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In the early 1920s the Greek Consul General in Queensland, Christy Freeleagus, attempted to persuade Australian politicians, diplomats and immigration officials to grant assisted passage and allotments of land to Greek refugees. Making representations in the United Kingdom and Australia, Freeleagus claimed that Greek refugees, who were displaced due to an imposed transfer of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923, would make ideal agricultural settlers. While Freeleagus' representations for a Greek land settlement scheme were ultimately unsuccessful, his advocacy reveals how Australia's preference for British immigration overshadowed any likelihood that displaced Greeks could be humanitarianly assisted to immigrate and resettle in Australia as farmers. By focusing on Freeleagus' advocacy and the refusal of Australian immigration officials to assist displaced Greeks, this article ties Australian history to studies on Greek-Turkish population exchange. It also reveals how the interwar dynamics of land settlement and immigration restriction in White Australia were interlinked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on rules-based Indo-Pacific Region addressing economic and geostrategic challenges, and building Indo-Pacific cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic with Australia-France-India Trilateral Dialogue. It mentions cooperation on marine global commons; potential areas for practical partnership at the trilateral and regional level, including through regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Commission; and the challenges and priorities of multilateralism. It also mentions separate evolution of the bilateral partnerships.

In the three decades following World War II, Australian assistance to Papua New Guinea (PNG) comprised around 80 per cent of the Australian 'aid' budget. The large amount of colonial spending has led many observers of contemporary Australian policy to reflect on the 1960s as a time of Australian generosity in the field of foreign aid. Examining this history through the prism of Australian colonial policy complicates the story of Australian generosity. From the immediate postwar challenges of Eddie Ward's 'New Deal' to the Paul Hasluck period and the immense changes of the 1960s and 1970s, foreign aid and colonial development were inherently (if not explicitly) linked. By bringing these fields of policy together, this article demonstrates that the narrative of Australian foreign aid generosity is challenged by the historical imperatives of colonial administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the Australian government began to formulate its approach to space research, exploring the way it approached the establishment of American tracking stations from 1956, proposals for a civilian space research program in 1959, involvement with British space research and, from 1960, the negotiations for the European Launcher Development Organisation use of rocket testing facilities at Woomera. It argues that financial and strategic considerations were foremost in the minds of the Menzies government in shaping its approach to space policy, in particular in the context of rocket testing at Woomera. Ultimately, while the decisions taken between 1956 and 1962 laid the foundations for significant and often celebrated Australian involvement in space during the 1960s, the way in which these decisions were made reflected a reluctance to be involved at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on U.S.‐Australia alliance after a joint statement issued by U.S. president Donald Trump and then–Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull reiterated on sentimental basis for the two countries' alliance and special relationship. It mentions proclamation of common vital interests as the basis for a special relationship has, therefore, often been augmented by the idea of shared values. It also mentions joint commitment to particular values such as personal freedom, representative democracy, the primacy of markets, and the rule of law.

