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In Islamic Republic of Iran, femininity encounters a distinct conflict with the prevailing political system discourse. The rise of political Islam after the Islamic revolution has resulted in extensive limitations on women’s rights and the institutionalized suppression of their freedoms. In light of the constraints imposed by the I.R, social media platforms, particularly Twitter, have become vital spaces for accessing valuable information pertaining to competing political discourses, specifically those concerning women-related issues. This study examines the frequency and nature of women-related indicators generated by the opposition movement on Twitter from early 2020 to early 2022. The findings indicate that, relative to other groups, subversive oppositions place a stronger emphasis on women’s demands. Drawing inspiration from feminist discourse and advocating for the elimination of political Islam, subversives argue that women’s demands cannot be met without overthrowing the Islamic Republic. They focus on topics such as women’s rights violations and the individual’s right to choose whether or not to wear the hijab, thereby posing significant challenges to the I.R. These challenges were further intensified by the death of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, who died while in the custody of morality police, leading to widespread public demonstrations in the summer and fall of 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces Islamic apocalyptic jurisprudence (theories of final law that will govern humanity in the End Times) to academic study. Section 1 considers why the topic has remained unexamined and suggests a basic taxonomy. Section 2 exposes the apocalyptic jurisprudence of two case studies, representing the "reversionist" and "progressivist" poles of Sunni discourses: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ("ISIS"), and Dāwūd and his "Awaited Mahdī" movement in Egypt. Section 3 considers two further case studies, representing the "revanchist" and "idealist" orientations in Shi'i discourses: the Islamic Republic of Iran, and al-Ṣadr, a theorist of the Iraqi Ṣadrist movement. Throughout, the following aspects of the final legal system are considered: sources of law; conflicts between Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and international laws; the jurist's role; changes to classical Islamic legal theory, including qiyas and ijtihad; the legitimacy of legal schools; and new positive laws, policies, and rules of evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article charts changes in the views towards popular culture of the most prominent Turkish-Islamist movement that operated in the late twentieth century, the Millî Görüş ('The National Outlook'), a movement that altered Turkey's history and brought up its current Islamist leader – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Through a unique and intensive analysis of Millî Görüş texts and documents, the article follows significant changes in Millî Görüş discourse regarding three forms of popular culture – cinema, television, and spectator sports – from the 1970s – when these forms of popular culture were warned against – to the 1990s – when the movement recommended engaging with such culture. This article argues that these changes reflect a greater change in the movement's views on how Muslims should live their lives. Lastly, the paper suggests these changes may have occurred due to three main reasons: (1) deciding strategically to not resist the growing availability and appeal of popular culture; (2) the movement's wish to win the Turkish elections, which required them to appeal also to less pious Turks, and (3) the gradual appearance of alternative, 'Islamic' popular culture in Turkey – one which the Millî Görüş felt comfortable to promote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of Tunisian ‘moderation’ as an essential constituent part of national identity has been historically used by autocratic governments as an instrument of securitization, investing the state with the unique authority to suppress movements – in practice, usually the Islamist opposition – deemed antithetical to this identity and thus threatening to the nation and its people. This paper explores how, after the Arab Uprisings in 2010–2011, diverse groups of Islamists responded to pre-existing discourses of Tunisian national identity as moderate. After the revolution, Tunisian Islamists and Salafis initially both contested the assumptions behind pre-revolutionary conceptualizations of national identity that had previously excluded them from the boundaries of normative citizenship by reframing the nature of the threat or attempting to redefine and expand the nature of moderation. Both groups encountered different outcomes in their attempts to recalibrate the notions of identity, religion and the state. These divergences can be traced to their differing ideologies, political situations and incentives. Nevertheless, the fact that each group engaged with – rather than dismissed – this discourse suggests the centrality of the state-moderation-security nexus in structuring past and present conceptualizations of Tunisian moderation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime came to power in Sudan in1989, the international community was alarmed. Among other things, the treatment of Sudan's minorities was a chief concern. For instance, in his ten-hour visit to Sudan in 1993, Pope John Paul II warned against imposing Islamic law on the country's large Christian population. The concerns about the NIF regime's treatment of minorities were due to its ideological background, since particular interpretations of Islamic law discriminate against minorities. The paper examines the regime's policies toward the largest ethnic minorities in Sudan. It illustrates that the regime's treatment of minorities lacked coherence toward both Christian and Muslim ethnic groups. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the regime's minority policies were the result of shifts in alliances that followed internal divisions within the regime. As the Islamist leadership fractured, the ruling faction sought to coopt new allies, including ethnic groups, to strengthen its position in the face of relentless opposition from ousted Islamists. The paper draws on material collected through fieldwork as well as secondary sources to make its claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic backsliding in many world regions has prompted scholars to study how democracies can resist and push back against autocratization, and many accounts suggest that a unified, pluralist opposition is key to mobilize voters against democratic backsliding. However, pluralist ideology is not necessarily associated with higher awareness of and opposition to backsliding, as evaluations of democratic erosions are highly contingent on political context. We illustrate this point with the case of Indonesia, a country where a pluralist government coalition has deepened democratic erosion by harshly repressing an anti-pluralist Islamist opposition. Using data from a national survey, we document that Islamist Indonesians are systematically more likely than pluralist individuals to believe that democracy has worsened: Resistance to democratic erosion is thus concentrated in the most ideologically illiberal citizens. Rethinking the pluralist/anti-pluralist dichotomy has implications for how we conceptualize democratic backsliding and assess democratic resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The secularizing