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Studies on Chinese nationalist discourse in the late Qing era rarely consider the role of settler-colonialism in the development of nationalism, instead assuming that anti-colonialism was the dominant ideological source. This article transcends the traditional binary discourse of the colonised and the coloniser by exploring how settler-colonialism helped to project a borderless China in late Qing utopian fiction. I argue that this body of literature, as exemplified by Lü Sheng's A Madman's Dream, is a useful lens for exploring how Chinese settler-colonialism developed a (trans)national imagination. China, as a non-Western settler-colonist, had a dual identity: its experience of being colonised by the West resulted in its acting as a settler-colonist, while its efforts to promote a 'new China' overseas were intended to create solidarity with others who had suffered from colonisation. This article thus contributes to the growing body of scholarship about Qing expansionism as an instance of colonialism by demonstrating the internal tensions within Chinese discourse on colonialism in that era. I illustrate that Chinese settler-colonialism displayed a unique blend of discourse about expansion in the past, the experience of suffering in the present, and imagining the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the intersections between state and fashion in China by examining the facilitation of a new fashion identity in a fashion edutainment program produced by national television. It argues that the state-sponsored (re)appraisal of traditional sartorial esthetics from which a decolonized fashion identity is expected to evolve is intimately interweaved with the state's metanarrative of national revival. The study interprets the reversion back to native historical traditions to counter and offer an alternative to Western cultural episteme as an inherently decolonial effort. With an emancipated fashion identity, the state aims to reclaim cultural authorship from the dictates of colonialism and orientalism. The paper examines how sartorial nationalism is given new expressions and highlights the question of authenticity working within state-prescribed parameters. The desire for international recognition however undermines the decoloniality of this undertaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outside of the dominant frame depicting World War II as a showdown between the Allied and Axis powers, the war also represented a critical juncture in the global battle between empire and nation. In Asia, the war allowed a "semi‐colonial" China to successfully reclaim its sovereignty from both its allies and enemies and compelled the Dutch to forfeit colonial rule in Indonesia and its prestige as a regional power. Moving beyond conventional dichotomies and great‐power bias, this paper analyses two portentous wartime controversies between China and the Netherlands, whose common goals as allies did not prevent clashes over diametrically opposed national pursuits. In exposing the conflicting nature of their respective nationalisms, these disputes elucidate the interplay of war, nationalism, and imperialism in East Asia as well as China's changing place in the emergent post‐war regional and global orders. The Dutch refusal to accept these shifting realities and underlying notions of national self‐determination presaged the traumatic trajectory of Indonesia's decolonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to common undeclared pedagogical assumptions in translation skill classes that 'faithfulness' to the source text is the highest good guiding translation exercises, I draw from Begriffsgeschichte to demonstrate how translations which have found a place in history often achieve their authority not by being 'the most faithful' to the source texts, but by successfully dominating and displacing alternatives. Intrigued by Koselleck's close attention to the ideologization and politicization of language, I transform his Begriffsgeschichte into a tool for examining the history of translation as driven by the will to power rather than truthfulness to the source text. Using as examples the Chinese renditions of two Western terms in the early twentieth century, I demonstrate how the translations which became standardized gained dominance by engaging the Chinese people's will to empowerment when the country came under constant existential threats of subjugation by colonial powers. Thus channelling Koselleck via Nietzsche, new horizons are opened up for translation studies. The article concludes with a comparison between this and other approaches to translation, highlighting the distinctive contributions made possible by this Nietzschean-informed Begriffsgeschichte method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many historians of China, particularly those based in North America, insist that the Qing dynasty's territorial expansion was imperial and comparable to the imperial expansions of