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Australia's Labor government committed a naval task force to participate in the enforcement of sanctions, and subsequently, the Gulf War to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The Australian government justified its response to the Persian Gulf crisis in various ways, including the threat it posed to national and international security, and by employing representations of Australian identity and the radical Otherness of Saddam Hussein. The paper considers these aspects, then focuses on two ostensibly complementary justifications. Firstly, the rapid commitment was represented as a necessary act of collective security connected to revitalisation of the United Nations. Secondly, it was justified as contributing to the development of a post‐Cold War new world order (NWO), framed within Australian regional security interests and shaped by the US alliance. The paper argues that the Australian discourse melds the justifications, despite collective security, based on UN leadership, sitting uneasily with a NWO premised on US leadership, without having to attend to the tensions between the two justifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the conflict between pro‐ and anti‐Rhodesian government parliamentarians is the only way to understand how and why Australia struggled to formulate a coherent Rhodesia policy. It reveals the extent to which Malcolm Fraser had to struggle against his own party in this matter and adds needed nuance to this period. Fraser's opinion that Rhodesia was a racist and immoral project caused a schism in the Coalition parties. Despite Fraser's open antipathy towards Rhodesia, Rhodesia's interests in Australia were largely safeguarded. This reflects the reality that the Liberal and National Country Parties contained sizeable blocs of parliamentarians who openly and publicly saw Rhodesia as a fraternal country, not a dangerous pariah. They did not hold these beliefs passively and actively sought to resist any moves made by Fraser to damage Rhodesia and its interests. By following the development of Fraser's Rhodesia policy in the late 1970s the power of Rhodesia's allies in the Australian parliament becomes clear. Opposing Rhodesia was touted by Fraser as one of the greatest achievements of his government, yet the issue was divisive and caused bitter infighting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The historical narrative of Australia's foreign and defence policy‐making during the Pacific War tends to foreground the years 1941–42, characterising them as the turning point when the government realised that Britain alone could no longer protect Australia's regional security interests and turned to the United States of America for its salvation. This article makes a contribution to the alternative view, arguing that Australia was looking to the US well before Prime Minister John Curtin's famous "looks to America" proclamation. It does so with a focus on Australia's thinking and policy towards the engagement of the US in the years 1939‐41, arguing that the coordination of its economic policy with the US, rather than seeking insight into high‐level strategic planning, offered the nation the greatest opportunity to tie its security interests in the Asia‐Pacific region with those of the US. In exploring the role of economic policy in Australia's preparation for war, this article offers new insight into the maturation of Australia's foreign policy apparatus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear cooperation has been a consistent feature of the Australia-US alliance. In the 1950s and 1960s, Canberra explored transferring US nuclear weapons to Australian forces operating in Southeast Asia. Since the 1960s, Australian governments have supported hosting joint facilities that contribute to America's ability to execute global nuclear operations. And Australia has regularly invoked the nuclear umbrella as part of the alliance. We explain the key sources of nuclear cooperation in the alliance by leveraging realist and institutionalist theories of alliance cooperation. While realism explains limits to US nuclear commitments in the 1950s, institutional explanations are more relevant in pinpointing the sources of nuclear cooperation and in explaining why Australia has often achieved its policy preferences as the junior partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years Australia ignored or downplayed the role of values in foreign policy, preferring to focus on economic issues and engagement with Asia. Recently, however, values have re-emerged as a central aspect of Australian foreign policy, both rhetorically in government White Papers and through initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprising the established democracies of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. This commentary charts the rise of values-based language in Australian and Japanese speeches and policy documents, and argues that core concepts such as shared democratic values have an important – and under-appreciated – relevance in the new era of a rising autocratic China and in the framing of the Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China in recent decades has forged closer naval bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. Amongst these the Indo-Australian maritime ties have been a noteworthy development. Beijing's expanding maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region and growing influence in the South China Sea have become a core convergence in Indo-Australian cooperation. China's approach of asserting its rise as friendly while simultaneously becoming more aggressive in boundary claims has increased security concerns for Australia and India, thereby prompting maritime security convergences through the AUSINDEX exercises, increased trilateral engagements and establishing a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). However, the maritime convergence is not only based on hedging, as there are common views of maintaining an inclusive security framework with China to address non-traditional maritime security threats affecting the region. In examining the China factor, this article also draws in other players such as USA, Japan and the ASEAN states with stakes involved in the region as also influencing Indo-Australian