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This paper lays out the first step towards a complete methodology of interreligious investigation, emphasizing the issue of how we should treat individual religions while not committing ourselves to religious apologetics in general. From that perspective, I introduce two theoretical requirements that the methodology of interreligious exploration should fulfill, what we call the constraint of consistency and ontology and the constraint of absoluteness and plurality. The article expounds how and on what grounds those two methodological constraints can be fulfilled by the philosophical notions of "naturalism" and "religion as grammar." In doing so we reach the following methodological canons: When initiating interreligious exploration, (1) adopt an "open-ended minimal naturalism" in which transcendent realities appearing in individual religions are neither affirmed nor denied in advance, and (2) on the basis of that naturalism, take individual religions as different systems of grammar, that is, distinct linguistic-conceptual frameworks upon which one can see and understand various religious worlds in a constitutive way. The paper is the exposition and defense of these ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article proposes a contemporary reflection on Hegel's famous quote "the real is the rational and the rational is the real" that tradition has often misinterpreted. Inspired by a new reading by Jean- François Kervégan (which translates the sentence "the rational will become effective/real and the real/effective will become rational"), the article focuses on one of the possible illustrations of this Hegelian thesis. Émile Zola's novel The Work consists of a very interesting analysis of the notions of reality, effectiveness and rationality that the author applies to both literature and visual arts. Behind the controversies of Pierre Sandoz and Claude Lantier, it is possible to discern all the debates that opposed Émile Zola to his friend Paul Cézanne. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ontological status of mental disorders raises a classical debate between naturalist and social constructionist perspectives. With conceptual tools borrowed from the philosophy of psychiatry, we claim that, although seemingly opposite, both naturalist and social constructionist arguments incur in a fact/value dichotomy. As an alternative to this classical polarization, we suggest a deflated normativity position capable of integrating factual descriptions and values to psychopathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ontological status of mental disorders raises a classical debate between naturalist and social constructionist perspectives. With conceptual tools borrowed from the philosophy of psychiatry, we claim that, although seemingly opposite, both naturalist and social constructionist arguments incur in a fact/value dichotomy. As an alternative to this classical polarization, we suggest a deflated normativity position capable of integrating factual descriptions and values to psychopathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since phenomenology isn't just a method of philosophical research but also a genuine philosophical stance, Husserl discusses in his famous article Philosophy as a Strict Science from 1910/11 at least three notions of philosophy to demonstrate, what should be considered solely as a scientific philosophy. This may only be his phenomenological philosophy, which Husserl contrasts against boThin his time most popular philosophical positions, i.e. the naturalism, and the philosophy of world view. But there is also another "brand" of philosophy that's being mentioned in his article: the so called 'Tiefsinn'. Is it a fourThnotion of philosophy, or just the extreme derivation from the "world view"? Not only shall our article answer that question, but also demonstrate Husserl's conception of a phenomenological philosophy being a strict scientific philosophy in contrast to naturalism as well as the world view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this issue, four critical comments on my book "Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie" are published, I try to reply to. More strictly than it is accomplished in "Gott denken", I outline systematically the fundamental questions and the most pertinent principles of a rational theology as an alternative to naturalism, predominant in our time. In the center of the following considerations, I try to establish a concept of God and a kind of a Kantian "moral" argument, why it would be more reasonable in one's own life to hope to God as the creator and redeemer of the world and mankind instead of adopting a naturalistic point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Holm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie" theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten's claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kathryn Tanner's recent work rehabilitates the decades-long debate concerning the supernatural, in which the church fathers feature as principal interlocutors. It is her particular ressourcement of Gregory of Nyssa that I want to consider and contest, especially her interpretation of his understanding of human nature as wholly apophatic, or "plastic". Tanner's self-described "apophatic" anthropology consists of a critique of naturalism, opening the way for her to posit an expansive supernaturalism that makes grace intrinsic to human nature. I offer an alternative reading of Gregory to show that a theological naturalism may obtain, namely, that human nature has integrity and autonomy of its own, even if it also may exceed its economy of finitude in pursuit of grace that is wholly other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knut Hamsun's Hunger (1890, Sult) is nowadays often regarded as one of the first Scandinavian, or even European, modernist novels. However, some have also classified it as naturalist. The author of the article claims that the text does contain some naturalist elements, but this alone is not a sufficient argument for considering the novel to be naturalist as a whole. The article offers several arguments as to why it is inappropriate to designate Hunger as a naturalist work and supports those readings of the novel that see it as representing a modernist break with realist and naturalist aesthetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focusses on a set of anthropomorphic figurines. It suggests that realistic human proportion and canonical body posture were pursued in the carving of these objects as a means of expressing ideology, in a context of diversified forms of manipulation of bodies in funerary practices. It is argued that, against a background of predominantly schematic art, the more realistic and canonical anthropomorphic representation of the human body was used to communicate a set of ideological statements in a more controlled and immediate way, in a period of ontological and cosmological transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Max Weber's postulate of value-neutrality and the naturalistic justification of norms . The relationship between facts and values is an essential problem in philosophy, political science and sociology. Usually it is held that there is a wide gap between what is and what ought to be, the nature of which, however, is far from clear. My purpose is to elucidate this relationship by analyzing some well-known articles of Max Weber. I first present Weber's postulate of `value-neutrality' and outline the reasons he gave for it. Then I proceed by examining Weber's scientific methodology, arguing that its presuppositions contradict the existence of a hiatus irrationalis between facts and values. This conclusion is supported by some historical examples which show that facts are constituted by values and values by facts. I propose that Weber's epistemological justification of value-neutrality be discarded in favor of a pragmatic one that can also be derived from his arguments. I conclude by sketching the outline of a naturalistic approach in philosophy and related disciplines. This approach admits the continuity of facts and values and provides a realistic view of every-day normative disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]