Search

Before we can make any choice, we must gather information from the environment about what our options are. This information-gathering process is critically mediated by attention, and our attention is, in turn, shaped by our previous experiences with—and learning about—stimuli and their consequences. In this review, we highlight studies demonstrating a rapid and automatic influence of reward learning on attentional capture and argue that these findings provide a human analog of sign-tracking behavior observed in nonhuman animals—wherein signals of reward gain incentive salience and become attractive targets for attention (and overt behavior) in their own right. We then consider the implications of this idea for understanding the drivers of cue-controlled behavior, with focus on addiction as a case in which choices with regard to reward-related stimuli can become injurious to health. We argue that motivated behavior in general—and addiction in particular—can be understood within a "biased competition" framework: Different options and outcomes compete for attentional priority as a function of top–down goals, bottom–up salience, and prior experience, and the winner of this competition becomes the target for subsequent outcome-directed and flexible behavior. Finally, we outline the implications of the biased-competition framework for cognitive, behavioral, and socioeconomic interventions for addiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research demonstrates different ways in which attentional prioritization of salient nontarget stimuli is shaped by prior experience: Reward learning renders signals of high-value outcomes more likely to capture attention than signals of low-value outcomes, whereas statistical learning can produce attentional suppression of the location in which salient distractor items are likely to appear. The current study combined manipulations of the value and location associated with salient distractors in visual search to investigate whether these different effects of selection history operate independently or interact to determine overall attentional prioritization of salient distractors. In Experiment 1, high-value and low-value distractors most frequently appeared in the same location; in Experiment 2, high-value and low-value distractors typically appeared in distinct locations. In both experiments, effects of distractor value and location were additive, suggesting that attention-promoting effects of value and attention-suppressing effects of statistical location-learning independently modulate overall attentional priority. Our findings are consistent with a view that sees attention as mediated by a common priority map that receives and integrates separate signals relating to physical salience and value, with signal suppression based on statistical learning determined by physical salience, but not incentive salience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stimuli that signal large reward have an increased likelihood of capturing attention and gaze relative to stimuli that signal small or no reward, even when capture counterproductively prevents reward delivery. These findings suggest that a stimulus's signaling relationship with reward (the contingency between stimulus presentation and reward delivery) is a potent influence on selective attention. Recent studies have also implicated a stimulus's response relationship with reward (the contingency between orienting to a stimulus and reward delivery) in reducing capture by signals of reward. Here we show that this response pathway modulates capture by encouraging a reactive, goal-directed distractor suppression process. In a rewarded visual search task, participants demonstrated an oculomotor preference away from a distractor that had a negative response relationship with high reward (looking at the distractor caused reward omission) and toward a distractor that had no such negative response relationship, providing evidence for the role of the response relationship in suppressing capture by reward-related distractors. Analysis of the temporal dynamics of eye movements suggests that this distractor suppression process operates via a reactive mechanism of rapid disengagement (Experiment 1). Consistent with a goal-directed mechanism, the influence of the response relationship was eliminated when reward was unavailable (Experiment 2). These findings highlight the multifaceted role of stimulus-reward relationships in attentional selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People have a strong tendency to attend to reward cues, even if these cues are irrelevant to their current goal or their current task. When reward cues are goal-irrelevant, their presence may impair cognitive performance. In this meta-analysis, we quantitatively examined the rapidly growing literature on the impact of reward-related distractors on cognitive performance. We included 91 studies (N = 2,362) that used different cognitive paradigms (e.g., visual search, conflict processing) and reward-related stimuli (e.g., money, attractive food). Overall, results showed that reward-related distractors impaired cognitive performance across different tasks and stimuli, with a small effect size (standardized mean change =.347). Between-study heterogeneity was large, suggesting that researchers can plausibly expect to sometimes find reversed effects (i.e., reward-related distractors boosting performance). We further showed that the average reward-driven distraction effect was robust across different reward-learning mechanisms, contexts, and methodological choices, and that this effect existed regardless of explicit task instructions to ignore distractors. In sum, the findings of this meta-analysis support the notion that cognitive processes can be thwarted by reward cues. We discuss these findings against the background of distraction-related phenomena as they are studied in clinical, educational, and work psychology. Public Significance Statement: We show meta-analytic evidence that the human mind prioritizes rewards, even if this prioritization is counterproductive to people's current goals or to performance on their current task. We propose that this basic psychological process may underlie performance impairments in real-life settings, for instance at school and at work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pairing a stimulus with large reward increases the likelihood that it will capture attention and eye-gaze, even when such capture has negative consequences. This suggests that a stimulus's signalling relationship with reward (the co-occurrence of that stimulus and reward) has a powerful influence on attentional selection. In the present study, we demonstrate that a stimulus's response relationship with reward (the reward-related consequences of attending to that stimulus) can also exert an independent, competing influence on selection. Participants completed a visual search task in which they made a saccade to a target shape to earn reward. The colour of a distractor signalled the magnitude of reward available on each trial. For one group of participants, there was a negative response relationship between making a saccade to the distractor and reward delivery: looking at the distractor caused the reward to be cancelled. For a second group, there was no negative response relationship, but an equivalent distractor–reward signalling relationship was maintained via a yoking procedure. Participants from both groups were more likely to have their gaze captured by the distractor that signalled high reward versus low reward, demonstrating an influence of the signalling relationship on attention. However, participants who experienced a negative response relationship showed a reduced influence of signal value on capture, and specifically less capture by the high-reward distractor. These findings demonstrate that reward can have a multifaceted influence on attentional selection through different, learned stimulus-reward relationships, and thus that the relationship between reward and attention is more complex than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comment on an article published in a 2014 issue which claimed to have found one of the strongest explicit-implicit dissociations yet seen in the categorization literature and vertical structure is learned via an explicit rule-based process.