relations in their considerations of China. This article will explore China as a strong point of interest in India-Australia maritime cooperation; the roots of which can be traced from 1991 and have culminated into synergies of collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how Australia's successful campaign for a non‐permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2008‐12) and its subsequent term on the Council (2013‐14) both encouraged and impacted on the country's engagement with Africa. Drawing on extensive interviews with senior Australian politicians and government officials with intimate knowledge of the country's campaign for the UNSC and its time on the Council, as well as with senior African diplomats, the article contributes new knowledge on how Canberra campaigned to secure African UN votes and how it engaged with the Council's Africa‐dominated agenda. The article concludes by evaluating the legacy of this period of high engagement for both ongoing Australia‐Africa relations and Australia's new campaign for a UNSC seat during the 2029‐30 term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a 'dependent ally' tradition and a 'middle power' approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, 'pragmatic' Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than ever as the uncertainties of a digitalised world are upon us and where power shifts to and within the region disrupt the familiar patterns of engagement, the acquisition of the knowledge and competencies necessary for Australia to be a trusted international partner are pressing matters. So too, in the development of both personal and professional skills, our pedagogic remit to students guides us to assist them in learning more about themselves in the process. How, then, should we teach Australian foreign policy and in doing so grow the conjunctive tissue of student self-learning in order to prepare students for the world of diplomacy necessitated by Australia's international workspace? Here, experiential learning can have a powerful effect in the teaching of Australian foreign policy and in the development of students' life and professional skills. Both in-person simulations situated within the context of a thoughtful curriculum, and short-term international mobility study tours can contribute to an effective mix of learning experiences and assist us in moving closer toward effective practice in the current uncertainties and an era of digital transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian foreign policy is often taught in a purely descriptive way or as a case study for critiquing various international relations theories. Neither approach does justice to the rich historical traditions in foreign policy making in Australia or to the trends shaping the way students are exposed to foreign policy issues in the digital age and teaching can be enhanced if these trends are engaged with. Reflection on Australia's unique strategic culture can provide a pluralistic narrative plot that connects both IR approaches to particularistic attributes of AFP practice and also the lived experience of students with current events as they unfold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the current higher education context there are strong incentives for the development of work-ready skills for graduates. In this article, I reflect on the challenges of mediating between developing vocational skills and emphasising the immediate practical and policy relevance of coursework on one hand, and the development of critical thinking and research skills on the other, in the context of teaching Australian Foreign Policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we are to help students develop opinions and perspectives on world politics, and understand at the same time what it means to hold these opinions and perspectives in the Australian context, we need to bring the world to the classroom. Information overload has led to feelings of alienation among students, and the way we teach needs to instil in students a sense that they are stakeholders in Australian foreign policy, and help them develop strategies for incorporating the complex information environment into their learning. In this short piece I propose two forms of assessment that authentically place the focus on these learning outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whaling has been a consistent theme in Australia's relations with Japan since the 1930s, Australia having endeavoured to regulate, restrict, or bring to a complete halt Japan's Antarctic whaling virtually since it began. Australia's motivations have been mixed, involving at various points, some combination of protection of Australia's coastal whaling industry, concern for Australia's security, for safeguarding Australia's Antarctic territorial claim, and more recently, concern for Australia's whale-watching industry and/or for the whales. Since environmental consciousness became a primary factor in the 1970s, Australian policy has been aligned with that of anti-whaling non-governmental organizations (NGOs), albeit that certain actions of NGOs have caused difficulties for the Australian Government. Law – inclusive of legal argument in the course of diplomacy, domestic laws, and international litigation – has been a mechanism of influence used by the Australian Government and NGOs. This paper traces Australia's legal opposition from its beginnings until Japan's announcement in December 2018 that it would end Antarctic whaling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International migration governance can be represented as a system set up to manage cross‐border mobility of people in the interest of participating states; mostly by means of bilateral agreements between countries and top‐down, UN‐mediated multilateral and EU‐directed plurilateral arrangements. The latter have often failed to work effectively, so we ask if there is another way. We argue that Australia and New Zealand, together with several Pacific nations, form the ANZ Pacific Migration Governance System (ANZPAC), which provides an alternative way of regional migration governance. We call it an idiorhythmic system of governance: a bottom‐up arrangement between states using devolved and/or self‐regulating coordinating mechanisms to allow participating states sufficient freedom to pursue their own agendas at a pace determined mostly uni‐nationally. ANZPAC facilitates enhanced mobility of migrants to and within the region while also helping to reticulate inflows of unauthorized immigrants. It offers interesting, albeit at times controversial, lessons for other countries. Polish Research Foundation NCNOPUS 10 research support scheme (research project 2015/19/B/HS4/00364 'The impact of wealth formation by economic migrants on their mobility and integration: Polish migrants in countries of the European Community and Australia'). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the popular image of William Gladstone which gradually emerged and evolved in the Australian Colonies throughout the nineteenth century. By using a wide variety of newspaper sources and political speeches, the piece shows how Gladstone was extensively discussed and interpreted on the far side of the 'British World'. It tracks the ups and downs of the turbulent relationship Gladstone had with the Australian Colonies over his long career, as he influenced Australian history both directly through the policies he implemented and indirectly as an inspiration for local politicians. It concludes that although Gladstone repeatedly aggravated Australian opinion both through his time at the Colonial Office and the 'soft' foreign policy he pursued as Prime Minister, his domestic popularity as a successful liberal and democratic figure was enough to make him a hero in colonial eyes. This conclusion shows how 'British World' popular sentiment was able to trump nominal local interests. This demonstrates not only the predominance of Britishness in Australian identity during this time period, but also how as a simultaneously separate yet intimately linked part of the Empire, Australians abstracted their own significance and meaning from domestic British politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between Aboriginal people and the British Crown is well established. Less understood is their appreciation of, and reliance on, British democratic traditions in their politics. Drawing on the archive of Aboriginal activist, William Cooper, this article explores the way he used the language and practices associated with British democracy to advance his political claims in interwar Australia. With Protestant Christianity, Britishness represented a cluster of values and attributes which Cooper claimed as the Aborigines' own. In drawing on an 'imperial ideology of democracy', he was part of a global black political renaissance characteristic of the times demanding justice, freedom and representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women in international affairs play powerful and influential roles in shaping laws and policies, negotiating on subjects of war, peace and security, and representing national interest. In Australia, women outnumber men at all levels of public service to executive level one. Yet, women remain under-represented in more senior ranks and appear to experience significant challenges gaining leadership in agencies involved in diplomacy and security. What are the gendered institutions at play in Australian international affairs? Using a comparative case study approach, this paper explores the experiences of senior executive level women leaders across the Australian Federal Government in four case agencies—the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Defence, Department of Home Affairs (DHA), and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Women's gendered challenges in international leadership are not surprising within a diplomatic history that has often restricted women's roles based off the 'appropriateness' of sending women as envoys to nations of varying safety and respect for their status. What is surprising is that women report greater sexism, discrimination and harassment from within their own agencies, not from countries in which they are hosted. This has important ramifications globally on gaining and retaining women in international affairs leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synthetic biology is an emerging technology that will impact on the future security and prosperity of Australia. As a discrete policy area synthetic biology has not been explored in relation to Australian foreign policy. To begin this process an understanding of Australia's genetic endowment, Australia's agricultural endowment and those security concerns novel to synthetic biology need to be developed. The convergence of the biological sciences and the information sciences is creating novel security concerns that impact on Australian sovereignty, both mainland and the Antarctic Territories, plant and animal health, and defence medical infrastructure. These concerns cross many traditional disciplinary and policy boundaries, an awareness of this is required and a nascent national practitioner community can develop this further. Drawing from work conducted by the US and UK synthetic biology practitioner communities, this article lays out the unique touch points synthetic biology has on Australian foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of foreign aid in OECD countries navigate a unique form of politics. The beneficiaries of foreign aid spending have little voice in elite level decision-making about aid commitments from OECD countries. Thus foreign aid spending has a form of politics unlike other areas of policy where there is more direct budget accountability with citizens. Scholarly attention has increased on this unusual domestic politics of aid spending yet there remains little examination of the opportunities, challenges and tensions for aid organisations in advocating to elected officials. This article focuses on the case of Australian foreign aid, and the Australian Aid and Parliament project, an initiative of Save the Children. This initiative facilitates exposure visits to aid recipient countries for Australian parliamentarians. Most aid advocacy projects in OECD countries rely on mobilising citizens of those countries to act as a proxy, advocating on behalf of aid beneficiaries. This project reveals the potential of advocacy efforts that focus on the direct 'presence' of aid beneficiaries in the experience of elected officials (from donor countries). Yet it also reveals several challenges, and tensions between