India confronts a complex, multidirectional, multifaceted strategic environment. Its traditional rival Pakistan lies to the northwest, China to the northeast. Rivals could station ballistic-missile submarines in nearby waters or use the Indian Ocean sea lanes to transport weapons-related materiel, menacing Indian security directly or abetting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to "rogue regimes" or non-state groups. This paper will review four clusters of questions pertaining to Indian nuclear strategy in this strategic environment, examining (1) Indian perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons; (2) New Delhi's efforts to match doctrine with capabilities; (3) Indian officials' efforts to reconcile a more capable nuclear force with their nation's traditional commitment to global disarmament; and (4) the influence of the U.S.-Indian nuclear accord on New Delhi's approach to multilateral cooperation on nuclear-related issues. Specifically:First, the paper will identify some of the dominant perceptions of nuclear weapons formed by Indian officials and scholars as they survey their surroundings. Do they see nuclear weapons primarily as political tools of deterrence, or as weapons of last resort? Or, under certain circumstances, does New Delhi regard these weapons as usable in a limited nuclear war? If so, what doctrines can be discerned that would guide the use of Indian nuclear weapons in a clash with major adversaries such as China, Pakistan, or nuclear-armed terrorists?Second, the paper will explore how India is trying to match doctrine with capabilities. What institutional changes has the Indian government undertaken, and what kind of technological pursuits is the Indian military-industrial sector carrying on, both indigenously and in collaboration with âstrategic partnersâ such as Russia, Israel, and the United States? Is New Delhi developing capabilities that support doctrine, or is it allowing existing capabilities to drive the development of doctrine? With what implications for regional security and peace?Third, the paper will examine how India's no-first-use policy and commitment to global disarmament fit within the military's emerging nuclear doctrine and growing force-projection capabilities. What is the impact of India's non-membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the nation's nuclear strategy, in particular its second-strike capability? How will this affect New Delhi's future policy toward disarmament by the officially declared nuclear weapon states, as well as the nuclear weapon states that have remained outside the treaty?And fourth, the paper will consider the ramifications of the U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement. How will the agreement influence India's stance on multilateral enterprises such as signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, entering into negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or taking part in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership? How will the agreement affect Indiaâs overall approach toward devising multilateral solutions to nuclear challenges posed by cases such as Iran and North Korea?The topic of Indian nuclear strategy clearly demands bridging regional divides such as those separating South Asia from Southeast and Northeast Asia. Perhaps more importantly, it spans disparate sub-disciplines such as military strategy, nonproliferation, collective action, and international organizations. We thus expect the paper to enrich the offerings at the 2008 International Studies Association conference considerably. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]