When we move our articulator organs to produce overt speech, the brain generates a corollary discharge that acts to suppress the neural and perceptual responses to our speech sounds. Recent research suggests that inner speech – the silent production of words in one's mind – is also accompanied by a corollary discharge. Here, we show that this corollary discharge contains information about the temporal and physical properties of inner speech. In two experiments, participants produced an inner phoneme at a precisely-defined moment in time. An audible phoneme was presented 300 ms before, concurrently with, or 300 ms after participants produced the inner phoneme. We found that producing the inner phoneme attenuated the N1 component of the event-related potential – an index of auditory cortex processing – but only when the inner and audible phonemes occurred concurrently and matched on content. If the audible phoneme was presented before or after the production of the inner phoneme, or if the inner phoneme did not match the content of the audible phoneme, there was no attenuation of the N1. These results suggest that inner speech is accompanied by a temporally-precise and content-specific corollary discharge. We conclude that these results support the notion of a functional equivalence between the neural processes that underlie the production of inner and overt speech, and may provide a platform for identifying inner speech abnormalities in disorders in which they have been putatively associated, such as schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of visual search demonstrate that the 'learned value' of stimuli (the extent to which they signal valued events, such as rewards and punishments) influences whether they will be prioritized by spatial attention. Recent work suggests that learned value also modulates attentional prioritization even when all stimuli are presented in the same location, suggesting an influence on temporal selection wherein value-related stimuli become more capable of disrupting central mechanisms of perceptual awareness. However, it remains unclear whether temporal selection is influenced specifically by learning about the relationship of stimuli with reward, or with punishment, or both. This question motivated the current experiments. Participants saw a stream of pictures in a central location, and had to identify the orientation of a rotated target picture. In Experiment 1, response accuracy was reduced if the target was preceded by a 'valued' distractor picture that signaled that a correct response to the target would be rewarded, relative to a distractor picture that did not signal reward. In Experiment 2, accuracy was reduced if the valued distractor picture signaled that an incorrect response would be punished, relative to a distractor that did not signal punishment. Experiment 3 replicated these findings, and demonstrated that the influence of rewards/punishments persisted into an extinction phase in which valued distractors were entirely task-irrelevant. These findings suggest that it is the motivational significance of the outcome, rather than its valence, that is the crucial determinant of the influence of learned value on temporal selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Predictive coding assumes an interactive hierarchy of prediction-errors. • We combined the auditory oddball and visual semantic priming ERP paradigms. • We found that the N400 was larger when preceded by a standard than a deviant. • These results are consistent with hierarchical prediction-error processing. Abstract The human brain is an efficient, adaptive, and predictive machine, constructing a generative model of the environment that we then perceive and become conscious of. Here, we show that different types of prediction-errors – the discrepancies between top-down expectations and bottom-up sensory input – are integrated across processing levels and sensory modalities of the cortical hierarchy. We designed a novel, hybrid protocol in which five prediction-establishing sounds were played in rapid succession (e.g., "meow", "meow", "meow", etc.), followed by either a standard (e.g., "meow") or a deviant (e.g., "woof") prime sound, then a visual target word that was either congruent or incongruent (e.g., "cat" or "dog") with the prime sound. We found that the deviants elicited a more negative voltage than the standards at about 150 ms – the mismatch negativity (MMN), an event-related potential (ERP) sensitive to low-level perceptual violations – and that the incongruent words elicited a more negative voltage than the congruent words at about 350 ms – the N400, an ERP sensitive to high-level semantic violations. We also found that the N400 was context-dependent: the N400 was larger when the target words were preceded by a standard than a deviant. Our results suggest that perceptual prediction-errors modulate subsequent semantic prediction-errors. We conclude that our results are consistent with one of the most important assumptions of predictive coding theories: hierarchical prediction-error processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of research has shown that learning about relationships between neutral stimuli and events of significance – rewards or punishments – influences the extent to which people attend to those stimuli in the future. However, different accounts of this influence differ in terms of the critical variable that is proposed to determine learned changes in attention. We describe two experiments using eye-tracking with a rewarded visual search procedure to investigate whether attentional capture is influenced by the predictiveness of stimuli (i.e., the extent to which they provide information about upcoming events) or by their absolute associative value (i.e., the expected incentive value of the outcome that a stimulus predicts). Results demonstrated a clear influence of associative value on the likelihood that stimuli will capture eye-movements, but the evidence for a distinct influence of predictiveness was less compelling. The results of these experiments can be reconciled within a simple account under which attentional prioritization is a monotonic function of the expected, subjective value of the reward that is signalled by a stimulus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research in animals has suggested that attention is distributed to exploit known relationships between stimuli and explore stimuli whose consequences are uncertain. While there is strong support for exploitative attention and its effects on learning in humans, the evidence for exploratory attention is less well developed. Two experiments examined whether preferential allocation of attention (as measured by eye-gaze) to cues associated with uncertainty leads to more rapid learning of new associations involving these cues in the future. In each experiment, participants first learned about compounds containing one predictive cue and one nonpredictive cue. The level of uncertainty during this first stage of training was also manipulated: cue-outcome relationships were either deterministic (certain) or probabilistic (uncertain). In a second stage, new cue-outcome relationships were trained and the uncertainty of these relationships could be resolved by learning about the previously nonpredictive cues. As a result of the manipulation of uncertainty in the first stage, some participants experienced a sudden onset of uncertainty at the start of this second stage, while others experienced a stable level of uncertainty throughout the experiment. Experiment 1 showed that the former learned novel cue-outcome associations faster than participants for whom uncertainty was constant. Furthermore, participants experiencing unexpected uncertainty showed a greater increase in attention to cues in Stage 2. Extending the training stage in Experiment 2 resulted in a larger difference in rate of learning between conditions in stage 2. We argue that this represents evidence for an effect of exploratory attention on rate of learning in humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study examined whether age and frequent cannabis use interact to influence the trajectories of positive and negative schizotypy over time. Participants were 155 cannabis users, aged 15-24 years old, assessed over a 12-month period at 6-monthly intervals. The analyses examined the influence of age, frequent use, and time on positive and negative schizotypy. The current study found that among frequent cannabis users, younger age was associated with increased negative schizotypy over time, while among occasional cannabis users, younger age was associated with decreasing negative schizotypy over time. The current findings have implications for understanding how cannabis use may influence psychosis risk differently depending on age and frequency of use, as well as bring together past mixed findings on the relationship between negative schizotypy and cannabis use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mechanisms