advocates, about how aid commitments change, and the most effective role for advocacy groups to play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with eroding United States hegemony and the rise of a more multipolar distribution of global power, Australia has embraced a new foreign policy platform built around advocacy for a 'rules-based global order'. In this essay I first argue that the emerging characterisation of multipolarity overemphasises the centrality of the United States and overlooks the legacies of Asian colonisation, decolonisation, state-building and local norm development. I then consider the reasons for the embrace of the rules-based global order construct, locating it as an instinctive reaction to issues arising from the South China Sea dispute, the raw use of power, and the inclination to share the ideas of a close ally. I note, however, that linking Australia closely with the United States approach to global rules has drawbacks, given the United States' explicit attempts to reserve a right to use force outside the UN Charter. I suggest that Australia would be better served by clearly delineating a separation between its military alliance with a United States, a policy for worst-case scenarios, from its support for international law and institutions, which should form the mainstay and leading edge of its foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The advent of the Trump Presidency, coupled with the rise of China, has put considerable strains on the ANZUS alliance between Australia and the United States. Herein, Dr Wilkins presents a methodology for assessing Australia's putative bargaining power within the alliance, demonstrates how Australia's position has been weakened overall by Trump and China, and proposes options for Australia going forward. He concludes that the ANZUS alliance relationship requires careful attention from policy-makers and analysts in the face of mounting challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to examine Vietnam-Australia bilateral relations from 2000 to 2018. It will focus on political and economic dynamics of this relationship. Canberra and Hanoi established initial diplomatic contacts in 1973. After the first 27 years of approaching each other, they both recognized that it is in their mutual interests to strengthen and deepen their political and economic linkages. Therefore, from 2001 to 2018, Hanoi and Canberra continued to take practical steps to create political establishments and economic chances for greater successes in their relations. Like any other bilateral relations in world politics, there may be differences between Canberra and Hanoi, yet these differences have not prevented them from bringing their relationship to a new height. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A generation of scholars has depicted the premiership of Labor Party leader Gough Whitlam as a watershed in Australian foreign policy. According to the prevailing consensus, Whitlam carved out a more independent and progressive role in international affairs without significantly endangering relations with Western-aligned states in East and Southeast Asia or with Australia's traditionally closest allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. This article takes issue with these views and offers a more skeptical assessment of Whitlam's diplomacy and questions his handling of Australia's alliance with the United States. In doing so, it shows that Whitlam, in his eagerness to embrace détente, reject containment, and project an image of an allegedly more progressive and independent Australia, in fact exacerbated tensions with Richard Nixon's Republican administration and caused disquiet among Southeast Asian countries that were aligned with or at least friendly toward the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the foreign policy discourse that surrounded the Abbott government's 2014 decision to fight the Islamic State (IS). An analysis of parliamentary Hansard reveals that the debate featured three prominent axes: the legacy of the 2003 Iraq War; the strategies and objectives of the 2014 mission; and Australia's domestic terror threat level. Throughout, the Abbott government not only marginalised dissenting views, but also justified its renewed engagement in the Middle East via a highly securitised and elitist foreign policy discourse. This finding has consequences beyond the battle against the IS. It reveals a deep-seated tension between the ideals of democratic pluralism and the reality that securitised and elitist foreign policy discourses protect governments from serious scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the backdrop of a protracted global "war on terror" campaign, there has been a significant increase in the frequency and scope of informal intelligence‐sharing agreements by democratic states with non‐traditional partner regimes known to routinely employ torture. It will be argued that an international "norm vacuum" currently exists surrounding policies and practices in efforts to uphold the torture prohibition in these types of contemporary security relationships. This article will focus on the 2015 Australia‐Iran intelligence relationship as an illustrative case‐study to identify the problems, opportunities and risks related to such sharing arrangements and agreements. It will be argued that, at present, Australia appears indifferent to the risk of being passively complicit in torture. However, in applying an analytical framework of norm entrepreneurship, this article examines the role that countries like Australia could play in crafting normative standards and supporting appropriate behaviour about how global intelligence co‐operation should be considered through reinforcing accountability standards and the torture prohibition world‐wide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses issues in Australian foreign policy. Topics covered include tensions in the Australia-China bilateral relationship, the struggle of the Australian government with the presence of U.S. President Donald Trump and his decision to impose tariffs on China, and the systemic volatility facing Australian lawmakers in the Indo-Pacific region including China's claim to control South China Sea. The ousting of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is also mentioned.