reforms of the republican elites in modern Turkey encountered Islamic resistance orchestrated by Naqshbandīs, who were declared enemies of the regime, repressed, and banned. The literature on how Turkish Islamists and the Naqshbandiyya have responded to republicans predominantly deals with either how they withdrew into a sort of diaspora or how they submitted and/or adapted to the republican regime. The consensus has been that Naqshbandīs played a role in inhibiting the infiltration of radical Islamic ideologies in modern Turkey. However, there is a lacuna in the literature on the Naqshbandī diaspora outside Turkey and its cooperation with transnational Islamic movements in building networks of resistance to secularism. Addressing this gap, this paper argues that some Naqshbandīs evaded republican surveillance and bans by creating an Egypt-based diasporic community, developing an Islamic cadre intended to eventually re-Islamize the Turkish state, its politics and society. Based on the memoirs and biographies of the prominent figures of the diaspora in Cairo, the study uncovers the connection between the Naqshbandiyya and other Islamic transnational movements, principally the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, at the ideological and institutional levels from the 1920s to the 1980s, to show how this cadre emerged and subsequently shaped the character of Islamism in modern Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the idea of political Islam as a discursive tradition within the context of Iranian Kurdistan. It challenges the prevailing essentialist and universalist approaches commonly used in the analysis of political Islam, advocating for a more adaptable and comprehensive interpretation. By conceptualizing political Islam as a discursive tradition, this study sheds light on the complex interconnections, configurations, and historical contingencies influencing Islamist discourses and movements. The paper argues that political Islam should be examined in relation to other phenomena and discourses, acknowledging its dynamic nature within specific temporal and spatial contexts. Focusing on an influential yet underexplored Islamist discursive tradition in Iranian Kurdistan during the 1970s and 1980s, the research acknowledges the hybrid nature of Islamist discourses, drawing from diverse traditions to fulfill particular objectives. In particular, it explores the perspectives of Ahmad Moftizadeh, a Sunni Kurdish Islamist and the founder of the Maktab Quran (MQ). This study investigates Moftizadeh's views on the Islamic government, positioning it within the framework of discursive tradition. It analyzes his core categories and inquiries within Islamist thought, notably emphasizing Moftizadeh's alignment of the Islamic government with the Islamic tradition of the Shura, highlighting its central role in the Islamist discursive tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the ideas of the most prominent Turkish-Islamist movement which operated in the late twentieth century, Millî Görüş ('The National Outlook'). The research focuses on the evolution of their view on Muslim migration to 'the West' (focusing on Germany as a case study). The article demonstrates a substantive change in the movement's discourse on the subject. During the early 1970s, prominent Turkish Islamist politicians and intellectuals warned Turks against migrating to Germany. They warned of migrating to a morally corrupt country, filled with 'Western' values which are alien to Islam, a country in which Turks will neither make a good living, nor manage to hold on to an Islamic lifestyle. Two decades later, during the 1990s, Turkish migration to Germany was presented by the Millî Görüş as a model of Islamic life, Germany was portrayed as an example of a country which allows Muslims religious freedoms they can only dream of in Turkey, and migrants were shown as exemplary Muslims. This article suggests a few causes for the Millî Görüş movement's discursive change on Turkish migration to Germany, from initially seeing it as a liability, but – eventually – as an asset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sets out to address the root of religious-based intolerance cases in Indonesia arising out of particular groups of Muslims in Indonesia. It seeks to identify which group triggers those cases and offers a possible response for Indonesian Christians faced with this confronting reality. The case is made for a non-violent response that opens up the possibility of reconciliation with those whose political stance is opposed to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The disbandment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in 2017 marked a significant shift in the dynamics of Islamist movements within Indonesia's political landscape. Although officially banned, the HTI continued to operate in the shadows, employing various camouflage methods. This article analyzes how political dynamics led HTI to its outlawed status and how it adapted in pursuit of its goals amidst the challenges faced. By adopting a political opportunity structure and Islamist ideology as the theoretical framework with the case study as the method, this study scrutinizes HTI's postdisbandment endeavors at the national level and delves deeper into cases in West Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java. The primary findings of this study reveal that the disbandment of HTI reflected the peak of incongruence between the antisystem ideology they embraced and Indonesia's political structure. HTI's ideological drive to exploit electoral events in 2016-2017 eventually put them at a threshold that the ruling authority perceives as a severe threat. HTI struggled to maintain its movement, mixing overt and covert operations, and facing significant pressures and constraints. Its strength is rooted in an Islamist ideology that integrates political and religious beliefs, supported by a disciplined structure. This resilience, seen as adaptive resistance, leverages tactical ingenuity and militancy in response to external pressures and the socio-cultural context in which they operate. Nevertheless, the disbandment has rendered it nearly impossible for HTI to reestablish its expansion in Indonesia's political arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Outlook Movement (Millî Görüş), a prominent Turkish-Islamist movement which previously held strong anti-Western views, moderated its views towards the West in the 1990s. With an examination of Millî Görüş documents from 1973 to 1995, this study sheds light on the dynamics of this shift in view and argues that one aspect of this ‘tilt’ towards the West was the geopolitical realities – mainly the collapse of the USSR and the rise of US hegemony. While the current literature on the moderation of other similar Islamist movements around the world throughout the 1990s largely cites internal and national level explanations for moderation and leaves out the geopolitical argument made here, the case of the National Outlook suggests that geopolitical influences can also play an important role and further research is needed on other Islamist movements to understand the effects of the changing geopolitical context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few decades, interest in and conversion to Islam among non-Muslims in the West has been on the rise. There is a view in the scholarly literature that Western converts to Islam are overrepresented in regard to politicized interpretations of the religion, commonly referred to as political Islam or Islamism, and even militancy or jihadism. This