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Four studies tested a prediction derived from the shifting-standards model (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) regarding the role stereotypes play in judgments of individual group members. Previous research has documented that stereotyping effects are stronger on objective than on subjective response scales, and the present studies found that these effects were intensified when participants were under heavy cognitive load. Stereotyping effects increased on objective judgment scales, but decreased on subjective scales. The latter is a paradoxical effect: By relying on stereotypes, one may increasingly use them as within-category comparative standards, which leads to the apparent reduction of stereo-typing effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across 3 small studies, 80 female undergraduates were confronted with the dilemma of deciding whom--themselves or another research participant--to assign to a positive consequences task, leaving the other to do a dull, boring task. In Study 1, where morality was not mentioned, 16 of 20 assigned themselves to the positive consequences task, even though in retrospect only 1 said this was moral. In Studies 2 and 3, a moral strategy was suggested: either flipping a coin or accepting task assignment by the experimenter. In Study 2, 10 of 20 participants flipped a coin, but of these, 9 assigned themselves the positive consequences task. In Study 3, participants were significantly more likely to accept the experimenter's assignment when it gave them the positive consequences task. Overall, results suggested motivation to appear moral yet still benefit oneself. Such motivation is called moral hypocrisy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stereotypes may influence judgment via assimilation, such that individual group members are evaluated consistently with stereotypes, or via contrast, such that targets are displaced from the overall group expectation. Two models of judgment--the shifting standards model and status characteristics theory--provide some insight into predicting and interpreting these apparently contradictory effects. In 2 studies involving a simulated applicant-evaluation setting, we predicted and found that participants set lower minimum-competency standards, but higher ability standards, for female than for male and for Black than for White applicants. Thus, although it may be easier for low- than high-status group members to meet (low) standards, these same people must work harder to prove that their performance is ability based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies how subjective evaluations relevant to stereotypes are translated into open-ended descriptions. Information on stereotypes with individual standards; Information on the study of shifting standards models.

Presents a study which discusses the question of why and how individuals determine whether they have been victims of gender discrimination. How social status differences between men and women may change the significance of experiencing gender discrimination; How self-protective and situational factors influence the interpretation of prejudicial events.

Men tend to achieve higher response accuracy than women on surveys of political knowledge. We investigated the possibility that this performance gap is moderated by factors that render the communicative context of a survey intellectually threatening to women and thereby induce stereotype threat. In a telephone survey of college students' political knowledge, we manipulated two factors of the survey context: the alleged diagnosticity of the question set (i.e., whether it was portrayed as being sensitive to potential gender differences) and the gender of the interviewer. Consistent with previous studies of political knowledge, men scored higher than women overall. However, as predicted, this difference was reliably moderated by the manipulated factors. Women's scores were not reliably different from men's when the survey was portrayed as nondiagnostic and when women were interviewed by female interviewers. Diagnosticity and interviewer gender had no effects on men's scores. Consistent with previous research on stereotype threat, these results suggest that explicit and implicit cues reminding women of the possibility that they might confirm a negative gender stereotype can impair their retrieval of political knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors tested the shifting standards model (M. Biernat, M. Manis, & T. E. Nelson, 1991) as it applies to sex- and race-based stereotyping of self and others in the military. U.S. Army officers attending a leadership training course made judgments of their own and their groupmates' leadership competence at 3 time points over a 9-week period. We examined the effects of officer sex and race on both subjective (rating) and objective/common-rule (ranking/Q-sort) evaluations. Stereotyping generally increased with time, and in accordance with the shifting standards model, pro-male judgment bias was more evident in rankings than in ratings, particularly for White targets. Self-judgments were also affected by sex-based shifting standards, particularly in workgroups containing a single ("solo") woman. Differential standard use on the basis of race was less apparent, a finding attributed to the Army's explicit invocation against the use of differential race-based standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judgments of self and referent others tend to be positively related, as evident in the false consensus effect, but others may also be contrasted from the self, as noted in the false uniqueness literature. In 3 studies that examined the domains of attitudes and traits, evidence of both assimilative and contrastive associations between self- and other-judgments were noted, depending on the form of judgment (objective vs. subjective) and the relevant judgment scale anchor (self vs. others). When self-judgments were made first, objective appraisals of reference groups were contrasted from subjective self-appraisals (after controlling for individual differences in participants' behavioral reports). When judgments of others were made first, objective self-ratings were contrasted from subjective other-judgments. Implications for the false consensus literature and the shifting standards model (M. Biernat, M. Manis, & T. E. Nelson, 1991) are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]