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Various conceptions of philosophy of education have been mooted over the last sixty years. The paper looks at five of these, associated particularly with R. S. Peters, D. W. Hamlyn, David Bakhurst, Philip Kitcher, and Harvey Siegel. It shows differences and sometimes overlaps among these, to do with whether or not philosophy of education should be seen as a branch of philosophy, as central to philosophy as a whole, or as a form of applied philosophy. The paper puts most weight on the last of these while recognizing the importance of work on the enculturation of young human beings as exemplified in Hamlyn's and Bakhurst's writings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the philosophy of ambiguity, associated with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir, provides a helpful framework for understanding the complex and paradoxical nature of old age outside the dominant categories of the "third" and "fourth" ages. Building on philosophical literature in cultural gerontology including that focused on the "art of living" and other approaches that draw on existentialist thought, it suggests "ambiguity" as a theme that has been overlooked in such literature. The advantage of this approach is that it can accommodate contradictory elements and thus underpin an integrated approach to old age. At the same time, in distinguishing between ontological and social dimensions of ambiguity, the conceptual framework offers a new perspective on ageism that can help clarify the distinction between ageism as oppression and the negative aspects of deep old age itself. The paper is structured as follows. After making the case for the value and importance of "ambiguity" as a framework for viewing old age, I set out the key aspects of this philosophy as found in the work of Merleau-Ponty and particularly Beauvoir. I then apply this framework to a discussion of 2 literary memoirs of deep old age, by Diana Athill and Florida Scott-Maxwell, respectively. I argue that the picture of old age that emerges contrasts with the hegemonic discourses enframed by successful aging and frailed old age and offers the possibility not only of a true appreciation of old age but also of a more meaningful life course itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sparse literature on the use of imperatives in research papers suggests that they are relatively common in a small number of disciplines, but rare, if used at all, in others. The present study addresses the use of imperatives in a corpus of upper-level A-graded student papers from 16 disciplines. A total of 822 papers collected within the past 5 years were analyzed for imperative use, with particular emphasis placed on the main text of papers from the five disciplines with the highest proportion of imperatives. In each of these disciplines, text-based interviews were conducted with faculty members to establish disciplinary contexts. Results show that imperatives are used frequently in physics, philosophy, economics, mechanical engineering, and linguistics, though in quite varying ways. The interview data suggest that successful and experienced student writers adopt the potentially 'high risk strategy' (Hyland 2012) of initiating a sentence with an imperative for various strategic purposes that are discipline-specific. Such insights have implications for writing instructors and materials designers in both L1 and L2 contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a 'manifest contradiction'. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indicative and subjunctive conditionals are in non-complimentary distribution: there are conversational contexts at which both are licensed (Stalnaker 1975 ; Karttunen and Peters 1979 ; von Fintel 1998). This means we can ask an important, but under-explored, question: in contexts which license both, what relations hold between the two? In this paper, I'll argue for an initially surprising conclusion: when attention is restricted to the relevant contexts, indicatives and subjunctives are co-entailing. §1 introduces the indicative/subjunctive distinction, along with a discussion of the relevant notion of entailment; §2 presents the main argument of the paper, and §3 considers some of the philosophical implications of the argument in §2. Finally, §4 argues that we can reconcile the equivalence of indicatives and subjunctives with apparently conflicting judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to clarify one of the deepest questions about the source or ground of normativity, while also presenting an essence-based approach to answering it. We call it the 'Arché Question.' Though all metanormative theories must address this question, very few realists have explicitly grappled with the challenge it poses; those who have appear to deny any need to give an answer. After critically discussing extant realist responses, this paper outlines an essence-based approach to answering the Arché Question that draws on theoretical resources forged in recent advances in post-modal metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine some difficulties with the argument presented as a topological sorites in Z. Weber and M. Colyvan, ‘A topological sorites’, Journal of Philosophy 107, 311–325. In particular, I suggest that the argument may be used to support the claim that sorites-type paradoxes cannot arise in a cohesive environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Departments of animal sciences must be relevant to a society in which a small number of people can raise almost all the food animal products needed. The declining number of people involved in animal agriculture has decreased enrollment of students interested in food animals in many departments of animal science. However, several departments welcomed students from a diverse background and began research on animals other than food animals. In many states, the undergraduate enrollment is made up primarily of students interested only in companion animals. A benefit of this is that we have recruited new students into animal agriculture and they have gone on to excellent