article presents the findings of a national survey of Muslim Australians. It focuses on views amongst Australian converts to Islam concerning political Islam, including views and understandings of such concepts as the caliphate, shariah, and jihad, and the relationship between Islam and politics, democracy, and conflict. The findings suggest that in the Australian context, converts to Islam are not more likely, and in some cases less likely, than the broader born-Muslim population, to understand and interpret Islam in accordance with political Islamist ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the influence of the renowned Indo-Pakistani thinker and activist Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) on the political thought of two contemporary Arab Islamist thinkers: Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). In his extensive discourse on politics, Mawdudi resurrected and popularized two intersecting notions: the Islamic state and God's sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah, or hakimiyya). Borrowing these two pivotal Islamist notions from Mawdudi, Qaradawi and Qutb utilized them to construct contending perspectives on politics and society in majority-Muslim states. The article argues that the divergent views of Qaradawi and Qutb can be attributed, at least in part, to the fluidity of Mawdudi's notions of the Islamic state and hakimiyya, and their pliability to different interpretations. This fluidity helps explain the different stances of Qaradawi and Qutb on whether, or not, hakimiyya is compatible with popular sovereignty and democracy. Furthermore, the article underscores the cross-fertilization of ideas between the Arab and non-Arab (in this case South Asian) parts of the Islamic World. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the idea of ustāḏiyyat al-ʿālam (mastership of the world), in the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Ustāḏiyyat al-ʿālam was formulated by the movements' founder, Ḥasan al-Bannā, as the ultimate goal of the MB, the last of a gradual seven-stage plan to Islamize the individual, the family, society, the government, and the state, and restore the caliphate. In an attempt to unpack this abstract concept, this article offers a contextualized reading of its use in the foundational tracts of the MB general guides, and in pertinent commentaries on some of these tracts. We point to an inherent ambiguity in the concept, which intertwines ideational and active elements of domination, ranging between the homiletical task of propagating Islam to the world and striving to rule the world. Within the MB, ustāḏiyyat al-ʿālam is found to serve alternately as a privileged status of the Islamic nation, a duty, a mechanism of power legitimation, and as a source of motivation in times of despair, while utilized in anti-MB campaigns to discredit the MB and curb its internationalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the contribution of modern Muslim revivalism to Muslims' political decolonization, and the paradoxical role the West plays in that process. On the one hand, revivalism rejects the founding principles of liberal political theory, and on the other hand, it readily adopts the salient structures and mechanisms of the modern polity with a view to Islamize them, all the while insisting on the Muslims' need to de-Westernize. Toward revealing the hitherto neglected dimensions of revivalism, my analysis adopts an unconventional route by subjecting revivalism to a semiotic analysis in conversation with the archetypal theories of Mircea Eliade and Carl G. Jung. The analysis unveils the universal psychological structures of revival, and their specific Muslim symbolization. I conclude (a) that depth psychology makes modern Muslim revival inevitable, which will only grow stronger and gain wider appeal while the Muslims continue to suffer decline; (b) that among the different forms of Muslim revival, revivalism ventures the farthest in decolonizing Muslim political imagination; (c) that the revivalist imagination makes their espoused caliphate imperative for the purpose of ritual participation in Islam's sacred origins; and (d) that a critical reconstruction and evolution of revivalism holds out the promise of a greater contribution to Muslim decolonization. For my analysis, I largely turn to the Pakistani political theologian Israr Ahmad (d. 2010), whose ideas have been disseminated widely across the Muslim world, yet who has not received the requisite academic scrutiny. Moreover, intra-revivalist critique of revivalism has been a neglected aspect in the study of revival, and its careful scrutiny should become a topic of investigation in its own right. In that regard, Ahmad offers a most important critique of earlier revival efforts and their entanglement with certain aspects of coloniality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the emergence of a discourse on 'political Islam' in the policy circles of European elites. It interprets this discourse on one hand as a manifestation of the further criminalization of Muslimness emanating from programs of countering 'extremism' and deradicalizing Muslim youth in the wake of the global war on terror. More specifically, the discourse on 'political Islam' is seen as an extension of countering violent extremism projects to counter an alleged non-violent 'extremism.' The article discusses three cases: Austria, Germany, and France to analyze what the fight against 'political Islam' (in Austria), 'legalistic Islamism' (in Germany), and 'Islamist separatism' (in France) respectively mean. These terminologies are analyzed as 'empty signifiers' and (Foucauldian) dispositifs that are used deliberately to legitimize state interventions to shape their respective societies. It is argued that the main shared idea is not that Muslims break the law or commit violence. Rather, the argument is that Muslims use the law to subvert their European nation-states. This aims at excluding Muslims from political life and not allowing them to shape the future of these countries. A simultaneous effort is the nurturing of an unpolitical, submissive Muslim that does not question hegemonial power structures, a project which is pursued by creating a domesticated or 'national Islam.' The article discusses these three terminologies' similarities and differences in the respective countries. In sum, the apparatus of 'political Islam' is interpreted as a means to 1) push back or exclude Muslims from the public sphere; 2) crackdown on organized Muslims; and 3) silence critical voices to these policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil religion encompasses the implicit religious values of a nation manifested through public rituals, symbols, and ceremonies at significant locations and on special occasions. The emergence of new religious symbolisms reflects the evolving structure of religious authority. The Islamic Foundation Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland (ISN)), the largest mosque umbrella organization in the Netherlands, holds significant influence in shaping the religious beliefs and ethical standards of the Turkish–Dutch Muslim community. Furthermore, the ISN possesses the ability to construct and authenticate discourses that redefine the conceptualization of the 'self' and the 'other.' In early 2017, following increased criticism of sermons written by the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA/Diyanet) in the Netherlands, the ISN, as the Dutch branch of Diyanet, started composing its own Friday sermons in both Turkish and Dutch. This article aims to examine the