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This article uses the philosophical concepts of Henri Bergson (namely duration, intelligence, and intuition), in order to problematize ways of thinking about psychology, and how psychology produces knowledge. From this perspective, we discuss psychology as a scientific discipline and examine the differences between science and philosophy. In so doing, we deepen the understanding of the concepts of duration, time, and space, in relation to the logics of spatialized time which influence analysis in Human Sciences. We also discuss differences between ways of apprehending knowledge through intelligence and intuition, causing a change in the perspective from which we approach our objects of investigation. Finally, we propose a view of psychology in terms of duration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central thesis of this essay is that the problem of psychology lies at the very heart of the difficulties associated with integrating human knowledge. The startling consequence of this insight is that it means the solution to psychology's epistemological woes opens up a new pathway for achieving unified knowledge. A brief overview of the fragmentation of knowledge will be offered and special attention will be paid to Wilson's (1998) proposal. The problem of psychology, Wilson's failure to address it, and the reasons why it is integral to any proposal for unifying knowledge will then be specified. The article concludes with an articulation of how the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System solves the problem of psychology, resolves many of the fundamental issues associated with integrating human knowledge, and is commensurate with the foremost concerns of natural scientists, social scientists, and humanists, allowing for objectivity, coherence, and pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carlos Cornejo's book review on my Von Kunst bis Terror led me to the need to chart out a number of central issues in contemporary psychology that cultural psychology is in a position to resolve. Human subjectivity in all of its richness remains the core of investigation for all psychology, and cultural psychology has a central role to play in innovating psychology's research practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all empirical work in the psychology of perception has operated explicitly within a theoretical framework. But when it has, that framework has usually been provided by the inferential theory of perception. I argue that in spite of its explanatory strengths, the inferential theory of perception conceals a well-established empirical phenomenon. That phenomenon is known in ordinary parlance as 'familiarity'. I discuss why the inferential theory of perception cannot deal with familiarity and what it reveals about the limits of the inferential theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For centuries, philosophy and psychology in one way or another identified thought with logic, or logic with thought. Only in recent decades has it become clear that there is more to thought than logic. Evolutionary psychology has stressed the adaptive function of thought, as of other processes often identified as psychological. Gigerenzer et al. have worked for some years now on a program of research in which thinking is approached as an adaptive process. According to them, it is misleading to use the complexities of logic, mathematics or statistics as the standards for correct thinking or as a model for thought. On the contrary, thinking is the effective use of simple heuristics. The four volumes discussed in this review essay demonstrate that the approach can be very fruitful in many domains of human reasoning, and can be effective in practical problem solving as well, without having to fall back on the intricacies of logic, statistics, mathematics and other tools of the trade of scientific decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]