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Quantum Computing: From Alice to Bob, Alice Flarend and Bob Hilborn, Oxford U. Press, 2022, $80.00 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through analysis of a classroom lesson led by a decorated teacher, we illustrate how instructional practices favor students seeking empirical patterns at the expense of using mechanistic reasoning. In the lesson, when students spontaneously come up with hypothetical mechanisms to explain why a light bulb in an electric circuit does or does not light, the teacher, following the guidance of standardized curricula, redirects them toward pattern‐seeking. We argue that this bias toward pattern‐seeking in Chinese national standards and curricula, along with ambiguity in those documents on what an "explanation" is, sits in tension with students' productive abilities and propensities for engaging in mechanistic explanation. In discussion, we extend the argument to show a less severe but similar bias toward pattern‐seeking in the United States' Next Generation Science Standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mathematics and science education researchers focused on teacher education emphasize attention and responsiveness to student thinking as central to effective classroom practice. Being responsive to student thinking involves attending to the substance of students' ideas—the meaning students are making—and pursuing that thinking, adjusting the flow of instruction as needed. Yet, attention and responsiveness to student thinking is irregular and generally rare among novice teachers. In this theoretical paper, we argue that the irregularity of attention and responsiveness to student thinking, including variability within individual teachers' practice, can be explained by a framework grounded in teachers' localized framings of their classroom activity—their sense of "what is it that's going on here." Using analyses of classroom episodes across contexts and timescales to illustrate our claims, we demonstrate how a framing-anchored framework can coordinate and improve upon three common explanations for the irregularity of novice teachers' attention and responsiveness to student thinking: underdeveloped skills and/or knowledge for attending and responding, "transmissionist" beliefs about learning, and institutional constraints (and teachers' perceptions thereof). Building on this argument, we suggest that teacher educators can work with novice teachers' framings of their classroom activities as a generative anchor for supporting attention and responsiveness to student thinking in classroom settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As scientific models of student thinking, learning progressions (LPs) have been evaluated in terms of one important, but limited, criterion: fit to empirical data. We argue that LPs are not empirically adequate, largely because they rely on problematic assumptions of theory-like coherence in students' thinking. Through an empirical investigation of physics teachers' interactions with an LP-based score report, we investigate 2 other criteria of good models: utility and generativity. When interacting with LP-based materials, teachers often adopted finer-grained perspectives (in contrast to the levels-based perspective of the LP itself) and used these finer-grained perspectives to formulate more specific, actionable instructional ideas than when they reasoned in terms of LP levels. However, although teachers did not use the LP-based materials in ways envisioned by LP researchers, the teachers' interactions with the score reports embodied how philosophers envision the fruitful use of good models of dynamic, complex systems. In particular, teachers took a skeptical, inquiring stance toward the LP, using it as an oversimplified starting place for generating and testing hypotheses about student thinking and using concepts from the model in ways that moved beyond the knowledge available in the LP. Thus, despite—and perhaps even because of—their empirical inadequacy, LPs have the potential to serve teachers as productive models in ways not envisioned by LP researchers: as tools for knowledge generation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Computational thinking integration into a moral reasoning context. • Epistemic overlap between computational thinking, moral reasoning, and modeling. • Empathy as a resource for computational thinking. • Considerations for integration in socio-emotional learning settings in K12. In this work, we argue for expanding the scope of K-12 computational thinking (CT) integration contexts to include everyday scenarios involving moral reasoning. Epistemic overlap between computational thinking practices and moral reasoning suggest that these contexts are potentially rich sites to see "seeds of CT" in children's reasoning and can provide rich educational pathways for children into CT. Taking a case-study approach, we examine the reasoning of a second-grader, Ollie, on a task involving fair allocation of resources to victims of a natural disaster. Our analysis finds that Ollie's reasoning was rich with seeds of CT (e.g., problem formulation, abstraction, complex-systems thinking) and that empathy served as an important supporting role to the CT. This work has implications for curricular design, suggesting that fairness and resource allocation scenarios with built-in opportunities for empathy might provide rich sandboxes for CT integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students’ difficulties with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology. Students’ beliefs about knowledge and learning can hinder the activation and integration of productive knowledge they have. Such explanations, however, risk falling into a ‘deficit trap’—substituting a concepts/skills deficit with an epistemological one. Our interview-based