discursive features of the Friday sermons delivered between 1 January 2017 and 1 January 2023 and explore their connection to civil religion. The study employs Fairclough's three-dimensional critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework and Wodak's discourse–historical approach (DHA) to analyze the Friday sermons. The findings reveal that the civil religious discourses advanced by the ISN possess both unifying and divisive potential. However, the collected empirical evidence suggests that state-sponsored civil religion, emphasizing Turkish nationalism and Islamism, dominates the liberal and pluralistic form of civil religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exploration of the quiddity of political Islam and the diverse range of categories and terms associated with it has emerged as a prominent research agenda within the social and political sciences. The application of these terms to a wide array of heterogeneous phenomena and currents among Muslim populations worldwide, coupled with the utilization of multiple theoretical approaches to define and formulate them within the realm of social studies, has posed significant challenges to their usage. The inherent ambiguity and lack of determinacy surrounding the dominant categories and definitions prevalent in the study of political Islam have led to a decline in their explanatory capacity, giving rise to a host of theoretical, methodological, normative, and political dilemmas and predicaments. This problematic state, compounded by the extensive body of research in the field of political Islam, necessitates an epistemological interrogation into the prevailing categories and definitions within this scholarly domain. Through a critical examination of prevailing definitions within the field, particularly in relation to the idea of foundation, the present article draws on the post-foundationalist approach to propose a distinctive conceptual apparatus for understanding and interpreting the phenomena categorized under political Islam. By juxtaposing the notions of discursive tradition and social configuration, the article endeavors to construct a nuanced understanding of political Islam that not only incorporates and comprehends the singular characteristics of the objects of inquiry but also encompasses varying levels of universality in elucidating the social phenomena observed among Muslims and in the Islamic world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While research on geographies of creativity have proliferated in the last few years, there has been scant attention to religious cultural and artistic practices, particularly in the context of the Middle East. This research seeks to address such gap with a focus on the Islamic and traditional visual arts scene which has flourished in Istanbul in the past decade and a half along with the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Rendered obsolete through the Western-oriented and secular cultural politics since the early republican era, art forms such as Arabic calligraphy (hat), miniature (minyatür), and illumination (tezhip) have now found currency as 'authentically Turkish and Islamic' in an art scene that emerged alongside Islamist politics. This paper examines the trajectory of Islamic and traditional visual arts through the lens of cultural and creative industries starting from the cultural politics of Islamic urban governance through the 1990s and 2000s, and to the emergence of an Islamist-nationalist authoritarianism in the past decade. In doing so, it aims to situate Islamic and traditional visual arts on the map in studies on geographies of creativity, particularly in the Middle Eastern and Islamic context, where limited attention has been paid to cultural and artistic practices. With ethnographic reflections from the field, it highlights the internal dynamics of an art scene and the potential it bears in unsettling the core concepts of Turkish Islamic nationalism from within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article gives an historical and analytical account of post-1967 Islamist intellectual production in the Arab-Muslim world and the ways it shaped political ideology in the region. By discussing Islamist approaches and debates with regards to the "secular" and secularism in the Arab-Muslim world the paper tries to answer mainly two research questions: what the perceptions over secularism were after the 1967 Naksa, and how intellectual transformations were applied on political identities, ideologies and strategies by some Islamist parties, occasionally leading to cross-ideological synergies. Using conceptual history, we divide post-1967 into two broad periods, while we argue that Islamist thought copiously appropriated notions of the secular with, however, many limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inheritance rights in Bangladesh are a highly contested issue. These are interpreted differently in the two major religions in Bangladesh, Islam and Hinduism. Using the concepts of 'legal pluralism' and 'feminist institutionalism', we aim to understand different contestations and debates and the multiplicity of practices in these religions on this issue. Such contestation challenges the formulation of gender-equal inheritance policies in Bangladesh. In this article, we identify the major actors involved in policy formulation and investigate the key factors and events that led the state to formulate such policy and, later, to withdraw it. Based on a qualitative case-study method, we observe that gender-equal inheritance rights provision depends on multiple political factors and events. On the one hand, the international mandate of ensuring gender equality coupled with local and international donors' support influenced the formulation of equal inheritance rights provision in the National Women's Development Policy (NWDP). On the other hand, opposition from Islamic fundamentalist parties created tension in formulating such policy and, in the face of violent opposition, the government feared being framed as 'anti-Islamic' and withdrew the equal inheritance rights policy in Bangladesh in the policy formulation stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 15th Malaysian General Elections (GE15), the first since the Covid pandemic lockdown, were supposed to bring back political stability, after three different prime ministers since 2018. The results were inconclusive with no single coalition winning the bare minimum to form a government. The King then asked Anwar Ibrahim to form a new government. The biggest surprise was the rise of Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), which became the single largest party in Parliament. Another surprise was UMNO supporting Anwar to be prime minister. The role played by the King and the Malay rulers raised questions about the state of constitutional monarchy in Malaysia. PAS's victory will have a profound impact on Malaysia's reputation as a moderate Islamic country and will accelerate the trend towards Islamic identity politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tracing back political Islam to the French Campaign that invaded Egypt in 1798, the article argues that political Islam emerged and developed from within the folds of the modern nation state in Egypt. The article conceptualizes three historical phases: from 1805 to 1849, 1849 to 1879, and 1879 to the mid-1920s. Each of these phases is centered around a common theme that characterized the discourses, knowledge, and structures of politics, the economy and "Islam", as they encountered the West, which are, in