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Binding theories claim that features of an episode are bound to each other and can be retrieved once these features are re-encountered. Binding effects have been shown in task-switching studies with a strong focus on bindings of observable features such as responses. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether task rules, translating stimulus information into motor output can be bound and subsequently retrieved even if they act independently from specific response codes. To address this question, we utilized a task-switching paradigm with varying visual context features. Unlike previous studies, tasks in the present study did not differ in their response options, and sequential response repetitions were eliminated by design. In three experiments, we observed larger task-switch costs on trials repeating the context of the previous trial than on context-change trials. According to binding accounts, this suggests that response-independent task rules adopted in the previous trial became bound to the context feature and were retrieved upon re-encountering the context feature in the current trial. The results of this study generalize previous findings indicating that binding processes can include response-independent control to task-switching situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When simultaneously performing two tasks that share response properties, interference can occur. Besides general performance decrements, performance in the first task is worse when the second task requires a spatially incompatible response, known as the backward crosstalk effect (BCE). The size of this BCE, similar to congruency effects in conflict tasks, is subject to a sequential modulation, with a smaller BCE after incompatible compared to compatible trials. In the present study, we focus on a potential bidirectional interaction between crosstalk (and its resolution) at a lower level of task performance and higher-order processes of task organization. Two questions were of particular interest: First, do participants switch task order more frequently after a conflict-prone incompatible trial than after a compatible trial? Second, does changing task order influence the efficiency of conflict resolution, as indexed by the size of the sequential modulation of the BCE. Across four experiments, we only found marginal evidence for an influence of lower-level conflict on higher-order processes of task organization, with only one experiment revealing a tendency to repeat task order following conflict. Our results thus suggest practical independence between conflict and task-order control. When separating processes of task selection and task performance, the sequential modulation was generally diminished, suggesting that conflict resolution in dual-tasks can be disrupted by a deliberate decision about task order, or, alternatively, by a longer inter-trial interval. Finally, the study found a strong bias towards repeating the same task order across trials, suggesting that task-order sets not only impact task performance but also guide task selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence from multisensory body illusions suggests that body representations may be malleable, for instance, by embodying external objects. However, adjusting body representations to current task demands also implies that external objects become disembodied from the body representation if they are no longer required. In the current web-based study, we induced the embodiment of a two-dimensional (2D) virtual hand that could be controlled by active movements of a computer mouse or on a touchpad. Following initial embodiment, we probed for disembodiment by comparing two conditions: Participants either continued moving the virtual hand or they stopped moving and kept the hand still. Based on theoretical accounts that conceptualize body representations as a set of multisensory bindings, we expected gradual disembodiment of the virtual hand if the body representations are no longer updated through correlated visuomotor signals. In contrast to our prediction, the virtual hand was instantly disembodied as soon as participants stopped moving it. This result was replicated in two follow-up experiments. The observed instantaneous disembodiment might suggest that humans are sensitive to the rapid changes that characterize action and body in virtual environments, and hence adjust corresponding body representations particularly swiftly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical accounts of self-representation assume a privileged role for information that is linked to the self and suggest that self-relevant stimuli capture attention in a seemingly obligatory manner. However, attention is not only biased toward self-relevant information, but self-relevant information might also tune attention more broadly, for instance, by engaging cognitive control processes that regulate allocation of attention. Indeed, research in social, clinical, and developmental sciences predicts a close link between a cognitive representation of the self and cognitive control processes. The present research is concerned with such a possible signaling function of the self to recruit cognitive control and tested predictions that follow from this view using the well-known Stroop task. Participants identified the print color of words. Self-reference was manipulated such that a prime was presented before or together with a Stroop word that comprised of either a possessive pronoun (e.g., "my green") or a definite/indefinite article as control (e.g., "the/a green"). Results of three experiments (Ntotal = 137) showed that self-reference priming reduced the congruency effect in the Stroop task relative to control conditions. This finding is incompatible with an attentional bias account assuming that self-relevant distractors always impair performance, but rather suggests that stimuli relevant to the self can facilitate cognitive control processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hundred years ago, Kurt Lewin published a series of articles in which he vehemently argued against the idea that associations between stimuli and responses motivate behavior. This article reviews his empirical work and theory and the cogency of Lewin's conclusion according to modern standards. We conclude that Lewin's criticism of the contiguity principle of associationism is still valid, and is now supported by a broad range of theories on learning, motivation, and action control. Implications for modern dual-system theory and modern theories on motivated action and (instructed) task sets are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Goal-directed behaviour requires mental representations that encode instrumental relationships between actions and their outcomes. The present study investigated how people acquire representations of joint actions where co-actors perform synchronized action contributions to produce joint outcomes in the environment. Adapting an experimental procedure to assess individual action-outcome learning, we tested whether co-acting individuals link jointly produced action outcomes to individual-level features of their own action contributions or to group-level features of their joint action instead. In a learning phase, pairs of participants produced musical chords by synchronizing individual key press responses. In a subsequent test phase, the previously produced chords were presented as imperative stimuli requiring forced-choice responses by both pair members. Stimulus-response mappings were systematically manipulated to be either compatible or incompatible with the individual and joint action-outcome mappings of the preceding learning phase. Only joint but not individual compatibility was found to modulate participants' performance in the test phase. Yet, opposite to predictions of associative accounts of action-outcome learning, jointly incompatible mappings between learning and test phase resulted in better performance. We discuss a possible explanation of this finding, proposing that pairs' group-level learning experience modulated how participants encoded ambiguous task instructions in the test phase. Our findings inform current debates about mechanistic explanations of action-outcome learning effects and provide