show that politically competitive regimes, majoritarian electoral rules, and federal structures supply more holders of agenda power in comparison to their counterparts and, other things being equal, produce more innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the growing importance of public engagement in science policy making and declining levels of public trust in food production, the European Food Safety Authority ( EFSA) has attempted to embed 'good governance' approaches to strengthen scientific independence and open up risk decision making, which include the use of public consultations. However, 'opening up' of risk assessment policies reveals some tensions; namely, balancing the goals of scientific excellence and transparency, protecting science from interests, addressing value judgments, and limited opportunities to debate ethical and social issues. EFSA's development of risk assessment policy for genetically modified animals is used as a case study to analyze these tensions. This analysis suggests that in order to fulfill good governance commitments and maintain trust in risk governance, closer cooperation between EFSA and the European Commission is required to provide 'space' for debating the broader risk management issues. This publically accessible space may be needed alongside rather than instead of EFSA's consultation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization has generated increasing interest in technology-intensive industries as a way to sustain national economic competitiveness. High-technology growth is often conceptualized as a 'high road' to prosperity, more amenable to private-public, industry-labor, and interfirm cooperation than tax, regulatory, or cost competitive strategies. While specialization in technology-intensive industries does deliver several benefits, this article uses Finland's successful transformation into a high-technology economy to highlight the significant economic and political risks associated with this strategy. Economically, movement into electronics exposed Finland to cost competition and disruptive technological innovations. Politically, high-technology competition weakened the solidaristic ties that characterized postwar capitalism and the coordinating capacities that underpinned economic growth. In short, high-technology growth exacerbated the problems it was supposed to solve. The article concludes by generalizing the argument to several non-Nordic states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars disagree whether local decision making is inherently more democratic and sustainable than centralized governance structures. While some maintain it is, due to the incorporation of local knowledge, citizen decision makers' closeness to the issues, and the benefits of participatory democracy, others find it as susceptible to issues of corruption and poor implementation as any other scale. We argue that with wetlands, a natural resource with critical local benefits, it is imperative to incorporate local governance, using the U. S. state of Connecticut as an example. Despite the American policy of No Net Loss, the local benefits of wetland resources cannot be aggregated on a national scale. Each local ecosystem needs wetland resources to ensure local ecological benefits such as flood control and pollution remission, as well as the substantial economic benefits of recreation. We illustrate the benefits of local control of wetlands with data from the American state of Connecticut, which consistently surpasses the federal wetland goal of No Net Loss due, we argue, to the governance structure of town-level wetlands commissions. A national policy such as No Net Loss, where wetlands are saved or created in designated areas and destroyed in others, is insufficient when it ignores critical benefits for localities. The Connecticut system using local volunteers and unpaid appointees is a successful method for governing common-pool wetland systems. In the case of Connecticut, we find that local decision making is not a 'trap,' but instead an effective model of sustainable, democratic local governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science and technology policy initiatives in the early 1980s have focused in both the United States and Western Europe on improving capacity to apply a good science base in practice, expecting increases in technological advancement, improved market presence and enhanced economic growth. Results varied broadly in the United States and Europe. Even more puzzling, Japan charged ahead in technological advancement without that strong of a science base of its own. Some industrialized economies do not conform to the expected science–technology relationship, whereby strong performance in science shall lead to strong technological performance. The puzzling science–technology relationship in advanced countries has plausible explanations. (1) Science–technology relationship is much interdependent or symbiotic. Its strength and primary direction at a given time varies largely by field of science or technological innovation and across long periods of time. (2) Science–technology link in a country may depend on the overall scientific and technological level of development in that country. The strength and interdependent nature of this link evolves historically and varies across fields of science and technology. The strength of the link is affected by scientific and technological specialization in a country. Different technological fields have different scientific intensities, or degrees of building upon the science base. (3) Specialization of countries across scientific and technological fields varies. Hence, the strength of science–technology link differs between countries. High technological specialization of a country may impact its technological performance more than its immediately current scientific performance does. History, tradition and knowledge transfers may affect more returns on R&D expenditures than the actual value of R&D funds spent in science or technology. Explanations of puzzling behavior of science–technology link may become policy recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]