order, technology, civilization, and ideology. The works of Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār will be explored as an example of the first phase, and the works of Rifāʿah al-Ṭahṭāwī will be the example of the second phase, where Islam, as it encounters politics, becomes the foundation of state nationalism. The third phase will start with a transitional period of undifferentiated discourses, but will quickly, after the British occupation in 1882, differentiate into three political Islams: liberal, represented by Muḥammad ʿAbduh and al-Ummah Party; official, represented by ʿAlī Yūsuf and the Reform on the Constitutional Principles Party; and extra-state, radical Islamism, represented by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Jāwiš, and the Nationalist Party. The article will explain the national and international political and economic contexts that surrounded and participated in the formations of political Islam in all its varieties. Against the popular academic conviction of rooting Ḥasan al-Bannā's thought in Muḥammad ʿAbduh's work, and rooting ʿAbduh in Jamāl al-Afghānī's movement, this article will explain the rupture and contradictions between Afghānī and ʿAbduh, on the one hand, and the rooting of al-Bannā's ideology in ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Jāwīš's thought, on the other hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, Sufis, jurists, philosophers, and theologians, are known as different schools of Islamic thought, each of which has its own approach to Islamic education. However, from the 19th century onwards, another powerful approach emerged: political Islam, which also had a different conception of Islamic education. The present study tries to explain how the political conception of Islamic education was formulated in this approach. To achieve this goal, al-Afghani's ideas have been examined. Al-Afghani was one of the first Islamic theologians who formulated modern political Islam and called for accepting modern values because of their consonance with Islamic values. This article, interprets Al-Afghānī's political theology as an emancipatory proclamation that aimed at the liberation of Muslims. His emancipatory attitude concentrated on the cultural reform; and the education of the nation was the core of this cultural reform. He believed that a general education system must be established that all people enjoy from childhood; and the core of the curriculum of this education should be based on political education with the theme of the greatness of the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on empirical research, this article analyzes "the specialization" of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development and the internal tensions between its political and religious vocations. The latter is one of the Islamist parties with the longest political experience in the Maghreb area which started its "professionalization" in politics at an early stage, at least since 1997–1998. However, little is known in the literature if this pragmatic decision led to the reformation of the movement's classical ideology. In fact, the "inclusion-moderation hypothesis" showed that the institutionalization of the Islamists parties does not necessarily entail their ideological moderation. By analyzing the contradictions of the structural reform between the party and the Movement for Unity and Reform this article argues that some practices could question the "specialization" thesis. It highlights that despite the "specialization," the PJD did not reform its core beliefs which are preserved for both religious and political reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines various aspects of the discourse of political Islam. Based on a meaningful analysis, the continuity of the international political Islamic discourse is shown. The conclusions obtained during the study are related to the sharp revival of political Islam in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Complex and diversified Islamism and Islamists, while maintaining continuity, have undergone significant changes over time. This was revealed because of the analysis of the main stages of the development of Islamism. Modern Islamism is a relatively young political ideology of Islam. In recent decades, the development of Islamism has been closely linked with the revival of Islam and the modernization of Muslim countries. Islamism is often defined as «politicized Islam» or «political Islam». Researchers draw attention to the fact that it is impossible to put an equal sign between Islam and Islamism, between religion and the political ideology that arose on its basis. Such an understanding of Islamism does not give a complete picture of it, because Islamism is not only a political, but also a social ideology and a certain way of life. At the same time, this article will also pay enough attention to the stages of the development of Islamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work examines some recent developments and transformations in the Islamist discourse in Morocco. The emphasis is laid on how sharīʿa, or Islamic law, is redefined within an objective-based outlook to fit with what this article argues to be a symptom of post-Islamism. Central to these developments is the abandonment of establishing a khilāfah, "caliphate" or an Islamic state, as the main purpose for which Islamism has toiled to achieve since its inception. The article argues that the metamorphoses of Islamism in Morocco are not necessitated by some ephemeral political exigencies exclusively, but rather they reflect a paradigm shift in the ideology underpinning the Islamist discourse. To explore the aspects and implications of this shift, the article focuses on some recent works of two Islamic leaders: Ahmad al-Raysuni and his reformulation of Islamic law based on an emasculated utilitarianism and Saadeddine Othmani in his attempt to lay down theoretical and legal foundations for a silent religious secularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Politics in Malaysia revolves around the tensions between the three major ethnic groups: Malays, Chinese and Indians. After the 1969 ethnic riots, the country adopted an affirmative action programme widely regarded as racist towards the non-Malays. The rise of political Islam in recent times has added a religious layer to institutional racism. This article looks at contemporary racism towards the Malaysian Chinese community and argues that things will get worse in the future owing to the omnipresence of the Malay Islamic supremacy ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia has a long history of racism towards its Chinese population dating back to colonial times. Its population has suffered through discriminatory policies and a series of racist riots, some sponsored by the state. This article examines the transformation of racism towards the Indonesian Chinese by summarising the past, before investigating recent developments. While the Chinese have enjoyed unprecedented political freedom since the fall of the racist New Order regime, they have been witnessing worrying developments, including: continuing racist attitudes of some officials and political elites; a proliferation of Shariah-inspired bylaws in the regions; and lastly, unresolved grassroots racism. Grassroots racism has become more difficult to tackle as it has intertwined with religious issues, making being anti-Chinese justifiable. This article suggests that a counter-narrative from Islamic moderate civil organisations would be needed to redress the religious sentiment in native