Search

Infections by A/H5 and A/H7 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) can cause acute disease and are therefore notifiable in poultry and wild birds. During winter 2015-2016, several cases of infection caused by highly pathogenic (HP) AIVs belonging to the A/H5N1, A/H5N2, and A/H5N9 subtypes were detected in southwestern France. Throughout winter 2016-2017, several cases of infections caused mainly by A/H5N8 HP AIV (A/goose/GD/1/1996, clade 2.3.4.4) were detected across Europe. On both occasions, the viruses were widely detected on palmiped farms in France. This study was designed to evaluate the persistence of A/H5 HP AIV in slurry from various duck productions. This was achieved (i) in the laboratory setting by artificially spiking four AIV-free slurry samples with known amounts of A/H5N9 HP AIV and monitoring virus infectivity, with or without lime treatment to achieve pH 10 or pH 12, and (ii) by sampling slurry tanks on five naturally A/H5N8 HP-contaminated farms. Experimental results in artificially spiked slurry suggested virus survival for 4 weeks in slurry from Muscovy or Pekin duck breeders and for 2 weeks in slurry from ducks for foie gras production during the assisted-feeding period, without lime treatment. Persistence of infectious A/H5N9 HP AIV in all slurry samples after lime treatment at pH 10 or pH 12 was less than 1 week. The A/H5N8 HP AIV persisted in naturally contaminated untreated slurry for 7 weeks. The results obtained provide experimental support for the 60-day storage period without treatment or the 7-day interval after lime treatment defined in French regulations for slurry sanitization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 2020 up to summer 2023, there was a substantial change in the situation concerning the high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus in Europe. This change concerned mainly virus circulation within wildlife, both in wild birds and wild mammals. It involved the seasonality of HPAI detections, the species affected, excess mortality events, and the apparent increased level of contamination in wild birds. The knock-on effect concerned new impacts and challenges for the poultry sector, which is affected by repeated annual waves of HPAI arriving with wild migratory birds and by risks due to viral circulation within resident wild birds across the year. Indeed, exceeding expectations, new poultry sectors and production areas have been affected during the recent HPAI seasons in France. The HPAI virus strains involved also generate considerable concern about human health because of enhanced risks of species barrier crossing. In this article, we present these changes in detail, along with the required adjustment of prevention, control, and surveillance strategies, focusing specifically on the situation in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An H3N1 avian influenza virus was detected in a laying hens farm in May 2019 which had experienced 25% mortality in Northern France. The complete sequencing of this virus showed that all segment sequences belonged to the Eurasian lineage and were phylogenetically very close to many of the Belgian H3N1 viruses detected in 2019. The French virus presented two genetic particularities with NA and NS deletions that could be related to virus adaptation from wild to domestic birds and could increase virulence, respectively. Molecular data of H3N1 viruses suggest that these two deletions occurred at two different times. • Avian Influenza H3N1 virus detected in poultry farm exhibited mortality in France. • Concomitant NA and NS deletion on French avian Influenza H3N1 virus. • tMRCA analyses suggest two independent event dates for the occurrence of NA and NS deletions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A serological test for detecting N9-specific antibodies may be useful as a DIVA strategy to differentiate vaccinated from infected animals or simply for direct serological detection of infection with N9-subtype virus. The method currently recommended for the detection of antibodies against neuraminidase is neuraminidase inhibition (NI), which is a laborious method using toxic chemicals and has low sensitivity. The present study describes the development and validation of an N9-specific ELISA. Data obtained with this N9 ELISA were compared to those obtained with nucleoprotein-based ELISA, haemagglutination inhibition test using homologous antigen and NI assay. 785 sera from ducks and chickens were used, from flocks previously determined to be AI negative or from experimentally infected or immunized flocks. Sensitivity and specificity were evaluated, and a ROC curve and kappa values, which provide a comparison between methods, were calculated. The results obtained in this study indicate that the N9 based-ELISA is effective in detecting N9-specific antibodies with high specificity and with better sensitivity than the recommended NI method; using data from 177 common sera tested with N9 ELISA and NI assay both compared to NP-based ELISA, their specificity were evaluated at 93.6% and 91.5% respectively, and sensitivity at 90.8% and 39.2% respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Comparison of a commercial H5 ELISA and H5 HI test. [•] Muscovy and Pekin duck species sera in high number (more than 1700). [•] SPF ducks experimentally infected and conventional naturally infected ducks. [•] Determination of sensitivity and specificity with Bayesian method. [•] Analyze at individual and batch level. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

During winter 2020–2021, France and other European countries were severely affected by highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses of the Gs/GD/96 lineage, clade 2.3.4.4b. In total, 519 cases occurred, mainly in domestic waterfowl farms in Southwestern France. Analysis of viral genomic sequences indicated that 3 subtypes of HPAI H5 viruses were detected (H5N1, H5N3, H5N8), but most French viruses belonged to the H5N8 subtype genotype A, as Europe. Phylogenetic analyses of HPAI H5N8 viruses revealed that the French sequences were distributed in 9 genogroups, suggesting 9 independent introductions of H5N8 from wild birds, in addition to the 2 introductions of H5N1 and H5N3. