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This article explores the impact of the US foreign policy's predictability, or lack thereof, vis-à-vis the Middle Easter regional order. It lays out two main arguments. Firstly, since 2003, the US has undertaken some concrete actions which have undermined former expectations of its behaviour among regional actors. By that, Washington distanced itself from open and predictable foreign policy that played a key role in maintaining the regional order, most concretely as an external security provider. US actions fostered a double-level uncertainty: amid a broader process of strategic disengagement from the region, the US's level of intervention was not really predictable as in some occasions it adhered to its former responsibilities and opted either for direct intervention or offshore engagement, while in others it advanced in its disengagement by not intervening or doing less than expected by regional actors; additionally, in terms of the direction of its interventions, its policies fostered uncertainty as they fluctuated from some reinforcing the status to those disrupting it. Secondly, this uncertainty prompted regional actors to assume further security-oriented responsibilities, as shown by the renewed centrality of the Gulf Cooperation Council or the innovative Saudi foreign policy in Bahrain, Yemen or Qatar since 2011. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Saudi Arabia's decision in recent years to use novel and hitherto unexplored informal alliance formats, which we term multinational security coalitions (MSCs). This development was initiated by the new Saudi political leadership under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who have a much greater inclination to pursue proactive foreign and security policies than their predecessors. However, it will be highlighted that beyond the priorities of individual personalities, this shift in Saudi Arabia's behaviour occurred against the backdrop of significant changes in the existing security environment, including the perceived withdrawal of the United States from the security affairs of the region during the presidency of Barack Obama, and crucially also Saudi Arabia's frustration over the failure of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to develop into a viable security mechanism. The article begins with the introduction of the key ideas relating to institutional design, the conceptual framework for this study. Section two outlines the most important reasons for Saudi Arabia's choice of the MSC format. The third section examines the strengths of the MSC format—especially informality, the resulting low entry-thresholds and the low risk of entrapment—that provided Saudi Arabia with partial and temporary success in recruiting coalition partners and thus bolstering its leadership role. The final section demonstrates, however, that ultimately MSCs are not a panacea. The informality of MSCs that makes it easy for the pivotal state to assemble a coalition also makes it hard for it to forge, and enforce, a common vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the alliance between Syria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the years 1970–1989. The relations between the two Arab powers were characterized by cooperation and support amid ideological and 'structural' differences. This was a stark contrast with the conflictual relations of the previous decade. The change was driven mainly by a reshaping in Syria's regional policy. The new 'realist' foreign policy imposed by Hafiz Al-Assad created an overlapping of interests between Syria and the KSA. Riyadh valued Syria's role in the region and used its support of Damascus vis-à-vis Israel as a tool to obtain domestic and regional legitimacy. On the other hand, Syria benefited from the KSA's generous economic and diplomatic help. This study will use an approach based on neoclassical realism to show how domestic and international factors led to these changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Iran and Saudi Arabia, long time adversaries socially, politically, militarily and religiously. The author traces this competition back to two events in 1979: the Iranian revolution and the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Other topics discussed include how the Iranian revolution transformed the country into a theocracy, Islamic extremism and Shiite and Sunni Islam.

The article focuses on developments in Saudi Arabia foreign policy. Topics discussed include the liberal ideals such as regional integration and international institutionalization; the 2015 ascension of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and limited increase in U.S. support for Riyadh and the deployment of Saudi troops inside Jordan.

Saudi politics is commonly portrayed as reflecting a system of centralised personal rule in which decision-making power trickles down from the tightly knit power circles within the House of Saud. In contrast, this paper draws attention to the empowerment of quasi-autonomous state organisations in Saudi Arabia as a result of state transformation and regional integration. At its most extreme, state transformation in Saudi Arabia has created institutional and regulatory enclaves with vested interests and areas of competence that cross Saudi borders. This paper illustrates the foreign policy ramifications of transformed statehood in Saudi attempts to further Gulf regional integration in the context of the Gulf Monetary Union project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A special relationship has developed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, centered on a particular trade-off. Saudi Arabia depends on Pakistan for strategic depth and regards it as both an important asset in restraining Iranian influence and an answer to its need for a non-Arab ally. In exchange, Pakistan receives extensive economic aid, and benefits from Saudi Arabia's influence in the Gulf and its role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites. The two countries have been able to overcome several disputes between them by maneuvering between various pressures, strengthening their special relations, and ensuring that more is unknown than known about their strategic cooperation, both conventional and nuclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saudi Arabia's massive air campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen initiated a major shift from the Kingdom's traditional policy of restraint, to a force-based foreign policy approach unofficially dubbed the "Salman Doctrine." The doctrine aimed at repositioning the Kingdom as the Middle East's preeminent power by rolling back its archrival Iran. This commentary argues that the Kingdom has made hardly any progress on the war and diplomatic fronts so far to achieve this objective, due mainly to a glaring mismatch between the doctrine's ends and the means to achieve these ends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the competition for regional leadership between Egypt, under President President Abdel Fattah Sisi, and Saudi Arabia, under crown prince Muhammad bin Salman. An overview of their mutual opposition to Iran and to the alliance between the organization Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar is provided.

