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The self-similarity of Indonesian Borobudur Temple is observed through the dimensionality of stupa that is hypothetically closely related to whole architectural body. Fractal dimension is calculated by using the cube counting method and found that the dimension is 2.325, which is laid between the two-dimensional plane and three dimensional space. The applied fractal geometry and self-similarity of the building is emerged as the building process implement the metric rules, since there is no universal metric standard known in ancient traditional Javanese culture thus the architecture is not based on final master plan. The paper also proposes how the hypothetical algorithmic architecture might be applied computationally in order to see some experimental generations of similar building. The paper ends with some conjectures for further challenge and insights related to fractal geometry in Javanese traditional cultural heritages.

The paper discusses some aspects of Iterated Function System while referring to some interesting point of view into Indonesian traditional batik. The deconstruction is delivered in our recognition of the Collage Theorem to find the affine transform of the iterated function system that attracts the iteration of drawing the dots into the complex motif of – or at least, having high similarity to – batik patterns. We employ and revisit the well-known Chaos Game to reconstruct after having some basic motifs is deconstructed. The reconstruction of the complex pattern opens a quest of creativity broadening the computationally generated batik exploiting its self-similarity properties. A challenge to meet the modern computational generative art with the traditional batik designs is expected to yield synergistically interesting results aesthetically. The paper concludes with two arrows of our further endeavors in this field, be it enriching our understanding of how human cognition has created such beautiful patterns and designs traditionally since ancient civilizations in our anthropological perspective while in the other hand providing us tool to the empowerment of batik as generative aesthetics by employment of computation.

The paper discusses the terminology behind batik crafting and showed the aspects of self-similarity in its ornaments. Even though a product of batik cannot be reduced merely into its decorative properties, it is shown that computation can capture some interesting aspects in the batik-making ornamentation. There are three methods that can be exploited to the generative batik, i.e.: using fractal as the main source of decorative patterns, the hybrid batik that is emerged from the acquisition of L-System Thue-Morse algorithm for the harmonization within the grand designs by using both fractal images and traditional batik patterns, and using the random image tessellation as well as previous tiling algorithms for generating batik designs. The latest can be delivered by using a broad sources of motifs and traditionally recognized graphics. The paper concludes with certain aspects that shows how the harmony of traditional crafting and modern computation could bring us a more creative aspects of the beautiful harmony inherited in the aesthetic aspects of batik crafting.

The paper elaborates an endeavor on applying the algorithmic information-theoretic computational complexity to meta-social-sciences. It is motivated by the effort on seeking the impact of the well-known incompleteness theorem to the scientific methodology approaching social phenomena. The paper uses the binary string as the model of social phenomena to gain understanding on some problems faced in the philosophy of social sciences or some traps in sociological theories. The paper ends on showing the great opportunity in recent social researches and some boundaries that limit them.

I previously laid the groundwork for Frequency Value Grammar (FVG) in papers I submitted in the proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Cognitive Science (2003), Sydney Australia, and Corpus Linguistics Conference (2003), Lancaster, UK. FVG is a formal syntax theoretically based in large part on Information Theory principles. FVG relies on dynamic physical principles external to the corpus which shape and mould the corpus whereas generative grammar and other formal syntactic theories are based exclusively on patterns (fractals) found occurring within the well-formed portion of the corpus. However, FVG should not be confused with Probability Syntax, (PS), as described by Manning (2003). PS is a corpus based approach that will yield the probability distribution of possible syntax constructions over a fixed corpus. PS makes no distinction between well and ill formed sentence constructions and assumes everything found in the corpus is well formed. In contrast, FVG’s primary objective is to distinguish between well and ill formed sentence constructions and, in so doing, relies on corpus based parameters which determine sentence competency. In PS, a syntax of high probability will not necessarily yield a well formed sentence. However, in FVG, a syntax or sentence construction of high ‘frequency value’ will yield a well-formed sentence, at least, 95% of the time satisfying most empirical standards. Moreover, in FVG, a sentence construction of ‘high frequency value’ could very well be represented by an underlying syntactic construction of low probability as determined by PS. The characteristic ‘frequency values’ calculated in FVG are not measures of probability but rather are fundamentally determined values derived from exogenous principles which impact and determine corpus based parameters serving as an index of sentence competency. The theoretical framework of FVG has broad applications beyond that of formal syntax and NLP. In this paper, I will demonstrate how FVG can be used as a model for improving the upper bound calculation of entropy of written English. Generally speaking, when a function word precedes an open class word, the backward n-gram analysis will be homomorphic with the information source and will result in frequency values more representative of co-occurrences in the information source.