The article offers information on how attitudes and intercultural relationships help us view the world that is multinational, multicultural and multi-faith in the 21st century. It offers a historical background of trade between Asia and Australia and the rule of East India Company. It also offers information on Immigration Restriction Act.. The article includes topics such as globalization, perception of the outer environment or cultural perception, and diagram of information processing.

A critique of the novels "Amnesia" by Peter Carey and "And Then We Heard the Thunder" by John Oliver Killens is presented. Topics discussed include the ways in which the two novels depict the relationship between the U.S. and Australia during the World War II period, the observation that the Battle of Brisbane in "Amnesia" shows xenophobia and racism among white Australians and the two authors' imagined alternatives to narratives of globalization wherein U.S. power and capitalism predominate.

The article focuses on several aspects of Australia's defence and foreign policy for protecting and upholding international criminal and humanitarian law (ICHL). It mentions that Australia has signed and ratified the Rome Statute in 2002 that underpins the International Criminal Court. It also mentions about important role of Australia in drawing up the United Nations (UN) Charter, drafting the universal declaration on human rights, and the establishment of the UN Security Council.

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper emphasises the importance of 'maximising' Australia's power and influence. However, the White Paper and much of the commentary on Australian foreign policy do not clearly conceptualise 'power' or indicate how it ought to be increased. The Lowy Institute's recent Asia Power Index implies one possible strategy via its resource-based approach to measuring power. We outline a different approach and argue that power should be conceptualised and evaluated as a specific relationship causing behavioural change, rather than as a general attribute of its wielder. To complement the Lowy Institute's carefully catalogued database, and facilitate a more focused conversation about maximising power and influence in Australian foreign policy, we offer a typology identifying five pathways through which states can translate their material and non-material resources into outcomes that serve the national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit that was held in Sydney, New South Wales in March 2018. Topics discussed include shared commitment to free and open markets; signing of a memorandum on combatting terrorism and violent extremism; expressing a regional identity based on a series of strong and deeply different national identities; and need for Australia to build a Eurasian foreign policy.

