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The article takes a critical look at the current state of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in light of the recent escalation between China and Japan. The article's central thesis is that the practical significance of the dispute has diminished considerably due to developments in the security and economic spheres. Rather, the dispute continues to exist and escalate because of the domestic political interests of the respective governments. This recognition is important to manage the dispute effectively, to avoid hyperbolic arguments about the dispute's conflict potential, and similarly to avoid undue comparisons with the South China Sea. This article adopts a realist, rational-choice based approach to demonstrate the diminishing nature of the security and economic significance of the islands, which underpins a decreasing rationale for actively seeking an alteration of the status quo. The question of why the dispute continues to escalate is highlighted in the article's examination of how the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and the Chinese Communist Party use the islands as a political symbol to pursue their own domestic and regional political agenda, in a way only tangentially connected to the actual dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the policy response of the Abe government (2012–present) to UNESCO's inscription of the 'Documents of Nanjing Massacre' to argue that the historical revisionists' perspective is central to the thinking of Japan's UNESCO diplomacy. The UNESCO's inscription heightened a sense of shame from the viewpoint of Japanese historical revisionists, leading the Japanese government to the unprecedented step of using its economic power to reform UNESCO's Memory of the World programme and to prevent further inscription of historical documents that go against the view of the government. Because UNESCO constitutes the existing biographical narrative of Japan as a peace-loving, law-abiding country, the Japanese government remains careful to maintain a good-will posture to UNESCO. This article highlights the case of Japan to illustrate the importance of memory and identity change, as well as of the distinction between ontological security and the removal of threat to a historical narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is necessary to conduct an analysis of relations between Japan and Russia to determine the main trends and prospects for joint development. The purpose of the article is to study and disclose the stages of development of cultural relations between Russia and Japan and determine its features, highlight the most pressing problems of relations and identify possible ways to build strong interstate relations. The methodological basis of the study is the analytical method, for a comprehensive analysis of the changes that occurred during the development of cultural relations between Japan and Russia. Also a prerequisite is compliance with the principles of historicism and objectivity. In the course of studying used the method of study and systematization of literature. As a result of studying the problem, we can evaluate the historical development of cultural relations between Russia and Japan. Assess the state of relations between Russia and Japan and uncover limitations and growth points to strengthen relations between Japan and Russia. The results of this study can be useful as Japanologists and to specialists dealing with the problems of Asia-Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the early nineteenth century Italy became the second biggest world exporter of silk thread. To improve productivity in silk cultivation a number of Chinese and Japanese silk production techniques were tried and when Europe was struck by a ruinous and incurable silkworm disease (1845-1880) to keep domestic silk production running Italian experts went to Inner and East Asia to purchase large quantities of healthy silkworm eggs. Eventually Japanese silkworm eggs were seen as the best choice and exported consecutively to Italy for some twenty years in a row. As well as trade connections, cultural ties between Italy and Japan were developed as well while from the late nineteenth century Italy showed much interest in Chinese silk production too. Two expeditions were sent there, the first 1914 lasted for about one year while the second was from 1932 to 1937 and was headed by an Italian expert who was recruited by the League of Nations to revive and modernize Chinese silk production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article covers the controversy that followed the March 16, 1893 escape of prisoner Yosaku Imada to the Japanese warship, the Naniwa, which was docked in Honolulu. Imada's act of seeking refuge onboard the ship occurred at a time when the provisional government of Hawai'i had no extradition treaty with Japan. This created a diplomatic event that entangled leaders from Japan, the provisional government, and the United States. To further complicate matters, Issei and Meiji government officials were also pressing for franchise in the Islands, a right that a majority of the community did not have access to at home. By placing Imada's escape and the Issei fight for voting rights in the context of the uncertainty that followed the January 17, 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, this article emphasizes Hawai'i's relevance as a site where inter-imperial dynamics aligned with competing settler colonialisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Samuels' [(2007). Securing Japan: The current discourse. The Journal of Japanese