Over the last few decades, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have become very active in Northeast Africa. In addition to developing bilateral relations with countries in the region, they regard the area as the gateway to connections with the rest of the continent, although they are guided by different motivations. Turkey's expansion of its interests in Africa is both a reaction to the European Union's rejection of its membership and an opportunity to expand its trade, which has been hindered by instability in the Middle East in recent years. Like Saudi Arabia, it views Northeast Africa as a place to extend its cultural influence with that region's indigenous Sunni population. Saudi Arabia has used its wealth to curtail Iran's attempts to expand its influence in the region, while Turkey has provided on-the-ground technical assistance to enhance its political and economic connections in the region. In recent years the two countries have been drawn together by Iran's involvement in Yemen, although Turkey has sought to avoid becoming involved in local political disputes. Rather, it has served in multinational peacekeeping efforts and actions to prevent piracy in the sea lanes off the coast of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. However, since the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the latter country's relations [End Page 1] with Iran that began in June 2017, some tension has arisen between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. While Iran also wants those sea lanes to be freely open to traffic—as they were during the time of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi—it also wants to counteract Israeli involvement in Northeast Africa. Turkey has made great inroads politically and economically in Northeast Africa in recent years, while Saudi Arabia has gained the upper hand in its rivalry with Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents speeches given by attendees of the meeting held at the Capitol Visitor Center in Washington D.C. on November 30, 2018, including Ryan Crocker, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, scholar Hussein Ibish, and professor Bülent Aras on the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the Middle East. Topics discussed include the massacre at the Shatila refugee camp, the killing of author Jamal Khashoggi, and Turkey's increasing influence in North Africa.

The article discusses the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia for 2017-18 by referring to the rise of politicians Haider al-Abadi and Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq and Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. Topics discussed include the Iraqi revolution of 1958, the change in the Saudis' Iraq policy driven by Iran's increasing involvement in regional conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, and building of a barrier along the Saudi-Iraqi border.

The events of the 2016 summit of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Turkey demonstrate how Saudi Arabia’s role within the organization has been transformed from leadership into a hegemonic one, a process that has been unfolding over five decades. As a strong voice in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia has employed a range of diplomatic strategies, in accordance with its national interests, to influence the OIC and its member states. Based on the analysis, this paper argues that Saudi Arabia has been able to exert hegemonic control over the OIC due to the organization’s structural make-up, its reliance on Saudi funding, as well as dominance in bilateral affairs with majority of the OIC members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If shared security perceptions were the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2011 might be analysed as the watershed year in which the GCC began to fragment from within. Both the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises were manifestations of conflicting security perceptions, formed across the GCC countries in and since 2011. Through an in-depth analysis of the events and of the subsequent reaction of the GCC governments in terms of discourse and foreign policy, we distinguish three different categories of conceptualization. First, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates perceived domestic protests as an 'intermestic' threat - triggered by the intersection of the international and domestic levels. Second, the leaders of Oman and Kuwait conceptualized protests in their countries as manageable domestic insecurity, rather than as fully-fledged externally orchestrated events - arguably because they did not perceive a direct danger to their stability and legitimacy. Finally, it can be argued that the government of Qatar did not see any real danger in the protests but instead viewed them as an opportunity to expand Doha's regional influence, arguably at Riyadh's expense. Unpacking the fundamental factors shaping such perceptions is the key to finding the appropriate framework for analysing GCC security in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Yemen with the aim of restoring the rule of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and destroying the Houthi movement. Scholars and policy analysts moved quickly to examine the Yemen war as a sectarian struggle and a byproduct of Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the region. However, these traditional explanations fall short of unravelling the Saudi motive behind launching a largescale operation in Yemen, its severely weakened and politically divided neighbor. This paper offers an alternative explanation for the abrupt Saudi aggressiveness toward Yemen. It argues that this intervention is driven by a non-material need: Saudi leadership aims to assert the Kingdom’s status as a regional power in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines foreign relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and discusses the impact the relationship has within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It covers the UAE's national security efforts since its creation in 1971 and how Saudi Arabia has viewed the UAE as a competitor within the GCC in both politics and economics.