Chinese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Late Ottoman intellectual Mehmed Akif (1873–1936) was for decades depicted in Turkish public discourse in generic terms as an Islamist radical opposed to the secular nation state. Through Akif's poetry, articles, translations, correspondence from his exile in Egypt, and biographical detail revealed in the scattered memoirs of students and colleagues, this article offers a reappraisal of his thought as a leading Muslim modernist who adapted the thinking of Egyptian religious scholar Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905) to an Ottoman and then Turkish audience in the formulation of an early, prescient compromise between religion and nationalism. The article also notes remarkable similarities between Akif and Indian thinker Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877–1938), whom Akif was instrumental in introducing to Arab audiences, and suggests that, once political Islam had later gained currency across all fields of public life, Akif became an alternative to nationalist icon Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) as an intellectual symbol of the republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship on political Islam suggests that support for early Islamist movements came from literate merchants, government officials, and professionals who lacked political representation. We test these claims with a unique tranche of microlevel data drawn from a Muslim Brotherhood petition campaign in interwar Egypt. Matching the occupations of over 2,500 Brotherhood supporters to contemporaneous census data, we show that Egyptians employed in commerce, public administration, and the professions were more likely to sign the movement's petitions. The movement's supporters were also overwhelmingly literate. Contrary to expectations, the early Brotherhood also attracted support from Egyptians employed in agriculture, albeit less than we would expect given the prevalence of agrarian workers in the population. A case study tracing Muslim Brotherhood branch formation and petition activism in a Nile Delta village illustrates how literate, socially mobile agrarian families were key to the propagation of the movement in rural areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship on state–civil society dynamics in neoauthoritarian contexts demonstrates that the space for civil society is rapidly shrinking worldwide. Faced with legal, administrative, and extralegal measures that restrict operations and resources, civil society actors are forced to choose between marginalization or co-optation. This article examines the ruling party–Islamic civil society symbiosis in Turkey and identifies mutual constitution as an alternative model of the state–civil society relationship in hybrid regimes. Defined as utilitarian reciprocity between the ruling authority and civil society actors where both parties expand and consolidate their respective domains, the mutually constitutive relationship between the AKP government and Islamic civil society actors has facilitated the consolidation of neoauthoritarianism. Drawing attention to the recent rise of conservative civil society actors worldwide, the article urges the civil society and neoauthoritarianism research program to shift its focus to non-state actors that endorse non-democratic socio-political agendas and function as co-constitutors of illiberal regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the demise of Suharto's New Order in 1998, many observers have noted the growing influence of political Islam in Indonesia, despite its peripheral presence in national politics. A notable development was an unprecedented surge in the influence of Islamists during the 2019 presidential election campaign, many of whom were known for their intolerance of religious minorities. What ideological appeal drove Islamists into unprecedented collective action for the first time since 1998? This paper sheds light on the historical trajectory of the Masyumi and an organization called Dewan Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council). More specifically, via an analysis of their discursive efforts, it shows that rather than sectarian exclusivism which has long characterized political Islam in Indonesia, historically embedded anti-authoritarian efforts developed by their predecessors during the Sukarno and Suharto regime have enabled Islamists to engage in collective actions and attract the support of many ordinary Muslims. However, such collective action will not last because they have lost the shared aspirations of their predecessors for an alternative political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outburst of The Iranian Revolution in 1978 generated fear and hope at the same time for several political forces across the West and the East. The emergence of Islam as a political force came as a surprise across all political spectrums in Europe, even though religion was already at the time becoming a determining variable in the field of international relations. The echoes of The Iranian Revolution precipitated even further the making of several organizations of political Islam in the Middle East, forging transnational identities. Through primary and secondary sources drawn from mainly British leftist organizations, this study aims at examining the responses of the British Left towards Islamic revivalism. Thus, this article gives an historical outline of the intellectual production and the strategies of interpretation adopted by the British Left during the period of 1978–2001, by exploring the main historical events that involved (political) Islam, such as The Iranian Revolution, the Lebanese civil war, the Palestinian Intifada and The Algerian Civil War. The main argument postulated is that interpretation trajectories by the British Left were highly dependent on ideological and geostrategic lineages and respective synchronic political alliances, resulting in putting the centre of gravity sometimes on Islamic activism's regressive nature and sometimes on its anti-imperialist perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When under pressure do mainstream Islamist movements moderate more, or do they moderate less? Focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan, I argue that religious framing and references are reaffirmed in the discourse and programmes of the movement (and its party) despite pressure, ensuing splits and internal disputes. Through field interviews, media and content analysis, I find that the movement reacted to pressure by adopting a conciliatory stand and appeasing rhetoric towards the Jordanian authorities. However, the movement also stresses its religious themes and references as a source for mobilization and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revolutionary 1960s are often seen as the heyday of socialist theories and leftist movements. In the Middle East the period until the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 is regularly perceived as the pinnacle of secular, socialist Arab nationalism in the region, whereas the rise of various forms of political Islam is often presented as a phenomenon pertaining to a different era beginning in 1979. This article proposes a perspective which situates important Islamic thinkers in the intellectual environment of the revolutionary 1960s. Starting with the Algerian war in 1954 and lasting until the Iranian revolution of 1979, I argue that the 'long' 1960s were dominated not only by Marxist thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre. Muslim revolutionary intellectuals, such as Malek