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We detected 3 genotypes of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) virus in France during winter 2016-17. Genotype A viruses caused dramatic economic losses in the domestic duck farm industry in southwestern France. Our phylogenetic analysis suggests that genotype A viruses formed 5 distinct geographic clusters in southwestern France. In some clusters, local secondary transmission might have been started by a single introduction. The intensity of the viral spread seems to correspond to the density of duck holdings in each production area. To avoid the introduction of disease into an unaffected area, it is crucial that authorities limit the movements of potentially infected birds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We detected highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus in a domestic cat that lived near a duck farm infected by a closely related virus in France during December 2022. Enhanced surveillance of symptomatic domestic carnivores in contact with infected birds is recommended to prevent further spread to mammals and humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2016–2017, France experienced a devastating epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8, with more than 400 outbreaks reported in poultry farms. We analyzed the spatiotemporal dynamics of the epidemic using a structured‐coalescent‐based phylodynamic approach that combined viral genomic data (n = 196; one viral genome per farm) and epidemiological data. In the process, we estimated viral migration rates between départements (French administrative regions) and the temporal dynamics of the effective viral population size (Ne) in each département. Viral migration rates quantify viral spread between départements and Ne is a population genetic measure of the epidemic size and, in turn, is indicative of the within‐département transmission intensity. We extended the phylodynamic analysis with a generalized linear model to assess the impact of multiple factors—including large‐scale preventive culling and live‐duck movement bans—on viral migration rates and Ne. We showed that the large‐scale culling of ducks that was initiated on 4 January 2017 significantly reduced the viral spread between départements. No relationship was found between the viral spread and duck movements between départements. The within‐département transmission intensity was found to be weakly associated with the intensity of duck movements within départements. Together, these results indicated that the virus spread in short distances, either between adjacent départements or within départements. Results also suggested that the restrictions on duck transport within départements might not have stopped the viral spread completely. Overall, we demonstrated the usefulness of phylodynamics in characterizing the dynamics of a HPAI epidemic and assessing control measures. This method can be adapted to investigate other epidemics of fast‐evolving livestock pathogens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of subtype H5N1 have spread since late 2003 in East and Southeast Asia. In April 2005, a large-scale outbreak of H5N1 infection that occurred in migratory waterfowl in Qinghai Lake nature reserve in western China, killing more than 6000 wild birds, appeared to be the beginning of a epizootic that caused outbreaks in domestic and wild birds in nearly 60 countries from Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. The first case of Asian lineage HPAI H5N1 virus in France was described in dead wild ducks (Common pochard) in the east of France in mid-February 2006. Up to the end of April, 42 HPAI H5N1 viruses were identified from about 60 wild birds belonging to different species and one outbreak occurred in commercial turkeys. To establish genetic relationships with other HPAI H5N1 viruses, 12 selected viruses were subjected to phylogenetic analysis. Genotyping and genetic analyses revealed that the French viruses were very similar to those of the 'Qinghai-like' sublineage and belonged to clade 2.2. However, two related but distinct genetic subgroups were identified, indicating that two different viruses were circulating in France at the same time and in the same area. Viruses of one subgroup were highly similar to one identified in Bavaria in Germany (A/mallard/Bavaria/1/2006). More surprisingly, French viruses belonging to the other subgroup retained the cleavage motif PQGERKRKKR/G, which is unique among the known HPAI H5N1 viruses. Our results confirmed that multiple H5N1 genogroups were present in Western Europe in early 2006. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) clade 2.3.4.4 spread in France during 2016-2017. We assessed the biosecurity and avian influenza virus infection status of 70 backyard flocks near H5N8-infected commercial farms. One flock was seropositive for clade 2.3.4.4. Backyard flocks linked to commercial farms had elevated risk for H5 infection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, France faced large avian influenza outbreaks, like in 2016 and 2017. Controlling these outbreaks required the preventive depopulation of a large number of duck farms. A previous study in 2017 showed that the quality of decontamination of trucks and transport crates used for depopulation was often insufficient. A new study was then set up to evaluate cleaning and disinfection (C&D) of trucks and crates used for duck depopulation and whether practices had changed since 2017. Three methods were used to assess decontamination: 1) detection of avian influenza virus (AIV) genome, 2) visual inspection of cleanliness, and 3) microbial counts, considering that 2 and 3 are commonly used in abattoirs. Another objective of the study was to evaluate the correlation between results obtained with the 3 methods. In 5 abattoirs, 8 trucks and their crates were sampled by swabbing to detect AIV genome by rRT-PCR before and after decontamination. Visual cleanliness scores and coliform counts were also determined on crates after C&D. Trucks and crates were decontaminated according to the abattoirs' protocols. Before C&D, 3 quarters of crates (59/79) and 7 of 8 trucks were positive for AIV genome. C&D procedures were reinforced in 2021 compared to 2017; use of detergent solution and warm water were more common. Nevertheless, 28% of the crates were positive for AIV genome after C&D, despite the fact that cleaning scores and microbiological counts were satisfactory for 84% and 91% of the crates, respectively. No correlation was observed between results for AIV genome detection and results from visual control or from coliform counts. Abattoirs are encouraged to use environmental sampling coupled with AIV genome detection to monitor the quality of cleaning and disinfection of trucks and crates during AI outbreaks. Reinforcement of biosecurity measures at abattoirs is still needed to avoid residual contamination of the equipment and cross-contamination during the decontamination process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]