of motor-sensory prediction are dependent on expectations regarding when self-generated feedback will occur. Existing behavioral and electrophysiological research suggests that we have a default expectation for immediate sensory feedback after executing an action. However, studies investigating the adaptability of this temporal expectation have been limited in their ability to differentiate modified expectations per se from effects of stimulus repetition. Here, we use a novel, within-participant procedure that allowed us to disentangle the effect of repetition from expectation and allowed us to determine whether the default assumption for immediate feedback is fixed and resistant to modification or is amenable to change with experience. While EEG was recorded, 45 participants completed a task in which they repeatedly pressed a button to produce a tone that occurred immediately after the button press (immediate training) or after a 100-msec delay (delayed training). The results revealed significant differences in the patterns of cortical change across the two training conditions. Specifically, there was a significant reduction in the cortical response to tones across delayed training blocks but no significant change across immediate training blocks. Furthermore, experience with delayed training did not result in increased cortical activity in response to immediate feedback. These findings suggest that experience with action–sensation delays broadens the window of temporal expectations, allowing for the simultaneous anticipation of both delayed and immediate motor-sensory feedback. This research provides insights into the mechanisms underlying motor-sensory prediction and may represent a novel therapeutic avenue for psychotic symptoms, which are ostensibly associated with sensory prediction abnormalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can judgments be biased via passive monitoring of eye-gaze? We examined this question using a perceptual discrimination task (Experiment 1) and a complex moral judgment task (Experiment 2). Information about the location of participants' gaze at particular time-points in a trial was used to prompt responses. When there was no objective perceptual information available to decision-makers, the timing of the prompt had a small, but detectable effect on judgments (Experiment 1). However, this small effect did not scale up to more complex judgments about moral issues (Experiment 2). Our results are consistent with the well-established idea that participants' judgments are reflected in their eye-gaze, but do not support the recent bold claim of a causal link wherein the timing of a gaze-contingent response-prompt influences complex judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attentional prioritisation of stimuli in the environment plays an important role in overt choice. Previous research shows that prioritisation is influenced by the magnitude of paired rewards, in that stimuli signalling high-value rewards are more likely to capture attention than stimuli signalling low-value rewards; and this attentional bias has been proposed to play a role in addictive and compulsive behaviours. A separate line of research has shown that win-related sensory cues can bias overt choices. However, the role that these cues play in attentional selection is yet to be investigated. Participants in this study completed a visual search task in which they responded to a target shape in order to earn reward. The colour of a distractor signalled the magnitude of reward and type of feedback on each trial. Participants were slower to respond to the target when the distractor signalled high reward compared to when the distractor signalled low reward, suggesting that the high-reward distractors had increased attentional priority. Critically, the magnitude of this reward-related attentional bias was further increased for a high-reward distractor with post-trial feedback accompanied by win-related sensory cues. Participants also demonstrated an overt choice preference for the distractor that was associated with win-related sensory cues. These findings demonstrate that stimuli paired with win-related sensory cues are prioritised by the attention system over stimuli with equivalent physical salience and learned value. This attentional prioritisation may have downstream implications for overt choices, especially in gambling contexts where win-related sensory cues are common. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between learned variations in attention and schizotypy was examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants low on a negative subscale of schizotypy exhibited an explicit bias in overt attention towards stimuli that were established as predictive of a trial outcome, relative to stimuli that were irrelevant. The same participants also showed a bias in learning about these stimuli when they presented in a novel context. Neither of these effects was observed in participants high in schizotypy. In Experiment 2, participants low on the negative subscale of schizotypy exhibited faster reaction times towards a target that was cued by a stimulus that had a history of predictive validity relative to a stimulus that had a history of irrelevance. Again, this effect was not present in participants high in schizotypy. These results imply a disruption in the normal allocation of attention to cues that have predictive significance in schizotypy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a comprehensive survey of research concerning interactions between associative learning and attention in humans. Four main findings are described. First, attention is biased toward stimuli that predict their consequences reliably (learned predictiveness). This finding is consistent with the approach taken by Mackintosh (1975) in his attentional model of associative learning in nonhuman animals. Second, the strength of this attentional bias is modulated by the value of the outcome (learned value). That is, predictors of high-value outcomes receive especially high levels of attention. Third, the related but opposing idea that uncertainty may result in increased attention to stimuli (Pearce & Hall, 1980), receives less support. This suggests that hybrid models of associative learning, incorporating the mechanisms of both the Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall theories, may not be required to explain data from human participants. Rather, a simpler model, in which attention to stimuli is determined by how strongly they are associated with significant outcomes, goes a long way to account for the data on human attentional learning. The last main finding, and an exciting area for future research and theorizing, is that learned predictiveness and learned value modulate both deliberate attentional focus, and more automatic attentional capture. The automatic influence of learning on attention does not appear to fit the traditional view of attention as being either goal-directed or stimulus-driven. Rather, it suggests a new kind of "derived" attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The perceptual system makes a specific prediction regarding the timing of impending, self-initiated sensations to facilitate the attenuation of these sensations. The current study used electroencephalography to investigate whether temporal expectations can be modified with training. Participants underwent a button-press-for-tone task and evoked responses to the tones were measured. Fifty participants were randomly assigned to receive repeated exposure (training) to either immediate tones, or tones delayed by 100 ms. Pre-training, N1 amplitude to delayed tones was significantly larger compared to immediate tones. However, while training to the immediate tone maintained a significant difference in N1 amplitude between the immediate and delayed tones post-training, this difference was eliminated when trained to the delayed tone. This suggests that participants’ neural expectations regarding the anticipated timing of self-generated sensations can be modified with behavioural training. This result has implications for alleviating the subnormal sensory attenuation which has been observed in patients with schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cross-modal symbolic paradigm was used to elicit EEG activity related to semantic incongruence. Twenty-five undergraduate students viewed pairings of visual lexical cues (e.g., DOG) with congruent (50% of trials) or incongruent (50%) auditory nonlexical stimuli (animal vocalizations; e.g., sound of a dog woofing or a cat meowing). In one condition, many different pairs of congruent/incongruent stimuli were shown, whereas in a second condition only two pairs of stimuli were repeatedly shown. A typical N400-like pattern of incongruence-related activity (including activity in the N2 time window) was evident in the condition using many stimuli, whereas the incongruence-related activity in the two-stimuli condition was confined to differential