novel evidence that joint action is supported by dedicated mental representations encoding own and others' actions on a group level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imitating someone's actions influences social-affective evaluations and motor performance for the action model and the imitator alike. Both phenomena are explained by the similarity between the sensory and motor representations of the action. Importantly, however, theoretical accounts of action control hold that actions are represented in terms of their sensory effects, which encompass features of the movement but also features of an action's consequence in the outside world. This suggests that social-affective consequences of imitation should not be limited to situations in which the imitator copies the model's body movements. Rather, the present study tested whether copying the perceived action-effects of another person without imitating the eventual body movements increases the social-affective evaluation of this person. In three experiments, participants produced visual action-effects while observing videos of models who performed either the same or a different movement and produced either the same or a different action-effect. If instructions framed the action in terms of the movement, participants preferred models with similar movements (Experiment 1). However, if instructions framed the action in terms of the to-be produced action-effect in the environment, participants preferred models with similar action-effects (Experiments 2 and 3). These results extend effect-based accounts of action control like the ideomotor framework and suggest a close link between action control and affective processing in social interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present research explores decision making in multitasking, investigating how people make optimal decisions between tasks. Empirical evidence suggests that difficulties in task performance (i.e., response conflict within a task) can bias decision making. Here we investigate whether also conflict between task representations can tune choices away from conflict-associated tasks. Using a combined forced/free-choice task-switching design, we tested whether task conflict that arises because of proactive interference of previously activated tasks biases task choice. We compared free-choice decisions between 3 tasks after forced-choice sequences that instigated either high task conflict (task sequences of type ABA, in which persisting inhibition needs to be overcome because one switches back to a just-abandoned task) or low task conflict (task sequences of type CBA). Results of 2 experiments (N = 16; N = 32, preregistered) showed that participants were more likely to switch away from the previously performed task after high than after low task conflict. Furthermore, participants preferably selected the task that suffered least from task conflict and/or proactive interference. In addition, a third experiment (N = 32) confirmed that this bias in task selection could not be explained in terms of randomness heuristics. These results suggest a close link between decision making and performance in multitasking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In interference tasks, the magnitude of the congruency effect is reduced in trials that follow an incongruent trial. This congruence sequence effect (CSE) reflects cognitive control processes, yet accounts disagree when and how control is exerted. Here, we address these questions in the context of the prime-target task. In this task, control can either modulate early prime or late target information. Furthermore, control can utilize information specific to the stimulus (perceptual features) or relational information between stimuli (temporal order). Two experiments (N = 41 | N = 62) were conducted using a prime-target task with arrows (prime) and letters (target). We presented either the prime before the target or the target before the prime. For both trialtype transitions, the CSE was assessed. Regarding the first question, when is control exerted, results showed a larger CSE for prime→target relative to target→prime trials. This suggests that control in the prime-target task modulates prime activity. Regarding the second question, how is control exerted, a combined analysis of both experiments showed a larger CSE for repetition of the same prime and target order across two trials (e.g., previous trial: prime→target; current trial: prime→target) compared to changes (e.g., previous trial: prime→target; current trial: target→prime), suggesting that control in the prime-target task can employ temporal selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central function of the human brain is prediction. Influential theoretical views suggest that we form predictions about forthcoming sensory outcomes that follow from our own actions and that anticipation of these outcomes is fundamental for action control. However, little is known about how predicted outcomes are represented at the neural level. We hypothesized that neural activity reflecting the anticipation of outcomes should precede action initiation. Following computational theories on action control, anticipation should be reflected in an outcome-selective reduction in neural activity. To test this, the present study recorded scalp electroencephalography to show that brain activity reflects action-effect specific representations before response initiation. We harnessed frequency entrainment to tag neural activity specific for particular action-effects. Participants engendered visual action-effects that were presented in flickering frequencies of 6 or 10 Hz, either according to a fixed cue-response mapping (Experiment 1) or freely chosen (Experiment 2). Results showed that perception of action-effects entrained a steady-state visual brain response specific to the perceived action-effect at either 6 or 10 Hz. More important, neural pattern reflecting action-effect specific representations emerged even before a response was given (i.e., without any visual stimulation). In line with theoretical accounts, perception of action-effects led to a specific increase in neural activity, while prediction of action-effects led to a specific decrease in neural activity. These findings provide neural evidence for the anticipation of action-effects before response initiation, supporting major theories of action control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflict-monitoring theory proposes that conflict between incompatible responses is registered by a dedicated monitoring system, and that this conflict signal triggers changes of attentional filters and adapts control processes according to the current task demands. Extending the conflict-monitoring theory, it has been suggested that conflict elicits a negative affective reaction, and that it is this affective signal that is monitored and then triggers control adaptation. This review article summarizes research on a potential signaling function of affect for cognitive control. First, we provide an overview of the conflict-monitoring theory, discuss neurophysiological and behavioral markers of monitoring and control adaptation, and introduce the affective-signaling hypothesis. In a second part, we review relevant studies that address the questions of (i) whether conflict elicits negative affect, (ii) whether negative affect is monitored, and (iii) whether affect modulates control. In sum, the reviewed literature supports the claim that conflict and errors trigger negative affect and provides some support for the claim that affect modulates control. However, studies on the monitoring of negative affect and the influence of phasic affect on control are ambiguous. On the basis of these findings, in a third part, we critically reassess the affective-signaling hypothesis, discuss relevant challenges to this account, and suggest future research strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to feedback control models, errors are monitored and inform subsequent control adaptations. Despite these cognitive consequences, errors also have affective consequences. It has been suggested that errors elicit negative affect which might be functional for control adaptations. The present research is concerned with the temporal dynamics of error-related