Search

In societies where the populace exhibits a wide range of religiosity, social conservatives (religiously devout or socially traditional) feel their beliefs and way of life threatened, even where others in their society (secular, or socially liberal) have no desire to threaten them, or to discriminate against them, or even to proselytize. Examples include devout English Pilgrims in liberal 16th century Holland and devout Muslims in liberal 21st century Western Europe. We suggest that this is because diversity in religiosity itself poses a threat to conventional personal morality (attitudes on abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide, prostitution). The consequences of societal diversity in religiosity (the centrality of religion to one's life) for individuals' endorsement of conventional personal morality have been neglected in prior research. This paper shows that diversity in religiosity at the national level undermines individuals' endorsement of conventional personal morality, net of an individual's own religiosity, net of the average levels of religiosity and socioeconomic development in the individual's society, and net of key individual‐level controls. Data are pooled from the World Values Surveys/European Values Surveys, 1981–2008, with 90 countries, 200+ surveys, and 300,000+ individual respondents. Analysis is by multilevel methods (variance components models with fixed effects and random intercepts, estimated by generalized least squares [GLS]). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract A growing body of evidence supports the contention of scholarly culture theory that immersing children in book-oriented environments benefits their later educational achievement, attainment and occupational standing. These findings have been interpreted as suggesting that book-oriented socialization, indicated by home library size, equips youth with life-long tastes, skills and knowledge. However, to date, this has not been directly assessed. Here, we document advantageous effects of scholarly culture for adult literacy, adult numeracy, and adult technological problem solving. Growing up with home libraries boosts adult skills in these areas beyond the benefits accrued from parental education or own educational or occupational attainment. The effects are loglinear, with greatest returns to the growth in smaller libraries. Our evidence comes from regressions with balanced repeated replicate weights estimated on data from 31 societies which participated in the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) between 2011 and 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on earlier, mainly aggregate analyses, conventional wisdom previously held that income inequality reduces happiness. But aggregate models consistently yield misleading results in this domain, substantially because of intractable problems of sample size, confounding omitted variables, and conditional effects differing between poor developing nations, rich advanced nations, and nations in transition from Communism. Based on more recent evidence, scholarly views are beginning to merge on a consensus that national income inequality is irrelevant to individuals' subjective well-being in advanced nations and normal times, as shown by multi-level models with appropriate controls (including socioeconomic development, an engine of happiness and foe of inequality). For developing nations, consensus is not as strong, but the bulk of the evidence indicates a neutral to positive effect for inequality. Building on this foundation, this paper provides exploratory analyses to stimulate future research, extending our understanding of the social psychological and cultural forces that generate these results; dissects changes over time and expectations for the future; and addresses the possibility that inequality may reduce well-being in extraordinary circumstances and for particular groups – for example creating differences in formerly Communist nations between the political left and the right, and between older and younger cohorts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Income inequality has been contentious for millennia, a source of political conflict for centuries, and is now widely feared as a pernicious “side effect” of economic progress. But equality is only a means to an end and so must be evaluated by its consequences. The fundamental question is: What effect does a country's level of income inequality have on its citizens' quality of life, their subjective well-being? We show that in developing nations inequality is certainly not harmful but probably beneficial, increasing well-being by about 8 points out of 100. This may well be Kuznets's inverted “U”: In the earliest stages of development some are able to move out of the (poorly paying) subsistence economy into the (better paying) modern economy; their higher pay increases their well-being while simultaneously increasing inequality. In advanced nations, income inequality on average neither helps nor harms. Estimates are from random-intercept fixed-effects multi-level models, confirmed by over four dozen sensitivity tests. Data are from the pooled World Values/European Values Surveys, Waves 1 to 5 with 169 representative national samples in 68 nations, 1981 to 2009, and over 200,000 respondents, replicated and extended in the European Quality of Life Surveys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parental divorce imposes a small but significant educational disadvantage on American children. Does this generalize across nations and over time? We analyze representative national samples from Australia (n=29,443) and Canada (n=28,266), together with US General Social Survey data (n=32,380). Using OLS and logistic regression with robust standard errors, we estimate models controlling many potentially confounding variables. Divorce costs seven-tenths of a year of education, mainly by reducing secondary school completion. Importantly, it has become more damaging in recent cohorts. Because this holds in all three nations, the explanation probably lies in common circumstances of, and parallel changes in, modern industrial societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women’s workforce participation increased strongly over the 1980s and 1990s, especially among middle aged wives. Multivariate analysis of IsssA data (N =9412) reveals large compositional changes and a trend for succeeding cohorts of women to work more than their predecessors, but few if any period effects. Among the compositional changes, rising women’s education and falling fertility substantially elevate women’s workforce participation and hours worked. No clear time effects were associated with particular policy initiatives. Importantly, interaction tests suggest that the effects of education and of family situation have not changed over time. Finally, family of origin and religiosity have both direct and indirect effects. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