This article argues that the creation of ‘strategic partnerships’ as an alternative form of alignment represents an effort by Tokyo, and other US-allies, to ‘decenter’ their respective security policies from their erstwhile over-dependence on Washington. By examining the nature, purpose, and dynamics of strategic partnerships more closely, and investigating the empirical case of Australia, we can gain a greater appreciation of their significance both to Japan's evolving security policy and the broader role they play in the Asia Pacific security landscape. The article argues that Australia has been the most significant and successful of Japan's new strategic partnerships to date, has therefore come to represent the template for other new alignments, and hence provides a yardstick against which their effectiveness can be measured. It concludes that while the strategic partnership certainly represents a new departure for Japanese security policy - ostensibly independent of the US-alliance - closer inspection reveals how this relationship remains fundamentally bound to the broader American-hub-and-spokes system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brexit vote will fundamentally transform the European Union (EU) and will change how the UK relates to Europe and the rest of the world. What are the implications for Australia at this critical juncture? The UK has been a major player in the Australia-EU relationship, and Australia will now need to recalibrate its approach to both the UK and the EU across a range of policy areas. This article examines the future of Australia-UK and Australia-EU relations in the wake of Brexit, and assesses Australia’s options going forward. The authors advance three considerations. Firstly, Australia’s national interests are best served by adopting a pragmatic rather than nostalgic approach towards future relations with the UK and the EU. Secondly, Australia should avoid pursuing one relationship at the expense of the other and creating a zero-sum dynamic. Finally, Australia’s future strategy must consider broader global developments, such as events within its own region and the US presidency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses economic and political issues concerning Australian foreign policy from July to December 2017. Topics explored include the commitment demonstrated by the Australian government to its strategic alliance with the U.S., the evolution of the foreign policy strategy under the leadership of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, and the response of Australia to geopolitical trends such as the growing economic influence of China and political situation in the U.S.

The suppression of Poznan June 1956 workers’ rebellion (Poznanski Czerwiec) by Polish authorities prompted immediate Australia‐wide demonstrations and protests by Polish émigrés who were supported by friends and allies in the Catholic Church and the Australian anti‐communist movement. Nation‐wide demonstrations in Australia and subsequent approaches by émigré Poles and supporters required a disinterested Australian government to develop a position on Poznan June events. Pressure on the Australian government for a response, potentially disruptive to its foreign policies, was applied only by elements within the Australian political scene that posed little threat to its future. Poznan June ‘56's effect on Australia takes place within the particular nature of Australian domestic politics where the June events were used to fan the flames of bitter rivalry within the labour movement by a strident anti‐communist faction seeking to restructure the Australian Labor Party in a manner consistent with its ideological predilections. In taking up the anti‐communist cause of the Polish émigrés, the Australian anti‐communist leadership claimed a moral high‐ground, but lacked sufficient commitment to use their considerable parliamentary advantage to pressure the Australian government to adopt a more muscular position towards Poland's government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identifies major themes and recommends preferred strategies in Australia’s engagement with the world. These themes and strategies relate to geopolitics, economics and the ‘new international agenda’; there is also a more specific focus on Australia’s Pacific island neighbours and Timor-Leste. There is a strong emphasis on perceived Australian national interests throughout the document. The geopolitical discussion is primarily ‘realist’; economically the document is pro-globalisation; the discussion of the ‘new international agenda’ involves an Australian-oriented pragmatism; there is an assertion of Australian leadership in the South Pacific. With some minor criticism, Labor has accepted the general direction advocated in the White Paper. The document is thus indicative of the likely future direction of Australian foreign policy. Lack of US response indicates declining US engagement with Australia and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. China, as the other major power highly significant for Australia, has been low-key in its criticisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers his views on the foreign policy of Australia. Topics discussed include the foreign policy White Paper released in March 2018, indications that the post-war global order has ended, and the changes that Australia has to make in order for it to be heard in the global arena. Also discussed are the three different kinds of public opinion dealing with foreign affairs, namely, the interest groups, the interested generalists, and the general public.

While many have remarked upon Prime Minister John Howard's “use” of the Anzac legend for political purposes, our understanding of the nature and dynamics of such use remains fragmented and underdeveloped. Using the area of foreign policy as a case study, this essay approaches Howard's Anzac Day and related ceremonial rhetoric as examples of the epideictic genre, which presents speakers with a combination of unique rhetorical opportunities and strict generic constraints. While often perceived as apolitical and inconsequential, the genre embodies a form of argumentation that serves not only to increase the “intensity of adherence” to certain values, thus laying the groundwork for later deliberative appeals, but also creates a “disposition to act at the appropriate moment”. This paper will argue that Howard's employment of Anzac was bounded and defined by the nature and dynamics of the epideictic genre, of which Howard proved to be a savvy user. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]