This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper.

There is now a huge amount of interest in consciousness among scientists as well as philosophers, yet there is so much confusion and ambiguity in the claims and counter-claims that it is hard to tell whether any progress is being made. This ``position paper'' suggests that we can make progress by temporarily putting to one side questions about what consciousness is or which animals or machines have it or how it evolved. Instead we should focus on questions about the sorts of architectures that are possible for behaving systems and ask what sorts of capabilities, states and processes, might be supported by different sorts of architectures. We can then ask which organisms and machines have which sorts of architectures. This combines the standpoint of philosopher, biologist and engineer. If we can find a general theory of the variety of possible architectures (a characterisation of ``design space'') and the variety of environments, tasks and roles to which such architectures are well suited (a characterisation of ``niche space'') we may be able to use such a theory as a basis for formulating new more precisely defined concepts with which to articulate less ambiguous questions about the space of possible minds. For instance our initially ill-defined concept (``consciousness'') might split into a collection of more precisely defined concepts which can be used to ask unambiguous questions with definite answers. As a first step this paper explores a collection of conjectures regarding architectures and their evolution. In particular we explore architectures involving a combination of coexisting architectural levels including: (a) reactive mechanisms which evolved very early, (b) deliberative mechanisms which evolved later in response to pressures on information processing resources and (c) meta-management mechanisms that can explicitly inspect evaluate and modify some of the contents of various internal information structures. It is conjectured that in response to the needs of these layers, perceptual and action subsystems also developed layers, and also that an ``alarm'' system which initially existed only within the reactive layer may have become increasingly sophisticated and extensive as its inputs and outputs were linked to the newer layers. Processes involving the meta-management layer in the architecture could explain the origin of the notion of ``qualia''. Processes involving the ``alarm'' mechanism and mechanisms concerned with resource limits in the second and third layers gives us an explanation of three main forms of emotion, helping to account for some of the ambiguities which have bedevilled the study of emotion. Further theoretical and practical benefits may come from further work based on this design-based approach to consciousness. A deeper longer term implication is the possibility of a new science investigating laws governing possible trajectories in design space and niche space, as these form parts of high order feedback loops in the biosphere.

Consider the chess game: When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario may evolve.

Free will (if any) may be lost because of fear and our dependence on others. In this paper, we develop cognitive models to support this argument. We do not describe what free will is but what free will is not. Our results indicate that moral responsibility is reversed and society is at fault. We argue that judgment (by society) is similar to pouring gasoline on fire, and forgiveness is the only way to regain free will if any.

Neuroeconomic conditions for “rational addiction” (Becker and Murphy, 1988) have been unknown. This paper derived the conditions for “rational addiction” by utilizing a nonlinear time-perception theory of “hyperbolic” discounting, which is mathematically equivalent to the q-exponential intertemporal choice model based on Tsallis' statistics. It is shown that (i) Arrow-Pratt measure for temporal cognition corresponds to the degree of irrationality (i.e., Prelec’s “decreasing impatience” parameter of temporal discounting) and (ii) rationality in addicts is controlled by a nondimensionalization parameter of the logarithmic time-perception function. Furthermore, the present theory illustrates the possibility that addictive drugs increase impulsivity via dopaminergic neuroadaptation without increasing irrationality. Future directions in the application of the model to studies in neuroeconomics are discussed.

In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we introduced some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements allow to define the general cognitive distortions as well as the specific cognitive distortions. This model is extended here to the description of two other classical cognitive distortions: over-generalisation and mislabelling. The definition of the two latter cognitive distortions is based on preliminary distinction between three levels of reasoning: primary, secondary and ternary pathogenic arguments. The latter analysis also leads to define two other cognitive distortions which insert themselves into this framework: ill-grounded inductive projection and confirmation bias.

In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we did present some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. The latter elements, based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, are applied here to generalised anxiety disorder. This allows to describe, on the one hand, the specific distortions related to generalised anxiety disorder, consistently with recent work emphasising the role played by uncertain situations with regard to future events. On the second hand, these elements allow to define one type of structured reasoning, of inductive nature, which contributes to the formation and maintenance of anxious ideas.

Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both – although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ‘computation’ and ‘information processing’ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In this paper, we address this unsatisfactory state of affairs by presenting a general and theory-neutral account of computation and information processing. We also apply our framework by analyzing the relations between computation and information processing on one hand and classicism and connectionism/computational neuroscience on the other. We defend the relevance to cognitive science of both computation, at least in a generic sense, and information processing, in three important senses of the term. Our account advances several foundational debates in cognitive science by untangling some of their conceptual knots in a theory-neutral way. By leveling the playing field, we pave the way for the future resolution of the debates’ empirical aspects.

In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we did present some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements led to distinguish between the general cognitive distortions (dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one pole, minimisation, maximisation) and the specific cognitive distortions (disqualifying the positive, selective abstraction, catastrophism). By also distinguishing between three levels of reasoning - the instantiation stage, the interpretation stage and the generalisation stage - we did also define two other cognitive distortions: over-generalisation and mislabelling (Théorie des distorsions cognitives : la sur-généralisation et l'étiquetage, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2009). We currently extend this model to another classical cognitive distortion: personalisation.

During the Indonesian president election process, the coalition of parties could be shown as the dominant process beside the president campaign. The coalition could be regarded as the emergence of the parties’ preferential coherence based upon the interest and attributes of each party. The similarity and difference of parties’ preference and attributes could be depicted through of party elites’ opinions and attitude toward flowered political issues. In this paper, we use the Heider’s balance theory to construct relation network among parties by using the longitudinal news data of the party elite’s opinion that published by the media, and then analyze the dynamic of coalition formation in the Indonesian political system during the election process. We have shown that the balance of the party’s relational network move toward the larger balance index relative to the initial condition. This phenomenon has verified the structural balance hypothesis especially for the conflict situation such as the election process. Interestingly, the balance of the system is fluctuated dynamically through time following certain trajectory. This dynamics is divided into 3 phases, that is, disorder state, conflict state, and order state, as well as signed the difference of party behavior before and after the legislative election. Moreover, we also analyzed the stability two parties’ relation in particular period in order to understand specifically the dynamic of the system in triadic level.

In this paper, I propose an accurate description of the cognitive process involved in the one-sidedness fallacy, a widespread type of fallacy. I describe first several characterizations of the one-sidedness fallacy, that are either inductive or deductive, or occurring at a meta-philosophical level. I recall, second, the framework of the cognitive distortions described in Franceschi (2007). I give then a definition of the one-sidedness fallacy, by describing it as a general cognitive distortion: the disqualification of one pole. I show finally how the one-sidedness fallacy distinguishes itself from the confirmation bias.

The paper introduces the idea that the human brain may apply complex mathematical modules in order to process and understand the world. We speculate that the substrate of what appears outwardly as intuition, or prophetic power, may be a mathematical apparatus such as time-delay embedding. In this context, predictive accuracy may be the reflection of an appropriate choice of the embedding parameters. We further put this in the perspective of mental illness, and search for the possible differences between good intuition and delusive ideation. We speculate that the task at which delusional schizophrenic patients falter is not necessarily of perception, but rather of model selection. Failure of the psychotic patient to correctly choose the embedding parameters may readily lead to misinterpretation of an accurate perception through an altered reconstructed of the object perceived.

Consider the chess game: When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario may evolve.

When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? Consider the chess game: how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario may evolve.

From the works of mathematical properties of songs, we construct the phylomemetic trees of Indonesian ethnic and traditional songs. The memeplexes are then reflected by the used notes and respective durations as they exhibit the Zipf-Mandelbrot law, the gyration coefficient, “spiraling effects”, and the dynamic entropy shown in the structure of the songs. The cladistic techniques yielding phylomemetic tree shows widespread innovations of the songs sampled in the observation. This is however reflects the cultural evolutionary models for the innovations involve generations of people within ethnic groups. The paper ends with open discussions and conjectures for more detailed discussions related to each traditional songs as well as the properties of Indonesian people that are attached to heterogeneous ethnic groups that are continually swarming songs and in general, other aesthetic audible artifacts.