N2-like activity. A supplementary analysis excluded stimulus characteristics as the source of this differential activity between conditions. We found that a single individual performing a fixed task can demonstrate either a protracted N400-like pattern of activity or a more temporally focused N2-like pattern of activity in response to the same stimulus, which suggests that the N2 may be a precursor to the protracted N400 response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study examined the effects of frequency of cannabis use, schizotypy, and age on cognitive control, as measured using a location-based negative priming task in a sample of 124 Australians aged 15–24 who had ever used cannabis. This study found that the schizotypy dimension of Impulsive Nonconformity had a significant effect on negative priming such that participants with higher scores on this dimension showed reduced negative priming. Also, higher levels of psychological distress were associated with greater negative priming. Finally, there was a significant age by cannabis use interaction indicating that younger, frequent users of cannabis may be more susceptible to its effects on cognitive control and perhaps at greater risk of developing a disorder on the psychosis dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attention provides the gateway to cognition, by selecting certain stimuli for further analysis. Recent research demonstrates that whether a stimulus captures attention is not determined solely by its physical properties, but is malleable, being influenced by our previous experience of rewards obtained by attending to that stimulus. Here we show that this influence of reward learning on attention extends to task-irrelevant stimuli. In a visual search task, certain stimuli signaled the magnitude of available reward, but reward delivery was not contingent on responding to those stimuli. Indeed, any attentional capture by these critical distractor stimuli led to a reduction in the reward obtained. Nevertheless, distractors signaling large reward produced greater attentional and oculomotor capture than those signaling small reward. This counterproductive capture by task-irrelevant stimuli is important because it demonstrates how external reward structures can produce patterns of behavior that conflict with task demands, and similar processes may underlie problematic behavior directed toward real-world rewards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies of human contingency learning investigated the influence of stimulus salience on the cue competition effect of blocking. These studies demonstrated that blocking (defined as a difference in responding to blocked and control cues) was greater for target cues that had high "semantic salience" than those of lower salience. Moreover participants showed weaker responding to high salience blocked cues than low salience blocked cues, but a corresponding difference was not observed for control cues. These findings suggest that the influence of relative salience on associative learning depends on the relative validity of the cues in question. Use of eye tracking in Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants' overt attention to cues was also influenced by both relative salience and relative validity. We describe three associative learning models, based on the attentional theory proposed by Mackintosh (1975), that are able to account for our key findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attentional theories of associative learning and categorization propose that learning about the predic-tiveness of a stimulus influences the amount of attention that is paid to that stimulus. Three experiments tested this idea by looking at the extent to which stimuli that had previously been experienced as predictive or nonpredictive in a categorization task were able to capture attention in a dot probe task. Consistent with certain attentional theories of learning, responses to the dot probe were faster when it appeared in a location cued by a predictive stimulus compared to a location cued by a nonpredictive stimulus. This result was obtained only with short (250-ms or 350-ms) but not long (1,000-ms) delays between onset of the stimuli and the dot probe, suggesting that the observed spatial cuing effect reflects the operation of a relatively rapid, automatic process. These findings are consistent with the approach to the relationship between attention and learning taken by the class of models exemplified by Mackintosh's (1975) theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four experiments using human participants examined how learning about the value of an outcome with which a cue is associated influences attention to that cue. Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants learn more rapidly about cues that previously predicted high-value outcomes than those that predicted low-value outcomes, indicating an attentional bias that is based on the learned value of cues. Experiments 2 through 4 examined the nature of this bias by retrospectively manipulating the value of the outcomes involved through instructions to participants. Results demonstrate that learning about value through trial-by-trial training and through instruction both influence attention to the cues involved, but in different ways. We take these findings to suggest that the learning of attentional responses, just like more overt forms of instrumental action, can be influenced by both goal-directed and habit-like processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose that biases in attitude and stereotype formation might arise as a result of learned differences in the extent to which social groups have previously been predictive of behavioral or physical properties. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that differences in the experienced predictiveness of groups with respect to evaluatively neutral information influence the extent to which participants later form attitudes and stereotypes about those groups. In contrast, Experiment 3 shows no influence of predictiveness when using a procedure designed to emphasize the use of higher level reasoning processes, a finding consistent with the idea that the root of the predictiveness bias is not in reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrate that the predictiveness bias in formation of group beliefs does not depend on participants making global evaluations of groups. These results are discussed in relation to the associative mechanisms proposed by Mackintosh (1975) to explain similar phenomena in animal conditioning and associative learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Food restriction is argued to be a precursor for unhealthy preoccupation with food, possibly leading to the development of an eating disorder. We updated previous meta-analyses that examined the relationship between eating restraint and deficits in either general or food-related attentional and inhibitory control. We hypothesized that inconsistencies in the literature around eating restraint, impaired cognitive control, impulsivity and cognitive biases for food could be attributed to the scale used to measure eating restraint. A (preregistered) subgroup meta-analysis examined whether patterns of impaired cognitive control and cognitive bias for food in predominantly healthy (non-clinical) samples differed as a function of the scale used to measure eating restraint. A series of exploratory meta-analyses were carried out for specific attentional bias tasks. In total 57 datasets were included. The subgroup analysis did not provide evidence that the relationship between eating restraint and impaired or biased cognitions differed significantly as a function of restraint scale. Heterogeneity across studies was high. When examining specific attentional bias tasks there was no evidence that increased eating restraint was associated with increased attentional bias or distraction by food cues, regardless of which scale was used to measure eating restraint. There is little experimental evidence for the common narrative that increased eating restraint is related to impaired cognitive control generally or increased cognitive bias for food, in non-clinical samples. • Food restriction is argued to lead to an unhealthy preoccupation with food. • Attentional and behavioural biases for food are increased in eating-disorder populations. • These 'cognitive biases' were investigated in non-clinical samples using meta-analysis. • No evidence that increased eating restraint is related to increased cognitive bias for food. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the difficulty of establishing a link between cognition and neuroscience. The authors mention that bridging neural science and cognition is very difficult since it needs mapping cognitive constructs with a troublesome to measure neural activity online. Moreover, they said that researchers will also experience trouble in examining psychotic phenomena and definition problems.

