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Comparative policy studies face a number of methodological challenges where conceptualization of the object of comparison-policy output-is the most fundamental. On the basis of three common approaches of the study of policy output, we reconsider this widely applied concept and propose a refined measure as a function of both density (number of policy instruments) and intensity (content of policy instruments). We theoretically derive six policy-intensity measures (objectives, scope, integration, budget, implementation, and monitoring), which are used for weighting national policy instruments on an Index of Climate Policy Activity. The article presents an empirical application of this measurement approach. Focusing on national climate policy instruments in the energy production sector in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom, we investigate changes in the countries' policy portfolios from 1998 to 2010. The article demonstrates that our Index of Climate Policy Activity provides a reliable and valid measurement for national policy output that can be applied for comparative analyses of policy output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany has reduced its emissions of greenhouse gases more than almost any other industrialized democracy and is exceeding its ambitious Kyoto commitment. Hence, it is commonly portrayed as a climate-policy success story, but the situation is actually much more complex. Generalizing Germany's per-capita emissions to all countries or its emissions reductions to all industrialized democracies would still very likely produce more than a two-degree rise in global temperature. Moreover, analyzing the German country-case into eleven subcases shows that it is a mixture of relative successes and failures. This analysis leads to three main conclusions. First, high relative performance and high environmental damage can coexist. Second, we should see national cases in a differentiated way and not only in terms of their aggregate performances. Third, researchers on climate policies should more often begin with outcomes, work backward to policies, and be prepared for some surprises. Ironically, the most effective government interventions may not be explicit climate policies, such as the economic transformation of eastern Germany. Moreover, the lack of policy-making in certain areas may undercut progress made elsewhere, including unregulated increases in car travel, road freight, and electricity consumption. Research on climate and environmental policies should focus on somewhat different areas of government intervention and ask different questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norwegian climate policy has been marked by several shifts with regard to adopted targets and measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Three knowledge-based discourses – respectively a tax discourse, a quota discourse and a technology discourse – have been influential throughout. By tracing the development of Norwegian climate policy from 1989 until 2008, it is shown, however, that while significant in early phases of policymaking, the discourses lose influence in the phase when policy solutions are designed and implemented. Those ideas and ambitions that characterise the ruling discourses in Norwegian climate policy are not necessarily materialised in actual policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A vast economics literature embraces taxation of the carbon content of fossil fuels as the superior policy approach for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, experience around the world suggests that carbon taxes face exceedingly difficult political hurdles. Federal experience in the United States and in Canada confirms this pattern. This article reviews sub-federal policy development among American states and Canadian provinces, a great many of which have pursued climate policy development. With one major exception, explicit carbon taxation appears to remain a political nonstarter. At the same time, states and provinces have been placing indirect carbon prices on fossil fuel use through a wide range of policies. These tend to strategically alter labeling, avoiding the terms of 'tax' and 'carbon' in imposing costs. The article offers a framework for considering such strategies and examines common design features, including direct linkage between cost imposition and fund usage to build political support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is first to provide empirical evidence of what can be seen as a rather remarkable change in EU’s position on the use of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading (ET) in climate policy, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards more of a frontrunner. The paper argues that there is a synergistic and multilevel mix of explanatory factors for this “U-turn”, including developments at the international, EU, Member State, sub-national, and even down to the personal level. Second, the paper explores and discusses the philosophy behind the Commission’s proposal for a directive on GHG ET. Third, the paper examines the prospects for ‘success’ of a scheme for EU-wide ET using a multifaceted set of metrics. In brief, we argue that output success—the chances for having a directive adopted—hinges on the resolution of two key issues. First, whether the preliminary phase is to be mandatory or voluntary, and second, incompatibilities with domestic ET schemes. Outcome success—steering and cost-effectiveness—will in turn depend on factors like the coverage of the scheme and inclusion of project-based credits, while more long-term political implications hinges on the successful adoption and operation of the scheme.“The Proposal on emissions trading represents a major innovation for environmental policy in Europe. We are de facto creating a big new market, and we are determined to use market forces to achieve our climate objectives in the most cost-conscious way […]. The emissions trading system will be an important cornerstone in our strategy to reduce emissions in the most cost-effective way”.Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstro¨m. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Official figures submitted in 2002 showing the trends of GH gases during the period 1990–2000 indicate that Spain is a long way from in attaining its commitments with the international and national programmes on climate change. Both structural and cultural factors are used to explain the evolution in climate politics and the growth of its emissions with particular emphasis given to the lack of public participation in this respect. It is also argued that Spain will have either to buy emission reductions abroad or/and find new ways to reduce GH in a more decentralised manner in tune with its current Autonomous Communities’ (ACs) political organisation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]