careers. We have a new challenge now: how to maintain and expand the efforts in teaching, research, and outreach of companion animal science. Departments wishing to expand in teaching have examples of successful courses and curricula from other departments. Some departments have expanded their teaching efforts across their own university to teach about pets to a wider audience than their own majors; other departments can follow. In research, a small number of faculty have been able to establish extramurally funded projects on pets, including horses. But it will be difficult for more than a handful of departments to have a serious research effort in dogs, cats, birds, fish, or exotic animals. Departments will have to make a concerted effort to invest in such endeavors; joint ventures with other universities and colleges of veterinary medicine (or medicine) will probably be required. Funding sources for "traditional" efforts in nutrition, reproduction, and physiology are small and inconsistent; however, with the progress of the equine, canine, and feline genome projects, there should be opportunities from federal funding sources aimed at using animal models for human health. In addition, efforts in animal behavior and welfare can be expanded, perhaps with some funding from private foundations or animal-supportive organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the infinitude of nature's various forms, precisely what should we aesthetically appreciate? And supposing we come to achieve such discernment, how should we properly appreciate the aesthetic qualities we thereby find? To address these questions, Carlson has argued that the aesthetic appreciation of nature ought to be guided by scientific insight. In response, non-cognitivists have levelled criticism and suggested alternatives, yet Carlson's (2009) scientific cognitivism remains the best-argued approach to nature appreciation in the field. One non-cognitivist position that Carlson rejects—although much too quickly—is Berleant's (1985) engagement model. The purpose of this paper is to modify and revive that model. Specifically, I will argue that genuine engagement requires a particular form of disinterest. The result is a non-cognitivist approach to the aesthetic appreciation of nature, stronger than the extant alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plato's discourse on beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is distinctly apophatic in nature. Plato describes beauty in terms of what it is not (an approach sometimes referred to apophasis, or the via negativa). In this paper, I argue that Platonic apophatic practise in the Hippias Major and the Symposium depicts beauty as an ally to certain aspirations of philosophical discourse. In the first section, I offer some brief prefatory remarks on the nature of apophasis and its presence in Plato's thinking. In the second section, I provide some background to the dialogue of the Hippias Major and highlight the apophatic nature of the descriptions of beauty offered therein. In the third and final section, I discuss the Symposium , a dialogue within which, in addition to representing beauty apophatically, Plato illustrates how we may become able to achieve some positive, or cataphatic, insights into the nature of beauty. I conclude that the purpose of the Platonic apophatic portrayal of beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is to show that, while beauty cannot be reduced to a series of assertive truth statements, it can nevertheless function as an accessory to other dimensions of philosophical thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does 'remembering that p ' entail 'knowing that p '? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often 'vaguely remember' a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology (e.g. fuzzy-trace theory and simulationism), I will construct cases where the subject vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then 'remembering that p ' does not entail 'knowing that p '. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life acceptance and an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to reflect Fischer's ideas on vocational orientation and vocational choice as fundamental prerequisites for vocational education in the current German system of vocational guidance in general and vocational education schools. A special focus is placed on Fischer's view on the relevance of informed choice when choosing an occupation. In a first step, the reader will be introduced to the philosophical basis of German vocational guidance, namely, Beruf and self‐knowledge, as it is the foundation for understanding Aloys Fischer's thinking on vocational guidance. In a second step, key points of Aloys Fischer's paper 'Vocational Guidance and Vocational Counsellors' (1920) that relate to the issue of informed choice will be presented. Finally, as Aloys Fischer's ideas are reflected in vocational guidance in general and vocational education schools in Germany, the paper provides a brief discussion of informed choice—Fischer's central topic—from the author's German and contemporary perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'epistemic trespassing' has recently been coined to denote a person's judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number of distinctions, I argue that while intra-scientific trespassing testimony may seriously hamper scientific collaboration, it does not invariably do so and may even be beneficial to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As will be argued, once some basic features of our naïve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence between valid arguments and true conditionals makes perfect sense. The account of validity outlined here, which displays one coherent way to articulate the Stoic intuition, accords with standard formal treatments of deductive validity and encompasses an independently grounded characterization of inductive validity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A call for papers for a special issue of "Stand-Up Comedy and Philosophy" to be published in November 2020 is presented.

