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During the summer of 2023, I conducted an interview with Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon, a veteran of over 30 years in key roles within the Israeli Defense Forces. As a leading authority on national security and intelligence, Ya’alon provided critical insights, particularly regarding the intelligence failures of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and how these failures inform present-day security dilemmas. Although this interview was conducted three months before the surprise Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, Ya’alon stressed the significance of lessons from previous conflicts and significant geopolitical developments. He also underscored the importance of cultural and emotional factors in intelligence failures and the dynamics of Israel’s relations with the Five Eyes alliance, offering insights that illuminate some of the challenges Israel would encounter three months later. This interview is part of an ongoing oral history project designed to gather diverse perspectives on intelligence and national security leadership in Israel, enhancing our understanding of the security dilemmas of the Middle East and the world of espionage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foundation model has brought unprecedented opportunities and challenges to the military field due to its powerful capabilities in natural language understanding, logical reasoning, and text generation. This paper reviews related technologies of large language models, including architectural and modeling, adaption and fine-tuning, and prompting and learning, as well as the current status of the development of typical multimodal foundation models. It conducts a deep analysis of the characteristics of mainstream domestic and international military application platforms that utilize foundation models, and designs typical task scenarios and capability requirements for military applications of large models. Then, challenges of military foundation models are discussed. Finally, the key common technologies in military applications are summarized. Hopefully, our work can be beneficial for the design of significant military applications based on foundation model technologies and researches of actual combat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in military affairs is largely limited to logistics, transport, reconnaissance, and other support functions at present. Yet, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are also making significant progress in developing autonomous combat vehicles and other offensive applications of AI. The ambiguous nature and multifaceted applications of AI in military affairs could be seen as either increasing or decreasing the relative cost of offensive military action. The critical question, therefore, is not a technical determination of whether the emerging uses of AI favor the offensive or defensive force, but rather an assessment of how AI is perceived by policymakers. Similar to the World War I era cult of the offensive, ambiguous emerging technology may drive leaders to focus on the offensive advantages of that technology when expectations of conflict are rising. This paper examines the policy elite discourse surrounding the military applications of AI in both the United States and the PRC between 2014 and 2022. It finds that over this period, elite discussion of the use of AI in military affairs has shifted in both states in ways that indicate more focus on the offensive rather than defensive applications of this emerging technology. While by no means determinative, it is an indicator that perceptions of the offense–defense balance may be moving in a destabilizing direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Military Internet of Things (MIoT) has emerged as a new research area in military intelligence. The MIoT frequently has to constitute a federation-capable IoT environment when the military needs to interact with other institutions and organizations or carry out joint missions as part of a coalition such as in NATO. One of the main challenges of deploying the MIoT in such an environment is to acquire, analyze, and merge vast amounts of data from many different IoT devices and disseminate them in a secure, reliable, and context-dependent manner. This challenge is one of the main challenges in a federated environment and forms the basis for establishing trusting relationships and secure communication between IoT devices belonging to different partners. In this work, we focus on the problem of fulfillment of the data-centric security paradigm, i.e., ensuring the secure management of data along the path from its origin to the recipients and implementing fine-grained access control mechanisms. This problem can be solved using innovative solutions such as applying attribute-based encryption (ABE). In this work, we present a comprehensive solution for secure data dissemination in a federated MIoT environment, enabling the use of distributed registry technology (Hyperledger Fabric), a message broker (Apache Kafka), and data processing microservices implemented using the Kafka Streams API library. We designed and implemented ABE cryptography data access control methods using a combination of pairings-based elliptic curve cryptography and lightweight cryptography and confirmed their suitability for the federations of military networks. Experimental studies indicate that the proposed cryptographic scheme is viable for the number of attributes typically assumed to be used in battlefield networks, offering a good trade-off between security and performance for modern cryptographic applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indications and Warnings subfield of intelligence has traditionally divided warnings into a dichotomy of “ambiguous” and “unambiguous” that gives policymakers a false sense of security. This article examines how unambiguous warning has been conceptualized and why it has become an inadequate planning tool