Studies, 33(1), 125–152] political categories of Japanese perspectives on strategic policy, this article argues that the nation's foreign and security policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has undergone three distinct phases: a first phase of neoconservatism during his first tenure as Prime Minister from 2006 to 2007; a second period when he returned to the office of Prime Minister five years later in 2012 that can be described as neoautonomous; and a third phase of pragmatic realism from 2015 to 2016. In addition, this article analyses the factors driving change from one phase to another. By adopting an eclectic approach to theory, it claims that each traditional theory in the field of International Relations (IR) offers different but complementary causal effects to shifts in security and foreign policies. Each IR theory emphasizes or downplays these four factors: actors, structures, material forces and ideas. This article will employ all three IR traditional theories as they relate to these factors to discern the change factors of Abe's foreign policy. Finally, it concludes by siding with those scholars who assert that Japan's foreign policy has made a consequential break from its past and has embarked on a new path towards a remilitarization of its foreign and security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses whether Japanese military and political elites perceived the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) as threats during the Cold War. Realist scholars have argued that Japan's security alliance with the United States and the global balance of power were such that most Japanese officials did not perceive either of the Communist giants as a serious military threat. Reaching a similar conclusion but for starkly different reasons, constructivist scholars have argued that cultural, normative, and identity factors explain why Japanese elites did not perceive the Soviet Union or China as militarily threatening. Neither of these arguments holds up. Archival data and oral history collections from Japan's Self-Defense Force and National Diet Library reveal that Japan's defense establishment and political leaders perceived both the Soviet Union and the PRC as extremely threatening and that these perceptions fluctuated in intensity over time, across sectors, and among actors. Psychological factors, including affect, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive beliefs (the ABC model), may better explain why Japanese judged the intensity and source of perceived threats in the manner that they did. These findings underscore why threat perception in the international system is best evaluated by aggregating individual judgments and their distribution among larger groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has shown a keen interest in his country's relationship with India with an intention to protect Japan's stake in maritime affairs under the 'Indo-Pacific' concept. In evaluating Japan's India strategy, a particularly important factor is China's regional presence. This article, through an analysis of Japan's India policy during 2013–18, seeks to address the following two questions. First, how has Japan's India diplomacy under Prime Minister Abe in politics, security, and economics been influenced by its strategies towards China? Second, how can Japan's diplomatic policies towards India be evaluated in terms of key concepts in relation to a state's foreign policy responses? The exploration of the development of Japan's India diplomacy, the geopolitical and geo-economic factors behind it, and the strategic nature of the diplomatic policies enables us to understand the prospect of increasingly important Japan–India relations and their strategic implications for rapidly evolving regional politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea–Japan relations are at their lowest point in decades, as colonial era disputes flare once again. Most pundits argue that the South Korean public is strongly united against Japan. We argue that South Korean elites are sharply divided over how to manage the crisis; this division is starting to impact how South Koreans understand colonial era narratives; and, long‐term, bilateral relations depend on how these growing divisions play out. Despite state censorship, a rising counter‐narrative in South Korea challenges the dominant, Manichaean, anti‐Japanese one. For the first time, Korea and Japan have a realistic chance of reconciling based on liberal public discourse and a nuanced, empirically based understanding of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Japanese unity of Overseas Despatch Operation (ODO) actors, laws, and operational aspects, interaction with state and institutional actors, '4C' functional regional engagement and concepts of partnership, and Japan's United Nations Peace Operations-Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief Operations (UNPO-HADRO) nexus. Japanese cooperation for dual liberal-international peace and realist security goals within increasing regional strategic competition and nationalist antipathy is examined, particularly in Japan's 'poor neighbourhood'. The paper questions why, despite undoubted expertise, Japan has not emerged as a regional UNPO-HADRO development leader, and whether Japanese UNPO-HADRO and 'pro-active pacifism' approaches are utilising UNPO-HADRO for Asia-regional strategic competition purposes? Japanese ODO have played important functional engagement, value sharing, and institutional socialisation roles, with integrated legal-civil–military holistic approaches providing models for others and foundations for partnerships. However, despite specialist capacity-building knowledge transfer efforts Asian disquiet remains concerning cooperation and partnership. Japan remains highly risk-averse, raising questions regarding its dependability, and 'HADRO-CIMIC superpower-aspirations', or bridging-actor role between Indo-Pacific and 'Northern-Developed' practitioners, can be evaluated by Japan's modest present UNPO actor status. Japanese leadership and initiative is limited by its neighborhood and attendant institutions, but also by its self-perceived identity shaped by historical, alliance, and leadership challenges to manage relative decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's primary objective of the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called 'tactical hedging'. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1945 Japanese navy circles in Berlin tried to begin peace negotiations with the United States. Using their contacts with the arms trader Friedrich Wilhelm Hack, they sent Commander Fujimura Yoshikazu to Switzerland, where he opened talks with Allen W. Dulles of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. Though the Japanese navy and Foreign Ministry showed some interest, the peace attempts finally failed since neither side took the initiative to an official level. Fujimura confused his government by claiming that the Americans had made the first step, while the U.S. side waited for proof that the administration in Tokyo was backing the navy officer's initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International economic agreements increasingly touch on fundamental principles of corporate governance. The trend contrasts with existing scholarship, which assumes corporate law evolves via domestic mechanisms. This Article introduces the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, with its dedicated chapter on corporate governance, as a case study. At the normative level, the emergence of corporate governance in international agreements represents a positive development by enabling countries to signal and put into action commitments for better governance. Given these recent developments, the field of comparative corporate governance should incorporate international agreements as an emerging source of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the Sino-Japanese strategic foreign aid competition in the Philippine infrastructure sector. It argues that the practice of geoeconomics in East Asian affairs has intensified as a result of China's rise as a great-power competitor and the growing nexus of security and economics in the region. In order to make their foreign aids attractive, Japan has adopted a set of normative principles that are encapsulated in its "Quality Infrastructure" as a strategy, while China continues to emphasize the principles of Chinese aid and the adoption of the BRI. The article found, among other outcomes, that the existing maritime dispute between the Philippines and China affects the legitimacy and attractiveness of Chinese assistance. On the other hand, due to their deepening bilateral relation, Japan remains the Philippines's most important bilateral development partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whaling has been a consistent theme in Australia's relations with Japan since the 1930s, Australia having endeavoured to regulate, restrict, or bring to a complete halt Japan's Antarctic whaling virtually since it began. Australia's motivations have been mixed, involving at various points, some combination of protection of Australia's coastal whaling industry, concern for Australia's security, for safeguarding Australia's Antarctic territorial claim, and more recently, concern for Australia's whale-watching industry and/or for the whales. Since environmental consciousness became a primary factor in the 1970s, Australian policy has been aligned with that of anti-whaling non-governmental organizations (NGOs), albeit that certain actions of NGOs have caused difficulties for the Australian Government. Law – inclusive of legal argument in the course of diplomacy, domestic laws, and international litigation – has been a mechanism of influence used by the Australian Government and NGOs. This paper traces Australia's legal opposition from its beginnings until Japan's announcement in December 2018 that it would end Antarctic whaling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, Sir David Warren, who was British Ambassador to Japan from 2008 to 2012, lays out the historical background to modern Japan, its political and economic structures (and international relationships); explores why we tend not to think of Japan as affected by the populism that we see in other Western democracies; and asks why Japan still presents itself as such a 'different' country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia is currently in a transitional period. Recognizing the challenges presented by China's rise to the current regional order, existing literature analyses the security situation in Asia by focusing on the material aspects of power distribution between the US and China. Few works substantively discuss the roles played by middle powers such as Japan in shaping the regional order and how they can deal with the challenges of great power competition and threats to the global rules‐based order. By employing Japan's involvement in the South China Sea issues as a case study, this article examines how a middle power attempts to shape or underpin the regional security order and if such attempts are effective. The investigation of Japan's engagement illustrates that a middle power's practical support can indirectly and gradually contribute to sustaining and defending the regional "rules‐based order". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses trends in regional security order in Asia. Topics covered include the maritime security policy of Japan with Vietnam and the Philippines, peace-building efforts of China at Burma, South Korea's cybersecurity contributions in the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries, the evolution of the regional economic order in East Asia and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