According to theories of cultural neuroscience, Westerners and Easterners may have distinct styles of cognition (e.g., different allocation of attention). Previous research has shown that Westerners and Easterners tend to utilize analytical and holistic cognitive styles, respectively. On the other hand, little is known regarding the cultural differences in neuroeconomic behavior. For instance, economic decisions may be affected by cultural differences in neurocomputational processing underlying attention; however, this area of neuroeconomics has been largely understudied. In the present paper, we attempt to bridge this gap by considering the links between the theory of cultural neuroscience and neuroeconomic theory of the role of attention in intertemporal choice. We predict that (i) Westerners are more impulsive and inconsistent in intertemporal choice in comparison to Easterners, and (ii) Westerners more steeply discount delayed monetary losses than Easterners. We examine these predictions by utilizing a novel temporal discounting model based on Tsallis' statistics (i.e. a q-exponential model). Our preliminary analysis of temporal discounting of gains and losses by Americans and Japanese confirmed the predictions from the cultural neuroeconomic theory. Future study directions, employing computational modeling via neural networks, are briefly outlined and discussed.

Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models locate conscious phenomenology in the dynamic interaction of organisms with the external world, and in some versions, they reduce conscious phenomenology to such interactions, in the hope that this will resolve the hard problem of consciousness. The reflexive model accepts that experiences of the world result from dynamic organism-environment interactions, but argues that such interactions are preconscious. While the resulting phenomenal world is a consequence of such interactions, it cannot be reduced to them. The reflexive model is externalist in its claim that this external phenomenal world, which we normally think of as the “physical world,” is literally outside the brain. Furthermore, there are no added conscious experiences of the external world inside the brain. In the present paper I present the case for the enactive and reflexive alternatives to more classical views and evaluate their consequences. I argue that, in closing the gap between the phenomenal world and what we normally think of as the physical world, the reflexive model resolves one facet of the hard problem of consciousness. Conversely, while enactive models have useful things to say about percept formation and representation, they fail to address the hard problem of consciousness.

Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models locate conscious phenomenology in the dynamic interaction of organisms with the external world, and in some versions, they reduce conscious phenomenology to such interactions, in the hope that this will resolve the hard problem of consciousness. The reflexive model accepts that experiences of the world result from dynamic organism-environment interactions, but argues that such interactions are preconscious. While the resulting phenomenal world is a consequence of such interactions, it cannot be reduced to them. The reflexive model is externalist in its claim that this external phenomenal world, which we normally think of as the “physical world,” is literally outside the brain. Furthermore, there are no added conscious experiences of the external world inside the brain. In the present paper I present the case for the enactive and reflexive alternatives to more classical views and evaluate their consequences. I argue that, in closing the gap between the phenomenal world and what we normally think of as the physical world, the reflexive model resolves one facet of the hard problem of consciousness. Conversely, while enactive models have useful things to say about percept formation and representation, they fail to address the hard problem of consciousness.

Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be understood as prescientific attempts to make sense of brain functioning that can be entirely understood in third person terms. I trace the history of this position in behaviourism (Watson, Skinner and Ryle) and early forms of physicalism and functionalism (Armstrong), and summarise some of the difficulties of this view. Critical phenomenology also includes a conventional, third person, scientific investigation of brain and behaviour that includes subjects’ reports of what they experience. CP is also cautious about the accuracy or completeness of subjective reports. However, unlike HP, CP does not assume that subjects are necessarily deluded about their experiences or doubt that these experiences can have real qualities that can, in principle, be described. Such experienced qualities cannot be exhaustively reduced to third-person accounts of brain and behaviour. CP is also reflexive, in it assumes experimenters to have first-person experiences that they can describe much as their subjects do. And crucially, experimenter’s third-person reports of others are based, in the first instance, on their own first-person experiences. CP is commonplace in psychological science, and given that it conforms both to scientific practice and common sense, I argue that there is little to recommend HP other than an attempt to shore up a counterintuitive, reductive philosophy of mind.

In this paper, we describe several factors that can contribute, from the patient's viewpoint, to the plausibility of psychotic complex hallucinations. We sketch then a Plausibility of Hallucinations Scale, consisting of a 25-item questionnaire, which aims at evaluating the degree of plausibility of hallucinations. We also emphasize the utility of pointing out to the patient the various factors that contribute to the plausibility of his/her hallucinations, in the context of cognitive therapy for schizophrenia.

Intention awareness is a necessary condition for collective structures to cooperate. This short paper explains the concept of intention awareness, both internal and external. It highlights the importance of adopting a view of intention as an emergent as well as for system design.