that can lead to dire consequences in the quest for certainty. Using the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Pearl Harbor attack as case studies, the article shows unambiguous warning is an inadequate planning tool that can lead to dire consequences in the quest for certainty. The article concludes with observations about the role of intelligence and the future of military planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expansion of intelligence studies into new areas shows that intelligence behaves differently in different environments. Taking Military Intelligence as a context, this article will frame and define Combat Intelligence as a distinct field of activity within that context, with a unique set of behaviours and characteristics. It will also demonstrate that examination of Combat Intelligence through perspectives used to look at state level intelligence – role, oversight, failure, politicisation, and processes – offers up new insights into the production and usePage 3 of 3 of intelligence in a military context that improve our understanding of it as a discrete sphere of activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the objective to predict and pre-empt the emergence of political violence, the US Department of Defence (DoD) has devoted increasing attention to the intersection between neurobiology and artificial intelligence. Concepts such as 'cognitive biotechnologies', 'digital biosecurity' and large-scale collection of 'neurodata' herald a future in which neurobiological intervention on a global scale is believed to come of age. This article analyses how the relationship between neurobiology and AI – between the human and the machine – is conceived, made possible, and acted upon within the SMA programme, an interdisciplinary research programme sponsored by the DoD. By showcasing the close intersection between the computer sciences and the neurosciences within the US military, the article questions descriptions of algorithmic governmentality as decentring the human, and as juxtaposed to biopolitical techniques to regulate processes of subjectivity. The article shows that within US military discourse, new biotechnologies are seen to engender algorithmic governmentality a biopolitical dimension, capable of monitoring and regulating emotions, thoughts, beliefs, and subjectivity on population level, particularly targeting the minds and brains of 'vulnerable' populations in the global South. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the need for securitisation and counterterrorism cooperation among states is consistently re-echoed in the previous studies on security, the role (or complicity) of the neo-liberal state in distorting and undermining these arrangements has been neglected. The objective of this article is to examine how state actors are implicated in the weakening of counterterrorism engagements in the Lake Chad region. Based on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, the study identified three thresholds of state complicity undermining the fight against Boko Haram: (i) information compromise (ii) amnesty programme complicity (rehabilitation of Boko Haram members) and (iii) intelligence complicity. These are primarily underpinned by the rehabilitation of 'unrepentant' Boko Haram terrorists, fragmentation of military institutions, and complicity in cross-border arms movements. These acts do not only undermine internal peace and security but also perpetuate transnational terrorism in the Lake Chad region. The article, therefore, recommends a new peace agenda hinged on a hybrid of regional partnership on peace education and security cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the notion of strategic intelligence, namely with respect to leadership and business-oriented areas. Strategic intelligence is a researched concept that primarily concerns the collection and analysis of intelligence for policy and military planning, mainly at national and international levels, whereas this study of management and organizational decision-making application is an extension of that. This article's subject is the necessity for strategic intelligence, a crucial competence for leaders, managers, and companies striving to remain competitive, to be utilized and best leveraged in today's volatile and dynamic business contexts. This study follows a research design that includes a thorough literature review and bibliometric research, executed via VoSViewer, illustrating the concept of strategic intelligence from a leadership point of view as a driver of competitive advantage, enhanced by knowledge dynamics. Furthermore, this article points out that the limitations are acknowledged because the literature on the matter is limited, as strategic intelligence is relatively new to the business sector; moreover, more research is required to fully understand and use the potential of strategic intelligence in business growth. Overcoming these limitations and continuing to study the strategic intelligence concept could, on the one hand, use multiple platforms, such as scholarly articles or encyclopedias, and, on the other hand, support businesses in gaining a competitive edge and making informed decisions that can fuel their success in an ever-evolving market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a comparison between Romanian communist counterinsurgency (1944–1962) and similar campaigns fought by Western and Eastern governments in the early Cold War, in particular those waged by the British and French governments in their African, Asian and European colonies and those of the Soviet Union in its borderlands. The comparison focuses on three main components, population control, intelligence and military operations. Highlighting both similarities and differences across different cultural, economic, geographical, ethnic and political landscapes, the perspective laid out in this paper is an argument in favour of systematic and sustained comparative approaches to asymmetric warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The