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Highlights • Cash transfers increase farm production by 33.5 percent. • None of these impacts are channelled through transfer-induced changes in farm labour. • In fact, cash transfers have no significant impact on family labour supply or on demand for hired labour. • This implies that the productive impacts of cash transfers flow through other channels, different from the labour one. Abstract This paper has the double aim to study whether unconditional cash transfers have an impact on farm production and to look into the causal mechanisms through which government transfers produce productive impacts. We use mediation analysis to identify the total effect of transfers on farm production and to isolate the influence of the labour channel from other transmission channels. In particular, we analyze whether changes in farm production are caused by transfer-induced changes in the use of farm labour – either by reallocating family labour between off- and on-farm work or by changes in the demand for hired labour – or if other transmission channels are at work. We find that cash transfers have a sizable impact on farm production but they do not lead to increased use of family or hired labour on the farm, which implies that the productive impacts of cash transfers flow through other channels, different from the labour one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives. We examined the effects of market income inequality (income inequality before taxes and transfers) and income redistribution via taxes and transfers on inequality in longevity. Methods. We used life tables to compute Gini coefficients of longevity inequality for all individuals and for individuals who survived to at least 10 years of age. We regressed longevity inequality on market income inequality and income redistribution, and we controlled for potential confounders, in a cross-sectional time-series sample of up to 28 predominantly Western developed countries and up to 37 years (1974-2011). Results. Income inequality before taxes and transfers was positively associated with inequality in the number of years lived; income redistribution (the difference between market income inequality and income inequality after taxes and transfers were accounted for) was negatively associated with longevity inequality. Conclusions. To the extent that our estimated effects derived from observational data are causal, governments can reduce longevity inequality not only via public health policies, but also via their influence on market income inequality and the redistribution of incomes from the relatively rich to the relatively poor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the SB 535 greenhouse gas reduction fund meant for addressing challenges related to poverty and pollution in California. Topics discussed include impact of environmental conditions on low income communities, role of environmental policies in enhancing challenges for low income community and racism, and impact of climatic changes and pollution on low income communities of California.

This paper studies the Rwandan case to address some of the challenges and pitfalls in defining pro-poor strategies. The paper first looks at the danger of a purely growth-led development focus (as in Rwanda's first PRSP), and evaluates the extent to which the agricultural sector has been a pro-poor growth engine. It then studies Rwanda's current rural policies, which aim to modernise and 'professionalise' the rural sector. There is a high risk that these rural policy measures will be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. This paper stresses that the real challenge to transform the rural sector into a true pro-poor growth engine will be to value and incorporate the capacity and potential of small-scale 'non-professional' peasants into the core strategies for rural development. The lessons drawn from the Rwandan case should inspire policy makers and international donors worldwide to shift their focus away from a purely output-led logic towards distribution-oriented rural development policies. In other words, the challenge is to reconcile efficiency in creating economic growth with equity, and perhaps, to put equity first. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The plight of New York City's poor has been an ever-present problem. Their rapid increase accompanied New York's accelerated growth during the post-Revolutionary years. This condition, in turn, imposed new responsibilities for public welfare upon the municipal government. Public provisions for the relief of poverty in New York began with a provincial poor law of 1665-one year after the British assumed control of the colony. This measure and succeeding legislation of the colonial period, based upon the principles of the Elizabethan poor laws, made local communities responsible for their own poor and stipulated that taxation would be the source of relief funds. The economic and social dislocations produced by the American Revolution imposed obvious strains upon New York's local welfare system. Each year thousands of others came to depend on public outdoor relief and the city's charitable societies. As the number of publicly supported paupers rose, so did municipal expenditures for poor relief, which soon became the most costly item in the city's annual budget.