case study of a freshman engineering major, ‘Jim,’ explains his difficulty solving a physics problem (on hydrostatic pressure) in terms of his epistemology, but avoids a deficit trap by modeling the dynamics of his epistemological stabilities and shifts in terms of fine-grained cognitive elements that include the seeds of epistemological expertise. Specifically, during a problem-solving episode in the interview, Jim reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates common sense. We show that Jim has all the mathematical skills and physics knowledge he would need to resolve the contradiction. We argue that his difficulty doing so stems in part from his epistemological views that (i) physics equations are much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and (ii) physics equations do not express meaning that tractably connects to common sense. For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish. But Jim’s in-the-moment shift to a more sophisticated epistemological stance highlights the seeds of epistemological expertise that were present all along: he does see common sense as connected to formalism (though not always tractably so), and in some circumstances, this connection is both salient and valued. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Some researchers, including B. K. Hofer and P. R. Pintrich (1997) and W. A. Sandoval (2005), argue for defining personal epistemology as views about the nature of knowledge and knowing but not views about the nature of learning. Others continue using a more expansive definition of personal epistemology that includes views about learning. I argue that the scope of personal epistemology should not be decided entirely a priori. If people's views about the nature of knowing and knowledge turn out to be separable from (despite being intertwined with) their views about the nature of learning, then it makes sense to define 2 separate areas of study corresponding to those 2 separable sets of psychological constructs. From some theoretical perspectives, however, empirical results may support the interpretation that views about knowledge are inseparably entangled with views about learning. In that case, excluding views about learning from personal epistemology obscures rather than elucidates the content and cognitive structure of students' views. To be clear, I do not think the community should decide, now, to etch “views about the nature of learning” into the definition of personal epistemology. I argue instead that it is more productive not to converge on a definition until further empirical and theoretical progress points us toward the best way to “cut up [nature] ... along its natural joints” (Plato, 1995, p. 64). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss a case study of the influence of epistemology on learning for a student in an introductory college physics course. An analysis of videotaped class work, written work, and interviews indicates that many of the student's difficulties were epistemological in nature. Our primary goals are. to show instructors and curriculum developers that a student's personal epistemological stance-her ideas about knowledge and learning can have a direct, causal influence on her learning of physics, and to describe a mechanism for this interaction. This influence exists even when research-based curriculum materials provide implicit epistemological support. For this reason, curriculum materials and teaching techniques could become more effective by explicitly attending to students' epistemologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on personal epistemologies has conceived them as made up of relatively large, coherent, and stable cognitive structures, either developmental stages or beliefs (perhaps organized into theories). Recent work has challenged these views, arguing that personal epistemologies are better understood as made up finer grained cognitive resources whose activation depends sensitively on context. In this article, we compare these different frameworks, focusing on their instructional implications by using them to analyze a third-grade teacher's epistemologically motivated intervention and its effect on her students. We argue that the resources framework has more predictive and explanatory power than stage- and beliefs-based frameworks do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on personal epistemologies has begun to consider ontology: Do naive epistemologies take the form of stable, unitary beliefs or of fine-grained, context-sensitive resources? Debates such as this regarding subtleties of cognitive theory, however, may be difficult to connect to everyday instructional practice. Our purpose in this article is to make that connection. We first review reasons for supporting the latter account, of naive epistemologies as made up of fine-grained, context-sensitive resources; as part of this argument we note that familiar strategies and curricula tacitly ascribe epistemological resources to students. We then present several strategies designed more explicitly to help students tap those resources for learning introductory physics. Finally, we reflect on this work as an example of interplay between 2 modes of inquiry into student thinking, that of instruction and that of formal research on learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions the community consensus about epistemological sophistication. Distinction between the correctness and productivity of an epistemological belief; Conception of elementary school students on science; Generalizations on the nature of knowledge and learning.

Examines the instructional practices for developing knowledge and learning of physics students. Nature of knowledge and learning in understanding physics; Comparison of students beliefs on physics; Effect of epistemological beliefs of students on physics course.

