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This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding academic gender gaps is difficult because gender-imbalanced fields differ across many features, limiting researchers' ability to systematically study candidate causes. In the present preregistered research, we isolate two potential explanations—brilliance beliefs and fixed versus growth intelligence mindsets—by comparing two fields that have inverse gender gaps and historic and topical overlap: philosophy and psychology. Many more men than women study philosophy and vice versa in psychology, with disparities emerging during undergraduate studies. No prior work has examined the contributions of both self-perceptions of brilliance and fixed versus growth mindsets on choice of major among undergraduate students. We assessed field-specific brilliance beliefs, brilliance beliefs about self, and mindsets, cross-sectionally in 467 undergraduates enrolled in philosophy and psychology classes at universities in the United States and Canada via both in-person and online questionnaires. We found support for the brilliance beliefs about the self, but not mindset, explanation. Brilliance beliefs about oneself predicted women's but not men's choice of major. Women who believed they were less brilliant were more likely to study psychology (perceived to require low brilliance) over philosophy (perceived to require high brilliance). Findings further indicated that fixed versus growth mindsets did not differ by gender and were not associated with major. Together, these results suggest that internalized essentialist beliefs about the gendered nature of brilliance are uniquely important to understanding why men and women pursue training in different academic fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses fragmentarily preserved views of Empedocles, that, in the author's opinion, represent the antecedents of deviations from the anthropocentric vision of the world and anticipate the majority of later attempts at scientific, philosophical, and legal modifications of the status of all living beings. Empedocles, namely, claims that all beings think, i.e., that they have understanding or consciousness. He is, moreover, portrayed as a proponent of the thesis that plants as well have both intellect and the ability to think, and that they are driven by desire and have feelings, sadness and joy. According to him, the idea that the whole nature is akin not only has a vital-animal meaning but, to a certain extent, a mental meaning. Empedocles urged his disciples to abstain from consuming ensouled beings, since it is in the bodies of these beings that penalized souls reside. He believed that he himself was one of them who had been killed and eaten, and that it is by purification that prior sins in connection with food should be treated. Empedocles' case shows that humans are living beings that err, and that they owe to animals justice based on mutual kinship. Aside from living a pure life, practicing the recommended katharmoi, and abstaining from flesh in any version, the path to the salvation of the soul leads through two additional dimensions. The first is being revealed in the important phrase of the sage from Acragas that one should fast from evil. And secondly, the wealth of divine thoughts is connected with being happy, just as those who have vague opinions about the gods are wretched. Eventually, the "Sicilian Muse" believed that if people live in a holy and just manner, they shall be blessed in this life, even more so after leaving this one, because they will achieve happiness that will not be temporarily, and be able to rest for eternity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic similarity often generates positive interactions between host‐country nationals (HCNs) and co‐ethnic expatriates in multinational corporations (MNCs), but the potential causes of conflict between these groups are under‐studied. In two studies, we tested whether Chinese HCNs' attitudes towards expatriates are associated with the implicit theories of ethnicity held by HCNs—essentialism (i.e., believing ethnicity has an immutable essence) versus constructivism (i.e., believing ethnicity to be malleable/socially constructed)—as well as expatriates' ethnicity, which we operationalised as Chinese (co‐ethnic) versus Scottish (other‐ethnic), and expatriates' cultural upbringing, operationalised as Chinese (local) versus American (foreign). In Study 1, HCNs who endorsed an essentialist perspective of ethnicity expected co‐ethnic (vs. other‐ethnic) expatriates to demonstrate greater ingroup identification and favouritism towards them irrespective of the expatriates' cultural upbringing. In Study 2, HCNs primed with the essentialist view expected co‐ethnic (vs. other‐ethnic) expatriates to demonstrate greater ingroup identification and favouritism towards them irrespective of the expatriates' upbringing, whereas those primed with the constructivist view expected expatriates with local (vs. foreign) upbringing to demonstrate greater ingroup identification and favouritism towards them irrespective of their ethnicity. These findings advance international management literature by providing a nuanced understanding of the interactions between HCNs and co‐ethnic expatriates that are influenced by essentialist beliefs about ethnicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I discuss the contribution by Davenport, Davison, Liou, & Love (2015) in which they relate reliability represented by coefficient α to formal definitions of internal consistency and unidimensionality, both proposed by Cronbach (1951). I argue that coefficient α is a lower bound to reliability and that concepts of internal consistency and unidimensionality, however defined, belong to the realm of validity, viz. the issue of what the test measures. Internal consistency and unidimensionality may play a role in the construction of tests when the theory of the attribute for which the test is constructed implies that the items be internally consistent or unidimensional. I also offer examples of attributes that do not imply internal consistency or unidimensionality, thus limiting these concepts' usefulness in practical applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the philosophy of logic as presented by philosopher Willard V. O. Quine. Topics discussed include the set of treatise which presents a summary of the philosophy of logic as determined by Quine, a set of contradicting arguments and an explanation of each arguments and the idea of redrawing the whole concept of logic. Also mentioned are the troubles in what Quine has said about logic.