other global empires. Other historians, particularly but not only those based in the People's Republic of China, continue to resist this interpretation. They argue that dynastic expansion in the Ming and Qing periods was simply a form of nation-state building, akin to similar processes in Europe. Rather than rejecting their claims as a product of Chinese nationalism, we argue that the term "empire" should be (re)understood as a global co-production, emerging from multiple intersecting histories and scholarly debates about those histories. Doing so challenges influential definitions of empire that rely on a distinction between empires and nation-states, highlighting their dual presence in both Euro-American and Chinese pasts (and presents). This move demands a rejection of periodizations that suggest that empires ceased to exist following the period of decolonization from 1945 to the 1970s. This opens up new avenues of historical and normative inquiry to acknowledge the modern continuity between empires and nation-states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on archival sources in Britain, Singapore, Malaysia, and the United States, this article explores late-colonial anxieties about the influence of Chinese nationalism in Malaya (and especially among students in Chinese-medium schools) in the lead up to self-government in 1957. It demonstrates that the colonial fear of communism in Malaya was not always synonymous with the fear of cultural influence from "new China" and that the "rise of China" in the mid-1950s was viewed as a challenge to colonially sanctioned programs for "Malayanization." More importantly, in exploring some of the ways in which the colonial state mobilized anti-communist cultural workers from Hong Kong to help counter the perceived threat from China, the article argues that more focus should be placed on the role of colonial agency in shaping "Sinophone" cultural expression in Southeast Asia during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay challenges the 'methodological territorialism' and 'methodological nationalism' prevalent in recent studies of imperial biographies, examining the role of the German Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1801–1851) in establishing a transnational form of free-trade imperialism in China. A native of Prussia and a missionary by training, Gützlaff was first posted in the Netherlands East Indies before associating himself with British interests on the China coast. However, his loyalty was not limited to one imperialist power. In the 1840s, Gützlaff promoted German trade with China, and at certain points of time he also supported American as well as Scandinavian interests. In addition to making a name for himself as a cultural broker and promoter of free trade and diplomatic representation, he also became involved with various forms of imperialism, from the more fluid commercial variant to the more formalised power structures of territorial rule. The case of Gützlaff therefore lends itself to a reflection about the permeable and shifting boundaries of empires. Moreover, it calls for a reassessment of German imperialism in the period before 1871, showing how Germany's involvement with 'Western' global expansion was palpable and not merely confined to the realm of colonial fantasy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perhaps the first thing to note about a forum on the subject of 1919 in Asia is how awkwardly the spatial frame of "Asia" maps onto the international history of that moment. To be sure, the postwar international conjuncture, which I have elsewhere called the "Wilsonian Moment," had a revolutionary impact across Asia, perhaps more so than in any other world region outside of Europe. As the three preceding essays in this forum note, that year was a waypoint, and sometimes a launching pad, for a rush of novel or renewed revolutionary discourses, connections, and mobilizations in China, India, and Korea, as it was in other parts of Asia and of the world. These were all propelled by the accumulated material and ideological transformations of the years of war, transformation that imbued the moment with revolutionary potential and gave contemporaries a sense that the international order, its power structures and its norms of legitimacy, were uniquely malleable, amenable to concerted action. Indeed, 1919 was a moment in which the very idea of "Asia"—its spaces, the identities they attached to, and the solidarities that ran across and beyond it—was reimagined in ways that at once stitched it together and rent it apart. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at Chinese nationalism in the 20th century and foreign imperialism in the country. Topics include writer Lu Xun's views on preventing the more advanced countries from exploiting China's corrupt culture in order to rule over our corrupt populace; seizure of the non-Han regions of the country by the Communists under Mao Zedong's leadership; and internationalization of China.

