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Introduction: While the benefits of integrated care are widely acknowledged, its implementation has proven difficult. Together with other factors, financial factors are known to influence progress towards care integration, but in-depth insight in their influence on the envisioned outcomes of integrated care projects is limited. Methods: We conducted a multiple case study of four integrated care projects in the Netherlands. The projects were purposely sampled to be representative of integrated care in its different forms. A total of 29 semi-structured interviews were held with project members, both medical and non-medical staff. In addition, 141 documents were analyzed, including scientific publications and minutes of meetings. Based on elaborate project descriptions we deduced the synergistic influences of financial and other factors on the outcomes of the projects. Results: Financial factors have an important influence on integrated care projects, though this influence is neither deterministic nor isolated. This is because the likelihood of realizing a positive outcome is affected by the degree to which four key conditions are fulfilled: 1) willingness to change, 2) alignment of interests and uniformity goal, 3) availability of resources to change, and 4) effectiveness of management of external actors. Conclusion: Financial factors have an impact on the outcomes of integrated care projects and must be viewed in synergy with interrelated other factors. Crucial for realizing success in integrated care, a balance must be struck between the level of ambition set in a project and the reality of the prevailing key conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper we examine the pricing behaviour of nonprofit health insurers in the Dutch social health insurance market. Since for-profit insurers were not allowed in this market, potential spillover effects from the presence of for-profit insurers on the behaviour of nonprofit insurers were absent. Using a panel data set for all health insurers operating in the Dutch social health insurance market over the period 1996–2004, we estimate a premium model to determine which factors explain the price setting behaviour of nonprofit health insurers. We find that financial stability rather than profit maximisation offers the best explanation for health plan pricing behaviour. In the presence of weak price competition, health insurers did not set premiums to maximize profits. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that regulations on financial reserves are needed to restrict premiums. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The Netherlands was the first country that introduced a universal mandatory social health insurance scheme for covering a broad range of long-term care (LTC) services provided in a variety of care settings. Compared with most other OECD countries, both total and public expenditure on LTC is high, particularly since the Dutch population is relatively young. On the other hand, coverage of LTC services is relatively comprehensive. In this article we examine the past experiences, current deficiencies and future prospects of LTC financing in the Netherlands. By rationing of supply and tight budgetary restrictions, the government managed to effectively control the growth of LTC expenditure, but at the expense of growing waiting lists and deteriorating quality of care. Reform plans aim to make the LTC system more efficient and consumer-directed. We discuss whether the proposed reforms offer a perspective on a sustainable system of comprehensive LTC insurance. This is especially important in view of the ageing of the population and the expected increase in demand for LTC services. We conclude that the success of the reforms heavily depends on the definition of entitlements, the accuracy of needs assessment and the feasibility of determining appropriate client-based budgets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy analysts consider the Netherlands health system a possible model for the United States. Since 2006 all Dutch citizens have to buy standardized individual health insurance coverage from a private insurer. Consumers have an annual choice among insurers, and insurers can selectively contract or integrate with health care providers. Subsidies make health insurance affordable for everyone. A Risk Equalization Fund compensates insurers for enrollees with predictably high medical expenses. The reform is a work in progress. So far the emphasis has been on the health insurance market. The challenge is now to successfully reform the market for the provision of health care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we analyze the evolution of market-oriented health care reforms in the Netherlands. We argue that these reforms can be characterized as policy learning within and between competing policy programs. Policy learning denotes the process by which policy makers and stakeholders deliberately adjust the goals, rules, and techniques of a given policy in response to past experiences and new information. We discern three distinctive periods. During the first period (1988-1994), the prevailing corporatist and etatist policy programs were seriously challenged by the proponents of a new market-oriented program. But when it came to political decision making and implementation, the market-oriented program soon lost its impetus because it was technically too complex and could not provide short-term solutions to meet the urgent need for cost containment. During the second period (1994-2000), the etatist program regained its previously dominant position. In parallel to a strengthening of supply and price controls, however, the government also persevered in creating the technical and institutional preconditions for regulated competition. Moreover, public discontent over walling lists and the call for more autonomy by individual providers and insurers strengthened the alliance in favor of regulated competition. This led to the revival of the market- oriented program in a 2001 reform plan. We conclude that the odds of these new post- 2001 reforms succeeding are substantially higher than in the first period due to the technical and institutional adjustments that have taken place in the past decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines whether the introduction of managed competition in Dutch social health insurance has resulted in effective price competition among insurance funds. We find evidence of limited price competition, which may be caused by low consumer price sensitivity. Using aggregate panel data from all insurance funds over the period 1996–1998, estimated premium elasticities of market share are −0.3 for compulsory coverage and −0.8 for supplementary coverage. These elasticities are much smaller than in managed competition settings in US group insurance. This may be explained by differences in switching experience and higher search costs associated with individual insurance. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Focuses on the reformation of the health systems in the Netherlands and Belgium. Level of the systems' regulation in both countries; Objective in introducing managed competition; Comparison between the health care systems of the two countries.

