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Empirically, the commons are not as tragic as standard theory predicts. The predominant explanation for this finding is conditional cooperation. Yet many real life situations involve insiders, who are directly affected by a dilemma, and outsiders, who may be harmed if the insiders overcome the dilemma. The quintessential illustration is oligopoly. If insiders overcome their dilemma and collude, this inflicts harm on the opposite market side. In our experiment, harm on outsiders significantly reduces conditional cooperation of insiders. We can exclude that this result is driven by inequity aversion, reciprocity or efficiency seeking. Only guilt aversion can rationalize our findings, with guilt being most pronounced if the active insiders not only inflict harm on the outsider, but increase their own payoff at the expense of the outsider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a widespread belief among fundraisers that solicitations by volunteers will be more effective than solicitations by paid workers. In this paper, we confirm this belief through incentivized surveys of fundraising professionals. To explore whether this belief has merit, we conduct a door-to-door fundraising experiment in which solicitors communicate their compensation status to households. In our experiment, we vary (1) whether solicitors are paid or not and (2) the information that potential donors receive about solicitors' compensation. We find that fundraisers perform equally well in the paid and volunteer conditions when no information about compensation is given to donors. Interestingly, we find that donations are unchanged when donors are informed that solicitors are volunteers. Further, informing donors that solicitors are paid does not decrease donations – in fact, it somewhat increases donations. These results stand in contrast to forecasts of fundraising professionals. A follow-up survey with laypeople suggests that knowing whether a solicitor is paid affects both trust in the charity and perceptions of the solicitor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies how participation in decision procedures affects people’s reactions to the deciding authority. In our economic experiment, having voice, i.e., the opportunity to state one’s opinion prior to a decision, significantly increases subordinates’ subsequent kindness towards the authority. These positive effects occur irrespectively of the decisions’ content. The experimental findings stress the positive effects of voice when subordinates and authorities interact. Our results suggest that in organizations, but also in the legal and political arena, participative decision-making can be used to guide people’s actions after decisions have been made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]