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Hermeneutics approaches the meaning of life quite uniquely: it grasps the intrinsic intelligibility of life by employing a universal concept of meaning, applicable to all phenomena. While other conceptions identify the meaning of life with values or scopes, hermeneutics starts from a grass-roots work on the meanings that are embedded at every level of reality. In this paper, I analyze this approach, especially focusing on Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer. First, I outline Husserl's philosophy of meaning as developed in response to the crisis of meaning. Second, I discuss Heidegger's concept of meaning and his understanding of life as self-movement. Third, I analyze Gadamer's concept of common sense (viewed as the grasp of the totality of life) and his idea of hermeneutic mediation that conveys the meaning of life itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we elucidate an alternative conception of the "end of human life" that Germain Grisez considers but never develops. We then defend this conception against two key objections. We conclude by explaining a few ways that this alternative conception of the "end of human life" is particularly important both theologically (e.g., for interfaith discourse) and philosophically (e.g., for understanding the traditional Christian conception of human nature and, hence, of natural law). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the practical utility of Albert Camus' existentialist philosophy, especially in the context of the contemporary effort to improve the condition of human life and existence in Africa. The paper is a departure from prevailing mindset among some scholars and people of Africa that nothing good can be derived from Camus' philosophy In particular, the paper argues that the task of socio-political and economic transformation in today's Africa has a lot to benefit from a critical and pragmatic engagement with the existentialist philosophy of Camus. The paper maintains that the practical benefit of Camus' existentialist philosophy appears most clearly in the value it assigns to revolt/resistance, and ideals of friendship, commitment, solidarity and brotherhood to solve the cumulative problems of life. The obvious lack of all this has exasperated the human condition in modern African states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Victoria Davion in "Itch Scratching, Patio Building, and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited" takes biocentric individualism to task, focusing in particular on my paper, "Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue." Davion levels a wide-range of criticisms, and concludes that we humans would be better off putting biocentric individualism aside to focus on more important issues and positions. Worries raised by Davion can be defended by elaborating on the position laid out in the original paper, including a background normative theory appealing to hypothetical virtuous ideal observers, upon which the position is drawn. Many of her criticisms appear to arise out of misreading or ignoring what is explicitly argued. When these misconstruals are corrected, it becomes clear that there is still space for a viable virtue of reverence for life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Heraclitus's linguistic method as a structural expression of his cosmological philosophy. Through an analysis of the various kinds of motion that Heraclitus describes, including the crucial motion between opposites, this essay delineates the meaning of 'everliving fire' as emblematic of his cosmos. The image of the synapse frames this analysis as it is simultaneously a motion and an expression uniting two poles; 'syn' also invokes Heraclitus's notion o f 'shared logos' as xynon, contrasted with human incomprehension as axynetoi. The divine principle of Zeus and his thunderbolt serve as a source of motion; these motions of fire govern not only the cosmos, but human perception and thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bulk of the account of perception that Aristotle offers in De Anima focuses on analyzing the operation of the five senses and the reception of their respective objects. On Aristotle's own terms, this analysis is an incomplete account of perception, for it does not explain how perception operates in the life of an animal, with the aim of supporting a certain kind of life. This paper aims to supplement the account of the five senses by considering perception in the context of human life. I argue that human perception, i.e., rational perception, differs from non-rational perception insofar as the latter is perspectival--that is, the non-rational animal perceives objects only in light of its needs and desires--whereas the former is non-perspectival--that is, a person perceives objects as independent of and exceeding her desires. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes life-philosophical lecturing, as developed by the author, as a form of performing art and as a positive, oral and non-directive philosophical practice that revitalizes the Socratic ideal of philosophy. Life-philosophical lecturing is explicated as a systems-intelligent technology of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, Tyson E. Lewis theorizes an alternative genealogy of biopolitics that enables us to historicize three distinct phases of the dialectic of life and death within overall transformations of the social and material relations of production. Freud, Marcuse, and Agamben each signal decisive transformations from death to life, life to death, and now the indistinction of death and life in a state of exception. In conclusion, Lewis argues for a new politics that does not simply champion one concept over the other but rather dwells precariously in their mutual exhaustion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that suicide is very important for Cicero's articulation and defense of the philosophical life. Happiness, according to Cicero, is dependent upon a willingness to commit suicide. I explain why this is the case through a discussion of On Ends and the Tusculan Disputations. I conclude with some critical remarks about Cicero's argument, with reference to book XIX of Augustine's City of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores whether resolving to "live like there's no tomorrow" would be conducive to living life to the fullest. While there is much to commend a life lived with a sense of urgency, I conclude that living like there's no tomorrow, in the final analysis, is neither advisable, nor realizable. In its place I suggest a life lived in mindfulness of the transitory and uncertain nature of our lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I will argue that Hegel's account of the category of life in the Science of Logic provides ontological grounds for the recognition of living species along with their various ecosystems as the proper objects of ethical regard for environmental ethics. I will begin by enumerating some of the salient problems that have arisen in the more well known theoreti. cal attempts to articulate human duties to nonhuman beings. Then after a brief discussion of Hegel's methodology and the justification for turning to his ontological account, I will explicate Hegel's ontology of life with a view toward these problems and issues, presenting my argument as to why that account is relevant to environmental ethics and deriving from it a normative framework that implies a duty to preserve species, habitats, and biological diversity. Finally, I will suggest how the Hegelian account presented here might circumvent the shortcomings of the previously discussed theories while accommodating some of their concerns and provide solutions for some of the problems to which they call attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is a critical examination of Rorty's argument against foundationalism, on which depends his view of the social irrelevance of traditional philosophy. I try to demonstrate the incoherence and speciousness of his reasoning against foundationalism and in the process refute his view that traditional philosophy is a tool which can and should be cast off from the public, and even from the private, sphere of human life and that its universal concepts can therefore be circumvented. This demonstration is accomplished in two complementary stages. First, I provide a general justification of my "argumentative" style in engaging Rorty's position against his objection to this approach, while showing that what he calls his strategy of "re-description" is really nothing but a form of logical argumentation. Second, I attempt to show how, in order to substantiate his rejection of traditional philosophy's claim of social relevance, Rorty's "re-description" of the motivation underlying traditional philosophy is no different from the strategy of unmasking that he has called into question as an instance of a radical or foundationalist critique. I show that, despite his protestations to the contrary, "unmasking" is precisely what—at least on a number of occasions—Rorty quite inconsistently does in demonstrating that the claim of social relevance arises from a form of self-deception engaged in by the traditional philosopher. I further show that the anti-foundationalist stance that defines his characteristic manner of extricating himself from such self-reference problems is based on faulty reasoning and lands him in a deeper incoherence. Since his depoliticization of traditional philosophy depends on the cogency of this anti-foundationalist view, I conclude that this depoliticizing project fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]