This article focuses on the nature of Japan's foreign policy formulation and legitimization through a study of its interaction with Central Asian countries. The article examines foreign policy discourse that constructs Japan's "self" vis-à-vis Central Asian "other." It reveals the textual mechanism through which reality, objects, and subjects are constructed, and it interprets the official statements contained in several foreign policy initiatives, in particular, the "Eurasian (Silk Road) Diplomacy," the "Central Asia plus Japan," and the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," as an attempt to understand the intersubjective knowledge and analytical lens through which Japanese foreign policy makers conceive and interpret the constructed "reality," produce foreign policy choices, and choose among identified alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One striking feature of the Pacific War was the extent to which Wilsonian ideals informed the war aims of both sides. By 1943, the Atlantic Charter and Japan's Pacific Charter (Greater East Asia Joint Declaration) outlined remarkably similar visions for the postwar order. This comparative study of the histories surrounding both charters highlights parallels between the foreign policies of Great Britain and Imperial Japan. Both empires engaged with Wilsonianism in similar ways, to similar ends. Driven by geopolitical desperation, both reluctantly enshrined Wilsonian values into their war aims to survive a gruelling war with empire intact. But the endorsement of national self-determination, in particular, gave elites in dependent states a means to protest the realities of both British and Japanese rule and to demand that both empires practise what they preach. This comparative analysis of Britain and Japan thus sheds light on the part Wilsonian ideology played in the global crisis of empire during the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper's main aim is to contribute to the debate on the impact of China's rise on the established norms and practices in the field of international development. To do so, it zooms in on a single infrastructure project, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail line, which involved intense competition between China and Japan. Specifically, it examines how competition between China, a non-Western emerging power, and Japan, an OECD member, led to a recalibration of both China and Japan's approaches to infrastructure financing in the region. The findings suggest that rather than straight convergence or competition between diverging models, there is an ongoing process of two-way adjustment between China, and representatives of the dominant global norms and practices. We also argue that to understand the implications of China's participation in the field of international development, and its impact on the 'rules of the game' of global governance, researchers should avoid positioning inquiries within the premises of China's one-directional impact on the development assistance regime. Rather, it is necessary to take into account a complex set of relationships including China, host countries and other 'socialised' actors, and the process of negotiation between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the normative function of historic narratives using the example of South Korean perceptions of twentieth-century history. The exploration of how relations between South Korea and Japan are perceived is based on 32 semi-structured interviews with academics, representatives of non-government organizations, and government officials in South Korea. The paper posits that the normative function of historical narratives is based on four mechanisms: (1) recognition: identifying problems in society that are associated with the aggressive and vicious actions of an outgroup in the past; (2) assessment: framing these problems as injustices; (3) connotation: establishing a specific meaning of national identity that promotes motivations for actions and agency (with specific duties and obligations); and (4) prescription: defining explicit strategies and tactics for action. An analysis of these mechanisms, which comprise the structure of historical narratives, reveals that in the case of South Korea, perceptions of the relations between South Korea and Japan have been shaped by Japan's brutal colonization of South Korea, the absence of Japanese accountability for this period, and a need for a South Korean identity premised on uniqueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on unresolved disputes between South Korea and Japan as the U.S. is not mediating. Topics discussed include Koreans' mistrust of Japan may even intensify if Japan mounts a more serious challenge to South Korea's sovereignty over the Dokdo Islets which are disputed by both countries, visit of South Korean President Moon Jae-in with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe which establish an intergovernmental agreement on the comfort women issue and Japan's diminishing share in South Korean external trade reflects the broader declining linkage between the two countries.

