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This paper is the first in a larger project to estimate Congress-Administrator-President (CAP) scores, or ideal point estimates for federal cabinet secretaries, presidents, and members of congress on a common scale. In this paper, we present ideal point estimates for labor secretaries, presidents, and members of the Senate from 1991-2002. Two sets of estimates have been generated: (a) single-congress W-NOMINATE estimates with bootstrapped standard errors (Lewis and Poole 2004), and (b) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in a Bayesian framework (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Martin and Quinn 2003). Administrative positions have been constructed through a content analysis of congressional testimony in which an administrator expresses a position on a bill submitted to a roll-call vote in the current Senate session. Results indicate that most labor secretaries have ideal points distinct from their appointing presidents, questioning the assumptions of much of the theoretical literature on the executive branch. Also, using the CAP scores for labor secretaries and senators, we examine the effect of secretary preferences on the allocation of distributive policy projects. We find that the distances between the labor secretary and senators of the same party (Republican) in the 107 th Congress are directly related to the amount of labor department funding allocated to the senator?s state: the further the secretary?s ideal point is from senators of her own party, the less those senators receive in labor outlays. The implications are that the preferences of unelected officials have a direct impact on policy outcomes in Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]