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In this article we specify a model of millet prices in the three West African countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Using data obtained from USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) we present a unique regional millet price forecasting model that takes advantage of the panel nature of our data and accounts for the distance of rural markets from capital cities. Another novel aspect of our analysis is our use of the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) to detect and control for variation in conditions for productivity. We find that including NDVI information significantly improves price forecasts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fisheries managers use buybacks to reduce fleet capacity, conserve fish stocks, and accomplish other goals. In 2009, Maryland and Virginia conducted auctions to buy back commercial fishing licenses. The auctions in both States had similar timing, objectives, and target populations. The divergent designs of the auctions, however, provide a case study with which to investigate effective buyback practices. We compare and contrast the market designs used by Maryland and Virginia, and describe how those differing designs influenced the respective outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the relationship between markets, climate change, and food security in West Africa. The focus of the article is how the global fluctuations of food prices have made food security in West Africa tenuous. The article also discusses the role of technology in preventing food insecurity. According to the author, the use of technology has transformed agriculture and food production through advancements and improvements in irrigation, seed quality, and machinery; which has increased crop yields and the productivity of workers. Topics include an in-depth discussion of the agricultural systems in West Africa, including a welfare analysis of food prices in relation to sellers and buyers, the integration with global markets, and the use of technology to increase production.

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is arguably the world's largest payments-for-ecosystem services program, with $1.8 billion paid to farmers in 2017 for practices on 23.4 million acres. The CRP uses a pay-as-bid, reverse auction with field-specific price caps to enroll most of the land in the program. Economic theory and empirical studies from other domains suggest that the restrictive price-cap auction format used in the current design of the CRP exhibits issues in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Using a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of varying the tightness of the price-cap auctions. We also examine two alternative auction formats based on reference prices. We find that excessively tight bid caps reduce efficiency and cost effectiveness by discouraging participation. Conversely, bid caps set too high also reduce cost-effectiveness by allowing higher rents. An exogenous reference price ranking format, which makes medium-cost sellers more competitive against low-cost sellers, reduces both efficiency and cost-effectiveness. An endogenous reference price format increases cost-effectiveness by increasing participation and reducing rents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]