Until recent decades, historians of modern East Asia generally considered Asianism to be an imperialistic ideology of militant Japan. Although Japanese expansionists certainly used the term and its concept in this way in the 1930s and 1940s, earlier proponents of Asianism looked upon it as a very real strategy of uniting Asian nations to defend against Western imperialism. Showing that Chinese intellectuals considered different forms of Asianism as viable alternatives in the early days of the Republic of China, this article examines a number of discussions of Asianism immediately following the 1911 Revolution. Concentrating on newspaper articles and speeches by intellectuals Ye Chucang and Sun Yat-sen, I show the international aspirations of the Guomindang elite at this crucial point in the construction of the Chinese nation. Despite the dominance of discourse on the nation state, these intellectuals advocated different Asianist programmes for strategic purposes within the first two years of the Republic, dependent on their very different relationships with Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese imperialism was one of the most important driving forces in the history of modern East Asia. One influential group of actors at the grassroots level were the so-called 'continental adventurers' (tairiku rōnin)—Japanese nationals who travelled in Korea and China on the lookout for adventures and employment opportunities. Some of them worked part time for the army as spies, translators, and agents for special operations. These adventurers have been studied before as agents of Japanese imperialism, but existing accounts fail to present a convincing model of the mechanism that made their activities effective. The goal of this article is to fill this gap. This mechanism, which I shall hereafter call 'the military-adventurous complex', was a lobby of officers, continental adventurers, businessmen, politicians, criminal elements as well as Chinese, Manchurian, and Mongolian revolutionaries. The interests of these contingents were unique but nevertheless intertwining. Despite its decentralized character, the military-adventurous complex had a significant impact on Japanese foreign policy over an extended period. In this article, we shall explore the contours, structure, and modus operandi of that complex, its ambivalent relationship with the Japanese state, as well as several examples of its operations in the early twentieth century. Finally, we shall dwell on the ramifications of the complex on the development of Japanese imperialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether the European Union (EU) and Japan have the capabilities and resolve to save the global multilateral order. Topics discussed include impact of U.S. President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on Japan and the EU, multilateral order constructed by the U.S. after World War II, and market power and institutional capabilities of both Japan and the EU.

This article challenges the simplistic view that U.S. leadership in East Asia is weakening relative to China's increasing ability to shape the regional order, which will force other states to choose between these two powers. Based on interviews with political elites, analysts, and academics in the United States, China, Japan, and Indonesia, we argue that the East Asian order transition is more complex and nuanced, especially when we examine views toward: (1) the Sino–U.S. rivalry for regional leadership; (2) whether Chinese initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative disrupt the current order; and (3) the preferred vision of regional order for each of the four countries. While there is hardly a consensus view about issues of regional order, it appears that in the short to medium term, China is not expected to substantially overhaul the existing East Asian order. Nevertheless, Beijing is likely to chip away at U.S. regional leadership and, in the long term, would presumably seek to create an order that would sustain its rise and maintain its regional preponderance. The responses of other regional stakeholders toward these developments would be vital in shaping the collective impact on the East Asian order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

1919 was not the death knell of empires: it opened new imperial possibilities. The empires of the losers were destroyed; victors added new territories and a new element—the mandate—to their repertoires; Japan was recognized as a major imperial actor; the Soviet Union constituted a new form of empire; Germany, chafing at its exclusion from the world of empires, created the Third Reich; the US, after promoting a new international order, developed its own way of exercising power at a distance. This article describes the varied trajectories of empires in the decades after the First World War. It notes changes in discourse and international institutions after 1919, but argues against fitting 1919 into a linear narrative of 'empire to nation-state'. Self-determination proved a problematic concept both where it was implemented and where it was not. The forced breakup of the Ottoman Empire led to conflicts that have yet to be resolved. Anti-colonial movements fought oppression, but often sought alternatives to both old-style empires and the territorial state. Colonial empires were able to contain challenges, refine