Bennabi, Amar Ouzegane, or ʿAli Shariʿati, also took part during the Algerian war in the shaping of a new discourse in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) is the only official political organisation in the country that propagates the political Islam agenda and strives to establish the Islamic state. In harnessing public support, the Qurʾān is extensively utilised by the party leaders to justify their political agenda. In this regard, it is important to note the significant contribution of its prolific president, Abdul Hadi bin Awang. Despite the extensive influence of his Qurʾānic exegesis, it has yet to be sufficiently analysed. Therefore, this paper discusses the methodological trend of his political interpretation of the Qurʾān and analyses its widespread impact on the society. Notwithstanding the complexity of the subject matter, it is hoped that the outcomes will shed some light on the role of Qurʾān as a scripture in the present-day political scene of Malaysia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The place religion should occupy in social life and how religious education should be conducted has so far been one of the controversial issues in Turkey. Considering the history of the Republican era, it may be said that religious education actively exists in the configuration of official education except for some periods. Religious education was not included in the earlier years of the Republic in the hegemony construction process of the state; yet, increasing internal contradictions as well as developments occurring in the international arena caused religious education to enter into the agenda through time. Religion and religious education fulfilled important functions in activating the grassroots in the struggle between dominant classes for hegemony. Religious education schools (imam hatip schools [IHSs]), which are the basic institutions offering religious education, have taken shape in parallel to the struggle for power, and they have developed in accordance with the attitudes of political powers. IHSs, which have been continuously growing except for short-term periods, are assigned the mission of raising a new generation today and special efforts are made to qualify those schools. This study evaluates the IHSs in terms of the roles they play in hegemony construction and considers the historical development and transformation of IHSs on this basis. First, the relationships between hegemony, state, and education are considered and then their historical development is evaluated and their roles in hegemony construction are analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay considers Ziya Gökalp, the received "spiritual father of Turkish nationalism", as an early mastermind of fascism in Greater Europe. During the 1910s, Gökalp acted as a prophet of expansive war and as a mentor of demographic engineering in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, which was a laboratory for new political styles in a crisis-ridden empire. Gökalp's thinking longed for a supreme leader in an army-like, disciplined and hierarchised society, while it rejected a social contract-based nation and state. An influential inspiration for and beyond the new élites in the capital, Gökalp combined the call for radical modernisation according to "European civilisation" with an assertive essentialism based on völkisch (cultural-racial-ethnic Turkish) and religious (political Islamic) references. He was the chief ideologist of the Young Turk party-state (1913–18) – side by side with Talaat Pasha, its main executive leader – and "the father of my thoughts" for Kemal Atatürk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the case of the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), I seek to measure the actual impact of Islamist parties' moderation on their electoral performances and voter bases. Statistical analyses find that although PKS has experienced an influx of diverse voters since the early 2000s, the influx was offset by a gradual withdrawal of educated Islamist voters, who had been loyal to the party since its establishment. I further claim that this change in PKS's voter profile was attributable not to moderation per se but to normalization, manifesting in an adaptation of the party elites' behaviors to the existing patterns in Indonesian politics. The party's recent policy shift with a conservative tone was insufficient to regain votes from its original supporters, who already saw PKS as a run-of-the-mill party. PKS's case implies that it is necessary for Islamist parties to maintain their distinctiveness as an alternative voice in the party system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The commentary argues the Saudi-Qatari tensions lie in con- flicting perspectives about the role of political Islam within the fabric of both states and their actions regionally. Fundamentally, the rivalry stems from contrasting relations between political and religious elites in each country which has taken on increasing political importance in tensions between Riyadh and Doha. Central to much of this are questions about the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood (and its various affiliates). More relatedly, the Saudi-Qatari rifts emerge out of competing understandings of authority and legitimacy, and with it, concern at the contestation of these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the foundations, development, and evolution of Al-Shabaab's multi-tiered media and information operations through a historical lens from proto and early Al-Shabaab media in 2006 and early 2007 up to the beginning of 2021. Arguing that the group's media campaign is an integral part of its broader proto-state governance operations and kinetic actions, the article pays particular attention to central narrative frames aimed at domestic Somali, regional East African, and international audiences – both friendly and non-friendly – as well as to the role of media and information operations as part of the group's domestic governance operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Arab Emirates' (UAE) foreign policy has experienced substantial changes since the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011. This paper describes the characteristics and main reasons of this transformation, as well as the possible consequences of a visible militaristic projection that goes beyond the limits of the Gulf region, the main scenario of Emirati diplomatic action until recently. Our framework takes into account, first of all, the traditional link between the United States and the UAE and how recent US administrations changed their perception about security in the Gulf; how Emir Mohammed bin Zayed has secured his grip over the country, and the relevance of his alliance with the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman; the aim of neutralizing the democratic stream that emerged from the Arab revolutions and, from there on, the Emirati perception about how political Islam and particularly the current best represented by the Muslim Brotherhood was becoming the main beneficiary of the erosion of the traditional Arab regime. Moreover, this paper proposes that despite the convergence with Saudi Arabia in a number of scenarios, the UAE has kept a foreign policy based on its own interests, which strengthened its increasing role as a regional main contender in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What shapes political parties' direction of change on the political spectrum? Under what conditions do Islamist movements moderate or shift towards a more radical stance? Drawing