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The global market of developing Internet of Things (IoT) devices increases rapidly with improved design goals like cost, energy efficiency, and performance. Unfortunately, the above design goals often come at the expense of security. Illegal access to the network, malicious device control, compromised sensitive information, and theft of personal data are main threats to these devices. As a result, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is sometimes employed to ensure safe transmission and processing of data in IoT Systems. However, tampering, cloning, and reverse engineering are main concerns that impair the computational complexity of the 128‐bit AES at the hardware level. Recently hardware obfuscation‐based AES has emerged as a comprehensive hardware security approach for reducing threat impacts. The hardware obfuscation schemes efficiently introduce obfuscation keys for AES to conceal its functionality. The Xilinx Vivado 2016.2 software and BASYS‐3 FPGA have been used to implement obfuscated AES approaches in this work. The proposed methods have low resource usage in terms of area and power overhead while providing a high level of security in terms of Hamming Distance of 50% and Avalanche Effect of 40% for each obfuscation method. We have also analyzed the probability of success for brute‐force attacks for proposed methodologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With an increasing risk of circuit piracy and intellectual property (IP), it is necessary to solve the problem of hardware security in digital signal processing (DSP) via hardware obfuscation. To obscure the circuit at a structural level, a high level of transformation techniques is used. High-level transformations (HLT) not only help in obfuscating the architecture of the circuit, it simultaneously meets the area-speed-power trade-offs. A key-based multiplexer design is proposed for the switch instance, which gives the desired output to the next node only if the configuration key is correct. A single bit change in the key will affect the whole functionality of the design. This key-based multiplexer helps to achieve functional obfuscation. As a result, two-level security is achieved. The objective of this paper is to prevent reverse engineering by structurally and functionally obfuscating the DSP circuit. Implemented and analyzed the area of the obfuscated 3-tap, 5-tap finite impulse response (FIR) filter, and obfuscated infinite impulse response (IIR) filter. Results are compared with those of the non-obfuscated filter circuit. Experimental results show that by applying the high level of transformations, the circuit gets obfuscated. Despite that, the area is reduced. The results confirm that the area of the obfuscated third-order IIR filter design is reduced by 24.56% as compared with its corresponding non-obfuscated filter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effective resistance to intellectual property (IP) piracy, overproduction and reverse engineering are becoming more and more necessary in the integrated circuit (IC) supply chain. To protect the hardware, the obfuscation methodology hides the original function by adding a large number of redundant states. However, existing hardware obfuscation approaches have hardware overhead and efficiency of obfuscation limitations. This paper proposed a novel methodology for IP security using the minimum spanning tree finite state machine (MST-FSM) obfuscation. In the minimum spanning tree (MST) algorithm, the Hamming distance defines the cost of obfuscated states. The Kruskal algorithm optimizes the connection relationship of obfuscated states by computing the Hamming distance of the MST-FSM. The proposed MST-FSM is automatically generated and embedded in the hardware IP with the self-building program. Finally, the MST-FSM is applied on the itc99 benchmark circuits and encryption standard IP cores. Compared with other state-of-the-arts, the obfuscation potency is improved by 3.57%, and the average hardware cost is decreased by about 6.01%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Tunnel field‐effect transistor (TFET) exhibits significant p‐i‐n forward leakage with the increase in drain‐to‐source voltage bias, and this adversely impacts the power consumption and reliability of TFET digital circuits. This work presents low‐power circuit techniques that result in novel compact gates and recommends tristate gates to mitigate the leakage effects. The proposed novel compact gates and tristate gates demonstrate two and six times lower power consumption compared with conventional TFET transmission gates with enhanced reliability. Further, this work introduces a new design methodology that leverages TFET p‐i‐n forward leakage for hardware obfuscation applications. Utilizing the proposed design methodology, the optimization of 40% and 80% in area and power consumption of hardware security primitives like true random number generators is also accomplished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hardware obfuscation is a technique that modifies the circuit to hide the functionality. Obfuscations through algorithmic modifications add protection in addition to circuit-level techniques, and their effects on the data paths can be analyzed and controlled at the architectural level. Many error-correcting coding and cryptography algorithms are based on finite field arithmetic. For the first time, this paper proposes a hardware obfuscation scheme achieved through varying finite field constructions and primitive element representations. Also the variations are effectively transformed to bit permuters controlled by obfuscation keys to achieve high level of security with very small complexity overheads. To illustrate the effectiveness, the proposed scheme is applied to obfuscate Reed-Solomon decoders, which are broadly used in communication and storage systems. For a (255, 239) RS decoder over finite field $GF(256)$GF(256), the proposed scheme achieves 1239 bits of independent obfuscation key with 4.4 percent area overhead, while yielding no penalty on the throughput and only one extra clock cycle of latency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study reviews the current situation regarding design protection in the microelectronics industry. Over the past 10 years, the designers of integrated circuits (IC) and intellectual properties (IP) have faced increasing threats including counterfeiting, reverse‐engineering and theft. This is now a critical issue for the microelectronics industry, mainly for fabless designers and IP designers. Coupled with increasing pressure to decrease the cost and increase the performance of ICs, the design of a secure, efficient, lightweight protection scheme for design data is a serious challenge for the hardware security community. However, several published works propose different ways to protect design data including functional locking, hardware obfuscation and IC/IP identification. This study presents a survey of academic research on the protection of design data. It concludes with the need to design an efficient protection scheme based on several properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hardware intellectual-property (IP) cores have emerged as an integral part of modern system-on-chip (SoC) designs. However, IP vendors are facing major challenges to protect hardware IPs from IP piracy. This paper proposes a novel design methodology for hardware IP protection using netlist-levei obfuscation. The proposed methodology can be integrated in the SoC design and manufacturing flow to simultaneously obfuscate and authenticate the design. Simulation results for a set of ISCAS-89 benchmark circuits and the advanced-encryption-standard IP core show that high levels of security can be achieved at less than 5% area and power overhead under delay constraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrated circuit (IC) piracy and overproduction are serious issues that threaten the security and integrity of a system. Logic locking is a type of hardware obfuscation technique where additional key gates are inserted into the circuit. Only the correct key can unlock the functionality of that circuit; otherwise, the system produces the wrong output. In an effort to hinder these threats on ICs, we have developed a probability-based logic-locking technique to protect the design of a circuit. Our proposed technique, called "ProbLock", can be applied to both combinational and sequential circuits through a critical selection process. We used a filtering process to select the best location of key gates based on various constraints. Each step in the filtering process generates a subset of nodes for each constraint. We also analyzed the correlation between each constraint and adjusted the strength of the constraints before inserting key gates. We tested our algorithm on 40 benchmarks from the ISCAS '85 and ISCAS '89 suites. We evaluated ProbLock against a SAT attack and measured how long the attack took to successfully generate a key value. The SAT attack took longer for most benchmarks using ProbLock which proves viable security in hardware obfuscation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]