Refutes the argument that probabilistic support cannot be inductive. Technical conditions; Consequential disjointness versus logical independence; Michael Redhead's rejoinder; Inductive support for incompatible hypothesis.

Abstract: Problem solving in groups can be rich with tension for students. This tension may arise from conflicting approaches (conceptual and/or epistemological) and/or from conflict emerging in the social relations among group members. Drawing on video records of undergraduate students working collaboratively, we use three cases to illustrate the multifaceted ways in which conflict arises—combining conceptual, epistemological, and socioemotional dynamics—and a specific way of managing the tension that can emerge from the multifaceted conflict, “taking an escape hatch.” An escape hatch is a set of discourse moves through which participants close the conversational topic, thereby relieving tension, but before a conceptual resolution is achieved. We describe how epistemological twists and turns can be recruited as a means of managing the strong emotions experienced by the students, showing the coupling of emotion and epistemology in students’ conceptual sense making during group work. We help to provide the groundwork necessary for instructors to notice, understand, and respond to one way in which conceptual–epistemological–social–emotional aspects of interaction are coupled in the emergence of tension, rather than narrowly targeting instructional moves based on only conceptual or epistemological considerations. Instead, instructors should often respond to—and help students become aware of—the emotional component of peer interactions and its entanglement with the “cold cognitive” conceptual and epistemological components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between ideology and learning remains insufficiently theorized and sparsely investigated in the learning sciences. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s theorization of ideology, Judith Butler’s notion of the (un)grievability of lives, and Sara Ahmed’s construct of stickiness, we illustrate how insights from critical social theory are indispensable to understanding processes of learning and how perspectives from the learning sciences can enrich critical social theory. Through the analysis of a classroom discussion on the use of militarized drones in an undergraduate engineering ethics course, we show how ideological convergence among participants constructed locally significant categories of “civilian,” “terrorist,” and (un)grievability, which narrowed the possible trajectories for students’ disciplinary learning in engineering and engineering ethics. Our analysis also shows that fleeting moments of ideological expansion offered opportunities for new learning; however, most of these instances of possibility were not sustained through the classroom discussion. We explicate how ideological convergences and expansions, as interactional achievements, profoundly matter for disciplinary learning and students’ identities. In conclusion, we explore the implications of our findings for broader contexts of learning and for the field of the learning sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Background: Quantitative researchers have noted the impact of mentoring and support programming for students from underrepresented groups in engineering. Qualitative researchers have also noted the importance of student agency in persistence through marginalization. Nevertheless, challenges and questions remain in identifying practices which are effective in supporting underrepresented students. Purpose: The study applies scholarship from critical theory and narrative as a new resource for approaching and understanding the process of supporting marginalized student agency. Method: A longitudinal interview study with a female undergraduate engineering student, Emilia, developed into a way for her to process marginalizing educational experiences and to develop new narratives that expanded her agency. After an in‐depth member check, Emilia became a co‐author contributing a post hoc account of the impact of these discussions. Results: Our analysis indicates that naming one's own oppression and creating narratives that repurpose and resituate stereotypical stories of oppression was a liberatory act for Emilia. We trace three marginalizing themes of the participant's experience that are subverted and resisted through the student co‐constructed narrative. Conclusions: The paper builds theory for diversity support, suggesting critical theorizing may present a new form of agency not yet represented in the literature. It also points to possible value for student participants from qualitative methodologies exploring student experiences. Finally, it suggests supporting critical theorizing as a potential new orientation for diversity practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Background: To explain educational problems such as student attrition, engineering education literature often focuses on the characteristics of individuals. In 2006, Ray McDermott and Hervé Varenne called for examining the “cultural construction” of educational problems, uncovering how multiple actors create and inscribe meaning to the educational problem. Purpose: We apply the cultural construction framework to examine how the educational problem of a student being “not cut out for engineering” is constructed within the context of a specific electrical engineering course. We focus on culturally taken‐for‐granted course structures, practices, and interactions, all of which produce the local enactment of this common educational problem. Method: We used ethnographic methods, including field‐noted participant observations, one‐on‐one participant interviews, and video‐recorded student work on lab assignments. Coordinating multiple data streams enabled us to question explanations couched in terms of individual ability and background, and