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Risky decision-making (RDM) is when individuals make choices based on the definite cognition for the probabilities of the options. Risk is embodied in the certainty of reward, and the smaller the probability is, the greater the risk will be. As simulated in human behavior paradigms, RDM scenarios in real life are often guided by external cues that inform the likelihood of receiving certain rewards. There are few studies on the neural basis of RDM behavior guided by external cues, which is related to the relative paucity of the animal behavioral paradigms. Here, we established a cue-guided RDM task to detect the behavior of rats making a decision between a small certain reward and a large uncertain reward in a naturalistic manner. The reward of the risk option could be adjusted to observe the change of choice. Our results showed that: (1) rats were able to master the operation of the cue-guided RDM task; (2) many rats were inclined to choose risk rather than the safe option when the reward expectations were equal; (3) rats were able to adjust the decision strategy in time upon a change in risk, suggesting that they have the ability to perceive risk indicated by the external cues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral decision-making that are revealed when the numbers and ratio of lives to be traded off are varied, and when the probabilities of each outcome occurring are less than certain. Four studies examine participants' reactions to scenarios that diverge in these ways from the standard ones. Study 1 examines the extent to which people are sensitive to the ratio of lives saved to lives ended by a particular action. Study 2 verifies that the ratio rather than the difference between the two values is operative. Study 3 examines whether participants treat probabilistic harm to some as equivalent to certainly harming fewer, holding expected ratio constant. Study 4 explores an analogous issue regarding the sensitivity of probabilistic saving. Participants are remarkably sensitive to expected ratio for probabilistic harms while deviating from expected value for probabilistic saving. Collectively, the studies provide evidence that people's moral judgments are consistent with the principle of threshold deontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural systems are under deterioration due to ageing, mechanical stressors, and harsh environment, among other threats. Corrosion and fatigue can cause gradual structural deterioration. Moreover, natural and man-made hazards may lead to a sudden drop in the structural performance. Inspection and maintenance actions are performed to monitor the structural safety and maintain the performance over certain thresholds. However, these actions must be effectively planned throughout the life-cycle of a system to ensure the optimum budget allocation and maximum possible service life without adverse effects on the structural system safety. Life-cycle engineering provides rational means to optimise life-cycle aspects, starting from the initial design and construction to dismantling and replacing the system at the end of its service life. This paper presents a brief overview of the recent research achievements in the field of life-cycle engineering for civil and marine structural systems and indicates future directions in this research field. Several aspects of life-cycle engineering are presented, including the performance prediction under uncertainty and optimisation of life-cycle cost and intervention activities, as well as the role of structural health monitoring and non-destructive testing techniques in supporting the life-cycle management decisions. Risk, resilience, sustainability, and their integration into the life-cycle management are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: The prevailing perspectives and definitions of risk, at least in the engineering community, are based on probabilities. In this paper we argue that such perspectives and definitions are too narrow. The probability component of the risk concept should be replaced by uncertainty. By jumping directly into probabilities, important uncertainty aspects could easily be overlooked or truncated. In the paper we point at several extended risk definitions, and a formal structure for the various perspectives and definitions is developed. Fundamental concepts such as second-order probabilities and uncertainties are discussed. Examples are provided showing the importance of the choice of risk perspective in a risk assessment and decision-making context. The examples cover offshore operations, security and market price risks. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Psychologists and philosophers who pose moral dilemmas to understand moral judgment typically specify outcomes as certain to occur in them. This contrasts with real-life moral decision-making, which is almost always infused with probabilities (e.g., the probability of a given outcome if an action is or is not taken). Seven studies examine sensitivity to the size and location of shifts in probabilities of outcomes that would result from action in moral dilemmas. We find that moral judgments differ between actions that result in an equal increase in probability of harm (equal size), but have different end-states (e.g., an increase in harm probability from 25% to 50% or from 50% to 75%). This deviation from expected value is robust under separate evaluation, and increases when the comparison between shifts is made explicit under simultaneous evaluation. Consistent with the centrality of perceived harm in some models of moral judgment, perceived harm partially mediates sensitivity to location of harm probability shift. Unlike for shifts in harm probabilities, participants are insensitive to the location of shifts in probability of beneficial outcomes. They are also insensitive to the location of shifts in probability of analogous monetary losses and gains, suggesting an asymmetry between harm and benefit in moral reasoning, as well as an asymmetry between moral and monetary decision-making more broadly. Implications for normative philosophical theory and moral psychological theory, as well as practical applications, are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]