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In their recent paper, Parnia and colleagues propose a new label for the near‐death experience (NDE): recalled experience of death. They claimed NDEs are "authentic" only when an objective danger is present and that authentic NDEs have a proven core phenomenology. We consider that these claims are insufficiently supported by empirical data. NDEs appear as a continuum of heterogeneous experiences of consciousness precipitated by the disjunction of processes usually combined in normal mental activity. The "core phenomenology" of NDEs is also opened to several criticisms. Closeness to "real" death does not appear to be a decisive criterion for characterizing NDEs. The author's adhesion to Raymond Moody's NDE model produces a biased partition of this field of research that is unable to provide the basis for a consensus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1970s saw a growing interest in the vasopressin−memory hypothesis, proposed by David de Wied and his collaborators in Utrecht. This rose to a peak in the 1980s that saw a flurry of papers published from diverse sources critical of the experimental foundations of this idea. In subsequent years, interest in this hypothesis declined markedly as shortcomings were recognized. Here, we study this debate using citation network analysis to identify the influential papers in this debate and the citation links between them. The issues raised have contemporary relevance to the current controversy about the interpretation of studies using intranasal oxytocin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action‐perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people—to action‐oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities—and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a list of poster papers presented at a conference. Some of the papers included in the list are: "Entrainment, Evolution, and Ethology: Together in Time, Sound, and Action," by J. Bispham and I. Cross, "Neuronal Mechanisms "Underlying the Perception of Pitch and Harmony," by G. Langner and "Tonality and nonlinear resonance," by E.W. Large and A.E. Tretakis.

A list of poster papers presented at a conference of the New York Academy of Sciences is presented, which includes one on metrical accenting in physically identical tones, one on the dynamic modulation of cortical beta and gama-band activity in response to musical pulse and one on synchronization of sound and motion in piano duet performances.

Parnia et al. recently published suggestions for the study of death and experiences recalled in a near‐death context. We have serious reservations about the authors' statements. In this commentary, we discuss the omissions and knowledge gaps inherent to the authors' paper, which among others include incorrect neurological claims about brain death and misunderstandings regarding the terminology of consciousness. Although we believe that (near‐)death research deserves a framework guideline, the paper by Parnia and colleagues is misleading and, contrary to the authors' intention, hinders the scientific understanding of near‐death experiences and the neural mechanisms occurring in the dying brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]