Quantitative analysis of the events of synchronous references in the research papers followed throughout the publishing career of an individual scientist revealed interesting highlights on the knowledge-generating-system. In the case study of Homi Jehangir Bhabha first quinquennium and fifth quinquennium of his research career had low Self-references; third quinquennium and fourth quinquennium had moderate Self-references; whereas second quinquennium had highest Self-references. The two major clusters of Self-references occurring during the second and third quinquennium were indicators of active periods of knowledgegenerating and faster communications.

This paper employs two experimental datasets to assess along what dimensions agents evaluate whether two 2x2 or 3x3 games are similar. The Euclidean distance between the payoffs, the absolute difference in game harmony and the difference in mean and standard deviation between the games are all significant components of the estimated similarity function, and so is whether the two games have zero, unique or multiple pure Nash equilibria. However, our explanatory power is limited: substantial extra information can be gathered by collecting similarity evaluation data rather than relying just on our observable proxies.

The capacity to attribute beliefs to others in order to understand action is one of the mainstays of human cognition. Yet it is debatable whether children attribute beliefs in the same way to all agents. In this paper, we present the results of a false-belief task concerning humans and God run with a sample of Maya children aged 4 to 7, and place them in the context of several psychological theories of cognitive development. Children were found to attribute beliefs in different ways to humans and God. The evidence also speaks to the debate concerning the universality and uniformity of the development of folk-psychological reasoning.

Human cognition is unique in the way in which it relies on combinatorial (or compositional) structures. Language provides ample evidence for the existence of combinatorial structures, but they can also be found in visual cognition. To understand the neural basis of human cognition, it is therefore essential to understand how combinatorial structures can be instantiated in neural terms. In his recent book on the foundations of language, Jackendoff described four fundamental problems for a neural instantiation of combinatorial structures: the massiveness of the binding problem, the problem of 2, the problem of variables and the transformation of combinatorial structures from working memory to long-term memory. This paper aims to show that these problems can be solved by means of neural ‘blackboard’ architectures. For this purpose, a neural blackboard architecture for sentence structure is presented. In this architecture, neural structures that encode for words are temporarily bound in a manner that preserves the structure of the sentence. It is shown that the architecture solves the four problems presented by Jackendoff. The ability of the architecture to instantiate sentence structures is illustrated with examples of sentence complexity observed in human language performance. Similarities exist between the architecture for sentence structure and blackboard architectures for combinatorial structures in visual cognition, derived from the structure of the visual cortex. These architectures are briefly discussed, together with an example of a combinatorial structure in which the blackboard architectures for language and vision are combined. In this way, the architecture for language is grounded in perception.

Electronic journal (e-journal) publishing has started to change the ways we think about publish-ing. However, many scholars and scientists in the mind and brain sciences are still ignorant of the new possibilities and on-going debates. This paper will provide a summary of the issues in-volved, give an update of the current discussion, and supply practical information on issues re-lated to e- journal publishing and self-archiving relevant for the mind and brain sciences. Issues such as differences between traditional and e-journal publishing, open archive initiatives, world-wide conventions, quality control, costs involved in e-journal publishing, and copyright questions will be addressed. Practical hints on how to self-archive, how to submit to the e-journal Psycolo-quy, how to create an open research archive, and where to find information relevant to e-publishing will be supplied.

It is argued that due to the complexity of most economic phenomena, the chances of deriving correct models from a priori principles are small. Instead are more descriptive approach to modelling should be pursued. Agent-based modelling is characterised as a step in this direction. However many agent-based models use off-the-shelf algorithms from computer science without regard to their descriptive accuracy. This paper attempts an agent model that describes the behaviour of subjects reported by Joep Sonnemans as accurately as possible. It takes a structure that is compatible with current thinking cognitive science and explores the nature of the agent processes that then match the behaviour of the subjects. This suggests further modelling improvements and experiments.

The schemes for compositional distributed representations include those allowing on-the-fly construction of fixed dimensionality codevectors to encode structures of various complexity. Similarity of such codevectors takes into account both structural and semantic similarity of represented structures. In this paper we provide a comparative description of sparse binary distributed representation developed in the frames of the Associative-Projective Neural Network architecture and more well-known Holographic Reduced Representations of Plate and Binary Spatter Codes of Kanerva. The key procedure in Associative-Projective Neural Networks is Context-Dependent Thinning which binds codevectors and maintains their sparseness. The codevectors are stored in structured memory array which can be realized as distributed auto-associative memory. Examples of distributed representation of structured data are given. Fast estimation of similarity of analogical episodes by the overlap of their codevectors is used in modeling of analogical reasoning for retrieval of analogs from memory and for analogical mapping.