their methods of rule and claim international legitimacy. It took another catastrophe for colonial empires to be fundamentally threatened—by a war that was more the result of the reconfiguration of empires after 1919 than of their decline. The Japanese takeover of southeast Asia began the unraveling of European empires after 1945. Even then, political possibilities that reach well beyond the national continued to shape our world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the concept of "hedging" should be understood in the context of the "balancing-bandwagoning" spectrum within the "balance of power" theory, in which hedging is located between balancing and bandwagoning as the state's third strategic choice. Although polarity— unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar—largely determines the likelihood of hedging behavior, during a period of power shift, strategic uncertainty emerges. States, particularly secondary powers, attempt to calculate the risk of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging, adopting an optimal strategy. To identify states' strategic behavior, it is important to first examine their economic and military capabilities, and if these indicators are not decisive enough to identify balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging behavior, diplomatic factors should be taken into account, although those are a relatively weaker indicator. The use of this conceptual framework reveals that Japan's foreign policy behavior has not involved "hedging" vis-à-vis China; instead, Japan's behavior is consistently associated with "balancing" against the risks of China's rise. In addition, while Japan's behavior vis-à-vis the United States is considered to be bandwagoning, Japan made political efforts to strengthen its own military capabilities—internal balancing—which began in the 2010s when Japan relaxed its political constraints on use of its military. This behavior also aimed both to illustrate Japan's efforts related to alliance burden-sharing and to enhance its external balancing with the United States. Yet, the periods from 1997 to 2005 and from 2010 on represent an aberration because Japan engaged one type of hedging—security hedging—vis-à-vis the risk of US commitment reduction to East Asia. In this sense, while concurring with the realists' argument that Japan's current behavior is characterized as balancing, the argument differs from that of realists who believe that Japan's policy shift to balancing toward China only began with China's rise in the late 2000s or 2010s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Second World War, Japan began paying war reparations and instituted a strategy of international positioning - based on international cooperation activities - that aimed to ensure the supply of natural resources to its production and trade. Economic security became the target of Japanese cooperation. Japan soon became a major donor, whose strategy has been permeated by its interests. Taking a critical perspective, this paper analyses the evolution of the Japanese cooperation strategy, in particular the changes promoted by the prime minister, Shinzo Abe. Its starting point is a review of the stages of Japanese cooperation (emphasising the outside interference the country has had to respond to), the underpinning of which has shifted from the principle of economic security via the principle of human security to its present greater focus on strategic security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's new treaties with the Western powers came into force in the summer of 1899. These signified Japan's recognition as a modern state, but also opened the whole of Japan to residence and commerce for the nationals of the Western powers. This article examines Japan's legislative response to this new era of both political equality and expanded foreign intercourse and exchange. This comprised two new laws, Japan's first nationality law and new entry restrictions, both of which defined the boundaries of Japanese identity. The West played a paramount role in the crafting of these laws, but often forgotten is the role played by China. By examining the international contexts and the debates that attended the passage of these laws, this article shows that each law enacted a form of exclusion: the former sought to mitigate Western influence, while the latter sought to minimize Chinese immigration. Together, they reflected Japan's international position between two others: China and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article interrogates one of the most important emerging bilateral relationships in East Asian international relations: Japan's politico-economic relations with Burma/Myanmar (herein referred to as Burma). A long-time ally since the Second World War, Japan's role in Burma came under increasing and eventually unbearable pressure with US sanctions from the 1990s. However, since 2011 Japan has rapidly extended its influence in Burma—influence understood multi-dimensionally as comprising institutional, ideational, and material power—and built upon those well-established historical ties. This rush to rejuvenate relations has been driven by more than historical amity. It has been due to various shifts in the forms of state in East Asia and changes in the regional power order—principally increasing competition with China—and