to illustrate how ability hierarchies were constructed in the educational context. Results: Our findings illustrate how several mundane and seemingly innocuous aspects of engineering classrooms add up to construct the educational problem of our focal student as “not cut out” for engineering. Contributions to this construction included lecture seating positions, interactional norms in lecture and lab, and labels made meaningful through institutional and interactional processes. Conclusions: The forces at play in constructing educational problems for students are deeply embedded in institutions, disciplines, and society, making it difficult to generate a simple list of instructional interventions. We highlight cultural construction analysis as a potentially fruitful orientation for researchers and practitioners to find the particular sites and tools for local intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Students' identities and sense of belonging in a program affect whether they stay in engineering. Research suggests that students' ways of knowing and beliefs about what counts as knowing and learning - their personal epistemologies - can be aspects of their identities, or sense of self as knowers and learners. Purpose/Hypothesis Combining personal epistemology and identity theories suggests epistemological aspects of students' identities can influence whether they feel they belong in their engineering program. We have two research questions: Can a high-achieving engineering student be in danger of leaving a program because of a mismatch between epistemological aspects of his identity and his perceptions of the intellectual climate of their program? How does such a mismatch affect the student's day-to-day academic experiences? Design/Method For three years, we followed Michael, an electrical engineering student, through interviews and in-class observations. From more than 12 hours of semistructured clinical interviews, more than 10 hours of videotaped discussion sections, and two in-class observations in lectures, we produced a case study to characterize epistemological aspects of Michael's identity and how they influenced his perception of his program. Results Michael expressed and enacted a sense-making epistemology that is a fundamental aspect of his identity as a learner. Due to this sense-making aspect of Michael's identity, he often felt alienated from the intellectual climate of his program, and he considered leaving engineering. Conclusion Researchers focused on student retention should attend to epistemological aspects of student identities. Instructors and administrators focused on retention should attend to the epistemological messages students hear from their programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science education researchers agree about the importance of evidence in science practices such as argumentation. Yet, disagreements and ambiguities about what counts as "evidence" in science classrooms pervade the literature. We argue that these ambiguities and disagreements can be viewed as falling along three fault lines: (i) the source of evidence, specifically, whether it must be first‐hand; (ii) whether "evidence" must always be empirical; and (iii) the extent to which evidence is inferred, and what degree of inference transforms "evidence" into something else. In this paper, after showing how these three fault lines manifest in the literature, we argue that these three dimensions of disagreements and ambiguities are not confined to research and research‐based curricula; they are also salient in teachers' classroom practice, as illustrated by a dramatic, multiday debate between a mentor teacher and her teacher intern. After establishing the salience of the three fault lines in both research and practice, we explore whether Next Generation Science Standard (NGSS) can provide a resolution to the teachers' debate and to the disagreements/ambiguities in the literature. Our analysis reveals that NGSS reproduces rather than resolves those three fault lines—but in doing so, it invites a resolution of a different type. Instead of providing a single, precise, context‐independent definition of "evidence," NGSS implicitly reflects a defensible view that what counts as "evidence" depends on the epistemic aims of the practices in which the students are engaged. This implied context‐dependency of what counts as good evidence use, we argue, could be made explicit in an addendum document clarifying aspects of NGSS. Doing so would provide valuable guidance to teachers, teacher educators, and researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Current conceptions of quantitative problem-solving expertise in physics incorporate conceptual reasoning in two ways: for selecting relevant equations (before manipulating them) and for checking whether a given quantitative solution is reasonable (after manipulating the equations). We make the case that problem-solving expertise should include opportunistically blending of conceptual and formal mathematical reasoning even while manipulating equations. We present analysis of interviews with two students, Alex and Pat. Interviewed students were asked to explain a particular equation and solve a problem using that equation. Alex used and described the equation as a computational tool. By contrast, Pat found a shortcut to solve the problem. His shortcut blended mathematical operations with conceptual reasoning about physical processes, reflecting a view-expressed earlier in his explanation of the equation-that equations can express an overarching conceptual meaning. Using case studies of Alex and Pat, we argue that this opportunistic blending of conceptual and formal mathematical reasoning (i) is a part of problem-solving expertise, (ii) can be described in terms of cognitive elements called symbolic forms (Sherin, 2001), and (iii) is a feasible instructional target. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]