Though Einstein and other physicists recognized the importance of an observer being at rest in an inertial reference frame for the special theory of relativity, the supporting psychological structures were not discussed much by physicists. On the other hand, Rock wrote of the factors involved in the perception of motion, including one’s own motion. Rock thus came to discuss issues of significance to relativity theory, apparently without any significant understanding of how his theory might be related to relativity theory. In this paper, connections between Rock’s theory on the perception of one’s own motion, as well as empirical work supporting it, and relativity theory are explored.

PET and fMRI are relatively new techniques, which allows imaging of the brain without disturbing it, and they are important tools in clinical treatment and investigation. They are also used for cognitive investigation, by which I mean investigation the working of the healthy brain (Frackowiak et al, 1997). Naturally, the main focus of investigation is the cerebral cortex. In this paper, I survey the recent literature for evidence about the replicability of these studies. The survey covers 125 primary research articles, taken from 21 different journals during the first 10 months of 1997. The main findings are: 1.The data about replicability in cognitive imaging is extremely sparse. 2.The sparse data that does exists is mostly negative, i.e. points to irreplicability. These findings suggest that there is a problem with replicability in cognitive imaging, and an effort is required to resolve it.

This paper is about how to give human-like powers to complete agents. For this the most important design choice concerns the overall architecture. Questions regarding detailed mechanisms, forms of representations, inference capabilities, knowledge etc. are best addressed in the context of a global architecture in which different design decisions need to be linked. Such a design would assemble various kinds of functionality into a complete coherent working system, in which there are many concurrent, partly independent, partly mutually supportive, partly potentially incompatible processes, addressing a multitude of issues on different time scales, including asynchronous, concurrent, motive generators. Designing human like agents is part of the more general problem of understanding design space, niche space and their interrelations, for, in the abstract, there is no one optimal design, as biological diversity on earth shows.

Analogical inference depends on systematic substitution of the components of compositional structures. Simple systematic substitution has been achieved in a number of connectionist systems that support binding (the ability to create connectionist representations of the combination of component representations). These systems have used various implementations of two generic composition operators: bind() and bundle(). This paper introduces a novel implementation of the bind() operator that is simple, can be efficiently implemented, and highlights the relationship between retrieval queries and analogical mapping. A frame of role/filler bindings can easily be represented using bind() and bundle(). However, typical binding systems are unable to adequately represent multiple frames and arbitrary nested compositional structures. A novel family of representational operators (called braid()) is introduced to address these problems. Other binding systems make the strong assumption that the roles and fillers are disjoint in order to avoid ambiguities inherent in their representational idioms. The braid() operator can be used to avoid this assumption. The new representational idiom suggests how the cognitive processes of bottom-up and top-down object recognition might be implemented. These processes depend on analogical mapping to integrate disjoint representations and drive perceptual search.

Objections to functional explanations of awareness assert that although functional systems may be adequate to explain behavior, including verbal behavior consisting of assertions of awareness by an individual, they cannot provide for the existence of phenomenal awareness. In this paper, a theory of awareness is proposed that counters this assertion by incorporating two advances: (1) a formal definition of representation, expressed in a functional notation: Newell's Representation Law, and 2) the introduction of real time into the analysis of awareness. This leads to the definition of phenomenal awareness as existing whenever an object contains an autonomously updated configuration satisfying the Representation Law with respect to some aspects of its environment. The relational aspect of the Representation Law permits the development of multiple levels of awareness, which provides for the existence of illusions and hallucinations, and permits the identification of a new measure, accuracy of awareness . The relational perspective also permits the incorporation of referential concepts into the framework. Qualia can then be identified with referentially opaque elements of awareness. The functional form of the Representation Law is linked to neurophysiology and the underlying phenomena of chemistry and physics by phenomena involving activity-dependent connectivity.