The transformation of the Dutch health care system and the impetus behind the market-oriented health care reforms implemented since 1989 are examined. During the postwar period, the gradual transformation of the Dutch health care system was interrupted twice by attempts to introduce radical reforms: the 1974 comprchensive health plan and the 1987 pro-competitive national health insurance program. The market-oriented reform involves .a fundamental change of the incentive structure for insurers and providers. The objective is to interest both parties in containing costs and improving efficiency while preserving universal access through central redistributive financing. In the Dutch political context, radical reform proposals can be introduced only by a prolonged series of incremental changes, which offer the corporatist organizations of providers and insurers ample opportunity to dismantle the original reform design. The 1974 comprehensive health plan failed largely because of this corporatist trap. The 1987 market-oriented reform program faced the same risks, although it appeared to offer an ingenious political compromise. Private health insurers were particularly successful in slowing the reform by frustrating the development of a prospective, risk-adjusted payment mechanism. The resistance of corporatist organizations to the 1974 and 1987 reforms provoked a largely unplanned process of creeping etatization. Paradoxically, the present market-oriented reforms coincide with far-reaching state interventions in determining provider fees. A new, more satisfactory balance between corporatism, etatism. and market mechanisms must still be found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Declining use of institutional LTC in OECD countries is not well understood. • The residential population is getting older and more disabled over time. • This trend may reduce the perceived attractiveness of LTC institutions. • Reduced attractiveness may partly explain the declining use of institutional LTC. • Policies to encourage community living may have a self-reinforcing effect. Abstract Background In several OECD countries the percentage of people over 80 in LTC institutions has been declining for more than a decade, despite population ageing. The standard model to explain healthcare utilization, the Andersen model, cannot explain this trend. We extend the Andersen model by including proxies for the relative attractiveness of community living compared to institutional care. Using longitudinal data on long-term care use in the Netherlands from 1996 to 2012, we examine to what extent a decline in institutional care is associated with changes in perceived attractiveness of institutional LTC care compared to community living. Methods With a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition regression, we decomposed the difference in admission to LTC institutions between the period 1996–1999 and 2009–2012 into a part that accounts for differences in predictors of the Andersen model and an "unexplained" part, and investigate whether the perceived attractiveness of institutional care reduces the size of the unexplained part. Results We find that factors related to the perceived attractiveness of institutional care compared to community living explains 12.8% of the unexplained negative time trend in admission rates over the total period (1996–2012), and 19.1–19.2% over shorter time frames. Discussion Our results show that changes in the perceived attractiveness of institutional LTC may explain part of the decline in demand for institutional care. Our findings imply that policies to encourage community living may have a self-reinforcing effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A necessary condition for competition to promote quality in hospital markets is that patients are sensitive to differences in hospital quality. In this paper we examine the relationship between hospital quality, as measured by publicly available quality ratings, and patient hospital choice for angioplasty using individual claims data from a large health insurer. We find that Dutch patients have a high propensity to choose hospitals with a good reputation, both overall and for cardiology, and a low readmission rate after treatment for heart failure. Relative to a mean readmission rate of 8.5% we find that a 1%-point lower readmission rate is associated with a 12% increase in hospital demand. Since readmission rates are not adjusted for case-mix they may not provide a correct signal of hospital quality. Insofar patients base their hospital choice on such imperfect quality information, this may result in suboptimal choices and risk selection by hospitals. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

To effectively bargain about the price and quality of health services, health insurers need to successfully channel their enrollees. Little is known about consumer sensitivity to different channeling incentives. In particular, the impact of status quo bias, which is expected to differ between different provider types, can play a large role in insurers' channeling ability. To examine consumer sensitivity to channeling strategies and to analyze the impact of status quo bias for different provider types. With a large-scale discrete choice experiment, we investigate the impact of channeling incentives on choices for pharmacies and general practitioners (GPs). Survey data were obtained among a representative Dutch household panel ( n=2,500). Negative financial incentives have a two to three times larger impact on provider choice than positive ones. Positive financial incentives have a relatively small impact on GP choice, while the impact of qualitative incentives is relatively large. Status quo bias has a large impact on provider choice, which is more prominent in the case of GPs than in the case of pharmacies. The large impact of the status quo bias makes channeling consumers away from their current providers a daunting task, particularly in the case of GPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A competitive market for individual health