era of intelligent war is coming with the wide application of big data technology and artificial intelligence technology in military field. Based on the characteristics of intelligent war, this paper describes the challenges of traditional weapon equipment, and puts forward the development strategy of weapon equipment system under condition of intelligent war, it has certain practical significance to improve the system efficiency of weapon equipment and win the initiative of future wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Raven Sentry, a project that employed artificial intelligence to provide advance warning of insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. During 2019 and 2020, the Resolute Support Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J2) benefited from a command culture open to innovation, the urgency created by the US drawdown, and a uniquely talented group of personnel that, aided by commercial sector experts, built an AI system that helped predict attacks. The war's end cut Raven Sentry short, but the experience provides important lessons on AI and the conditions necessary for successful innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success of deep-learning algorithms in analyzing complex structured and unstructured multidimensional data has caused an exponential increase in the amount of research devoted to the applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine in the past decade. Public release of large language models like ChatGPT the past year has generated an unprecedented storm of excitement and rumors of machine intelligence finally reaching or even surpassing human capability in detecting meaningful signals in complex multivariate data. Such enthusiasm, however, is met with an equal degree of both skepticism and fear over the social, legal, and moral implications of such powerful technology with relatively little safeguards or regulations on its development. The question remains in medicine of how to harness the power of AI to improve patient outcomes by increasing the diagnostic accuracy and treatment precision provided by medical professionals. Military medicine, given its unique mission and resource constraints,can benefit immensely from such technology. However, reaping such benefits hinges on the ability of the rising generations of military medical professionals to understand AI algorithms and their applications. Additionally, they should strongly consider working with them as an adjunct decision-maker and view them as a colleague to access and harness relevant information as opposed to something to be feared. Ideas expressed in this commentary were formulated by a military medical student during a two-month research elective working on a multidisciplinary team of computer scientists and clinicians at the National Library of Medicine advancing the state of the art of AI in medicine. A motivation to incorporate AI in the Military Health System is provided, including examples of applications in military medicine. Rationale is then given for inclusion of AI in education starting in medical school as well as a prudent implementation of these algorithms in a clinical workflow during graduate medical education. Finally, barriers to implementation are addressed along with potential solutions. The end state is not that rising military physicians are technical experts in AI; but rather that they understand how they can leverage its rapidly evolving capabilities to prepare for a future where AI will have a significant role in clinical care. The overall goal is to develop trained clinicians that can leverage these technologies to improve the Military Health System. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Poland was the second-to-last country in the Soviet bloc to establish official relations with the PLO – only doing this in March 1976. However, mutual contacts date back to the late 1960s, when Polish military intelligence forged a top-secret relationship with the PLO based around the arms trade. Using a variety of archival sources, this paper seeks to re-assess the relationship between Warsaw and the PLO within the broader framework of Polish policy towards the Middle East from the time of the Six-Day War to the time of opening of the PLO Office in Warsaw in 1976. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AI-enabled systems are likely to inform future decisions to initiate war. They are well placed to manage data and deliver recommendations at speeds that far surpass human abilities. Yet, AI-enabled vision and knowledge, which inform military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance practices, curiously sustain both exposure and opacity. Machine learning algorithms are famously called black boxes even as they are in practice widening what we can see and know. While many call for greater algorithmic transparency to combat this technological opacity, I argue that this desire is misguided because it overlooks how algorithmic reason, which promises more precise knowledge and more efficient decision making, naturally conceals through political and socio-technical practices of in-visibility, anonymity, and fragmentation. Given how these practices will likely come to shape AI-enabled resort-to-force decision making, this article concludes with the suggestion that AI-enabled decisions are likely to undermine democratic legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the sole plausible military threat facing Sweden, the Soviet Union and then Russia have consistently been at the top of Swedish intelligence collection priorities. In fact, understanding Russia and its military forces well is a source of pride and self-perceived comparative advantage of the Swedish intelligence community. This article contextualizes Swedish intelligence collection on Russia, including its Cold War antecedents and the persistent counterintelligence threat. It then describes Swedish intelligence reporting in anticipation of the war in Ukraine, including a reported misjudgement that Russia would ultimately not conduct a full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in its entirety. This 'intelligence failure' was reportedly based on the assessment that Russia had assembled insufficient military capabilities to subjugate Ukraine, and that such an operation would be too risky and costly. Coming full circle in again beginning to focus mainly on great power competition and military capabilities in its near abroad, Swedish military intelligence has since reported valuable intelligence on Russian military capabilities, drawing on a combination of collection capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies US-Italian 'stay-behind' cooperation between 1943 and 1976, when it was terminated, within the context of US covert anti-communist activities in Italy. The paper first provides an overview of the operational activities jointly conducted by the US and Italian intelligence between 1943 and 1947, while detailing the US penetrations of the Italian intelligence system and the early stages of development of a US covert network. Subsequently, it delineates the proliferation of US covert anti-communist networks in north-east Italy, the rise of S/B cooperation and its institutionalisation in the Gladio agreement, as well as the CIA pressures for 'offsets' in exchange for its financial support of the Italian S/B programme. In the third part, after analysing the temporary hiatus in US intelligence covert activities, the paper describes the decline and end of US-Italian S/B cooperation and the stepping up of covert operations by both the CIA and the US military intelligence. It demonstrates that Gladio did not occupy a central role in US covert operations against communism until 1976 and that CIA pressures on the Italian military intelligence represented an opportunistic attempt at maximising the 'return' on the financial investment in the Italian S/B programme. The article concludes by summarising the pattern of US intelligence activities in Italy in the period under scrutiny and the role of Gladio, and laying out implications for theory-development in the realm of intelligence cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship of analytic standards generally focuses on their application in strategic intelligence assessments. Yet analytic standards are underexplored in other environments, particularly tactical and operational military intelligence analyses. These environments challenge many assumptions that generally underpin the implementation of analytic standards, including multi-analyst quality control chains and a focus on rigor as the primary measure of quality. The US Air Force’s implementation of analytic standards offers an illustration of how such standards can be applied in military intelligence environments. To successfully employ analytic standards in tactical and operational intelligence environments, emphasis must be placed on accrediting analysts themselves as well as their output. The rigor-led model of analytic standards must also be broadened to give greater weight to other attributes of quality intelligence analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Application of AI and machine learning in different domains of defence system in increasing rapidly to bring automation and to facilitate all the benefits of modern technologies in military. This article conducts a scientometric analysis on articles that are on application of Ai and Ml in military equipment, military intelligence, cyber security, decision making, military operations, defence medical systems etc. This study has executed a search query on Web of Science for identifying peer reviewed current resources that are contributing to the application of modern technologies in military systems. With extensive query and filtering this study has identified 417 articles with in the period of 1991 to 2023. With analysing all the data, it determines that a lot of varied research is there on the defence system that promotes use of modern technologies in development of weapon, conducting strategic military operation, prioritising military society etc. Prioritising legal and ethical parameters. This study has also highlighted legal, and security concerns surrounding using autonomous systems in military applications. The authorship pattern, document types, country production over time, and most cited countries have also been studied. Bradford's scattering law was applied to identify the core journals, and Lotka's law to check authors' productivity patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does the Lacanian notion of fantasy offer to the study of security imaginaries? The article answers this question by introducing a fantasmatic reading strategy illustrated by a case study of the US narrative of 'technological revolutions of war' that has recently been fueled by a growing demand for ethical and explainable artificial intelligence in military applications and weapon systems. The article offers a Lacanian comment to the expanding International Relations literature on security imaginaries. It demonstrates how a fantasmatic reading encompasses both a discourse analytical tracing of background understandings employed by many security imaginary scholars and an affective tracing at the margins of discourse that captures the force with which subjects continue to invest in – and patch the constitutive gaps of – a security imaginary. In studying security imaginaries through fantasies, we propose zooming in on three analytical moves: analyzing the continuing construction of a lost utopia in security discourses; following the specific objects of desire that is organized around its own inevitable failure; and locating the mode of enjoyment encountered at the boundaries of the socially acceptable norms. Concevoir les imaginaires de la sécurité comme des fantasmes : La perte, le désir et la jouissance dans la quête militaire d'une IA explicable [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 16 April 2013, the Assad regime's Military Intelligence Branch 227 committed a massacre of over 300 civilians (including women and children) in Damascus, by driving them to a secluded part of Tadamon neighborhood, taking them to a pre-dug pit, and executing them one by one. The perpetrators videotaped the entire massacre, footage that was never intended to be circulated, but a source close to the perpetrators leaked the video to us. Having analyzed the video content, managed to find the main shooter on Facebook and then interview him, and having found contextual information and evidence for this massacre, one of the questions that still need to be addressed was: How can we unravel, examine, and systemize these types of violent video produced by the Assad regime? Much like the Caesar photos, the prison CCTV system, and the Mukhabarat archives, the phenomenon of perpetrators producing and archiving very violent images like the Tadamon massacre demonstrates how and why the Assad regime has become the chief archivist of its own violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the first part of the series of articles, we dealt with the theoretical foundations of cognitive intelligence, including primarily the possibilities of increasing military cognitive performance and the relationship between AI. Every military in the world uses some form of general cognitive intelligence assessment to place recruits in the right jobs. In the assessment, one form of examination is the examination of cognitive ability. The purpose of this article is to explore whether military cognitive intelligence assessments can actually work. Accordingly, in this second part, after the theoretical approach of the first part, we want to prove our hypothesis with practical examples, according to which cognitive intelligence can decisively influence the execution of tasks in armies, so it can be a decisive condition for successfully fighting a war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Along the line of exploring the implications of algorithmic decision-making for international law, Garcia highlights the growing dehumanization process in the military domain that reduces humans to mere data and pattern-recognizing technologies. 'Immoral codes' containing instructions to target and kill humans raise the likelihood of unpredictable and unintended violence. Compounding this challenge is a lack of international law that puts restraints on the pervasive use of algorithms in society and the ongoing military AI race. Garcia argues that current international mechanisms under international humanitarian law developed to regulate 'hardware' are not sufficient to withstand 'software' challenges posed by algorithmic-based weaponry. Instead, the human-centricity of international law is eroded by algorithmic decision-making and more violence and instability triggered by great power rivalry. International rules need to be updated to ensure the prohibition of killing that is outside human oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are we likely to see anthropomorphisms in military artificial intelligence (AI) human-machine interactions (HMIs)? And what are the potential consequences of this phenomena? Since its inception, AI has been conceptualised in anthropomorphic terms, employing biomimicry to digitally map the human brain as analogies to human reasoning. Hybrid teams of human soldiers and autonomous agents controlled by AI are expected to play an increasingly more significant role in future military operations. The article argues that anthropomorphism will play a critical role in future human-machine interactions in tactical operations. The article identifies some potential epistemological, normative, and ethical consequences of humanising algorithms for the conduct of war. It also considers the possible impact of the AI-anthropomorphism phenomenon on the inversion of AI anthropomorphism and the dehumanisation of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Ferris, a professor of history at the University of Calgary, is a prominent figure in the study of intelligence. His work integrates intelligence with military and diplomatic history, international relations, and strategic studies. Ferris has published extensively on intelligence and strategy, particularly British signals intelligence. He emphasizes the importance of reading works in other languages and recognizing the value of research done by scholars in other languages. The text also addresses the myth surrounding Bletchley Park and the limitations on publishing intelligence history. In an interview, Ferris discusses the role of intelligence in the Cold War and the importance of diversity and inclusion in intelligence history. He praises GCHQ for its adaptability and effectiveness in times of change. [Extracted from the article]

The article examines the Cave Mission of 1876, led by Stephen Cave, a Conservative MP, and its impact on Britain's imperial information strategies. Cave's report on the financial condition of Egypt is analyzed as an early form of British intelligence intervention, showcasing how the acquisition of financial information paralleled emerging intelligence tactics in late nineteenth-century Britain. The mission, often considered a precursor to the management of Egyptian finances by France and Britain, is reevaluated as a pivotal process that facilitated novel forms of imperial intervention through the capture, synthesis, and distribution of proprietary information in finance. The collapse of Egypt's intelligence sovereignty, as exposed in Cave's report, undermined investor confidence and led to the British government becoming the arbiter of Egyptian fortunes. The article places Cave's mission within a broader context of nineteenth-century institutions and technologies that facilitated intelligence gathering across the British Empire, underlining the shift towards unraveling mysteries through the discovery of secrets. Additionally, the article explores the intersection of intelligence work and financial oversight roles in the colonial administration of Egypt.

The current reanimation of artificial intelligence includes a resurgence of investment in automating military intelligence on the part of the US Department of Defense. A series of programs set forth a technopolitical imaginary of fully integrated, comprehensive and real-time 'situational awareness' across US theaters of operation. Locating this imaginary within the history of 'closed world' discourse, I offer a critical reading of dominant scholarship within military circles that sets out the military's cybernetic model of situational awareness in the form of the widely referenced Observe, Orient, Decide, Act or OODA Loop. I argue that the loop's promise of dynamic homeostasis is held in place by the enduring premise of objectivist knowledge, enabled through a war apparatus that treats the contingencies and ambiguities of relations on the ground as noise from which a stable and unambiguous signal can be extracted. In contrast, recent challenges to the closed-world imaginary, based on critical scholarship and investigative journalism, suggest that the aspiration to closure is an engine for the continued destructiveness of US interventions and the associated regeneration of enmity. To challenge these technopolitics of violence we need a radically different kind of situational awareness, one that recognizes the place of ignorance in perpetuating the project of militarism. Only that kind of awareness can inform the public debate required to re-envision a future place for the US in the world, founded in alternative investments in demilitarization and commitments to our collective security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role did North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the coalition (International Security Assistance Force—ISAF) it led play in the failure of the West in Afghanistan? This essay argues that the ISAF intelligence community's inability to come to grips with the complex operational environment in Afghanistan contributed to the problem. Using three concepts from the complexity literature, requisite variety, learning, and enactment, I analyze critical flaws in NATO's approach. ISAF's weak cross-cultural competence, its inconsistent relationships with international civilian organizations, and its absence of double- and triple-loop learning are identified as key drivers of NATO's weak intelligence performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The collection, evaluation, analysis and presentation of location and spatial data, which is the field of study of the Survey Engineering profession, is at work in the military as well as in many other fields. It is known that wars and operations cannot be considered independent of space. In this context, it is possible to take the space and location data beyond just being a battlefield and use it as a data that will guide the course of the war. One of the fields of supply and usage of spatial data is intelligence. Within the scope of this article, the place of intelligence in general history, its meaning in different languages, the methodology of intelligence are explained, then the definition and concepts of geospatial intelligence, which is the spatial perception aspect of technical intelligence, are explained. Finally, geospatial intelligence, data collection and analysis tools; geographic information systems (GIS) and remote sensing technologies (RST) are explained. Some suggestions have been presented in order to increase the usability of geospatial intelligence in the fields of military operations in our country, which deals with the spatial dimension of intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Semantic understanding of high spatial resolution remote sensing (RS) images can be divided into object detection, object labelling, identification of geospatial relationships, and semantic description generation. Geographical relations represent the spatial distribution dependencies between geospatial entities such as points, lines, and polygons, and the topologies among them. Geospatial relations play a very important role in describing the relations between geographic objects. These relations can be broadly classified as topological, directional, and proximity relations. These relations describe the adjacency and association relations between geospatial objects. An approach to identify an appropriate directional geospatial relationship between geo-objects present in high spatial resolution RS images is proposed in this paper. Geospatial objects in the form of the closed boundary are taken as input and relationship triplets are generated. Two approaches have been used in the identification of directional relationships and the results of both approaches are compared. The first approach is based on the centroid of the objects and the second considers whole objects while calculating the direction. These relations are then further represented using a knowledge graph, where nodes represent objects and edges represent their relationship. Knowledge graph plays a very important role in overall scene understanding. It shows the association of all objects with each other. These relationships are then represented in the form of descriptions by using template-based sentence generation. Results show that these directional relationships are accurately identified between each pair of objects using both approaches, but relations generated by considering whole objects are closer to human cognition. Semantic understanding of remote sensing images is of great significance in different applications such as urban surveys, urban planning, and management, military intelligence, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Cuba's complex relationships with the Soviet Union and Eastern European states from 1959 to 1991, shedding light on previously overlooked aspects of this history. Through extensive research, the author reveals a nuanced and often adversarial dynamic between the various actors involved. The text highlights Cuba's evolving foreign policy activism, economic dependence on the Soviet bloc, and military involvement in Nicaragua and Grenada, offering a more balanced understanding of Cuba's role in the socialist world during the Cold War. [Extracted from the article]

This paper analyzes and combs the application and research status of artificial intelligence technology in the field. of military intelligence, in order to provide reference for subsequent military intelligence research. This paper summarizes the development and application of artificial intelligence in military intelligence work from the aspects of intelligence analysis and military command decision-making. Based on the intelligence workflow, the military intelligence service model under artificial intelligence technology is analyzed. This paper systematically combs the research and development status of typical projects of intelligent intelligence systems in the United States, and analyzes the key development trends and technical difficulties of artificial intelligence in the military intelligence field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Charters[1] has contributed a significant study on the evolution of Canadian military intelligence from the October Crisis countering terrorism in Quebec in 1970 until the conclusion of Canadian participation in the war in Afghanistan in 2010. Military intelligence played only a modest role in the October Crisis but, Charters suggests, provided an early insight into what challenges military intelligence would face in the years following the Cold War. Charters describes a long journey of Canadian military intelligence moving from a back water suffering staff inadequacies and shrinking budgets to one where technical collection proved highly competent and "intelligence understanding" reaching a point of viewing opponents in more realistic and complex terms. [Extracted from the article]

The present article deals with the issue of Zdeněk Schmoranz’s resistance group. This group operated throughout the entire territory of the Protectorate in 1939 and was mainly engaged in intelligence activities against the German occupants. This research deals with the regional aspects of the aforementioned group in the city of Olomouc and the specific activities of the former member of Czechoslovak Army Jaroslav Hess (1896–1940). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Georg Stammer is certainly not one of those people who are immediately associated with the German military intelligence service. But his private address in Berlin's Courbierestraße became notorious, which soon also presented the English intelligence service with some puzzles and was also used by German agents (including Carl Hans Lody) as a cover address. After the end of World War I, Stammer was immediately involved in the reconstruction of intelligence structures and soonjoined the camouflaged naval intelligence service. Here he was mainly active for the development of counterespionage. From 1926 Stammer built up the industrial espionage of the Navy. After a few years in retirement, Stammer died in 1936 in Berlin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ana Montes, a senior intelligence analyst, spied on the Defense Intelligence Agency for Cubans. Highly specialized in Latin American military intelligence, she was known as "Queen of Cuba." Her traumatic childhood made her susceptible to recruitment and her motivation was ideological. Using classic espionage techniques, mainly memorization, she managed to spy for 16 years until she was discovered. The findings of an American spy in Cuba, a bad relationship with coworkers, and the lack of a support agent led to her exposure. Ana was sentenced to 25 years in prison and five to probation. Her case indicates 10 conclusions about espionage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]