Background and Objectives: Neurocognitive processes are key drivers of addictive and compulsive disorders. The current study examined whether reward-related attentional capture and cognitive inflexibility are associated with impulsive and/or compulsive personality traits, and whether these cognitive characteristics interact to predict greater compulsivity-related problems across obsessive-compulsive and drinking behaviors.Methods: One-hundred and seventy-three participants (mean age = 34.5 years, S.D = 8.4, 42% female) completed an online visual search task to measure reward-related attentional capture and its persistence following reversal of stimulus-reward contingencies. Participants also completed questionnaires to assess trait impulsivity, compulsivity, alcohol use, and obsessive-compulsive behaviors.Results: Greater reward-related attentional capture was associated with trait compulsivity, over and above all impulsivity dimensions, while greater cognitive inflexibility was associated with higher negative urgency (distress-elicited impulsivity). Reward-related attentional capture and cognitive inflexibility interacted to predict greater compulsivity-related problems among participants who reported obsessive-compulsive behaviors in the past month (n = 57) as well as current drinkers (n = 88). Follow-up analyses showed that, for OCD behaviors, this interaction was driven by an association between higher reward-related attentional capture and more problematic behaviors among cognitively inflexible participants only. For drinking, the same pattern was seen, albeit at trend level.Limitations: This study includes a non-clinical, online sample and is cross-sectional, thus its findings need to be interpreted with these limitations in mind.Conclusions: Reward-related attentional capture and cognitive flexibility are related to trait compulsivity and impulsivity (negative urgency) respectively, and interact to determine more problematic behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our prior experiences shape the way that we prioritize information from the environment for further processing, analysis, and action. We show in three experiments that this process of attentional prioritization is critically modulated by the degree of uncertainty in these previous experiences. Participants completed a visual search task in which they made a saccade to a target to earn a monetary reward. The color of a color-singleton distractor in the search array signaled the reward outcome(s) that were available, with different degrees of variance (uncertainty). Participants were never required to look at the colored distractor, and doing so would slow their response to the target. Nevertheless, across all experiments, participants were more likely to look at distractors associated with high outcome variance versus low outcome variance. This pattern was observed when all distractors had equal expected value (Experiment 1), when the difference in variance was opposed by a difference in expected value (i.e., the high-variance distractor had a low expected value, and vice versa: Experiment 2), and when high- and low-variance distractors were paired with the maximum-value outcome on an equal proportion of trials (Experiment 3). Our findings demonstrate that experience of prediction error plays a fundamental role in guiding "attentional exploration," wherein priority is driven by the potential for a stimulus to reduce future uncertainty through a process of learning, as opposed to maximizing current information gain. Public Significance Statement: Uncertainty is a ubiquitous feature of our experience of the world and may represent a common currency in neural processing. This study demonstrates that our attention is involuntarily drawn to unreliable sources of information even when more reliable or rewarding options are available, highlighting the role of uncertainty as a fundamental motivating force in attentional control. This drive to explore the unknown has broad implications for the way that we gather information from the environment. For instance, prioritizing stimuli whose consequences are currently unknown may be a central way that our attention system facilitates learning: by focusing on uncertain stimuli now, we can learn more about them, reducing our uncertainty when we encounter them again in the future. These findings could also shed light on attentional processes linked to anxiety and gambling, where individual differences in responses to uncertainty may play a central role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rewards exert a deep influence on our cognition and behavior. Here, we used a paradigm in which reward information was provided at either encoding or retrieval of a brief, masked stimulus to show that reward can also rapidly modulate perceptual encoding of visual information. Experiment 1 (n = 30 adults) showed that participants' response accuracy was enhanced when a to-be-encoded grating signaled high reward relative to low reward, but only when the grating was presented very briefly and participants reported that they were not consciously aware of it. Experiment 2 (n = 29 adults) showed that there was no difference in participants' response accuracy when reward information was instead provided at the stage of retrieval, ruling out an explanation of the reward-modulation effect in terms of differences in motivated retrieval. Taken together, our findings provide behavioral evidence consistent with a rapid reward modulation of visual perception, which may not require consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attention researchers have long debated the role that attentional control settings play in determining selection. In their article, Luck et al. (2021) have identified points of consensus among traditionally opposed models of attentional control, one of which is that prior experience (i.e., selection history) allows attentional control settings to suppress attention to salient distractors by inhibiting the attentional priority of learned distractor features and/or locations. However, the influence of prior experience on attentional priority is not exclusively inhibitory. In particular, experiencing the relationship between a stimulus feature and reward has been shown to increase that feature's attentional priority. Here, we discuss recent findings investigating how these competing influences of selection history interact, suggesting that experience-driven distractor suppression and reward independently modulate attentional selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) and top-down (or goal-driven) processes govern the distribution of attention in risky choice. In three experiments, participants chose between a certain payoff and the chance of receiving a payoff drawn randomly from an array of eight numbers. We tested the hypothesis that initial attention is driven by perceptual properties of the stimulus (e.g., font size of the numbers), but subsequent choice is goal-driven (e.g., win the best outcome). Two experiments in which task framing (goal driven) and font size (stimulus driven) were manipulated demonstrated that payoffs with the highest values and the largest font sizes had the greatest impact on choice. The third experiment added a number in large font to the array, which could not be an outcome of the gamble (i.e., a distractor). Eye movement and choice data indicated that although the distractor attracted attention, it had no influence on option selection. Together with computational modeling analyses, the results suggest that perceptual salience can induce bottom-up effects of overt selection but that the perceived value of information is the crucial arbiter of intentional control over risky choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Preview benefit refers to faster search for a target when a subset of distractors is seen prior to the search display. We investigated whether reward modulates this effect. Participants identified a target among non-targets on each trial. On "preview" trials, placeholders occupied half the search array positions prior to the onset of the full array. On "non-preview" trials, no placeholders preceded the full search array. On preview trials, the target could appear at either a placeholder position (old-target-location condition) or a position where no placeholder had been (new-target-location condition). Critically, the colour of the stimulus array indicated whether participants would earn reward for a correct response. We found a typical preview benefit, but no evidence that reward modulated this effect, despite a manipulation check showing that stimuli in the reward-signaling colour tended to capture attention on catch trials. The results suggest that reward learning does not modulate the preview benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale: Previous research has shown that physically salient and reward-related distractors can automatically capture attention and eye gaze in a visual search task, even though participants are motivated to ignore these stimuli. Objectives: To examine whether an acute, low dose of alcohol would influence involuntary attentional capture by stimuli signalling reward. Methods: Participants were assigned to the alcohol or placebo group before completing a visual search task. Successful identification of the target earned either a low or high monetary reward but this reward was omitted if any eye gaze was registered on the reward-signalling distractor. Results: Participants who had consumed alcohol were significantly less likely than those in the placebo condition to have their attention captured by a distractor stimulus that signalled the availability of high reward. Analysis of saccade latencies suggested that this difference reflected a reduction in the likelihood of impulsive eye movements following alcohol. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that alcohol intoxication reduces the capacity to attend to information in the environment that is not directly relevant to the task at hand. In the current task, this led to a performance benefit under alcohol, but in situations that require rapid responding to salient events, the effect on behaviour would be deleterious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Smith and Church (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25, 1565–1584 2018) present a "testimonial" review of dissociable learning processes in comparative and cognitive psychology, by which we mean they include only the portion of the available evidence that is consistent with their conclusions. For example, they conclude that learning the information-integration category-learning task with immediate feedback is implicit, but do not consider the evidence that people readily report explicit strategies in this task, nor that this task can be accommodated by accounts that make no distinction between implicit and explicit processes. They also consider some of the neuroscience relating to information-integration category learning, but do not report those aspects that are more consistent with an explicit than an implicit account. They further conclude that delay conditioning in humans is implicit, but do not report evidence that delay conditioning requires awareness; nor do they present the evidence that conditioned taste aversion, which should be explicit under their account, can be implicit. We agree with Smith and Church that it is helpful to have a clear definition of associative theory, but suggest that their definition may be unnecessarily restrictive. We propose an alternative definition of associative theory and briefly describe an experimental procedure that we think may better distinguish between associative and non-associative processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exploitation-exploration (EE) trade-off describes how, when making a decision, an organism must often choose between a safe alternative with a known pay-off, and one or more riskier alternatives with uncertain pay-offs. Recently, the concept of the EE trade-off has been extended to the examination of how organisms distribute limited attentional resources between several stimuli. This work suggests that when the rules governing the environment are certain, participants learn to "exploit" by attending preferentially to cues that provide the most information about upcoming events. However, when the rules are uncertain, people "explore" by increasing their attention to all cues that may provide information to help in predicting upcoming events. In the current study, we examine how uncertainty affects the EE trade-off in attention using a contextual two-armed bandit task, where participants explore with both their attention and their choice behavior. We find evidence for an influence of uncertainty on the EE trade-off in both choice and attention. These findings provide support for the idea of an EE trade-off in attention, and that uncertainty is a primary motivator for exploration in both choice and attentional allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people consider a series of random binary events, such as tossing an unbiased coin and recording the sequence of heads (H) and tails (T), they tend to erroneously rate sequences with less internal structure or order (such as HTTHT) as more probable than sequences containing more structure or order (such as HHHHH). This is traditionally explained as a local representativeness effect: Participants assume that the properties of long sequences of random outcomes—such as an equal proportion of heads and tails, and little internal structure—should also apply to short sequences. However, recent theoretical work has noted that the probability of a particular sequence of say, heads and tails of length n , occurring within a larger (> n ) sequence of coin flips actually differs by sequence, so P (HHHHH) < P (HTTHT). In this alternative account, people apply rational norms based on limited experience. We test these accounts. Participants in Experiment 1 rated the likelihood of occurrence for all possible strings of 4, 5, and 6 observations in a sequence of coin flips. Judgments were better explained by representativeness in alternation rate, relative proportion of heads and tails, and sequence complexity, than by objective probabilities. Experiments 2 and 3 gave similar results using incentivized binary choice procedures. Overall the evidence suggests that participants are not sensitive to variation in objective probabilities of a sub-sequence occurring; they appear to use heuristics based on several distinct forms of representativeness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people consider a series of random binary events, such as tossing an unbiased coin and recording the sequence of heads (H) and tails (T), they tend to erroneously rate sequences with less internal structure or order (such as HTTHT) as more probable than sequences containing more structure or order (such as HHHHH). This is traditionally explained as a local representativeness effect: Participants assume that the properties of long sequences of random outcomes-such as an equal proportion of heads and tails, and little internal structure-should also apply to short sequences. However, recent theoretical work has noted that the probability of a particular sequence of say, heads and tails of length n, occurring within a larger (>n) sequence of coin flips actually differs by sequence, so P(HHHHH)

It has been suggested that attention is guided by two factors that operate during associative learning: a predictiveness principle, by which attention is allocated to the best predictors of outcomes, and an uncertainty principle, by which attention is allocated to learn about the less known features of the environment. Recent studies have shown that predictiveness-driven attention can operate rapidly and in an automatic way to exploit known relationships. The corresponding characteristics of uncertainty-driven attention, on the other hand, remain unexplored. In two experiments we examined whether both predictiveness and uncertainty modulate attentional processing in an adaptation of the dot probe task. This task provides a measure of automatic orientation to cues during associative learning. The stimulus onset asynchrony of the probe display was manipulated in order to explore temporal characteristics of predictiveness- and uncertainty-driven attentional effects. Results showed that the predictive status of cues determined selective attention, with faster attentional capture to predictive than to non-predictive cues. In contrast, the level of uncertainty slowed down responses to the probe regardless of the predictive status of the cues. Both predictiveness- and uncertainty-driven attentional effects were very rapid (at 250 ms from cue onset) and were automatically activated. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite advances in understanding the brain structures involved in the expression of stereotypes and prejudice, little is known about the brain structures involved in their acquisition. Here, we combined fMRI, a task involving learning the valence of different social groups, and modeling of the learning process involved in the development of biases in thinking about social groups that support prejudice. Participants read descriptions of valenced behaviors performed by members of novel social groups, with majority groups being more frequently encountered during learning than minority groups. A model-based fMRI analysis revealed that the anterior temporal lobe tracked the trial-by-trial changes in the valence associated with each group encountered in the task. Descriptions of behavior by group members that deviated from the group average (i.e., prediction errors) were associated with activity in the left lateral PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and lateral anterior temporal cortex. Minority social groups were associated with slower acquisition rates and more activity in the ventral striatum and ACC/dorsomedial PFC compared with majority groups. These findings provide new insights into the brain regions that (a) support the acquisition of prejudice and (b) detect situations in which an individual's behavior deviates from the prejudicial attitude held toward their group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. There is now significant evidence that prediction error signalling is mediated by dopamine in the midbrain, and that dopamine dysfunction is implicated in people experiencing psychotic symptoms, including delusions. There has also been significant theorizing and experimentation concerning the remaining link in this triad, namely that deviant prediction error signalling produces or maintains psychotic symptoms. Methods. The research supporting the link between prediction error signalling and delusional symptoms was reviewed. Numerous studies indirectly support this link, but only one set of studies claim to directly test this hypothesis by combining three crucial elements: a patient sample, a manipulation of prediction error and neuroimaging. This particular set of studies were examined in detail. Results. Important methodological limitations in these studies were observed, and a reinterpretation of their data was offered. Conclusions. Methodological inconsistencies significantly weaken the claims made by these studies, but their data are consistent with current theorizing and they are instructive for future lines of inquiry in this field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Incentive sensitization theory highlights role of reward cues in alcohol dependence. • Sign-tracking - orienting to signals of reward - examined in clinical population. • Sign-tracking to monetary reward correlated to problematic alcohol use. • Sign-tracking and alcohol craving predict alcohol abstinence at 3-month follow up. A prominent neuroscientific theory of drug addiction is the incentive sensitization model. Individual differences in the tendency to ascribe motivational salience to cues that predict reward, and involuntary "sign-tracking" (orientation towards) such cues have been identified as potentially important in understanding vulnerability to addiction and relapse. However, to date this behaviour has not been assessed in a treatment-seeking clinical population, who typically represent those most susceptible to alcohol-related harms and episodes of relapse. This highlights a significant gap in the literature pertaining to incentive sensitization and drug dependence. Individuals accessing inpatient drug and alcohol services with alcohol as primary drug of concern were recruited to participate in a Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) intervention. At the baseline assessment, participants completed various self-report measures (including the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; AUDIT) in addition to a visual search task measuring sign-tracking to cues signalling monetary reward. At 3-month follow up, abstinence from alcohol was the primary outcome measure. All analyses and hypotheses were pre-registered. At baseline (57 participants), AUDIT scores correlated with sign-tracking to signals of monetary reward. In a subsequent regression analysis sign-tracking, gender and self-reported alcohol craving predicted abstinence at 3-month follow up (41 participants). Our work demonstrates that involuntary sign-tracking to cues signalling non-drug reward is associated with problematic alcohol use and return to use at 3-month follow up, in a treatment-seeking sample. Whether this automatic prioritisation of cues signalling reward is a consequence or vulnerability for problematic alcohol use remains to be investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From an associative perspective the acquisition of new goal-directed actions requires the encoding of specific action-outcome (AO) associations and, therefore, sensitivity to the validity of an action as a predictor of a specific outcome relative to other events. Although competitive architectures have been proposed within associative learning theory to achieve this kind of identity-based selection, whether and how these architectures are implemented by the brain is still a matter of conjecture. To investigate this issue, we trained human participants to encode various AO associations while undergoing functional neuroimaging (fMRI). We then degraded one AO contingency by increasing the probability of the outcome in the absence of its associated action while keeping other AO contingencies intact. We found that this treatment selectively reduced performance of the degraded action. Furthermore, when a signal predicted the unpaired outcome, performance of the action was restored, suggesting that the degradation effect reflects competition between the action and the context for prediction of the specific outcome. We used a Kalman filter to model the contribution of different causal variables to AO learning and found that activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) tracked changes in the association of the action and context, respectively, with regard to the specific outcome. Furthermore, we found the mPFC participated in a network with the striatum and posterior parietal cortex to segregate the influence of the various competing predictors to establish specific AO associations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An attentional bias toward threat has been theorized to be a normative aspect of infants' threat and safety learning, and an indicator of risk for internalizing psychopathology in older populations. To date, only four studies have examined this bias using the dot‐probe task in infancy and the findings are mixed. We extended the literature by examining patterns of attention to threat in a culturally and linguistically diverse sample of infants aged 5–11 months old (N = 151) using all measures previously employed in the infant dot‐probe literature. Given that an attentional bias toward threat is associated with higher risk of developing anxiety disorders later in life, we also examined how negative affect—an early correlate of later anxiety disorders—is related to attentional bias toward threat in infancy. This study was the first to use a consistent measure of negative affect across the whole sample. An eye‐tracking dot‐probe task was used to examine attentional bias toward threat (i.e., angry faces) relative to positive (i.e., happy faces) stimuli. Results showed that an attention bias to threat was not characteristic of infants at this age, and negative affect did not moderate the putative relationship between attention and emotional faces (angry, happy). These findings therefore suggest that attention biases to socio‐emotional threat may not have emerged by 11 months old. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: To date, there has been little investigation on how motivational and cognitive mechanisms interact to influence problematic drinking behaviours. Towards this aim, the current study examined whether reward-related attentional capture is associated with reward, fear (relief), and habit drinking motives, and further, whether it interacts with these motives in relation to problematic drinking patterns. Methods: Ninety participants (mean age = 34.8 years, SD = 9.1, 54% male) who reported having consumed alcohol in the past month completed an online visual search task that measured reward-related attentional capture as well as the Habit Reward Fear Scale, a measure of drinking motives. Participants also completed measures of psychological distress, impulsivity, compulsive drinking, and consumption items of Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test. Regression analyses examined the associations between motives for alcohol consumption and reward-related attentional capture, as well as the associations between reward-related attentional capture, motives, and their interaction, with alcohol consumption and problems. Results: Greater reward-related attentional capture was associated with greater reward motives. Further, reward-related attentional capture also interacted with fear motives in relation to alcohol consumption. Follow-up analyses showed that this interaction was driven by greater fear motives being associated with heavier drinking among those with lower reward-related attentional capture (i.e., "goal-trackers"). Conclusion: These findings have implications for understanding how cognition may interact with motives in association with problematic drinking. Specifically, the findings highlight different potential pathways to problematic drinking according to an individual's cognitive-motivational profile and may inform tailored interventions to target profile-specific mechanisms. Finally, these findings offer support for contemporary models of addiction that view excessive goal-directed behaviour under negative affect as a critical contributor to addictive behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laboratory stress-induction procedures have been critical in illuminating the effects of stress on human health, cognition, and functioning. Here, we present a novel stress induction procedure, the Simple Singing Stress Procedure (SSSP), that overcomes some of the practical challenges and conceptual limitations of existing procedures in measuring the causal influence of stress on psychological variables. In the stress condition of the SSSP, participants were instructed to sing a song in front of the experimenter while being video- and audio-recorded. Participants were also informed that they would have to sing again at the end of the experiment, and that this second performance would later be assessed by a panel of experimenters. Participants in a no-stress condition instead read lyrics in each phase. Our findings revealed that participants in the stress condition showed significantly higher blood pressure immediately following the initial singing session, as well as heightened salivary cortisol at a latency consistent with the initial singing session, than those in the no-stress condition. Our stress procedure also generated elevations in self-reported stress ratings immediately after the first singing session and subsequently in anticipation of the second singing session, relative to the no-stress condition. Collectively, these findings suggest that the SSSP is a simple and effective stress induction procedure that may be a promising alternative to existing protocols. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reward-learning theory views habits as stimulus–response links formed through extended reward training. Accordingly, animal research has shown that actions that are initially goal-directed can become habitual after operant overtraining. However, a similar demonstration is absent in human research, which poses a serious problem for translational models of behavior. We propose that response-time (RT) switch cost after operant training can be used as a new, reliable marker for the operation of the habit system in humans. Using a new method, we show that RT switch cost demonstrates the properties that would be expected of a habitual behavior: (a) it increases with overtraining, (b) it increases when rewards are larger, and (c) it increases when time pressure is added to the task, thereby hindering the competing goal-directed system. These results offer a promising new pathway for studying the operation of the habit system in humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Salient-but-irrelevant distractors can automatically capture attention and eye-gaze in visual search. However, recent findings have suggested that attention to salient-but-irrelevant stimuli can be suppressed when observers use a specific target template to guide their search (i.e., feature search). A separate line of research has indicated that attentional selection is influenced by factors other than the physical salience of a stimulus and the observer's goals. For instance, pairing a stimulus with reward has been shown to increase the extent to which it captures attention and gaze (as though it has become more physically salient), even when such capture has negative consequences for the observer. Here we used eye-tracking with a rewarded visual search task to investigate whether capture by reward can be suppressed in the same way as capture by physical salience. When participants were encouraged to use feature search, attention to a distractor paired with relatively small reward was suppressed. However, under the same conditions attention was captured by a distractor paired with large reward, even when such capture resulted in reward omission. These findings suggest that reward-related stimuli are given special priority within the visual attention system over and above physically salient stimuli, and have implications for our understanding of real-world biases to reward-related stimuli, such as those seen in addiction. Public Significance Statement: Recent studies have suggested that distraction by physically salient stimuli can be suppressed when observers are searching for a specific target. This study demonstrates that distraction by reward-related stimuli cannot be suppressed under these conditions. This may have implications for our understanding of attentional biases to stimuli associated with drug-reward seen in addiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research indicates that learning about the Pavlovian 'signal value' of stimuli can induce attentional biases: findings suggest that our attentional system prioritises detection of stimuli that have previously signalled availability of high reward. These findings potentially provide a human analogue of sign-tracking behaviour previously reported in studies of non-human animals. Here we examine a visual search task that has been developed to demonstrate the Pavlovian influence of reward on attention, in which the critical reward-signalling stimuli are never explicit targets of search. This procedure has previously yielded robust effects of reward on attention; however it remains unclear whether this pattern reflects a persistent and automatic bias in attentional capture based on prior experience of stimulus–reward pairings, or whether it results from participants strategically attending to reward-signalling distractors because they provide useful information about reward magnitude. To investigate this issue, in the current study participants initially completed a rewarded visual search task, in which colours of distractor stimuli signalled availability of high or low reward. Participants then completed a test phase in which rewards were no longer available, such that distractor colours no longer provided useful information on reward availability. Performance during the initial rewarded phase was impaired by the presence of a distractor signalling availability of high relative to low reward. Crucially, the magnitude of this reward-related distraction effect did not reduce in the subsequent unrewarded test phase. This suggests that participants' experience of differences in reward value signalled by distractor stimuli in this task can induce persistent biases in the extent to which these stimuli involuntarily capture attention, even when they are entirely task-irrelevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facial emotion constitutes an important source of information, and rapid processing of this information may bring adaptive advantages. Previous evidence suggests that emotional faces are sometimes prioritised for cognitive processing. Three experiments used an emotion-induced blindness task to examine whether this prioritisation occurs in a purely stimulus-driven fashion or whether it emerges only when the faces are task-relevant. Angry or neutral faces appeared as distractors in a rapid serial visual presentation sequence, shortly before a target that participants were required to identify. Either the emotion (Experiment 1) or gender (Experiments 2 and 3) of the distractor face indicated whether a correct/incorrect response to the target would produce reward/punishment, or not. The three experiments found that reward-related faces impaired subsequent target identification, replicating previous results. Target identification accuracy was also impaired following angry faces, compared with neutral faces, demonstrating an emotion-induced attentional bias. Importantly, this impairment was observed even when face emotion was entirely irrelevant to the participants' ongoing task (in Experiments 2 and 3), suggesting that rapid processing of the facial emotion might arise (at least in part) from the operation of relatively automatic cognitive–perceptual processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]