affect. Therefore, we ask how affective responses to errors change over time. Two experiments assessed performance in a Stroop-like task in combination with online measures of facial electromyography that index affective responses specific for muscles that are associated with the expression of negative (corrugator supercilii) and positive affect (zygomaticus major). After errors, corrugator activity first increased relative to correct trials but then decreased (below correct trials) for later time bins. Zygomaticus activity showed a concomitant inverse pattern following errors, such that an initial decrease was followed by a later increase relative to correct trials. Together, this biphasic response in both facial muscles suggests that early negative responses to errors turn into increasingly more positive ones over time. Error-triggered electromyography did marginally predict behavioral adjustments following errors at the inter-individual, but not at the intra-individual level, providing only limited evidence for a functional role of error-related affect for immediate changes in behavior. However, the dynamics of error-related electromyography points to the role of implicit emotion regulation during task performance. We propose that this process helps to maintain homeostasis of positive and negative affect which in the long term could facilitate adaptive behavior. • We assessed the temporal dynamics of error-related affect • We used facial electromyography to index affective responses specific for muscles involved in the expression of negative and positive affect • Results suggest that an initially negative valence response to errors changed into increasingly positive valence for later time bins • EMG responses to errors did marginally predict behavioral adjustments following errors at the inter-individual but not the intra-individual level • The dynamics of error-related affect point to a role of implicit emotion regulation to maintain adaptive homeostasis of positive and negative affect [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do we manage to shield our goals against distraction? Traditionally, this ability has been attributed to top-down cognitive control, which is assumed to monitor for and intervene in case of response conflicts. However, this account has been challenged by episodic-retrieval views, which attribute sequential modulations of conflict effects to bottom-up memory for stimulus and response features. Here we tested a new theory suggesting that that control and retrieval accounts are no alternatives but, rather, 2 sides of the same coin. According to this view, the control parameter can become stored in event files, together with stimulus, response, and context codes, so that cognitive control operations, independently from the stimulus-response codes the operate on, can come under mnemonic control. Using a novel design that eliminates any stimulus and response binding and at the same time disentangles conflict and retrieval of control states, we provide the strongest evidence to date that abstract control parameters are stored into trial-specific event files. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study tested whether the coupling of covert attentional shifts and motor planning of pointing movements can be modulated by learning. Participants performed two tasks. As a primary movement task, they executed a pointing movement to a movement target (MT) location. As a secondary visual attention task, they identified a discrimination target (DT) that was presented shortly before initiation of the pointing movement. These DTs either occurred at the same or at different locations with the MT. A common finding in such and similar settings is the enhanced visual target identification when locations of MT and DT coincide. However, it is not known which factors govern the flexibility of spatial attention–action coupling. Here, we tested the influence of previously learned spatial contingencies between MT and DT on the coupling of covert attention and motor planning. These contingencies were manipulated in three groups (always same locations, always opposite locations, non-contingent locations) in a training session. Results indicated that in a subsequent test phase, previously learned contingencies enhanced visual identification accordingly, even when targets for the movement task and the visual task were presented at opposite sides. These results corroborate previous findings of a rather flexible interaction of attention and motor planning, and demonstrate how one can learn to control attention by means of motor planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that conflict detection triggers control adjustments has been considered a basic principle of cognitive control. So far, this "conflict-control loop" has mainly been investigated in the context of response conflicts in single tasks. In this theoretical position paper, we explore whether, and how, this principle might be involved in multitasking performance, as well. We argue that several kinds of conflict-control loops can be identified in multitasking at multiple levels (e.g., the response level and the task level), and we provide a selective review of empirical observations. We present examples of conflict monitoring and control adjustments in dual-task and task-switching paradigms, followed by a section on error monitoring and posterror adjustments in multitasking. We conclude by outlining future research questions regarding monitoring and control in multitasking, including the potential roles of affect and associative learning for conflict-control loops in multitasking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Actions of others automatically prime similar responses in an agent’s behavioural repertoire. As a consequence, perceived or anticipated imitation facilitates own action control and, at the same time, imitation boosts social affiliation and rapport with others. It has previously been suggested that basic mechanisms of associative learning can account for behavioural effects of imitation, whereas a possible role of associative learning for affiliative processes is poorly understood at present. Therefore, this study examined whether contingency and contiguity, the principles of associative learning, affect also the social effects of imitation. Two experiments yielded evidence in favour of this hypothesis by showing more social affiliation in conditions with high contingency (as compared to low contingency) and in conditions of high contiguity (compared to low contiguity). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the voluntary task-switching paradigm, participants are required to randomly select tasks. We reasoned that the consistent finding of a repetition bias (i.e., participants repeat tasks more often than expected by chance) reflects reasonable adaptive task selection behavior to balance the goal of random task selection with the goals to minimize the time and effort for task performance. We conducted two experiments in which participants were provided with variable amount of preview for the non-chosen task stimuli (i.e., potential switch stimuli). We assumed that switch stimuli would initiate some pre-processing resulting in improved performance in switch trials. Results showed that reduced switch costs due to extra-preview in advance of each trial were accompanied by more task switches. This finding is in line with the characteristics of rational adaptive behavior. However, participants were not biased to switch tasks more often than chance despite large switch benefits. We suggest that participants might avoid effortful additional control processes that modulate the effects of preview on task performance and task choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the ideomotor principle, behavior is controlled via a retrieval of the sensory consequences that will follow from the respective movement ('action-effects'). These consequences include not only what will happen, but also when something will happen. In fact, recollecting the temporal duration between response and effect takes time and prolongs the initiation of the response. We investigated the associative structure of action-effect learning with delayed effects and asked whether participants acquire integrated action-time-effect episodes that