has also been informed both by Burma's desire to begin internationalizing and industrializing and Japan's enthusiastic assistance in this process. The article interrogates three key questions associated with these post-2011 developments: What has been the nature of Japan's rush to rejuvenate its relations with Burma? Why has this been such a priority for Japan at this time? And how has Japan been endeavoring to secure its foreign policy goals with Burma? It concludes that Burma is in the middle of a period of great tension, and despite its democratic transformation (or rather because of it) is not best placed to handle the forces bearing down upon it. Great caution and attention is needed towards Burma, the "final frontier" of Southeast Asia, as big changes are coming and with these come significant and potentially overwhelming challenges for the country, its leaders and its people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses how Japan would maintain its superpower in military and economy in East Asia. Concepts behind the U.S.-Japanese military alliance; Strengths and weaknesses of Japanese military; Effects of the minimalist-pacifist `norms' on Japan's military posture; The dilemma of U.S.-Japanese alliance; Three reasons why economic discord could not erode strategic concord; How Korea and China gives uneasiness to Japan's future security; Analysis on Japan's future condition.

The article examines the changes to Japan's foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and its impact on the country's relationship with China. Topics include the 40th anniversary celebration of the signing of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the factors that triggered the changes to Japan's foreign policy, and Abe's goal for Japan to achieve major power status.

Japan disputes the sovereignty of two islands: Senkaku/Diaoyu with China and Takeshima/Dokdo with South Korea. These disputes have triggered political performances. In August 2012, Chinese activists landed on Senkaku/Diaoyu, and South Korean politicians landed on Takeshima/Dokdo. The group threat theory suggests that these events constitute threats to Japanese citizens, which lead to negative attitudes towards these countries. The theory also expects personal variations in the reactions to the threats, and the empirical findings of the theory predict an improvement in the worsened attitudes immediately after the event. Drawing on a Japanese social survey that was conducted every month for the two years during which these landing events occurred, I tested the effect of the events on Japanese attitudes towards China and South Korea in a natural experimental framework. The results show that the events negatively impacted Japanese attitudes towards both countries. However, contrary to the expectations of the group threat theory, individual variations (i.e., socioeconomic status, media exposure, and political orientation) in the responses to the events are not supported. Additionally, the attitudes do not return to preevent levels for one year. The contradictions between previous studies and this study potentially originate from the importance of the territories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan's security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan's recent security partnership with India is part of Japan's long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan's policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo's policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan's policy toward India, along with efforts to increase interoperability between Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy, coincides with US strategy to bring India into the US-led coalition to balance against China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China's economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers' concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Japanese government has spent considerably more diplomatic energy on national security and foreign economic policy initiatives beyond north-east Asia over the last decade. Recognizing that its capacity and resolve are limited in ways that restrain its role in maritime deterrence outside north-east Asia, the Japanese government has focused on deploying 'soft security infrastructure' to advance its grand strategic designs. The government is also seeking to position Japanese businesses—and ultimately the Japanese economy—to take economic advantage of emerging production networks and the growing consumer base in 'emerging Asia'—as well as, increasingly, in east Africa, in order to reduce its economic dependence on China and the West. The Japanese government anticipates that promoting the development of horizontally integrated economic corridors throughout subregions in emerging Asia and east Africa will be advantageous to Japanese commercial interests as well as enhance Japan's capacity, and others', to resist Chinese economic and military coercion. Japan's grand strategy and pivot within Asia thus goes beyond reactive, short-term balancing behaviour. It is focused, in the long term, on drawing the centre of regional economic gravity away from China to enable Japan and other regional nations to exist and prosper on the outer rim of Chinese hegemony—and to actively contest it if necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]