The article focuses relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and mentions demonstrations against government in Cairo, Egypt. Topics discussed include president of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz AlSaud, Egypt's involvement in regional conflicts and anti-Iran sentiment in the country.

This article reflects on the turmoil in the states of the Levant, particularly seen in the context of broader tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Particular regard is given to the radical challenge of Sunni and largely Salafi jihadism; the disabling of large parts of the Middle East state system in the wake of the Arab Spring; the dramatic fall in global energy prices; the fraying of traditional alliances between Saudi Arabia, the US and other powers. The increase in sectarianism and conflicts over authority in Islam are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores the opportunity for an Iran-Saudi Arabia dialogue as a result of Houthi rebels' occupation of Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, in September 2014. Topics mentioned include Iran's plan to export its revolutionary ideology and establish a Shia empire throughout the Middle East according to Arab Gulf officials, the influence of Yemen in Saudi Arabia for decades, and comments on Tehran's Yemen policy. Also discussed are the Iranian involvement in Yemen and the relationship of the Houthis with Iran.

The article talks about the status of the Arab Shi'a community which has been assumed to be Iranian influenced or explicitly backed by Iran. Topics covered include the implication of the execution of prominent Saudi Shi'i Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on January 6, 2016 on Iran-Saudi Arabia relations, the issue of Arab Shi'a identity, and the status of Shi'a under Saddam Hussein's rule. Also discussed are the rising sectarianism around the Gulf and the stance of the government of the U.S. on Shi'a deportations.

The article discusses on the condemnation of Saudi Arabia to the Islamist militant group Hezbollah following the reports of hostile attacks of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. The author highlights the report of turmoil between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia's media attack on Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrullah who accuses Saudi Arabia interfering with the domestic politics in Lebanon. Also noted are the external security threats Saudi Arabia confronted from groups in Yemen, Iran, and Iraq.

For the most part of the twenty-five years of the contemporary Russian-Saudi relationship it has been a mixed baggage of mutual accusations, large-scale suspicions and extremely limited cooperation. Swift regional transformations in the wake of the Arab spring, Russia's re-emergence in the region as a influential actor and the power transition in the Kingdom have pushed Moscow and Riyadh to seek a fresh start. The relationship has multiple dimensions, is dependent on too many outside factors and is still far from offering an "ideal formula" for adequately marrying each other's interests. At the same time, it possesses enough resources needed for a more robust cooperation. The present paper examines the nature of the Russian-Saudi relationship, as well as outside factors that frequently define it. It also assesses implications of the crisis in Syria on the bilateral relations and proposes a vision for a potential cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses social instability and conflict in the Middle East, including Islamic terrorism, sectarian conflict and the Syrian Civil War. An overview of Saudi Arabia and Iran's relations with other countries of the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia's support of client regimes in Yemen and Bahrain, is provided.

The article focuses on a research paper on Turkey's foreign policies. Topics discussed include Islamist background of the foreign policy makers, signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Turkey's changing strategic, political and economic interests.

The article provides an account of Saudi Arabia's "look east" trade policy. Topics discussed include strengthening of Saudi Arabia's diplomatic ties with India and China in 2006 under its previous king Abdullah, export of oil, development of renewable energy, and economic diversification, and high oil exports from Saudi Arabia in 2013.

The Iran nuclear deal has the potential to become a game changer in the Middle East by providing the opportunity for rapprochement between Iran, the preeminent power in the Gulf, and the United States, the preeminent global power, thus reducing the strategic importance of both Saudi Arabia and Israel. Israel's virulent opposition to the deal has also demonstrated that it has become a strategic liability for the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]