comprise a compound of all three elements or whether they acquire separate traces that connect actions to the time until an effect occurs and actions to the effects that follow them. In three experiments, results showed that participants retrieve temporal intervals that follow from their actions even when the identity of the effect could not be learned. Furthermore, retrieval of temporal intervals in isolation was not inferior to retrieval of temporal intervals that were consistently followed by predictable action-effects. More specifically, when tested under extinction, retrieval of action-time and action-identity associations seems to compete against each other, similar to overshadowing effects reported for stimulus-response conditioning. Together, these results suggest that people anticipate when the consequences of their action will occur, independently from what the consequences will be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four experiments examined motivational effects of response-contingent electric shocks on action initiation. Although the shock was unambiguously aversive for the individual in line with subjective and functional criteria, results showed that the shock-producing action was initiated faster relative to a response producing no shock. However, no facilitation effect was found when strong shocks were delivered, ruling out increased emotional arousal as an explanation. The action was initiated faster even when the response discontinued to generate a shock. Furthermore, a control experiment with affectively neutral vibrotactile stimulations at homologous sites showed an analogous response facilitation effect. Overall, the results contradict the widespread belief that a contingency with a punishing response effect is sufficient for a response suppression. Instead, the results suggest that punishing action effects can facilitate action initiation via anticipatory feedback processes. Implications for theories and applications of punishment are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to theoretical accounts of cognitive control, conflict between competing responses is monitored and triggers post conflict behavioural adjustments. Some models proposed that conflict is detected as an affective signal. While the conflict monitoring theory assumed that conflict is registered as a negative valence signal, the adaptation by binding model hypothesized that conflict provides a high arousal signal. The present research induced phasic affect in a Simon task with presentations of pleasant and unpleasant pictures that were high or low in arousal. If conflict is registered as an affective signal, the presentation of a corresponding affective signal should potentiate post conflict adjustments. Results did not support the hypothesis, and Bayesian analyses corroborated the conclusion that phasic affects do not influence post conflict behavioural adjustments in the Simon task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to ideomotor theory, people use bidirectional associations between movements and their effects for action selection and initiation. Our experiments examined how verbal instructions of action effects influence response selection without prior experience of action effects in a separate acquisition phase. Instructions for different groups of participants specified whether they should ignore, attend, learn, or intentionally produce acoustic effects produced by button presses. Results showed that explicit instructions of action-effect relations trigger effect-congruent action tendencies in the first trials following the instruction; in contrast, no evidence for effect-based action control was observed in these trials when instructions were to ignore or to attend to the action effects. These findings show that action-effect knowledge acquired through verbal instruction and direct experience is similarly effective for effect-based action control as long as the relation between the movement and the effect is clearly spelled out in the instruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In outcome-selective Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT), stimuli that are predictive of particular outcomes prime instrumental responses that are associated with these outcomes. Previous experiments with humans obtained evidence that a strong posttraining devaluation of the associated outcome abolishes outcome-selective PIT. The present study extends this research to an upvaluation of outcomes. Adults learned in a stock market paradigm to relate particular stimuli and responses with particular monetary outcomes. Participants preferred responses associated with the same outcome as that predicted by the Pavlovian cue in a first transfer test. Before a second test, one currency was devalued, while the value of another currency was increased. In two experiments, outcome devaluation reduced specific PIT, while the upvaluation had no effect. Thus, a downward shift in the reward value was more effective than an equidistant upward shift for a change of PIT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In outcome-selective Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT), stimuli that are predictive of specific outcomes prime instrumental responses that are associated with these outcomes. Previous human studies yielded mixed evidence in respect to whether the PIT effect is affected by a posttraining devaluation of an outcome, with the PIT effect being preserved after a devaluation of a primary reinforcer (food, drugs) but not following the devaluation of a secondary reinforcer (money). The present research examined whether outcome-selective transfer is eliminated when the devaluation of a primary (liquid) reinforcer is strong and aversive. Experiment 1 confirmed these expectations following a devaluation with bad tasting Tween 20. However, outcome-selective transfer was still observed when the earned (devalued) outcome was not consumed immediately after each test (Experiment 2). These results suggest that the capacity of a Pavlovian cue to motivate a specific response is affected by the incentive value of the shared outcome only when the devaluation yields an aversive outcome that is consumed immediately. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to a recent extension of the conflict-monitoring theory, conflict between two competing response tendencies is registered as an aversive event and triggers a motivation to avoid the source of conflict. In the present study, we tested this assumption. Over five experiments, we examined whether conflict is associated with an avoidance motivation and whether stimulus conflict or response conflict triggers an avoidance tendency. Participants first performed a color Stroop task. In a subsequent motivation test, participants responded to Stroop stimuli with approach- and avoidance-related lever movements. These results showed that Stroop-conflict stimuli increased the frequency of avoidance responses in a free-choice motivation test, and also increased the speed of avoidance relative to approach responses in a forced-choice test. High and low proportions of response conflict in the Stroop task had no effect on avoidance in the motivation test. Avoidance of conflict was, however, obtained even with new conflict stimuli that had not been presented before in a Stroop task, and when the Stroop task was replaced with an unrelated filler task. Taken together, these results suggest that stimulus conflict is sufficient to trigger avoidance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflict processing is assumed to serve two crucial, yet distinct functions: Regarding task performance, control is adjusted to overcome the conflict. Regarding task choice, control is harnessed to bias decision making away from the source of conflict. Despite recent theoretical progress, until now two lines of research addressed these conflict-management strategies independently of each other. In this research, we used a voluntary task-switching paradigm in combination with response interference tasks to study both strategies in concert. In Experiment 1, participants chose between two univalent tasks on each trial. Switch rates increased following conflict trials, indicating avoidance of conflict. Furthermore, congruency effects in reaction times and error rates were reduced