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The process of public assurance is a sequence of stages, following which you can obtain the right to use it, the service or the work, as a result of the award of a public procurement contract. The contracting authority carries out in the framework of the public insurance process various ways of awarding public service contracts in order to award contracts for products, services or works. On choosing the course of the process to make public, the contracting authority uses those qualification and/or selection criteria as well as award criteria, at different moments of the process. Most of the time in the development of the ways of assigning the specifics of the domain and the public ones, even specialists “impede” the understanding of three categories of previously mentioned criteria, and that is why it is necessary, on the one hand, to clarify the concepts of qualification criteria and/or of selection. and award criteria, and on the other hand it is necessary to identify the moment in which they are applied but also the way in which they are applied in this way depending on the method of award assumed by the contracting authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to provide a concise analysis of the rules applicable to the rejection of abnormally low and non-compliant tenders in the European Union. The paper will deal with a case decided by the European Court of Justice which deals with violations of rights or fundamental freedoms regarding the (potential) irregularities of tenders. The study is exploratory and interpretative in nature. Data used for this research is secondary data: the author analyses prior research, regulations and decisions of the European Court of Justice and national authorities. The first section of this paper will examine the history and development of the institute of abnormally low tenders within the European Union and Slovenian positive law. The main research part of the paper is the analysis of the most relevant cases stemming from the European Court of Justice. Finally, the main scientific contribution of this paper, in addition to the analysis, is the de lege ferenda observations, which may contribute to resolving challenges related to abnormally low tenders in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The second of the three tunnelling contract sections of the Semmering Base Tunnel is of comparable complexity to the first contract section SBT2.1. The geotechnical and hydrological conditions for sequential tunnelling are demanding and require extensive grouting and investigation measures in advance of the drives. The enormous extent of the construction works and the need to access parts of the running tunnels through an intermediate construction access are a logistical challenge. The construction time is also very ambitious. These circumstances had to be considered in the production of the tender documents. Die zweite Ausschreibung für eines der drei Tunnelbaulose des Semmering-Basistunnels schließt hinsichtlich Komplexität nahtlos an das erste Baulos an. Die Vortriebe haben unter geotechnisch und hydrogeologisch anspruchsvollen Bedingungen zu erfolgen und beinhalten intensive Erkundungs- und Injektionskampagnen. Der enorme Bauumfang sowie die Erschließung der Vortriebe über einen komplexen temporären Zwischenangriff stellen eine große logistische Herausforderung dar. Durch einen engen Bauzeitrahmen wird diese noch verstärkt. Diesem Umstand musste auch in der Vertragsgestaltung Rechnung getragen werden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public procurements, contracting entities, and other subjects particular to the field of public procurements are often criticized. The media, subject matter experts and others have sufficient reasons for this criticism. The opinions on public contracts are not uniform. One of the important parts of this discussion is the criteria used to evaluate the bids. The Act on Public Contracts offers two basic evaluation criteria: the lowest tender price and the economic advantageousness of the tender. The aim of this paper is to state the pros and cons of each and to determine what criteria the contracting entities use. Equally, to identify what are the differences when using the criteria according to the subject-matter and according to contracting entity, specifically hospitals and districts of the Czech Republic [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In connection with the many national and international attempts to improve 'cooperation in construction', a working group of the ITA Austria has been formed and has developed a new 'Tender Model for Infrastructure Projects - VIP'. The mostly complete basic concept, which at the moment is being discussed and further developed together with representatives of employers, is the subject of this article. The VIP has the essential intention of moving away from the currently dominant 'cheapest bidder principle' or 'best bidder principle', in which quality criteria play no role or are of only minor importance. The VIP lays more emphasis on qualitative award criteria and intends the award of the contract to the bidder whose bid has the highest 'benefit to society'. Im Zusammenhang mit mehreren nationalen und internationalen Bestrebungen, die 'Kooperation im Bauwesen' zu verbessern, hat sich eine Arbeitsgruppe der ITA Austria formiert und ein neues 'Vergabemodell für Infrastrukturprojekte - VIP' entwickelt. Das weitgehend fertiggestellte Grundkonzept, welches zurzeit mit Vertretern von Auftraggebern abgestimmt und weiterentwickelt wird, ist Gegenstand dieses Beitrags. Das VIP verfolgt als wesentliches Ziel eine Abkehr vom derzeit dominanten 'Billigstbieterprinzip' bzw. 'Bestbieterprinzip', bei dem qualitative Kriterien keine oder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Das VIP legt ein höheres Gewicht auf qualitative Zuschlagskriterien und strebt an, den Auftrag jenem Bieter zu erteilen, dessen Angebot den höchsten 'Nutzen für die Gesellschaft' hat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In Europe, off-patent biologicals and biosimilars are largely procured by means of tender procedures. The organization and design of tenders may play a key role in the evolving biosimilar market, and currently, it is not fully elucidated how tenders for off-patent biologicals and biosimilars are designed and if approaches are aligned with sustaining market competition and societal savings for healthcare systems over the long term. This study aims to (i) explore the design and implementation of tender procedures for off-patent biologicals and biosimilars in Europe, (ii) identify learnings for sustainable tender approaches from purchasers and suppliers, and (iii) formulate recommendations in support of competitive and sustainable tender practices in the off-patent biologicals market. Methods: A mixed methods design was applied. A quantitative web-survey was conducted with hospital pharmacists and purchasers (N = 60, of which 47 completed the survey in full), and qualitative expert-interviews with purchasers and suppliers (N = 28) were carried out. Results: The web survey results showed that the organization and design of tenders for off-patent biologicals and biosimilars, and the experience of hospital pharmacists and purchasers with this, considerably varies on several elements across European countries. From the qualitative interviews, signals emerged across the board that some of the current tender approaches might negatively affect market dynamics for off-patent biologicals and biosimilars. The focus on generating short-term savings and existence of originator favouring tender practices were identified as elements that may limit timely competition from and market opportunity for biosimilar suppliers. The need to optimize tender processes, considering a more long-term strategic and sustainable view, was expressed. In addition, challenges appear to exist with differentiating between products beyond price, showing the need and opportunity to guide stakeholders with the (appropriate) inclusion of award criteria beyond price. Due to the variety in tender organization in Europe, a 'one size fits all' tendering framework is not possible. However, on an overarching level, it was argued that tender procedures must aim to (i) ensure market plurality and (ii) include award criteria beyond price (warranted that criteria are objectively and transparently defined, scored and competitively rewarded). Depending on the market (maturity), additional actions may be needed. Conclusions: Findings suggest the need to adjust tender procedures for off-patent biologicals and biosimilars, considering a more long-term strategic and market sustainable view. Five main avenues for optimization were identified: (i) safeguarding a transparent, equal opportunity setting for all suppliers with an appropriate use of award criteria; (ii) fostering a timely opening of tender procedures, ensuring on-set competition; (iii) ensuring and stimulating adherence to laws on public procurement; (iv) securing an efficient process, improving plannability and ensuring timely product supply and (v) safeguarding long-term sustainable competition by stimulating market plurality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]