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Existing research on liquidity provision during National Banking Era (1863-1913) financial crises examines aggregate issuance of clearinghouse loan certificates by the New York Clearinghouse. We employ previously unexploited disaggregate data on clearinghouse loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks provided liquidity during the Panic of 1907. The large New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York Clearinghouse issuing) a volume of clearinghouse loan certificates far beyond their own immediate liquidity needs, in accord with their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specifically, the authors highlight the role of New York banking interests in the affecting legislations affecting the creation or expiration of central banking institutions. In our previous research we have detected that New York City banking entities usually exert substantial influence on the legislation, greater than their large proportion of United States' banking resources. The authors describe how this influence affected the success or failure of central banking movements in the United States, and the authors use this evidence to support their arguments regarding the influence of New York City bankers on the legislative efforts that culminated in the creation of the Federal Reserve System. The paper argues that successful central banking movements in the United States owed much to the influence of New York City banking interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The call loan market in New York City played a central role in funding the expansion of economic growth and capital investment in the United States in the 1800s and early 1900s. Changes in the identity of the intermediaries providing those funds help explain why the movement for the establishment of a central bank in the United States took hold only after the panic of 1907. The growing significance of nonclearinghouse creditors to the call money market diluted the relative financial influence of New York City bankers and compromised the apparent "coinsurance" arrangement between brokers and New York Clearinghouse lenders that prevailed during the late nineteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes a relative entropy procedure for imposing moment restrictions on simulated forecast distributions from a variety of models. Starting from an empirical forecast distribution for some variables of interest, the technique generates a new empirical distribution that satisfies a set of moment restrictions. The new distribution is chosen to be as close as possible to the original in the sense of minimizing the associated Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion, or relative entropy. The authors illustrate the technique by using several examples that show how restrictions from other forecasts and from economic theory may be introduced into a model's forecasts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines how the treatment of prior uncertainty about parameter values can affect forecasting accuracy and the interpretation of identified vector autoregression (VAR) models. Improvement of VAR forecasting method after the use of informative stochastic prior restrictions; Impact of priors on the relationships implied by the identified impulse responses.

Reveals why a successful movement for creating a United States central bank followed the Panic of 1907 and not earlier National Banking Era panics. Failure to regulate New York City-based trust companies; Influences of clearinghouses; Assistance to illiquid banks.

Argues that the inaccurate federal funds rate forecasts from vector autoregressions (VAR) limit their usefulness as a tool for guiding economic policy decisions. Elimination of poor forecast performance with the use of a Bayesian estimation technique instead of ordinary least squares; Impact of estimation technique on VAR forecasts.

Presents a study that examines whether financial aggregates provide information useful for predicting real output growth and inflation in Australia. Background of the study; Comparison of unconditional and conditional forecasts of growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation; Forecast errors from unconditional and conditional 4-period ahead forecasts of real output growth.

Examines the effectiveness of financial aggregates in predicting real output and inflation in Australia. Use of vector autoregression (VAR) techniques in summarizing the information data; Importance of the information on the policymakers; Accuracy of VAR system.

Develops a model in which information losses may be an important part of the cost of an over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives dealer's failure. Nature of the OTC derivatives market; Economics significance of a dealer failure; Possible disaster scenarios for a breakdown of the market for OTC derivatives.

Reports on the impact of clearinghouse access and bank runs on trust companies in New York City and Chicago, Illinois during the financial crisis of 1907. Isolation of New York City trust companies from pool of bank reserves controlled by the New York Clearinghouse; Accessibility of trust companies to Chicago Clearinghouse that prevented depositor withdrawals.