following conflict trials, demonstrating conflict adjustment. In Experiment 2, we used bivalent instead of univalent stimuli. Conflict adjustment in task performance was unaffected by this manipulation, but conflict avoidance was not observed. Instead, task switches were reduced after conflict trials. In Experiment 3, we used tasks comprising univalent or bivalent stimuli. Only tasks with univalent revealed conflict avoidance, whereas conflict adjustment was found for all tasks. On the basis of established theories of cognitive control, an integrative process model is described that can account for flexible conflict management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive control theories describe the active maintenance of goal representations over temporal delays as central for adaptive behavior. Dynamic adaptations of goal representations are often measured as the congruency sequence effect (CSE), which describes a reduced congruency effect in trials following incongruent trials compared to congruent trials. Previous studies questioned active maintenance of CSEs and instead found that CSEs decrease rapidly over time (Duthoo et al., 2014; Egner et al., 2010). However, in these studies, CSEs can be attributed to both, control adaptations following conflict and binding effects due to repetition of stimulus (S) and response (R) features. In four experiments, we demonstrate that CSEs originating solely from control adaptions were not affected by temporal delays. Additional within-subject conditions partially replicated previous research showing a decrease in CSEs in task designs allowing for S-R binding effects and controlled for task complexity as a potential moderator. Together, results support theories which predict an active maintenance or retrieval of cognitive control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined whether a temporal interval between an action and its sensory effect is integrated in the cognitive action structure in a bidirectional fashion. In 3 experiments, participants first experienced that actions produced specific acoustic effects (high and low tones) that occurred temporally delayed after their actions. In a following test phase, the tones that were presented as action effects in the previous phase were now presented as primes for the responses that had caused them previously and, critically, also as primes for the interval that previously separated action and effects. The tones were presented as go-signals in a free-choice test and as response-imperative stimuli in a forced-choice test. In the free choice test, participants were more likely to choose responses consistent with the previous pairing, but these responses were initiated slower than responses that were inconsistent with previous action-effect learning (Experiment 1). Effect-consistent responses were also initiated slower in the speeded forced-choice test (Experiment 2). These observations suggest that retrieval of a long action-effect interval slows down response initiation. In Experiment 3, response-contingent effects were presented with a long or short delay after a response. Reaction times in both, a forced-choice and free-choice setup, were faster in the short- than in the long-interval condition. We conclude that temporal information about the interval between actions and effects is integrated into a cognitive action structure and is automatically retrieved during response selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined the dynamic impact of self-control conflict on action execution. We reasoned that the tug-of-war between antagonistic action tendencies is not ultimately solved before movement initiation but leaks into action execution. To this end, we measured mouse trajectories to quantify the dynamic competition between initial temptations and the struggle to overcome them. Participants moved the mouse cursor from a start location to one of two targets. Each target represented a gain or a loss of points. Although participants earned points on the majority of the trials , they also had to make movements to the loss target on some trials to prevent an even higher loss. Two experiments found that movement trajectories on these loss trials deviate toward the tempting stimulus: The way we move reveals self-control conflicts that have not been resolved prior to action execution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined affective consequences of an active avoidance response. Catching a fleeting stimulus with a rapid key press secured a monetary reward in a reward condition or avoided a monetary loss in an avoidance condition. Outcomes of wins, missed wins, losses, and avoided losses were signaled with color patches that were evaluated explicitly (via evaluative rating) and implicitly (via an affective priming task). Liking scores in each condition were compared with those in yoked-control conditions in which wins and avoided losses were presented without the requirement of an active response. In the explicit measure, colors associated with an avoided loss were rated positively and colors associated with a missed win were judged negatively, irrespective of whether the outcome was self-generated. In the implicit measure, outcomes of missed wins and avoided losses were evaluated differently only when they were self-generated. The results confirm a qualitative affective equivalence between an avoided loss and an achieved win. Implications for avoidance theories are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies showed that initial comfort of a posture is traded for a better control at the end position, a phenomenon which has been termed the end-state comfort effect. When participants recall a recently performed motor plan, the end-state comfort effect is reduced. Two experiments investigated whether observing the grasp of another person is sufficient for later recall. Participants moved an object from a home location to different target positions. Results replicated an end-state comfort effect, revealing an inverse relation of grasp height to target height for the first movement. When participants later returned the object back to the home position, recall of the previously self-performed action dominated, replicating the reduction in end-state comfort due to recall processes. Notably, the end-state comfort effect was also reduced in conditions in which a model performed the first movement and in which the participant performed only the second movement (Experiment 1). Model actions were also recalled in situations in which the observed action was incongruent with a comfortable end position of the participant (Experiment 2). These results suggest that observed actions of others can serve as templates for movement planning in social situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imitation is assumed to serve crucial functions in social interaction, such as empathy and learning, yet these functions apply only to the imitating observer. In the two experiments reported here, we revealed a distinct function of imitation for the action model: Anticipation of being imitated facilitates the production of overt motor actions. Specifically, anticipated motor responses of social counterparts serve as mental cues for the model to retrieve corresponding motor commands to orchestrate his or her own actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anticipation of one's own actions' effects drives goal-directed behavior. In multitasking environments, the learning of stable action-effect associations seems particularly important, because establishing reliable response-effect associations for multiple competing tasks may help to differentiate between these tasks and thereby improve task-switching performance. Action-effects not only have cognitive, but also motivational aspects and often the consequences of our actions are hedonically marked. Thus, the anticipated hedonic quality of action-effects may also become part of the task representation, and positive and negative affect may distinctly modulate task-switching performance. We report a pre-registered experiment (N = 120) designed to examine how positive, negative, and neutral valence of action-effects impact performance in a cued task-switching paradigm. Pictures from the IAPS database were used to manipulate the action-effects' valence. Affective