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The article focuses on the problems that judges face in dealing cases that involve national security and civil liberties in the U.S. According to the article, cases like these, judges find it difficult to come up with a decision because they have little experience with national security matters. Such cases, judges are relatively novices when it comes to assessing the possible implications of their decisions on national security. It is suggested that judges must be reluctant to judgements of military and executive officials because if they make mistakes they may harm not only the national security but also the long-term credibility of the judiciary itself.

How do the justices of the Supreme Court make their decisions? How does the Supreme Court of the United States make its decisions? The answer to these questions may not be the same. In studying judicial decision making, there has been a disconnection between individual and institutional levels of analysis. Lifetime tenure insulates individual justices and permits them to act on their substantive preferences. At the same time, the Court lacks the "sword and purse" and must rely on the other branches to fund or implement its directives. This study develops an integrative model to explain Supreme Court decision making. Using constitutional civil liberties and civil rights cases in the 1953 to 2000 period, conditions favorable to the attitudinal model, we find that institutional decision making is a function of attitudinal, strategic, and legal factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The critics understanding of a more limited function for the judiciary in constitutional interpretation appears to rest, however, primarily on a highly contestable conception of the point of having a written constitution in the first place. Although such a conception is not without merit, it must compete with an alternative and arguably superior understanding of the raison d'etre of a written document called a "constitution." The question is whether a Supreme Court opinion should be entitled to deference just because of its source and not necessarily because of its content or its persuasiveness, and thus even when it is not persuasive.

"When media act as a judge" Media play an essential role in the contemporary democratic state. One of their most important functions is that which consists on surveying the democratic legitimacy of judiciary. They are instruments of popular control over judicial decisions. However, while media are reporting "sub iudice" matters they might be persuading people to believe in the guilt of a person before being condemned. As a result, they might be violating rights such as presumption of innocence, defence and honour. Furthermore, a parallel or simultaneous judgement in the media might exercise a negative influence on the trial and injure the independence and impartiality of the judges and the jury. Finally, sometimes they might interfere in the judicial investigation. This article analyses the solutions that have been tried in our country and others in order to solve these conflicts between freedom of the press and the rules of judiciary. Needless to say, journalists have also formulated ethical rules and self-control private mechanisms to achieve this item. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the judgment of the case of Tonino Quadrelli versus Italy delivered on January 11, 2000. The European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6, Section I, which is the right to fair trial, of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Article 41, which is just satisfaction, of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 10,000,000 for legal costs and expenses.

In a judgment delivered on January 11, 2000 in the case of Alexandre de Almeida Garrett, Jos&eacute Mascarenhas Falcão and Others versus Portugal, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article I of Protocol No. I to the European Convention on Human Rights, which is the protection of property and that it was not necessary to examine complaints under Articles 6, 13 and 17 of the Convention. The Court further held that the question of the application of Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction) was not ready for decision as regards pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, reserved that question and invited the parties to inform it, of any agreement they might reach on the matter.

This article presents the case of News Verlags GmBH & CoKG versus Austria. It notes that the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10, which is the freedom of expression, of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant company 276,105 Austrian schillings for legal costs and expenses. It held that its judgment constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained and dismissed the remainder of the applicant company's claims for just satisfaction.

The article focuses on the impact of political campaign rhetoric on judicial independence in the U.S. Topics include accusations of judicial activism, the politicization of court judgments, and legislative and executive attacks on the federal judiciary. Information is provided on the impartiality of judges and the judiciary's role in the preservation of civil liberties in the U.S.

In a judgment delivered on January 25, 2000 in the case of Mohamed Slimane-Kaïd versus France, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of the right to a fair trial of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court awarded the applicant 20,000 French francs for legal costs and expenses.