The article offers information on the calls for the submission of the paper for the periodicals. Topics discussed include submission of the paper need to be any philosophical treatment of environmental aesthetics and ethics; special papers of interest for the submission such as articles dealing with identifying aesthetic reasons, moral reason for protecting the natural environment; and articles dealing with aesthetic value structure our reasons for acting. It also invite papers related to aesthetic values conflict with moral values, and philosophers perception of the relation between environmental aesthetics and ethics.

The Exeter Book poem Judgement Day I has long been considered by scholars to be an inferior Old English poem, failing to reach the literary heights or vivid drama of Judgement Day II or Christ III. However, this comparison is caused largely by the presuppositions that the modern title imposes, rather than matters of content. This paper argues that Judgement Day I is not meant to warn about the Final Judgement but instead is concerned with the present time of the reader as a way to encourage contemplation of their present actions in order to safeguard their soul's future. To accomplish this, the poem draws on a psychological model of mind-body-soul primarily identified by Malcolm Godden, Soon-Ai Low, and Leslie Lockett. The presence of this psychological model has been previously noted by scholars in other Exeter Book poems such as The Wanderer , The Seafarer , and Soul and Body II. This study draws Judgement Day I into conversation with some of these poems and argues that its focus on safeguarding the soul for its final journey, or siðfæt , is a motif with which many of the Exeter poems engage. Judgement Day I can thus be read as a poem that engages with the themes of many other Exeter Book texts and participates actively in a larger poetic sequence throughout the manuscript. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing extensively on letters sent to me by him over fifty years, this paper tries to present a vivid picture of Paul Hirst in different aspects of his life. The first section covers the huge amount of work he did at the universities of London and Cambridge—in teaching and writing philosophy of education, high-level administrative university responsibilities, and involvement in national education policy. This is followed by a glimpse into his passion for music, especially opera. Final sections show him as an academic mentor and friend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized by proponents of the notion that grounding can be, indeed is, overdetermined. Moreover, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it that we ought to find concerning. Not only is the overdetermination apparently not problematic, metaphysically speaking, but that grounding is overdetermined is not problematic, conceptually speaking, either. From a small sampling of alleged cases, however, no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. And without an account of when a fact is technically overdetermined, we are unable to reasonably answer questions about the acceptability of that overdetermination either. In this paper, I attempt to understand when a fact is technically metaphysically overdetermined. I argue that such an exploration reveals that nothing as regards the overdetermination of grounding is straightforward, and that the phenomenon is deserving of much more philosophical attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the widely held view that 'good for', 'well-being', and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from 'simply good' as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to 'simply good'. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value 'good for' expresses is distinctively 'subject-relative'. One concerns the ground of this value, or the properties that make something good for you; it says these must involve some relation to you. The other concerns the resulting value itself, or what supervenes on this ground; it says that too involves a relation. Neither interpretation, the paper argues, yields a significantly distinct evaluative concept. The ethically fundamental evaluative concept is just 'simply good'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to classical theism, the universe depends on God in a way that goes beyond mere (efficient) causation. I have previously argued that this 'deep dependence' of the universe on God is best understood as a type of grounding. In a recent paper in this journal, Aaron Segal argues that this doctrine of deep dependence causes problems for creaturely free will: if our choices are grounded in facts about God, and we have no control over these facts, then we do not control our choices and are therefore not free. This amounts to a grounding analogue of the Consequence Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. If successful, it would have application beyond classical theism: similar concerns would apply to any view that takes our choices to be grounded in a deeper reality which is beyond our control. However, I show that the argument is not successful. Segal's Grounding Consequence Argument is so closely analogous to the Causal Consequence Argument that any response to the one provides a response to the other. As a result, if you don't think that prior causes (whether deterministic or indeterministic) undermine free will, you shouldn't think that prior grounds undermine free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the American Physical Therapy Association has upheld a code of ethics since 1935, the philosophical underpinnings of physical therapist practice have yet to be robustly explicated. Theoretical work in the field of philosophy of medicine can be engaged to study physical therapist practice. Modifying the phenomenological and teleological framework of Edmund Pellegrino, a physician and prominent bioethicist, the purpose of this theoretical paper is to particularize Pellegrino's philosophy of medicine to construct an internal morality of physical therapy. Acknowledging that the internal morality of health care professions is founded in the relationship