valence determined reaction times: participants who learned positive or negative action-effects responded faster than participants in the control condition. In particular, task-switch trials were faster in both conditions than in the control condition, while task-repetition trials were comparable across valence conditions. Our results further suggest that performance improvements in the positive and negative valence conditions occurred for different reasons. Negative action-effects expedited responses specifically for the task that produced the unpleasant outcome, while positive affect more generally promoted performance of both tasks. These findings point toward distinct roles of positive and negative valence of action-effects in regulating multitasking performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to recent theorizing, cognitive control and affective processing are closely linked. Specifically, it has been suggested that negative affect acts as a driving force for attentional adjustment. Empirical support comes from a study by van Steenbergen et al. (Psychol Sci 20:1473–1477, 2009) demonstrating that negative stimuli increase the congruence sequence effect (CSE), a behavioural marker that indexes attentional adjustment. In this research, we provide a theoretical analysis that identifies motivational orientation (approach vs. avoidance) as a potential moderator. To test this, we replicated the study by van Steenbergen et al. (2009) and additionally manipulated the motivational orientation of participants. Participants either gained extra money after task completion (gain-focused group) or lost money after task completion (loss-focused group). Results showed that negative stimuli boost attentional adjustment, but only in the loss-focused group. This finding highlights the role of motivation for recent theorizing on emotion-driven control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans adjust their behavior after they have committed an error, but it is unclear whether and how error commissions influence voluntary task choices. In the present article, we review different accounts on effects of errors in the previous trial (transient error effects) and overall error probabilities (sustained error effects) on behavioral adaptation. Based on this review, we derived five statistical models of how errors might influence voluntary task choices. We analyzed the data of three experiments in which participants voluntarily selected one of two tasks before each trial whereby task difficulty, and concomitantly error probability, increased successively for the selected/performed tasks. Model comparison suggested that choice behavior was best explained by a combination of error probability of the performed task, error probability of the alternative task, and whether the previous response was correct or incorrect. The results revealed that participants were most likely to switch tasks in situations where the error probability of the performed task was high, the error probability of the alternative task was low, and after an error on the previous trial. We conclude that task selection processes are influenced by transient and sustained error effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers in psychology and neuroscience want to know whether conflict and control scale up. Conflict and control mechanisms share many similarities across different levels of analysis. However, empirical evidence does currently not support a unified perspective on action control. We identify two major challenges for theoretical integration: a vertical challenge that requires conflict at different levels of abstraction to be linked, and a horizontal challenge that requires control of conflict at different points in time to be linked. We present a new integrative framework in which we propose that the difference between conflicts can best be understood along the dimension of complexity (i.e., amount of information). We propose that differences in conflict complexity go together with specific costs and benefits and that a normative account of hierarchical conflict control needs to take into account both. People regularly encounter various types of conflict. Here, we ask if, and, if so, how, different types of conflict, from lab-based Stroop conflicts to everyday-life self-control or moral conflicts, are related to one other. We present a framework that assumes that action–goal representations are hierarchically organized, ranging from concrete actions to abstract goals. The framework's key assumption is that conflicts involving more abstract goals (e.g., self-control/moral conflict) are embedded in a more complex action space; thus, to resolve such conflicts, people need to consider more associated goals and actions. We discuss how differences in complexity impact conflict resolution mechanisms and the costs/benefits of resolving conflicts. Altogether, we offer a new way to conceptualize and analyze conflict regulation across different domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Binding and retrieval of stimulus features, response features, and their attentional weighting tune cognitive processing to situational demands. The two mechanisms promote successful actions, especially in situations in which such actions depend on controlled processing. Here we explored binding and retrieval of attentional control states that follow from erroneous actions. By definition, such errors are characterized by insufficient cognitive control but at the same time, error detection has been shown to trigger corresponding adjustments to prevent future failures. We reanalyzed existing datasets and conducted a novel experiment to investigate whether error-induced control states become bound to task-relevant stimuli. Results point towards a binding and retrieval of error-induced control states; however, the effect appears to be less reliable than for binding and retrieval of specific stimulus and response features. We discuss potential implications and alternative interpretations in terms of a mediating impact of error-induced control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans are remarkably flexible in adapting their behavior to current demands. It has been suggested that the decision which of multiple tasks to perform is based on a variety of factors pertaining to the rewards associated with each task as well as task performance (e.g., error rates associated with each task and/or error commission on the previous trial). However, further empirical investigation is needed to examine whether task performance still influences task choices if task choices are rewarded but task performance is not. Accordingly, we exposed participants to a novel reward-varying voluntary task switching paradigm where the reward for the performed task gradually decreased while the reward associated for the alternative task was unchanged. Importantly, we rewarded participants' task choices before participants performed the task to investigate the effect of rewards independent from task performance. We examined the effect of (i) reward, (ii) error rates associated with each of the two tasks, and (iii) error commission in the previous trial on voluntary task choices. As expected, we found that participants' task selection was influenced by reward differences between task choices. In addition, error rates associated with a task also influenced task selection, with participants requiring larger reward differences to switch to a task associated with relatively higher error rates, compared to switching to a task with relatively lower error rates. However, errors in n − 1 did not influence participants' probability to switch to the alternative task. These findings contribute to an ongoing discussion on the influence of task performance on task selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies have suggested that abstract control states (i.e., internal attentional states independent from concrete stimuli and responses) can be stored in episodic memory and retrieved subsequently. However, the duration of such a control state memory remains unclear. Previous research has found a quick and complete decay for stimulus–response bindings after 2000–5000 ms. Here, we tested a possible decay of control state bindings with retrieval delays of 2000, 3000, or 5000 ms. Five