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We all learn about the mistake of treating ‘nothing’ as if it were a term standing for something; but is it a mistake to treat it as an empty term, denoting nothing? We argue not, and we introduce ‘zilch’, defined as ‘the non-self-identical thing’, as a term which is empty as a matter of logical necessity. We contrast its behaviour with that of the quantifier ‘nothing’, and illustrate its uses. We use the same idea to vindicate Locke’s, Descartes’ and Hume’s handling of ‘nothing’, and we show how Heidegger’s ‘das Nichts nichtet’ comes out as logically true. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Presents comments on the essay "Plotinus," by L.P. Gerson regarding the philosophy of Plotinus. Overview of the intellectual milieu of the late Roman Empire; Discussion of imputation of scholastic anachronism; Recognition of multiplicity in either the physical world of the Nous.