on the case of the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, I argue that transformation of the Islamist parties should be analysed on par with that of the secular parties, by focussing on the parties' popular base and the target electorate rather than through a moderation–radicalisation framework. I find that Ennahda's shift to Muslim democracy, self-defined as specialisation, is owed to their need to be backed by the new urban middle class in order to rule while maintaining the support of the rural and urban poor to come to power. Through field interviews conducted with the members of Tunisian political parties as well as union leaders and activists, I show that the secular parties are going through a similar process under the pressure of the spatial and class-related dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on Ottoman defeat in the First World War. Topics include coming from the head of the Anglican Church himself at the onset of the British occupation of Istanbul; and Indian Muslim leaders and Ottoman diplomats where British government policy putting the integrity of the empire at risk by stoking resentment among Muslims.

This paper discusses the Alevi-Sunni social conflict in Turkey through an examination of how the politically engaged youth of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) perceived the rights of the Alevi population around the time of the AKP's 'Democratic Opening'. Based on qualitative fieldwork involving 78 interviews conducted between 2009 and 2011 in seven different cities, the research focuses on the boundaries of AKP identity concerning Alevis' democratic demands and different modes of reconciliation with these. The results show the issue of Alevi politico-religious rights to reveal the religious, institutional and national boundaries of AKP political identity. In addition, the demand for the construction of a museum to commemorate the 1993 Madımak Massacre in Sivas triggered the Sunni memory boundaries of young activists in that city. The AKP youth also presented some approaches that reconciled with Alevi demands, classified as pragmatic, political and subjective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the impact of political transformation in Tunisia and the rise of Islamic political parties on people's perceptions toward developing the Islamic finance sector in the country. We assess the extent to which the future of Islamic finance in Tunisia could be related to political Islam or if political orientation could be detrimental to the development of the country's Islamic finance. Based on a survey distributed to 1,158 Tunisian citizens, we offer an insight into how political Islam has affected the development of Islamic finance in Tunisia. We find that: (1) political orientation does not appear to be a significant determinant of the acceptance of Islamic finance; (2) religious beliefs appear to be a significant determinant of the acceptance of Islamic finance; and (3) the future development of Islamic finance in Tunisia can be linked more precisely to the country's social transformation rather than the rise to power of Islamic political parties since the Arab Spring. Related Articles: Antwi‐Boateng, Osman. 2015. "No Spring in Africa: How Sub‐Saharan Africa has Avoided the Arab Spring Phenomenon." Politics & Policy 43 (5): 754‐784. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12129 Khodair, Amany Ahmed, Mostafa E. AboElsoud, and Mahmoud Khalifa. 2019. "The Role of Regional Media in Shaping Political Awareness of Youth: Evidence from Egypt." Politics & Policy 47 (6): 1095‐1124. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12335 Sarquís, David J. 2012. "Democratization after the Arab Spring: The Case of Egypt's Political Transition." Politics & Policy 40 (5): 871‐903. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00381.x [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bangladesh is the third‐largest Muslim country in the world where Islamic ideals inherently influence people's thought and actions. One of the Islamist political parties that has been trying to influence the Bangladeshi population is the Jama'at‐e‐Islami (JeI). The JeI is one of the oldest and largest Islamist political parties in the country and has continuously exerted its influence on the social ethos and state policy. JeI's unconditional support for Islamization and a society based on Sharia law undoubtedly attracts some sections of the Bangladeshi population. Apart from promoting an Islamist totalitarian ideology, it also maintains a requirement of religious purification for choosing its party members; a strategy that has earned a reputation as a party with robust intraparty discipline. To enhance its trust‐based relationships with its members (at both the horizontal and vertical levels), JeI helps its members through various means, including the provision of financial support, social welfare programs, and charity activities. Although the targeted population are their members, these schemes have had an impact, however minimal, on the Bangladeshi population to redress its anti‐independence stance in 1971, on the failure to send an apology message for what JeI did in 1971, and on the worldwide failure of political Islam. Related Articles: Barton, Greg. 2010. "Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam." Politics & Policy 38 (3): 471‐496. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00244.x Marinov, Robert, and Daniel Stockemer. 2020. "The Spread of Anti‐Islamic Sentiment: A Comparison between the United States and Western Europe." Politics & Policy 48 (3): 402‐441. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12354 Spalek, Basia. 2010. "Community Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to 'New Terrorism.'" Politics & Policy 38 (4): 789‐815. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00258.x [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From evolutionism to the theoretical concept of postmodernity, human socio-economic development has been a much welcomed phenomenon. Among the developing nations, such as Nigeria, development in all aspects has been a consistent aspiration, as it is believed to have the power to free the nation from much-dreaded domination by advanced nations. Much as it is needed in Nigeria, development of the nation since independence from Britain has been beset by socio-political and human-induced hitches. Among other things, Boko Haram has, for over a decade, launched a sustained attack on the system from all corners. Although the challenges posed by Boko Haram to Nigerian socio- economic and political development have been viewed by many scholars from the angle of a clash of interests, this article focuses on the sociological implications and developmental crisis accompanying the Boko Haram onslaught in Nigeria. The study utilises abstractions from Karl Marx's dialectical materialism as its theoretical gauge. The study utilises socio-historical information from Nigeria and the Middle East, and some non-material social facts from these regions, to explain and point to the underlying potentials of Boko Haram in Nigeria. In the process, the article unveils the emerging developmental problems in Nigeria and beyond. It recommends ensuring the neutrality of Islamic teachings to avoid ideological influencing, building nationality consciousness among the youth in the north-east region of Nigeria to neutralise the overwhelming influence of religion on the youth, and building internal security involving the indigenous people of the neighbouring regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]