preregistered experiments used a confound-minimized prime-target task to measure the congruency sequence effect (CSE) separately for trials in which a nominally irrelevant context feature changed or repeated across trials. Analyses of the individual experiments did not result in conclusive evidence. A mega-analysis integrating the data of all experiments (Ntotal = 326) replicated evidence for binding and retrieval of control states, in that larger CSEs were found for context repetition trials. Importantly, Bayesian analysis indicated that this effect was not modulated by the length of retrieval delay. While this finding suggests that bindings of abstract control states can be relatively robust, we also discuss possible limitations of the present research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dual-tasking often requires prioritizing one task over the other. For example, in the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, participants are instructed to initially respond to Task 1 (T1) and only then to Task 2 (T2). Furthermore, in the prioritized processing paradigm (PP), participants are instructed to perform T2 only if T1 was a no-go trial—requiring even more prioritization. The present study investigated the limits of task prioritization. Two experiments compared performance in the PRP paradigm and the PP paradigm. To manipulate task prioritization, tasks were rewarded differently (e.g., high reward for T1, low reward for T2, and vice versa). We hypothesized (a) that performance will improve for the highly rewarded task (Experiments 1 and 2) and (b) that there are stronger reward effects for T1 in the PRP than in the PP paradigm (Experiment 2). Results showed an influence of reward on task prioritization: For T1, high reward (compared to low reward) caused a speed-up of responses that did not differ between the two paradigms. However, for T2, reward influenced response speed selectively in the PP paradigm, but not in the PRP paradigm. Based on paradigm-specific response demands, we propose that the coordination of two motor responses plays a crucial role in prioritizing tasks and might limit the flexibility of the allocation of preparatory capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotional information captures attention due to privileged processing. Consequently, performance in cognitive tasks declines (i.e. emotional distraction, ED). Therefore, shielding current goals from ED is essential for adaptive goal-directed- behaviour. It has been shown that ED is reduced when participants recruit cognitive control before or after the presentation of an emotional negative distractor. Following up on this, we asked first, whether cognitive control of ED is negative-valence-specific or valence-general. A valence-general-account predicts that control shields against distracting influence of emotion, irrespective of the specific valence. In contrast, a negative-valence-specific-account predicts that control interacts with the valence and ED is reduced for negative stimuli only. Second, we asked whether this effect of ED differs between control modes operating on different time scales (i.e. proactively or reactively). To test this, we manipulated emotional distractor valence (positive/high-arousal; negative/high-arousal; neutral/low-arousal) and assessed how control interacts with ED. Results showed that ED was reduced for negative and positive valent stimuli when control was triggered before (i.e. proactive control, nExp1 = 141, between-subject-design) and after (reactive control, nExp2 = 37, within-subject-design) the emotional stimuli. Accordingly, control blocks off high-arousing emotional distractors from interfering with goal-directed-actions, irrespective of their valence (i.e. valence-general-account) and for both, proactive and reactive control modes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive control is the ability to monitor, evaluate, and adapt behavior in the service of long‐term goals. Recent theories have proposed that the integral negative emotions elicited by conflict are critical for the adaptive adjustment of cognitive control. However, evidence for the negative valence of conflict in cognitive control tasks mainly comes from behavioral studies that interrupted trial sequences, making it difficult to directly test the link between conflict‐induced affect and subsequent increases in cognitive control. In the present study, we therefore use online measures of valence‐sensitive electromyography (EMG) of the facial corrugator (frowning) and zygomaticus (smiling) muscles while measuring the adaptive cognitive control in a Stroop‐like task. In line with the prediction that conflict is aversive, results showed that conflict relative to non‐conflict trials led to increased activity of the corrugator muscles after correct responses, both in a flanker task (Experiment 1) and in a prime‐probe task (Experiment 2). This conflict‐induced corrugator activity effect correlated marginally with conflict‐driven increases in cognitive control in the next trial in the confound‐minimalized task used in Experiment 2. However, in the absence of performance feedback (Experiment 3), no reliable effect of conflict was observed in the facial muscle activity despite robust behavioral conflict adaptation. Taken together, our results show that facial EMG can be used as an indirect index of the temporal dynamics of conflict‐induced aversive signals and/or effortful processes in particular when performance feedback is presented, providing important new insights into the dynamic affective nature of cognitive control. Cognitive control plays a pivotal role in goal‐directed behavior. Nevertheless, it still remains elusive what mechanisms determine how cognitive control is recruited. Recent theories have proposed that negative emotions elicited by conflict help to adaptively increase the cognitive control. Although there is indeed accumulating evidence for the negative valence of conflict, no study has yet linked this directly to increased adaptive control. Using valence‐sensitive EMG measures, we here show that conflict is associated with increased activation of the corrugator (frowning) muscle and that the size of this effect predicts the size of conflict‐driven control adjustment in the next trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People can learn to control their thoughts and emotions. The scientific study of control has been conducted mostly independently for cognitive and emotional conflicts. However, recent theoretical proposals suggest a close link between emotional and cognitive control processes. Indeed, mounting evidence from clinical sciences, social and personality psychology, and developmental neuroscience suggests that the ability to control thoughts and behavior goes hand in hand with the ability to control emotions. Yet, the precise interface between control over cognition and emotions remains controversial. The present study investigates the question whether control is a general-purpose mechanism or rather a set of domain-specific mechanisms. Following previous research, we tested participants' control in a cognitive and an emotional Stroop task and assessed the congruency sequence effect (CSE) which has been taken as a marker of cognitive or (implicit) emotional control, respectively. Going beyond previous research, we asked how control in one domain (e.g., cognitive) interacts with control in the other domain (e.g., emotional) on a trial-by-trial basis. In four experiments (N = 259) presented participants with a task-switching design that intermixed cognitive and emotional conflicts. This procedure produced significant CSEs across cognitive-emotional domains, suggesting that control can interact across domains. However, effect sizes of within-domain CSEs were twice as large, indicating that control is also domain-specific. These results neither support the general-purpose account nor the domain-specificity hypothesis of control. Rather, a hybrid account fits the data best, which also reconciles previous behavioral and neurophysiological findings, suggesting domain-general and specific processes. Public Significance Statement: Emotional conflict such as irony, in which the emotion represented by a person's face and the person's voice do not match, is an inherent part of human social