The present study investigates the episode of Hong Kong student movement in the 1960s to 1970s inspired by the charismatic idea of the Chinese Nation. Unlike most other cases of nationalist politics in colonial societies, Chinese identity politics in Hong Kong not only failed to challenge fundamentally the legitimacy of the British colonial state. It also did not proselytise Hong Kong people towards Chinese national identification and preoccupy Hong Kong society with the Chinese Question thereafter. Propitious colonial modernisation experience acting upon a diasporic population, which found it hard to establish meaningful rapport with the Chinese Nation, had attributed to the eccentric trajectory of Chinese Nationalism in Hong Kong. Local societal and cultural formations were then the eclectic solution to the ideational paradox of colonial modernity and Chinese Nationality in Hong Kong, which, however, remains problematic on its own, and connects closely with the lingering coloniality observed in this post-colonial society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities has long been established as one of the major contributions to theories of nations and nationalism. Anderson located the rise of national identities within a long-evolving crisis of dynastic conceptions of identity, time, and space, and argued print-capitalism was the key cultural and economic force in the genesis of nations. This article offers a critical appropriation and application of Anderson's theory through two steps. Firstly, it evaluates the conceptual underpinning of his approach through an engagement with recent scholarship on the ‘theory of uneven and combined development’. The fruits of this interchange provide a deeper analytical framework to account for what Anderson calls the ‘modularity’ of national identity, that is, its universal spread across the globe. Modularity is now reconceptualised as a product of combined development with its causal efficacy derived from the latent dynamics of a geopolitically fragmented world. The latter gave shape and form to the new national communities. Secondly, this revised framework is applied to the emergence of Chinese national identity in the late nineteenth century. This allows Chinese nationalism to be recast as an ideological amalgam of indigenous and imported elements that emerged out of the crisis-ridden encounter between Imperial China and Western imperialism in the nineteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Fascist Italy's 1935 invasion of Ethiopia and the League of Nations’ handling of the crisis resonated strongly in Nationalist China, where it recalled the League's failure to thwart Japan's claims to Manchuria in 1931. As these two crises unfolded, the League became a nexus around which Nationalist Party debates about the position of colonized and semi-colonized countries within the extant world order crystallized. Party adherents reflected on China's and Ethiopia's positions as independent nation states with limited territorial integrity or juridical autonomy, and assessed this situation in light of their respective League memberships. While party liberals continued to view the League as a flawed but worthwhile experiment in global governance, newly-emerged fascist activists within the party denounced it as an instrument for curtailing the sovereignty of weak nations. From these conflicting views of the League, it can be discerned how Nationalist disunity was partially grounded in disagreements over the nature and ideal structure of the global order, and how Chinese fascists agitated to escape from modern structures of imperialist domination while reiterating the latter's racial and civilizational exclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The idea of the nation has been considered to have delivered political modernity from its native Europe to the rest of the world. The same applies, though more implicitly, to those paradoxes inherent to the nationalist ideology - that between universalism and national particularity and that between liberal nationalism and imperialism. This article seeks to complicate these theses by looking at the interpretations of nationalism, imperialism, and cosmopolitanism provided by Liang Qichao, one of the most influential Chinese intellectuals in early twentieth century, during his exile in Japan when increasingly exposed to the encounter between worlds. This reading also engages with the wider debates on modernity/modernities in non- Western societies through showing that neither the 'consumers of modernity' approach nor the 'creative adaptations' approach can be easily applied here. I argue that the various tensions, contingencies and historical situatedness in Liang's accounts of the nation-state structure represent and constitute the paradox of the structure itself. They also shed light on contemporary debates about the limits of our political imagination in the misnamed 'global politics' beyond the false opposition between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The worldview as reflected in the textbooks of the People's Republic of China during 1949–1966 centred on Party-led nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. This article emphasizes both the continuities and changes in nationalist ideology during the Republican and Maoist periods. First, textbooks in Maoist China presented the imperialist powers as shifting away from Britain, Russia and Japan under the KMT government and towards the United States (since 1949) and the Soviet Union (since the 1960s), and emphasized class struggle. Second, the CCP had far greater control over the production of textbooks than the KMT. In this sense, the CCP truly carried out “partified” (danghua) education, a goal shared by the KMT which it never had the ability to achieve. In addition, “the language of Cultural Revolution” appeared with the outbreak of the Korean War. In other words, the education that cultivated revolutionary successors began in the early 1950s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the last three decades, a considerable body of English-language academic work has shed much light on Japan's empire-building project in Greater China during the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time, Japanese-language studies of the country's pre-war financial history have also grown in leaps and bounds. Yet, to date, neither body of literature seems to have fully examined what might appear to the naked eye as one of the critical pre-war junctures, where Japanese financial history converged on imperial policy and Chinese nationalist responses thereto.1 This paper will therefore aim to fill part of the gap by examining how the Yokohama Specie Bank, arguably the backbone of Japanese finance in China Proper, was affected by Chinese anti-foreign boycotts throughout the pre-war era (1842–1937). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Shanghai’s peculiar status between 1842 and 1943, its sovereignty degraded in key ways, meant that it gave sanctuary to, and spawned, a wide range of nationalist activity and counteractivity. This essay examines five different layers of activity that the city hosted, and spawned, and explores how they interacted, and touches also on their legacies. It outlines the three key factors that gave shape to the city and to its overt and covert political communities: space, law, and time (or the calendar). The essay explores the interplay of the physical and administrative realms that cut across the city, the restrictions they imposed, and the opportunities they opened up, and shows vividly how nationalism and the urban intersected in this site of multinational imperial power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Shih, Chih-yu. (2011) Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State Versus The Ego State. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00158.x This paper distinguishes and integrates national identity and national image through a deep role analysis. It argues that the meaning of China's rising rests upon the views of those who evaluate China's role playing. This role analysis mediates between international relations and Chinese foreign policy. It also mediates between China watchers and their China. The two dimensions of role-role taking and role making-generate four different discursive approaches to interpreting the rise of China, each in its own way associated with the affects of opportunity and threat. They are 'nation state,''civilization,''Tianxia,' and 'Asianism.' In response to the external view on the rise of China, Chinese narrators often take the Tianxia and nation state approaches as components of their conception of national role. These conceptions mediated by role-making and role-taking, evolve into four possible strategic focuses-national interests, imperialism, sovereignty and center-periphery. While this last strategic focus on role-taking has recently attracted enthusiastic response in China, it has been re-appropriated by social science concepts such as soft power and social capital that assume an egoistic role-making China is on the move. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent debates within and beyond Marxism around empire and imperialism focus on deterritorialization, but fail to see non-Western states as anything other than collaborators or victims. Highlighting the importance of center-periphery relations within the territorially bounded political space of the nation-state, this paper puts forward a new concept of the Postcolonial Informal Empire (PIE) to characterize the emerging powers of China and India. The greatest paradox of PIEs is that a postcolonial impulse—to critically appropriate Western ideas and technologies such as sovereignty, nationalism, and the free market to build the multinational state and combine it with an affirmation of stories of historical greatness and long existing, pre-Westernized, civilizational-national cultures—enables the political entities to consolidate and discipline their borderlands and reduce diverse inhabiting peoples to culturally different but politically subservient subjects. It is predominantly a nationalist politics, and not economic calculability or financial interests, that shapes PIEs’ center-borderlands relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the Houston Mount Everest Expedition of 1933, which resulted in the first successful air flights over Mount Everest. Rather than the story of the flights or their technical contributions, it focuses upon their political implications. Central to those implications was the project’s connection to Britain’s extreme right community. Several involved with the expedition were associated with Britain’s high imperialist, often pro-fascist, far right. Their participation in such a cutting edge project acts as one example of the modernist impulse of the far right tendency in the inter-war years. The expedition would provide an opportunity to use modern technology as a metaphor for national regeneration during a period when many saw Britain in steep decline. Some hoped it would make a strong statement to the indigenous people of that region. The flights were conducted in the spring of 1933 during the anxious debate over the future of India. To the far right, the idea of granting Indians even limited autonomy was abhorrent, and many hoped that such a feat of courage and technical prowess would convince Indians of British racial superiority and to abandon their struggles for independence. Others would interpret the meaning of the expedition in different ways, related to the extension of British power. The War Office was delighted with the potential for mapping any area of the earth and facilitating imperial control of contested territories. Still others on the far right were excited about the potential air survey and what air cargo would mean for the economic development of the Empire, linked to the extreme right dream of an autarchic imperial economy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 1892, Terrien de Lacouperie (1845-1894), professor of Chinese at University College in London, set out to prove that the Chinese migrated from Mesopotamia in prehistoric times. Despite mixed responses from his colleagues, Lacouperie's "Sino-Babylonianism" found its way into China and captured the imagination of Chinese historians from the 1900s to 1930s. Whether they supported or opposed Lacouperie's view, Chinese historians were intrigued by his boldness in linking early China to the global network of trade and cultural exchange. This article examines how Chinese historians adopted, transformed, and appropriated Sino-Babylonianism in their discourse on the nation. It argues that the rise and fall of Sino-Babylonianism coincided with the Chinese perceptions of the world system of nation-states. Sino- Babylonianism was warmly received when the Chinese perceived the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in temporality, prescribing a process of evolution that all human communities must follow. Sino-Babylonianism was fiercely rejected when the Chinese saw the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in space, characterized by incessant territorial expansion of imperialist powers. In both instances, Sino-Babylonianism was no longer what Lacouperie had proposed in the late nineteenth century. Rather, it was an important benchmark for the Chinese understanding of the modern global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The generally accepted narrative for the birth of the modern Uyghur nation suggests that a national ideal for the Uyghur people and the use of the 'Uyghur' ethnonym in the modern context were creations of Soviet bureaucrats in the 1920s that were later promoted among Uyghurs in Xinjiang by Chinese authorities with Soviet sympathies. This article challenges this view by drawing on Uyghur language sources, which demonstrate the agency of Uyghur intellectuals in the creation of the concept of a modern Uyghur nation during the early twentieth century. In examining the activities of Uyghur intellectuals in fostering a modern Uyghur national identity, the article emphasizes the role of anti-colonial sentiments in this movement, thus linking the Uyghur example to post-colonial scholarly arguments about the development of modern national consciousness among formerly colonized peoples around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Northern Expedition, Guomindang (GMD) policy makers balanced popular anti-imperialism with measures to improve foreign relations. Military pressures meant that top revolutionary leaders could not afford to engage both the warlords and imperialists at the same time, yet rapid advances excited anti-imperialist forces eager to destroy foreign influence once and for all. Opting for security and control, party chiefs restrained popular anti-imperialism. However, when British/warlord collusion produced signs of a Southern Expedition in late December 1926, top party heads released these restraints, encouraging anti-imperialist groups to assail foreign institutions, including the British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang. Although a great success, the move also caused Britain to initiate troop buildups. Facing new pressures, revolutionary leaders decided to dismantle revolutionary anti-imperialism. In short, mass anti-imperialist organizations were dissolved in April 1927 for practical political reasons that extend beyond factional conflict between the CCP and GMD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares Chinese nationalism of the 1990s with the historic beginning of modern Chinese nationalism in the 1910s and argues that they are two different nationalisms. While the post-imperial May Fourth nationalism of the 1910s arose in a poor and backward China to seek wealth and power for the nation, the 1990s saw the resurgence of nationalism rooted in China's late communist authoritarian prosperity. Following a Weberian framework to examine nationalism's connections with material interests, political power and cultural orientations, the paper finds that the Chinese nationalism of the 1990s reversed all the radical features of early 20th century developmental and cosmopolitan nationalism, as it defended the Chinese model of development, endorsed political authoritarianism, and sought sources of legitimacy and identity in traditional Chinese culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the symbiotic relationship between Chinese thinking on human rights and Chinese nationalism. It analyses the three key periods in the Chinese discourse on human rights: late Qing, Republican, and post-Mao. In each case, discussions of rights have often (but not always) taken place within a wider debate about the protection of China's national interests from foreign infringement, although the nature of the foreign infringement has changed over time. During the late Qing debate, with China increasingly threatened by foreign military imperialism, scholars argued enthusiastically for the introduction of a new system of democratic rights as a vital tool of national resistance. During the Republican era that followed, the threat from outside remained the same. However by now many theorists had grown disillusioned with democracy and rights, believing that the only way China could withstand further foreign encroachments was to withhold rights from its people. In the post-Mao debate on rights, the interests of the nation are again at the fore. But with China now an emerging rather than a collapsing power, rights are often analysed - at least from an official perspective - within the context of cultural rather than military imperialism, the new 'threat' from abroad. The article then examines the views of China's 'non-official' rights thinkers, most of whom tend to be much less affected by nationalist concerns and ends with an assessment of the prospects for democracy and rights in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of sports in China since the nineteenth century has been influenced to varying degrees by imperialism, nationalism, Maoism, and postcolonial thinking. This paper explores these ideologies from three angles: (i) Mao's early thinking regarding physical culture and sport; (ii) the development of sports under Mao's socialism and the Cultural Revolution; and (iii) China's breakthrough in the post-Mao era. In sum, sport remains connected over time with the idea of "imagined Olympians" and of a response to the "Sick Man complex." The advent of postcolonial thought has opened the possibility of more diverse understandings of sports in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary reflects on the contributions of the five principal essayists in this volume of Modern China. It seeks to grasp the role and weight of historical and distinctively Chinese factors in relation to global forces operating in China since the early twentieth century in these macroscopic essays. Building on their contributions, I develop a "globalization paradigm" in which the embeddedness of nations in global discourses and practices are often misrecognized as national and domestic. But while many national practices represent globally familiar reactions to recognized global tendencies, several of these essays help us to identify often unarticulated historical tendencies and emergent practices, including those from the Chinese socialist experience. They suggest ways in which Chinese and global practices become intertwined, as for instance adaptations of the Qing imperial idea to the current day. These practices not only make China different from other nations, but also have the potential to make a difference in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central element of the narrative circulated by the Tibet Movement has been that China has carried out genocide and practised colonialism in Tibet. These notions are, for the most part, uncritically accepted by politicians and the media, especially in the West. This essay challenges such characterizations as inept and as obstacles to resolving the Tibet Question. It looks at whether convincing empirical evidence of physical and cultural genocide in Tibet exists, in light of the most common understanding of such practices as rooted in efforts to destroy a people and its culture. The essay also considers what the contours of colonialism have been in light of its principal modern experience, that of European, US and Japanese colonization, and determines whether the Tibet case fits these characteristics. The essay concludes that a critique of China's policies and practices in Tibet would be best served by focusing on actual problems experienced by Tibetans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a brief history of the trajectory from imperialism to continental and global federalism. Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet-state in northeast China (1932-45), was the first full-blown instance of the "new imperialism"--an imperialism exhibited in the foreign affairs of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, rather than in those of the older European colonial powers. The new imperialism reflected a strategic conception of the periphery as part of an organic formation designed to attain global supremacy for the imperial power. These imperialist formations depended on a variety of nationalism that extends the benefits and pains of creating an integrated, globally competitive entity.

The article discusses various reports published within the issue including one about the histories of capitalism in China and South Asia, a paper on British imperial concerns about the impact of Chinese nationalism in Malaya, and a critique of Eurocentric histories of capitalism.

This paper investigates the efforts to exteriorise and communalise Hong Kong in the public celebrations marking the 1997 ‘handover' from British to Chinese rule. Using Bhabha's notion of the colonial stereotype, I document the importance of commodifying history and the fusion of both epitaphs to Empire and invocations of Chinese nationalism as twin forms of colonialism. The repetition of stereotypes is traced to a transnational logic aimed at marketing events to a global television audience. I conclude that the dominant representational reliance on repetition functioned to prolong the constitutive anxieties provoked by the handover, preserving them in the public domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]