My description of the cognitive processes involved in the discovery, development, and acceptance of the bacterial theory of ulcers might have left the impression that science is all in the mind (Thagard, forthcoming-b). But only part of the story of the bacterial theory of ulcers is psychological. This paper discusses the important role of physical interaction with the world by means of instruments and experiments, and the equally important role of social interactions among the medical researchers who developed the theory. The main questions I want to answer are the following: 1. What instruments contributed to the development and acceptance of the new theory? 2. What kinds of experiments contributed to the development and acceptance of the new theory? 3. How did theorizing and experimentation interact in the development of new experiments and hypotheses? 4. How did social processes such as collaboration, communication, and consensus contribute to the development and widespread acceptance of the bacterial theory of ulcers? I conclude with a sketch of science as a complex system of interacting psychological, physical, and social processes.

Visual categorization, or making sense of novel shapes and shape classes, is a computationally challenging and behaviorally important task, which is not widely addressed in computer vision or visual psychophysics (where the stress is rather on the generalization of recognition across changes of viewpoint). This paper examines the categorization abilities of four current approaches to object representation: structural descriptions, geometric models, multidimensional feature spaces, and similarities to reference shapes. It is proposed that a scheme combining features of all four approaches is a promising candidate for a comprehensive and computationally feasible theory of categorization

Internet technologies, including electronic mail, preprint archives, and the World Wide Web, are now ubiquitous parts of scientific practice. After reviewing the full range of these technologies and sketching the history of their development, this paper provides an epistemological appraisal of their contributions to scientific research. It uses Alvin Goldman's epistemic criteria of reliability, power, fecundity, speed and efficiency to evaluate the largely positive impact of Internet technologies on the development of scientific knowledge.

Many of the lower-level areas in the mammalian visual system are organized retinotopically, that is, as maps which preserve to a certain degree the topography of the retina. A unit that is a part of such a retinotopic map normally responds selectively to stimulation in a well-delimited part of the visual field, referred to as its receptive field (RF). Receptive fields are probably the most prominent and ubiquitous computational mechanism employed by biological information processing systems. This paper surveys some of the possible computational reasons behind the ubiquity of RFs, by discussing examples of RF-based solutions to problems in vision, from spatial acuity, through sensory coding, to object recognition.

Nonmetric multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a family of algorithms that allow one to derive a quantitative representation of data from a set of qualitative measurements which must satisfy certain simple constraints. As a tool for vision, MDS combines the advantages of both qualitative and classical approaches, by relying, on the one hand, on an ordinal-scale input representation, and by supporting, on the other hand, the extraction of metric information. The present paper illustrates an application of MDS to the recovery of depth from the rank order of binocular disparity differences for a set of points. Our results indicate that multidimensional scaling constitutes a promising approach to the integration of biological and computational insights into the problem of depth perception.

This article considers the role of mental time travel in human evolution. A central thesis is that other primates, although having memory and expectation, do not possess the same ability to live in the past or in the future. The first half of this paper argues that reconstructive access to the past (i.e. episodic memory) is dependent on other advanced cognitive capabilities (e.g. self-awareness and meta-representation) and focuses on the results of recent `theory of mind' research in order to evaluate the thesis. Mental simulation is the proposed underlying mechanism for the development of both mindreading and mental time travel. The second half contrasts flexible awareness of possible futures with other forms of `anticipatory behaviour' and reviews evidence about how far other primates may think ahead. The phylogenetic history of mental time travel and its adaptive and exaptive relationships to other features are discussed. Mental access to the fourth dimension is essential for many of the distinctive characteristics of our species. Appendix A: presents the results of a survey on animal foresight Appendix B: outlines an experimental paradigm for the investigation of future-need anticipation

MEMORY OPERATES VIA SEVERAL COMPONENTS. THE MISCONCEPTION THAT MEMORY IS A UNITARY PROCESS HAS BEEN LONG HELD BY MANY NEUROPHYSIOLOGISTS AS WELL AS PSYCHOLOGISTS FOR YEARS NOW. HOWEVER, MEMORY IS MOST LIKELY THE CONSEQUENCE OF THREE SPECIFIC COMPONENTS: 1) DISTRIBUTED CONNECTIONIST SYSTEM, 2) NEUROLOGICAL, AND 3) THREE DIMENSIONAL HOLOGRAPHY. THE MAIN AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO PROPOSE THAT MEMORY IS PURELY A COMBINATION OF CEREBROCENTRIC FUNCTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA.