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Michelle Carter's texts instructing her mentally ill online boyfriend to commit suicide offended the social moral code. But the law does not categorize all morally reprehensible behavior as criminal. Commonwealth v. Carter is unprecedented in manslaughter law because Carter was convicted on the theory that she was virtually present as opposed to physically present--at the crime scene. The court's reasoning is expansive, as the framework it employs is excessively vague and does not provide fair notice to the public of which actions constitute involuntary manslaughter. Disturbingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's logic. This Article concludes that a conviction based upon a virtual-presence theory is unconstitutional, as it is void-for-vagueness. Hypotheticals are provided to illustrate how the Carter framework is unworkable when applied to online relationships based on electronic communications. State legislatures, not courts, should regulate this area, providing clear rules on when electronic encouragement of suicide violates the law. States can consider a physical-presence requirement and prohibit prosecutions on this basis. Or, legislators can borrow from aiding and abetting principles to expand their special relationship statutes to include online relationships, creating a duty to report when encouraging another to commit suicide. In either case, the law will provide citizens with bright-line rules to forecast when electronic conduct is subject to criminal sanction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The complexity and diversity of unlawful killings -- particularly those involving mentally impaired offenders -- does not fit neatly across the binary distinction of offence/defence that structures criminal law. This is demonstrated in the Australian State of Victoria, where cognitively impaired homicide offenders who fail to meet the strict remit of the mental impairment defence have no (partial) defence or offence available to them which adequately captures their levels of criminal responsibility, moral agency and culpability. This makes the sentencing of such offenders not only particularly complex but means that the only stage in which both moral and legal culpability can be considered is in mitigation. This article argues that a progressive framework is needed to permit a small minority of (mentally impaired) homicide offenders to be simultaneously inculpated and (partially) exculpated. Accordingly, we propose introducing a model of diminished culpability manslaughter in Victoria, drawing from Loughnan's seminal reconceptualisation of 'diminished responsibility manslaughter' as an offence-cum-defence, which renders the diminished accused differently liable. Informed by a study of all homicide cases (n=647) sentenced in Victoria between 1 January 2000 and 31 July 2017, we argue that this model would not revoke legal capacity and would instead enhance the legitimacy and coherence of criminal law procedures, allowing a wider range of more legitimate convictions and reflective sentencing dispositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diminished Responsibility is a statutory partial defence to the charge of murder in the Homicide Act 1957 which has been amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. In R v Brennan, the Court of Appeal described the new criteria as relating 'entirely to psychiatric matters'. This article will explore to what extent such a conclusion is warranted. The statutory wording of the 2009 Act will be analysed and the role of expert psychiatric evidence will be considered. It will conclude that the new Diminished Responsibility is not a purely psychiatric matter. This is because of the moral dimensions inherent in the defence, the ambiguity in the statutory wording and the fundamental problems of psychiatry usurping the function of the jury in relation to the ultimate issue. This results in inconsistent application and role confusion in relation to the defence and asks psychiatric evidence questions it cannot answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on causation element in manslaughter proceedings and difficulties it raises in suicide-related cases in the U.S. It mentions about Commonwealth v. Carter court case addressing maliciously encouraging the suicide of another under a theory of manslaughter; causation element in suicide related cases; and technological component of encouraging suicide.

There has been much academic debate concerning criminal liability for omissions and the extent to which such liability should be extended. The focus here concerns a recent, unreported, conviction for gross negligence manslaughter which raises the question of how far the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service are willing to blur existing boundaries of omissions liability and the established principles of causation. By scrutinising the current legal duties to act required for such liability to arise in the context of R v Bowditch, it will be demonstrated that we are moving incrementally towards a Good Samaritan law but with an absence of fair warning to guide citizens. Further, it is apparent from this conviction that the restricted principles of causation that apply to actions are not as restrictive when applied to omissions. It is clearly timely for the Law Commission to act to determine appropriate boundaries so that omissions liability complies with the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Massachusetts Juvenile Court's ruling in the 2017 case Commonwealth v. Carter which deals with American criminal law, liability for physical harm, and the trial court's determination that defendant Michelle Carter was guilty of involuntary manslaughter for using text messages and telephone calls to encourage her long-distance boyfriend Conrad Roy to commit suicide. Carter's self-created duty and failure to act to prevent the suicide are examined.

The crime of unlawful act manslaughter (otherwise known as constructive manslaughter) exists in English and Australian common law. It is also an offence contrary to the Canadian Criminal Code. In all three jurisdictions the offence shares the same essential elements, including the requirements that the accused commit an act which is both unlawful and dangerous. This article will explore the case law on unlawful act manslaughter in Australia, Canada and England, focusing on the elements of an unlawful act and dangerousness, in order to identify similarities and differences in the application of the law in the three jurisdictions. Where differences are found, consideration will be given to the question whether English law should be reformulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I shall examine when an alternative offence and also a lesser-included offence is available for an accessory. Particular reference will be made to the offences of manslaughter and murder. It shall be argued that the decision in R v Jogee and Ruddock v The Queen is wrong as far as it holds that an accessory can be liable for manslaughter when the principal has been convicted of murder, because it is necessary to prove that the accessory intended the principal to perpetrate the actus reus of the relevant offence with the requisite mens rea for that offence. In such a scenario the accessory does not intentionally assist or encourage the more serious offence (murder), so she cannot be derivatively liable for it, and the principal does not perpetrate the less serious offence (manslaughter), so there is no offence of manslaughter for the accessory’s liability to derive from. The accessory only attempts to assist or encourage the principal to engage in conduct that has the potential to form the conduct element of constructive manslaughter. Such a conviction would rest on a presumption of participation in a result crime, when no result was in fact caused by the non-perpetrated crime (manslaughter), but instead the result was caused by an alternative more serious crime (murder), which was in fact perpetrated. If the principal had done the actus reus that the accessory intended (i.e. unlawfully inflict actual bodily harm), the victim most likely would not have been killed and it is pure speculation to suggest that the victim could have been killed by actual bodily harm as opposed to the act of grievous bodily harm or an act of intentional killing, which in fact killed the victim. It shall be argued that in such cases it is best to prosecute the putative assister or encourager under ss 44 or 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, for attempting to assist or encourage a potential aggravated assault. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the gross negligence manslaughter case R v Evans in London, England. The topics discussed include the interpersonal relations that Alun Williams and Richard Bowler had, the mummification practices they carried out on Williams after their sexual activity, and the manslaughter case of a 15-year-old boy.

The article discusses a court case wherein the Court of Appeal dismissed appeals of appellants and held that there was no misdirection on the established law adverse to them in England. The Court dealt with elements for unlawful act manslaughter which had to be carefully differentiated namely the requisite state of mind and the requirement of dangerousness in relation to the unlawful act. It cites options for changing the law such as modifying the objective test and maintaining the status quo.

The article discusses the Popoe's appeal to the Solomon Islands Court of Appeal in case of 'R v Popoe' in which the judge found that evidence were sufficient to convict Popoe of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.

The article discusses three British Court of Appeal cases dealing with murder, voluntary manslaughter, loss of control, and sufficient evidence. It examines the evidences of loss of control in the cases which are reportedly insufficient that led the courts to dismiss the appeals. Also explored are the rights of defendants to seek to be excused from being held guilty for murder.

The article presents a report from news agency Associated Press as of early July 2016, stating that surgeon and stem cell advocate Paolo Macchiarini is facing preliminary charges of involuntary manslaughter and causing bodily injury.

The article tackles the prosecution of surgeons for manslaughter. Topics discussed are the three thresholds that must be crossed if a person is to be sentenced for manslaughter, the 1995 case Regina v. Adomako that illustrated a crime of gross negligence manslaughter, guidelines prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council of Great Britain, mitigating factors indicating lower culpability, and the court judge's reasoning behind the custody sentence on surgeon David Sellu.

The article discusses the acquittal by an Italian appeals court of six experts, including Giulio Selvaggi and Enzo Boschi, who were convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six years in prison in 2012 for giving advice ahead of the 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila, Italy that killed 309 people. Reportedly, only former deputy head of Italy’s Civil Protection Department, Bernardo De Bernardinis, remains in prison on proof some of the victims acted on his advice.