ABSTRACT. How do family arrangements affect subjective well-being? We investigate this issue using data pooled from the IsssA and HILDA, both large, representative national samples of Australia (pooled n = 38 447). Our regression analysis of cross-sectional and panel data examines how large are the differences in life satisfaction according to marital status and cohabitation. We find that women and men in formal marriages experience higher levels of life satisfaction than do people in other family arrangements. Moreover, both multiple tests in the cross-section, and tests controlling for prior happiness in the panel analysis, suggest that this is a causal relationship. Aggregating up the levels of life satisfaction generated by different marriage and cohabitation arrangements across a lifetime, suggests that a life-long marriage is the most satisfying. Early divorce followed by an enduring second marriage is little worse (because little time is spent outside the married state). But divorce without remarriage, or long lasting cohabitation without formal marriage, reduce the lifetime sum of subjective well-being by 4-12% for both women and men. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The large-scale entry of married women into the workforce has been a striking feature of the postwar period, particularly in the United States, Britain, and other Anglo-Celtic nations. Theory implies that this should happen in all developed nations. But there is a counter-example: Ireland. To discover whether this is truly an exception, we analyze data from large, representative samples of Ireland, the USA, Britain, and Australia (pooled n=8,240). We find that Irish are not especially traditional; they are especially devout, but the difference persists when this is controlled. Strikingly, the behavior of Irish immigrants is indistinguishable from other Anglo-Celts in their new societies. Thus it seems that Irish exceptionalism arises from an institutional setting uniquely hostile to women's employment. hostile to women's employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on a study which assessed the extent to which women's labor participation reflects culturally or situationally induced family strategies above and beyond the well-known effects of opportunities and constraints associated with education and the life cycle. Data and methodology; Discussions regarding the result.

In formulating views of just reward for high-status and low-status work, do ordinary citizens take cues from their nation's public stance on income inequality as institutionally embedded in their welfare state, i.e. their social welfare and labor market policies, their "welfarism"? How large a morally correct earnings gap flows from that? Our multilevel analyses (fixed effects, random intercepts) replicate prior research on the impact of individual characteristics and socioeconomic development. They open new territory with the discovery that public opinion on legitimate/just earnings of high-status occupations aligns moderately strongly with welfarism, ceteris paribus , with welfare state citizens advocating lower pay for the elite but not higher pay for working-class occupations: The welfare state is not (or no longer) a matter of helping the poor but instead of bringing down the elite, "cutting down the tall poppies". Data: World Inequality Study v2.1: 30 countries, 71 surveys, and over 88,000 individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kelley CGE, Kelley SMC, Evans MDR, Kelley J. Attitudes toward home-based employment for mothers of young children: Australian evidence Int J Soc Welfare 2010: 19: 33–44 © 2008 The Author(s), Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the International Journal of Social Welfare. People have mixed feelings about paid employment for mothers with young children. This might reflect opposition to women's work per se or, instead, fear that children are harmed by the mother's absence from the home. To find out, we developed new questions differentiating support for or opposition to mothers working for pay depending on whether the employment is home-based or outside the home. Data from a large representative national sample of Australia ( n= 1,324) show that public support for employment is about 30 percentage points greater if the mother works at home. Structural equation analyses show social differences in levels of support. Thus work at home provides a way of increasing labour force participation and earnings for mothers (with the welfare benefits that implies), which is congruent with public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]