insurance tends to risk-adjusted premiums. Premium rate restrictions are often considered a tool to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals in such a market. However, such regulation induces selection which may have several adverse effects. As an alternative approach we consider risk-adjusted premium subsidies. Empirical results of simulated premium models and subsidy formulae are presented. It is shown that sufficiently adjusted subsidies eliminate the need for premium rate restrictions and consequently avoid their adverse effects. Therefore, the subsidy approach is the preferred strategy to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regulators may be hesitant to permit price competition in healthcare markets because of its potential to damage quality. We assess whether this fear is well founded by examining a reform that permitted Dutch health insurers to freely negotiate prices with hospitals. Unlike previous research on hospital competition that has relied on quality indicators for urgent treatments, we take advantage of a plausible absence of selection bias to identify the effect on the quality of elective procedures that should be more price responsive. Using data on all admissions for hip replacements to Dutch hospitals and a difference-in-differences comparison between more and less concentrated markets, we find no evidence that price deregulation in a competitive environment reduces quality measured by hip replacement readmission rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a healthcare system with managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their customers. To fulfil this role adequately, understanding consumer preferences for health plan characteristics is of vital importance. Little is known, however, about these preferences and how they vary across consumers. Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) we quantified trade-offs between basic health plan characteristics and analysed whether there are differences in preferences according to age, health status and income. We selected four health plan characteristics to be included in the DCE: (i) the level of provider choice and associated level of reimbursement, (ii) the primary focus of provider contracting (price, quality, social responsibility), (iii) the level of service benefits, and (iv) the monthly premium. This selection was based on a literature study, expert interviews and focus group discussions. The DCE consisted of 17 choice sets, each comprising two hypothetical health plan alternatives. A representative sample (n = 533) of the Dutch adult population, based on age, gender and educational level, completed the online questionnaire during the annual open enrolment period for 2015. The final model with four latent classes showed that being able to choose a care provider freely was by far the most decisive characteristic for respondents aged over 45, those with chronic conditions, and those with a gross income over €3000/month. Monthly premium was the most important choice determinant for young, healthy, and lower income respondents. We conclude that it would be very unlikely for half of the sample to opt for health plans with restricted provider choice. However, a premium discount up to €15/month by restricted health plans might motivate especially younger, healthier, and less wealthy consumers to choose these plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2010 a bundled payment system for diabetes care, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease care, and vascular risk management was introduced in the Netherlands. Health insurers now pay a single fee to a contracting entity, the care group, to cover all of the primary care needed by patients with these chronic conditions. The initial evaluation of the program indicated that it improved the organization and coordination of care and led to better collaboration among health care providers and better adherence to care protocols. Negative consequences included dominance of the care group by general practitioners, large price variations among care groups that were only partially explained by differences in the amount of care provided, and an administrative burden caused by outdated information and communication technology systems. It is too early to draw conclusions about the effects of the new payment system on the quality or the overall costs of care. However, the introduction of bundled payments might turn out to be a useful step in the direction of risk-adjusted integrated capitation payments for multidisciplinary provider groups offering primary and specialty care to a defined group of patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislation that came into effect in 2006 has dramatically altered the health insurance system in the Netherlands, placing greater emphasis on consumer choice and competition among insurers. The potential for such competition depends largely on consumer preferences for price and quality of service by insurers and quality of affiliated providers. This study provides initial evidence on the preferences of Dutch consumers and how they view trade-offs between various aspects of health insurance product design. A key feature of the analysis is that we compare the responses of high and low risk individuals, where risk is defined by the presence of a costly chronic condition. This contrast is critically important for understanding incentives facing insurers and for identifying potential unanticipated consequences of market competition. The results from our conjoint analysis suggest that not only high risk but also low risk individuals are willing to pay substantially more for insurance products that can be shown to provide better health outcomes. This suggests that insurance products that are more expensive and provide better quality of care may also attract low risk individuals. Therefore, development and dissemination of good, reliable and understandable health plan performance indicators may effectively reduce the problem of adverse selection. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]