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Abstract The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System is a safety system that provides water to the reactor pressure vessel during off-normal BWR reactor conditions, such as reactor isolation from the turbines or loss of AC power. Under loss of AC power conditions, the RCIC System is expected to fail due to battery depletion within 4–8 h of operation for many units. However, the system did not fail until about 70 h into the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 2, which was well past the time of battery depletion. To investigate the full potential of the RCIC System, the Laboratory for Nuclear Heat Transfer Systems (NHTS) at Texas A&M University is designing and constructing an experimental RCIC System facility. A careful scaling analysis is essential to ensure proper representation of the RCIC System's key components and phenomena in the experimental testing. This paper describes a method to estimate the similarity level (SL) of the RCIC turbine-pump assembly (turbopump), along with application of the methodology using the Peach Bottom Unit 2 RCIC System as the reference full-scale system. The methodology is demonstrated with the Texas A&M University facility but can be applied to other RCIC system facilities. Zuber's H2TS (Hierarchal Two-Tiered Scaling) method has been adopted to specify the required level of detail for the scaling analysis. The analysis includes development of unitless characteristic time ratios to quantify the degree of similarity of the RCIC turbomachinery between the test facility and the prototype. The RCIC turbine and pump are focused on herein because, first, the Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 2 RCIC System may have ceased operation at 70 h due to turbine failure, and, two, the greatest RCIC System modeling challenges are with the long-term operation of these turbomachinery components. Since the Texas A&M experiments will provide validation data for analytical models of the turbomachinery, applicability of the data must be evaluated. Based on the similarity level estimates, there is a high degree of similarity between the NHTS and Peach Bottom RCIC System turbines, with a minimum similarity level of 75%. This allows the use of the NHTS RCIC turbine for testing over the full range of Design Basis Accident conditions. Another important finding from this study is that the pump configuration initially designed into the NHTS facility had a low similarity level between the experimental and full-scale facilities. This paper identifies pump parameters in the NHTS facility that can be changed to achieve greater similarity. The similarity level analysis indicate that the NHTS RCIC turbine control volume is appropriate for representing the full-size turbomachinery and can be used to study the prototype turbine and pump behaviors under design basis operating conditions. Scaling analyses of the other RCIC System components are to follow the turbomachinery similarity evaluations. The NHTS facility is currently being prepared to test over the entire Design Basis Accident containment pressure and temperature ranges. Future efforts will also focus on modeling, experimentally and with Computational Fluid Dynamics tools, the RCIC System to provide data for beyond design basis operational conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Destruction of critical nuclear infrastructure would have a debilitating effect on national public health, safety, national economy and security. For this reason, analysts perform safety risk analyses on the performance of the nuclear system to quantify and understand the nature of unwanted events. Since the world has gone through many changes after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, nuclear security risk analysis also became a necessity. To date, the safety and security risk analyses have been done separately without a combined evaluation. Study results are presented for three types of risk analyses for a pure security initiating event, pure safety initiating event, and a combined analysis of safety-security risk for either a security or safety initiating event. The pure security risk analysis uses adversary sequence diagram and pathway analysis to calculate the initiating security event frequency of a successful adversary attack. The pure safety analysis represented a series of natural (random) safety system component failure events for which a safety system failure frequency was calculated using SAPHIRE probabilistic risk analysis code. On the other hand, the combined safety-security analysis considered a security initiating event followed by safety system failure or vice versa. The main outcome of the comparative study of three different types of risk analyses is that pure safety risk evaluation without considering the possibility of a simultaneous security attack would underestimate the risk value. Failure frequency due to a security event should be combined with the safety system failure analysis for a meaningful risk analysis and the Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model can be employed for this purpose. The usefulness of a combined safety-security risk analysis is demonstrated through a case study for the spent fuel storage pool facility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]