This article uses the philosophical concepts of Henri Bergson (namely duration, intelligence, and intuition), in order to problematize ways of thinking about psychology, and how psychology produces knowledge. From this perspective, we discuss psychology as a scientific discipline and examine the differences between science and philosophy. In so doing, we deepen the understanding of the concepts of duration, time, and space, in relation to the logics of spatialized time which influence analysis in Human Sciences. We also discuss differences between ways of apprehending knowledge through intelligence and intuition, causing a change in the perspective from which we approach our objects of investigation. Finally, we propose a view of psychology in terms of duration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current paper presents an analysis of the NICE guidelines on depression and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) from the perspective of the philosophy of science, guided particularly by Foucault's notion of the symbiosis of knowledge and power. It examines how data that challenged the orthodox position on the validity and drug treatment of these conditions was managed in the process of guideline development. The depression guideline briefly considered the complexity and heterogeneity of depression, and numerous methodological problems with evaluating treatments, including antidepressants. However, the guideline recommendations made no reference to these issues and ignored evidence that questioned the analysis of antidepressant trials. The guideline on ADHD reviewed validity, but did not consider evidence from the critical literature, and overlooked inconsistencies in the data. The guideline identified that drug trials have shown no long-term benefit in ADHD, but still recommended treatment with stimulant drugs for children with severe symptoms and for all adults claiming consensus for this position. Both guidelines demonstrate how contradictory data are managed so as not to jeopardise the currently predominant view that ADHD and depression are valid and un-contentious medical conditions that should be treated with drugs. The subjective nature of guideline formation that is revealed illustrates Foucault's suggestion that the authority of medicine operates to promote a technological view of the nature of certain human problems, which in turn strengthens medical hegemony over these areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses on epistemology. It states that the greatest challenge to epistemology comes from the rapid development of humanitarian knowledge and from the need to take a new look at the integrity of science as such and in this connection the acute issue of the so called turn towards language and accordingly of the mediators on any cognition, including semiotic and symbolic systems of various kinds. The problems emerged in the realm of humanitarian knowledge before acquiring a more general status and eventually stimulating the creation of corresponding categories thus enriching the arsenal of conceptual means of epistemology.

In this article the author comments on views given on his article on knowledge by acquaintance. The author says that the objectual knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance, where acquaintance needs an encounter in experience that allows for a good look at the thing. He also says that knowledge has a nature which partly involves knowledge by acquaintance.

Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely unjustified. We have surprisingly poor justification for thinking that sensory properties are represented in perception. By focusing on the case of vision, I show that an embedded understanding of visual perception, and empirical evidence in cognitive psychology, indicate that SV is far from warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research target was to find out whether there are some differences in the level of creative imagination among patients with eating disorders and a comparison (non-clinical) group. Another aim was to use the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS) as a measure for suggestibility/hypnotic susceptibility which were put in the context of cognitive style field dependence - independence. There are some hypotheses tested which concern differences in the field dependence between patients with eating disorders and the comparison group. Research was attended by 46 girls and women with eating disorder diagnoses at the age between 14 - 48 years and 46 girls and women from non-clinical population at the age between 16 - 33 years. We used CIS to examine the level of creative imagination and Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) to identify field dependence - independence. Eating Attitude Test (EAT-26) was presented to distinguish between patients with eating disorders and the comparison group and the body image issues have been recovered by Stunkard silhouette test. The results reflect that there are no demonstrable differences in the level of creative imagination between the group with eating disorders and the comparison (non-clinical) group. It was found that people with eating disorders are significantly more field dependent than the comparison group (p < 0,01) and it was also found that there is a greater field dependence of people with inadequate body image. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inhibition of return (IOR) refers to slower responding to a visual target appearing at a previously cued versus uncued location. In three experiments, we asked whether IOR would be affected by the emotional content of target stimuli. Participants reported the location of negative (spiders, angry faces) or neutral (objects, neutral faces) targets as quickly and accurately as possible after a valid or invalid location cue (a simple circle). IOR was significantly smaller when detecting negative versus neutral targets, but only after repeated exposures to these stimuli (i.e., with blocked presentations). This effect was eliminated when target type was randomized within blocks. By presenting negative versus neutral targets in short alternating blocks and examining IOR on the first trial of each new block, we show that the emotional modulation of IOR stems from the affective context in place before visual orienting is initiated, not by perceptual processing of the target after cue offset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we approach the idea that, the ease or fluency of information processing being subjectively experienced as feeling of familiarity with a positive affective tone, interfere with evaluative processing. The close association of familiarity and positive affect is here addressed within a affective priming paradigm. Participants were asked to evaluate a set of target stimuli previously tested for their valence. These targets were immediately preceded either by a familiar or a unfamiliar stimuli. Congruently with the familiarity-positive affect association, familiar stimuli facilitated evaluations (generate faster responses) of affective consistent targets (positive targets). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To examine the effectiveness of various affect regulation strategies and categories of affect regulation strategies, a meta-analysis was conducted. Results generally indicate that reappraisal (d=0.65) and distraction (d=0.46 for all studies; d=0.95 for studies with a negative or no affect induction) are the most effective regulation/repair strategies, producing the largest hedonic shift in affect. The effectiveness of different categories of regulation/repair strategies depended on the valence of the preceding affect induction. Results also indicate that stronger affect inductions and the use of bivariate affect measures will provide a richer understanding of affect regulation. Additionally, not all specific strategies or categories of strategies have been researched and the impact of individual differences on affect regulation has received relatively little attention. Finally, results indicate that control conditions in affect regulation research may not provide a valid point for comparison, as they facilitate effective affect repair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that one dominant position in psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy about how genetic disorders point to the innate specification of dissociated modules in the human brain should be replaced by a dynamic, neuroconstructivist approach in which genes, brain, cognition, and environment interact multidirectionally. The article challenges current thinking about a series of questions: (a) Do significantly better scores in one domain necessarily indicate an intact module? (b) What do scores in the normal range suggest? (c) What is wrong with mental-age matching? (d) Why is the notion of an intact module unlikely? (e) Do developmental disorders suggest associations rather than dissociations? (f) Is the environment the same for atypically developing individuals? The article concludes by examining the implications of taking a neuroconstructivist approach and by arguing that human intelligence is not a state (i.e., not a collection of static, built-in modules that can be intact or impaired) but a process (i.e., the emergent property over developmental time of dynamic, multidirectional interactions between genes, brain, cognition, behavior, and environment) with domain-specific outcomes impossible without the process of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central thesis of this essay is that the problem of psychology lies at the very heart of the difficulties associated with integrating human knowledge. The startling consequence of this insight is that it means the solution to psychology's epistemological woes opens up a new pathway for achieving unified knowledge. A brief overview of the fragmentation of knowledge will be offered and special attention will be paid to Wilson's (1998) proposal. The problem of psychology, Wilson's failure to address it, and the reasons why it is integral to any proposal for unifying knowledge will then be specified. The article concludes with an articulation of how the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System solves the problem of psychology, resolves many of the fundamental issues associated with integrating human knowledge, and is commensurate with the foremost concerns of natural scientists, social scientists, and humanists, allowing for objectivity, coherence, and pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carlos Cornejo's book review on my Von Kunst bis Terror led me to the need to chart out a number of central issues in contemporary psychology that cultural psychology is in a position to resolve. Human subjectivity in all of its richness remains the core of investigation for all psychology, and cultural psychology has a central role to play in innovating psychology's research practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Background: Much has been published related to the epistemology of Heideggerian hermeneutic research. We seek to reveal insights from our experience of enacting such research. Objective: To articulate the lived experience of ‘doing’ Heideggerian hermeneutic research. Design: The authors of this paper shared their experiences with the primary author towards articulating the process of ‘doing’ such research. Participants: The authors all have long experience with Heideggerian hermeneutic research and meet regularly at the Institute for Interpretive Phenomenology. They supervise student''s research and are mindful of the process of coming to understand how to work in a phenomenological/hermeneutic manner. Methods: First the section on philosophical underpinnings was written by the primary author and then shared with all authors. There was published data related to the experience of three of the participants already available. This provided a spring board to further conversations when the primary author visited America, able to engage in daily conversations with three of the co-authors. In the spirit of phenomenology this paper represents a process of reading, talking, writing, talking, reading, re-writing, re-talking and so forth. Results: The process of doing hermeneutic phenomenology is represented as a journey of ‘thinking’ in which researchers are caught up in a cycle of reading-writing-dialogue- which spirals onwards. Through such disciplined and committed engagement insights ‘come’. The researcher is always open to questions, and to following a felt-sense of what needs to happen next. However, it is not a process of ‘do whatever you like’ but rather a very attentive attunement to ‘thinking’ and listening to how the texts speak. Conclusion: This paper argues that alongside a disciplined understanding of the methodology, both researcher and reader need to share a commitment to ‘thinking’ which is willing to question, and open to trusting the resonance of understanding that ‘comes’ without expecting answers that are declared ‘truth’ for all time. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We report an experimental evaluation of the “input−output surface” for a biochemical AND gate. The obtained data are modeled within the rate-equation approach, with the aim to map out the gate function and cast it in the language of logic variables appropriate for analysis of Boolean logic for scalability. In order to minimize “analog” noise, we consider a theoretical approach for determining an optimal set for the process parameters to minimize “analog” noise amplification for gate concatenation. We establish that under optimized conditions, presently studied biochemical gates can be concatenated for up to order 10 processing steps. Beyond that, new paradigms for avoiding noise buildup will have to be developed. We offer a general discussion of the ideas and possible future challenges for both experimental and theoretical research for advancing scalable biochemical computing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key question in cognitive psychology is whether information in short-term memory is lost as a function of time. Lewandowsky, Duncan, and Brown (2004) argued against that memory loss because forgetting in serial recall occurred to the same extent across serial positions regardless of the rate of recall. However, we believe Lewandowsky et al. (2004) only prevented one of two types of rehearsal; they did not prevent nonarticulatory rehearsal via attention. To prevent articulatory and nonarticulatory rehearsal without introducing interference, we presented unevenly timed stimuli for serial recall and, on some trials, required that the timing of stimuli be reproduced in the response. In those trials only, evidence of memory loss over time emerged. Further research is needed to identify whether this memory loss is decay or lost distinctiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the revival of interest in nineteenth century psychology and ethics in Britain during the 1980s, and the current debate around Utilitarian ethics in medicine (Buckle, 2005) and care (Offer, 2004), Utilitarian premises, understood as a psychological theory rather than as a moral philosophy, remain largely dormant in contemporary British Psychology. This is so despite their apparent survival in Behaviourism (Plaud & Vogeltanz, 1994). This article examines aspects of their decline within Victorian psychology, by focussing upon the relatively neglected psychological writings of Herbert Spencer. In doing so, it seeks to make a modest contribution to unravelling the complex changes in the nature of nineteenth-century psychology. In particular it is argued that, whilst some explanations of the decline of Utilitarian premises in the Victorian development of psychology focus upon the later part of the century and cultural or institutional factors, an examination of Spencer's works at the mid-century supports the view that changes were under way earlier. Whilst several explanations might be offered for this, changes in economic organisation and in the experience of individual agency are highlighted. The relation between Utilitarian psychology and Utilitarian ethics will then be considered. Finally, at this stage it should be possible to comment upon the significance of the marginalization of Utilitarian premises within the development of Victorian psychology for the contemporary debate about health resource allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume attempts to explain all human cognition in terms of impressions, ideas, and their qualities, behaviors, and relations. This explanation includes a complicated attempted reduction of beliefs, or judgments, to single ideas. This paper attempts to demonstrate one of the inadequacies of this approach, and any of its kind (any attempted reduction of judgments to their constituent parts, single or multiple) via an argument concerning the logical forms of judgment found implicitly in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and more explicitly in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important issue for information ethics is how much control people should have over the dissemination of information that they have created. Since intellectual property policies have an impact on our welfare primarily because they have a huge impact on our ability to acquire knowledge, there is an important role for epistemology in resolving this issue. This paper discusses the various ways in which intellectual property policies can have an impact on knowledge acquisition both positively and negatively. In particular, it looks at how intellectual property policies can affect the amount of information that people create, the quality of that information, the accessibility of that information, the diversity of that information, and the locatability of that information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract  In this paper we show how the concepts of answer set programming and fuzzy logic can be successfully combined into the single framework of fuzzy answer set programming (FASP). The framework offers the best of both worlds: from the answer set semantics, it inherits the truly declarative non-monotonic reasoning capabilities while, on the other hand, the notions from fuzzy logic in the framework allow it to step away from the sharp principles used in classical logic, e.g., that something is either completely true or completely false. As fuzzy logic gives the user great flexibility regarding the choice for the interpretation of the notions of negation, conjunction, disjunction and implication, the FASP framework is highly configurable and can, e.g., be tailored to any specific area of application. Finally, the presented framework turns out to be a proper extension of classical answer set programming, as we show, in contrast to other proposals in the literature, that there are only minor restrictions one has to demand on the fuzzy operations used, in order to be able to retrieve the classical semantics using FASP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an analysis of language variation and change in a socially stratified corpus of Glaswegian collected in 1997. Eight consonantal variables in read and spontaneous speech from 32 speakers were analysed separately and then together using multivariate analysis. Our results show that middle-class speakers, with weaker network ties and more opportunities for mobility and contact with English English speakers, are maintaining traditional Scottish features. Working-class adolescents, with more limited mobility and belonging to close-knit networks, are changing their vernacular by using ‘non-local’ features such as TH-fronting and reducing expected Scottish features such as postvocalic /r/. We argue that local context is the key to understanding the findings. Mobility and network structures are involved, but must be taken in conjunction with the recent history of structural changes to Glasgow and the resulting construction of local class-based language ideologies which continue to be relevant in the city today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James Conroy's Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Imagination, Education and Democracy implies three main aims: first, to celebrate aspects of imagination in education and politics; second, to challenge defensive closure in varieties of discourse, especially in the language of economic and monetary management in education and politics; and third, to open up, for reciprocal enrichment, situations and discourses pertaining to consideration of state funding for religiously affiliated schools. Liminality, characteristic of thresholds and borders, calls for interpretation and mediation, as well as appreciation of uncertainties. Liminality of imagination is explored in contexts associated with this third aim, but also in other kinds of context associated with the first two aims. As well as offering critical assessment of the book, this review article indicates some scope for interpretation and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all empirical work in the psychology of perception has operated explicitly within a theoretical framework. But when it has, that framework has usually been provided by the inferential theory of perception. I argue that in spite of its explanatory strengths, the inferential theory of perception conceals a well-established empirical phenomenon. That phenomenon is known in ordinary parlance as 'familiarity'. I discuss why the inferential theory of perception cannot deal with familiarity and what it reveals about the limits of the inferential theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly agreed that the well-known Lucas–Penrose arguments and even Penrose’s ‘new argument’ in [Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press] are inconclusive. It is, perhaps, less clear exactly why at least the latter is inconclusive. This note continues the discussion in [Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241–250; Shapiro, S.(2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19–42] and elsewhere of this question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show how to interpret intuitionistic propositional logic into a predicative second-order intuitionistic propositional system having only the conditional and the universal second-order quantifier. We comment on this fact. We argue that it supports the legitimacy of using classical logic in a predicative setting, even though the philosophical cast of predicativism is nonrealistic. We also note that the absence of disjunction and existential quantifications allows one to have a process of normalization of proofs that avoids the use of "commuting conversions." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ideas of cultural-historical psychology have led to a new understanding of the human psyche as developing in the process of the subject acting in social and historical contexts. Such a “non-classical” reinterpretation of psychological concepts should be based on a theoretical and philosophical framework in order to explain genetic sources of these concepts. For this purpose, Il’enkov’s philosophy is of great significance. This is illustrated by discussing a possible cultural-historical understanding of the concept of intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a poetics of memory which literalizes a post-retrieval idea of memory. It characterizes writing as a technology of memory, and memory as tekhne, writing. It offers a definition of a poetics of memory that acknowledges the reversibility of memory, simultaneously enacting a poetics of forgetting, and one which is a performative writing which breaks down the action/speech binary. It is the author's aim to rethink the relationality, or the mutual articulation, of the concepts of memory and writing.

Section 1 recalls a point noted by A. N. Prior forty years ago: that a certain formula in the language of a purely implicational intermediate logic investigated by R. A. Bull is unprovable in that logic but provable in the extension of the logic by the usual axioms for conjunction, once this connective is added to the language. Section 2 reminds us that every formula is interdeducible with (i.e. added to intuitionistic logic, yields the same intermediate logic as) some conjunction-free formula. Thus it would seem that any detour going via formulas with conjunction can be avoided, which raises a puzzle: how is this consistent with the point from Section 1? Sections 3 and 4 raise and discuss this puzzle. In fact, the puzzle turns out on closer inspection not to be so puzzling after all, but it does serve as a convenient centrepiece around which to organize a discussion of the phenomenon illustrated by the Bull–Prior example. Section 5 notes that Prior's observation can be extended to the case of the result of adding disjunction to Bull's logic, while Section 6 includes some further remarks aimed at diagnosing one source of possible residual puzzlement. A subtext of our discussion—spanning several of the notes—is that this work by Bull and Prior has been overlooked, their results having to be rediscovered, by many algebraists and logicians in more recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the logical relation between the Is and the Ought that was weaker than entailment, and indeed neither deductive nor inductive. Prominent post-1950s examples of claims that Is-like statements can support Ought-like statements; Argument that the support that some primarily descriptive statements give to normative conclusions looks like logical support; Reasons why some forms of support have an affinity to logical relations.

Ned Block ((1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5–43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block that it is not the nature of its processes but of its linguistic behavior which is responsible for his machine's lack of intelligence. As I show, not only has Block failed to establish that the nature of internal processes is conceptually relevant for psychology, in fact his machine example actually supports some version of behaviorism. As Wittgenstein has maintained, as far as psychology is concerned, there may be chaos inside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses natural accounts of human intellectual ability, or to those with a self-acknowledged claim to science of some kind. The article highlights certain periods which attach a clearer value to speed than others. Also, the article examines the challenges thus posed to conventional ways of periodizing the history of psychology. The claim that intellectual ability, considered separately from time, is a suitable case for measurement has been conclusively refuted from within psychometrics itself. Post-Kantian psychology assumed as self-evident that mental processes exist in time and therefore can be measured.

A continuation of the debate over the intelligibility, and plausibility, of Yolton's reading of Locke's account of perception. Here, the issue turns on the de-reification of ideas and its implications for the putative axioms of symmetry and transitivity governing the identity of ideas. The issue is illustrated by what Locke says about confused ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored Kocsis and Heller's findings concerning the relationship between one's belief and the perceived accuracy of a profile. The influence of types of information was also considered. A sample of 353 participants was used in the present experiment that gauged the perception of information contained in a profile. The results supported Kocsis and Heller's earlier findings with a positive relationship found between belief and perceived accuracy. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more likely he or she is to perceive a profile to be accurate. This relationship was most pronounced in participants' perceptions of information contained in a profile concerning an unknown offender's crime behavior and past history. The more an individual believes in profiling, the more information relating to these two factors is likely to be perceived. This relationship was not observed where information in the same profile involved physical features O f the offender [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Le premier tractatus du commentaire d'Albert le Grand à l' Isagoge de Porphyre consiste en une manière de proème ou d'introduction à l'ensemble de la logique. Comme la plupart des textes d'Albert le Grand, ce traité est d'une très grande richesse, qu'atténuent toutefois son manque d'ordre et son obscurité d'expression. Étant donné que les aspects fondamentaux de la logique y sont touchés--son statut scientifique et philosophique, son utilité, son sujet, sa division, sa relation aux sciences du langage, etc.--, ce petit ouvrage est du plus haut intérêt pour quiconque cherche à mieux comprendre la logique et la philosophie de la logique du XIII e siècle. L'auteur présente ici une traduction annotée et expliquée de ce texte difficile, faite d'après la version provisoire de la nouvelle édition de Cologne. Le relevé des sources principales de l'ouvrage révèle, sur un fond aristotélicien permanent, une forte influence des traités logiques arabes nouvellement arrivés en Occident. The first tractatus of Albert the Great's commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge consists of a kind of proem or introduction to the whole of logic. As most of Albert the Great's texts, this tract is of great richness, though it lacks order and is sometimes obscure. Since the fundamental themes of logic are addressed therein--its scientific and philosophical status, its utility, its subject, its division, its relation to the linguistic arts, etc.--, this small work is of high interest for anyone trying to better understand thirteenth-century logic and philosophy of logic. The author presents a translation of this difficult text, made after a preliminary version of the new critical edition and enriched with an introduction and explanatory notes. The survey of the main sources of the tract reveals, apart from a permanent artistotelian background, the strong influence of the Arabic logical treatises which were then coming in the Western world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For centuries, philosophy and psychology in one way or another identified thought with logic, or logic with thought. Only in recent decades has it become clear that there is more to thought than logic. Evolutionary psychology has stressed the adaptive function of thought, as of other processes often identified as psychological. Gigerenzer et al. have worked for some years now on a program of research in which thinking is approached as an adaptive process. According to them, it is misleading to use the complexities of logic, mathematics or statistics as the standards for correct thinking or as a model for thought. On the contrary, thinking is the effective use of simple heuristics. The four volumes discussed in this review essay demonstrate that the approach can be very fruitful in many domains of human reasoning, and can be effective in practical problem solving as well, without having to fall back on the intricacies of logic, statistics, mathematics and other tools of the trade of scientific decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that the so-called principles of “strong centering” and “weak centering” central to the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals are both fallacious. A foundation for an alternative semantics without these prinsciples is outlined. The core idea is that the statistically normal worlds – rather than those worlds most qualitatively similar to the actual world – should serve as the semantical fulcrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of combined expectancies have shown that spatial cueing effects are reduced on trials on which participants have to respond with an unexpected motor response. In the first two experiments the range of reduced expectancy effects is examined. Advance knowledge of the likely response was combined in a trial-by-trial procedure with modality cueing, object cueing, and task cueing. Effects of modality cueing were reduced on trials on which the target requested an unexpected response. However, effects of object cueing as well as effects of task cueing were unaffected by response cueing. Comparing experiments revealed that different types of cues were used in different experiments. To test the effect of type of cue on the interaction of expectancies the third experiment combined spatial cueing with response cueing. When integrated cues were used that cued the likely target location by an arrow and the likely response by an arrow too, spatial cueing effects were reduced on trials with unexpected responses. However, spatial cueing effects remained unaffected by response cueing when separated cues were used consisting in a word cueing the response and an arrow cueing target location. An account for the modulation of combined expectancies by the relation between cues is suggested in terms of the adjusted expectancy model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Personal epistemology has typically been conceptualized in one of two primary ways: as a cognitive developmental process or as a system of beliefs. The approach that is elaborated here is to conceive of epistemological understanding as a metacognitive process that activates epistemic theories, a multidimensional set of interrelated beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Building on the work of Flavell (1979), K. S. Kitchener (1983), and Kuhn (1999b), this article describes the rationale for conceptualizing epistemological awareness at the metacognitive level, delineates the nature of this construct, and describes how this directs methodological choices for research. This is discussed in light of a recent study of students' online searching for a simulated science assignment, investigated through the use of think-aloud protocols. Exploring students' thought processes during online searching allows examination of personal epistemology not as a decontextualized set of beliefs, but as an activated, situated aspect of cognition that influences the knowledge construction process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues that equivocation described as a fallacy is not a logical concept but an epistemic one. Claim that the arguments of one who equivocates is not logically flawed but is unpersuasive; Assertion that only arguments which are unpersuasive in a certain way involve equivocations.

Logic ought to guide our thinking. It is better, more rational, more intelligent to think logically than to think illogically. Illogical thought leads to bad judgment and error. In any case, if logic had no role to play as a guide to thought, why should we bother with it?The somewhat naïve opinions of the previous paragraph are subject to attack from many sides. It may be objected that an activity does not count as thinking at all unless it is at least minimally logical, so logic is constitutive of thought rather than a guide to it. Or it may be objected that whereas logic describes a system of timeless relations between propositions, thinking is a dynamic process involving revisions, and so could not use a merely static guide. Or again the objection may be that there is no such thing as logic, only a whole variety of different logics, not all of which could possibly be good guides. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Argues that although distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. Key issues of interest; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on philosophical studies.

This article focuses on causal theory of reference. Consider two theories of the reference of natural kind terms. The first, the Simple Nominal Essence Theory (SNE) proposes that a natural kind term is associated with a (usually complex) open sentence whose constituent expressions are (a) predicates that can be applied on the basis of observation and (b) the connectives of propositional logic. By contrast, the Simple Real Essence Theory (SRE) suggests that a natural kind term is associated with a sample of some substance, and that the term refers to the set of things that share the same inner constitution as the sample.

This article discusses modal epistemology. Philosophy abounds in modal arguments. A surprisingly high proportion of these arguments have the following features as they are formally valid; one of their premises is far more controversial than any of the others; it is a model premise. It is not always possible to invert a possibility argument. But it is always possible to replace the crucial modal premise of a possibility argument with the denial of its conclusion and to replace its conclusion with the denial of its crucial modal premise.

This research investigated the relationship of a self-appraisal of having lived up to one's intellectual abilities at midlife (average age of 49 years) with life satisfaction and retrospective life choices 1 and 3 decades later among 383 participants in the Terman Study of the Gifted. Study 1 showed that participants who reported living up to their intellectual abilities were higher in satisfaction with occupational success, satisfaction with family life, and joy in living 11 years later. Study 2 showed that participants who reported living up to their abilities were higher in overall life satisfaction and were less likely to report that they would make different life choices in work or family life 3 decades later. In an integrative structural equation model, the relation between the midlife self-appraisal of having lived up to intellectual abilities and overall satisfaction at age 80 was mediated by life satisfaction discrepancy at age 61. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]