interactions. We investigate whether the control mechanisms of our cognitive system that suppress interference from task-irrelevant distractions and lead to control-related adjustments are confined to cognitive disturbances or whether they can also be applied to tasks that elicit emotional conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Short-term action-effect binding is linked to the sense of agency. • Both, action-effect intervals and binding, predicted subsequent agency ratings. • These findings offer a new perspective on the formation of agency. Abstract The sense of agency is a pervasive phenomenon that accompanies conscious acting and extends to the consequences of one's actions in the environment. Subjective feelings of agency are typically explained in terms of predictive processes, based on internal forward models inherent to the sensorimotor system, and postdictive processes, i.e., explicit, retrospective judgments by the agent. Only recently, research has begun to elucidate the link between sense of agency and more basic processes of human action control. The present study was conducted in this spirit and explored the relation between short-term action-effect binding and explicit agency judgments. We found evidence for such a link in that the participants' short-term action-effect binding predicted subsequent agency ratings. This offers a new perspective on the sense of agency, providing an additional mechanism (together with predictive and postdictive processes) that may underlie its formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although multitasking has been the subject of a large number of papers and experiments, the term task is still not well defined. In this opinion paper, we adopt the ideomotor perspective to define the term task and distinguish it from the terms goal and action. In our opinion, actions are movements executed by an actor to achieve a concrete goal. Concrete goals are represented as anticipated sensory consequences that are associated with an action in an ideomotor manner. Concrete goals are nested in a hierarchy of more and more abstract goals, which form the context of the corresponding action. Finally, tasks are depersonalized goals, i.e., goals that should be achieved by someone. However, tasks can be assigned to a specific person or group of persons, either by a third party or by the person or the group of persons themselves. By accepting this assignment, the depersonalized task becomes a personal goal. In our opinion, research on multitasking needs to confine its scope to the analysis of concrete tasks, which result in concrete goals as anticipated sensory consequences of the corresponding action. We further argue that the distinction between dual- and single-tasking is dependent on the subjective conception of the task assignment, the goal representation and previous experience. Finally, we conclude that it is not the tasks, but the performing of the tasks, i.e. the actions that cause costs in multitasking experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus–response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motor actions are facilitated if they are foreseeably being imitated rather than counterimitated by social partners. Such beneficial effects of anticipated imitation have been explained in terms of compatibility between one's own actions and their anticipated consequences. Previous demonstrations of these effects might alternatively be explained by consistently faster partner responses for imitative than for nonimitative actions, however. This study contrasts both explanations by using virtual coactors to disentangle the contributions of anticipated action-effect compatibility and anticipated action-effect delay. The data of two experiments support previous theoretical assumptions by showing that the effects of anticipated imitation are indeed driven by compatibility rather than delay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Upcoming responses in the second of two subsequently performed tasks can speed up compatible responses in the temporally preceding first task. Two experiments extend previous demonstration of such backward compatibility to affective features: responses to affective stimuli were faster in Task 1 when an affectively compatible response effect was anticipated for Task 2. This emotional backward-compatibility effect demonstrates that representations of the affective consequences of the Task 2 response were activated before the selection of a response in Task 1 was completed. This finding is problematic for the assumption of a serial stimulus-response translation stage. It also shows that the affective consequence of a response is anticipated during, and has an impact on stimulus-response translation, which implies that action planning considers codes representing and predicting the emotional consequences of actions. Implications for the control of emotional actions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do emotional stimuli change the way we control our behavior? The interaction between emotion and behavior-shaping, cognitive control mechanisms remain little understood in psychological science. The present meta-analysis addresses this controversy by means of a quantitative review. We analyzed data from 71 studies published through December 2018 that investigated control in conflict tasks, like the Stroop, Simon, and/or flanker tasks, which are well-known tools for psychologists in various subdisciplines used to probe cognitive control mechanisms. We considered studies that experimentally manipulated emotional stimulus presentation and asked how perception of emotional stimuli modulates the size of the congruency effect (CE), as an index of control. Results of two primary meta-analyses found no clear evidence that emotional stimuli modulate cognitive control in general. Yet, moderator analysis suggested that specific aspects of the task, stimuli, and testing conditions show reduced CE for emotional stimuli. Thus, at a theoretical level, emotional stimuli can facilitate control under specific conditions, supporting views that attribute enhanced control either to overload of perceptual distractor processing or to increased amplification of target information and/or suppression of distractor information. Public Significance Statement: This meta-analysis shows that emotional stimuli have only a very small if at all existing influence on cognitive control in general. The effects are stronger for fully attended and verbal emotional stimuli, suggesting that emotional stimuli can increase control under specific conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotional information receives prioritized processing over concurrent cognitive processes. This can lead to distraction if emotional information has to be ignored. In the cognitive domain, mechanisms have been described that allow control of (cognitive) distractions. However, whether similar cognitive control mechanisms also can attenuate emotional distraction is an active area of research. This study asked whether cognitive control (triggered in the Color Stroop task) attenuates emotional distraction in the Emotional Stroop task. Theoretical accounts of cognitive control, and the Emotional Stroop task alike, predict such an interaction for tasks that employ the same relevant (e.g., color-naming) and irrelevant (e.g., word-reading) dimension. In an alternating-runs design with Color and Emotional Stroop tasks changing from trial to trial, we analyzed the impact of proactive and reactive cognitive control on Emotional Stroop effects. Four experiments manipulated predictability of congruency and emotional stimuli. Overall, results showed congruency effects in Color Stroop tasks and Emotional Stroop effects. Moreover, we found a spillover of congruency effects and emotional distraction to the other task, indicating that processes specific to one task impacted to the other task. However, Bayesian analyses and a mini-meta-analysis across experiments weigh against the predicted interaction between cognitive control and emotional distraction. The results point out limitations of cognitive control to block off emotional distraction, questioning views that assume a close interaction between cognitive control and emotional processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]