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In a world of growing international competition and rivalry between China and the United States, Latin America and the European Union (EU) are caught in the same thorny dilemma. Positioned between these global giants, both regions are facing a retorn to a Westphalian system of nation-states, which undermines their roles as emerging regional players. In view of these new global challenges in Latin America and the EU, this paper uses a qualitative and comparative approach to explore foreign policy discourses on autonomy in both regions. It examines their goals and priorities and assesses the potential regional and interregional consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the imposition of the US embargo, sixty years ago, Cuba became a laboratory for different strategies of democracy promotion implemented by Washington to change the regime and by Brussels to promote a reform from within. The maintenance of the one-party-system confirms not only the failure of these policies but their contribution to the consolidation of the revolutionary regime in place since 1959. The article asks why both actors maintain their policies towards Cuba. Through a qualitative and comparative analytical framework, it explores the dynamics between instruments and results of US and European Union (EU) strategies towards Cuba. It includes theoretical debates on political regimes, transitions and democracy promotion strategies through constructive engagement in case of the EU and through sanctions on behalf of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text asks how Europe and Latin America/Caribbean responded to the virus COVID-19 and addressed the challenges for public health. Consequently, we identify five regional governance gaps and explore their application during the management of the pandemic: information and knowledge, norms and principles, public policies, institutions and material resources. From a comparative perspective, we analyse in a two separated sections if the regional governance in the EU and Latin America/Caribbean in these areas increased (or not). Finally, we emphasize similarities and differences and explain the causes behind the diverse evolution of the collective management of the pandemic in both regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/Context: Central America, Colombia and Venezuela face important security challenges. Despite its rhetoric about the importance of human security, the EU applies different policies to the three conflicts: a securitydevelopment nexus in Central America, a combination of donor engagement and "securitization" in Colombia and a mixture of sanctions and diplomacy in Venezuela. Employing a comparative approach based on a common methodological framework, this article sets out to determine which EU concept of security -- State or human-focused --is applied to each conflict and assess its degree of coherence. Methodology: Basing itself on a qualitative content analysis, the article addresses the following question: to what extent does State or human security govern the EU´s respective policies towards these countries and how consistent are they? Conclusions: The article finds that, despite its official discourse, the EU´s securitydevelopment nexus is not a coherent policy and its relationship with the United States, its transatlantic "partner" and the region's main donor, are mainly responsible for that policy´s internal and external inconsistencies. Originality: The article questions the EU's image as a soft power and development partner. Although the EU continues to deal with the causes of insecurity, like inequality and poverty, rather than its consequences, its development-security nexus tends to "securitize" development, particularly in countries, like Colombia and Venezuela, which, due to their armed conflicts and fragile States, are regarded as "security threats." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature maintains that not all populisms are equal. Some are seen as projects of regeneration or democratisation because they would incorporate an excluded people; others are movements that would weaken democracy by promoting exclusion (xenophobia and racism). The former is "left-wing populism" while the latter is "right-wing populism". This paper shows that what is central to populism is its model of democracy, not whether it is situated on the right or the left. To do this, an evaluation is made of the democratic balance of populisms in three countries in Europe (Austria, France and Hungary) and three in Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela). As will be shown, those of the right have no more contributed to the destruction of democracy than those on the left may be presented as democratising successes; but all represent a profound challenge to liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil-European Union relations punch below their weight. Cooperation takes place at three levels: relations with European Union (EU) member states, Brazil's partnership with Brussels, and EU-MERCOSUR negotiations. This multilevel governance contrasts with poor results: there is no free trade agreement, development cooperation became irrelevant, and international positions rarely converge. The article explores the reasons for the underperformance by comparing foreign policy shifts in Brazil and the EU, and analyzing multilevel governance in selected sectors of cooperation. It is based on four assumptions: multilevel relations are uncoordinated, idealist inter-regionalism doesn't work, and crisis-driven, liberal realist foreign policies in Brazil and the EU facilitate bilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the rise of China and Brazil's inclusion in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the EU is no longer Brazil's main partner , and their power relations are now more horizontal. Even though they share the same values and beliefs, Brazil's and the EU's performance in global governance reveals as many similarities as it does differences. It is on this new base of relations that the EU-Brazil strategic association must be built. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]