between a patient and a health care professional, this paper analyzes the nature and telos , or end, of physical therapy through 3 phenomena of physical therapy—the fact of disability, the act of profession, and the act of physical therapy. This paper claims that, rather than medicine's clinical truth of a good treatment decision, physical therapy's clinical truth is a good process that capacitates patients. This relational approach to an internal morality robustly underpins a philosophy and ethics of physical therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that 'art', though an open concept, is not undefinable. I propose a particular kind of definition, a disjunctive definition, which comprises extant theories of art. I co-opt arguments from the philosophy of science, likening the concept 'art' to the concept 'species', to argue that we ought to be theoretical pluralists about art. That is, there are a number of legitimate, perhaps incompatible, criteria for a theory of art. In this paper, I consider three: functionalist definitions, procedural definitions, and an intentional-historical definition. The motivation for this pluralism comes from an analysis of practice, because the term is of apparent value to practitioners. However, a closer analysis of the concept reveals that, while disjunctive definitions help us to understand how we use certain terms (in other words, their pragmatic value), they lack ontological import. In sum, I attempt to glean lessons from the philosophy of science about the philosophy of art. If my analysis is correct, we ought to be eliminative pluralists about art as a concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptance comes in degrees and acknowledging this helps to resolve problems in at least two philosophical domains. Degrees of acceptance play vital roles when we simplify our reasoning, and they ground the common ground of a conversation if we assume context probabilism, i.e. that the common ground must be represented with probability spaces rather than possible worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the nature of academic judgement. It also suggests that academic judgement is not the special preserve of academics as such and is something with which students can be imbued. It is further suggested that academic judgement is best considered in the context of critical learning which is contrasted with demonstrative learning. The paper then proceeds with an analysis of judgement by considering the ideas of Peter Geach on this particular subject. It then moves to considering judgement in the context of a practice, as set out by Alasdair MacIntyre. Whilst providing insight into the nature of practical judgement, this approach is found wanting nonetheless and attention is next turned to considering judgement within the space of reasons – that is, the approach of John McDowell. The paper then suggests that the idea of the space of reasons can be given greater substance through consideration of two further kinds of judgement – epistemic and reflective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores ways in which Roland Barthes' discussion of the encyclopaedia provides us with resources for thinking about education and research practice today. What Barthes addresses in his essay 'The Plates of the Encyclopedia' is a particular encyclopaedia, the Encyclopédie produced by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, which was published in France between 1751 and 1772. This is commonly referred as the first of a form that we recognise as the encyclopaedia today. I begin with Barthes' analysis and critique of the Encyclopédie. Barthes, writing in 1964, engages with the Encyclopédie as an iconic product of its time, seeing it as conditioned by and, in effect, reinforcing a particular way of experiencing the world. Next, I consider ways in which a parallel critique is pertinent today. I explore some current examples of encyclopaedic form in relation to education and educational research. The purpose of this is to examine the interplay between particular cultural products and their society, in which not only certain types of knowledge but also a certain conception of knowledge are produced and reinforced. So, it will not be the purpose of this paper to provide direct analysis or critique of the Enlightenment, or to provide a historical account of knowledge. Rather, what I am interested in is problematising a particular understanding of language and knowledge that arises through these cultural products, particularly with regard to educational inquiry. This lays the way for thoughts expressed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in What is Philosophy? which, as I shall try to show, are of help in furthering the analysis of the dominant research culture's use of such products and in imagining the task of education and research differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the literature on mereology it is often accepted that mereological universalism entails extensionalism. More precisely, many accept that, if parthood is assumed to be a partial order (and, thus, the relevant theory of parthood is taken to be at least as strong as 'core mereology'), the thesis that every plurality of entities has a mereological fusion entails the thesis that different composite entities have different proper parts. Central to this idea is the principle known as 'Weak Supplementation' which many take to impose an important constraint on the relation of proper parthood. In this paper I argue that this claim is false as the principle that I will call 'Minimal Supplementation' appears to be capable of doing all the work done by Weak Supplementation but without entailing extensionalism if conjoined with universalism and core mereology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of philosophers uphold a metaphysical symmetry between time and hypertime, in this sense: in so far as hypertime exists, the nature of hypertime should agree with the nature of time. Others allow that we can mix and match the metaphysics of time and hypertime. Thus, it may be that time really passes, but hypertime does not or vice versa. In this paper, we provide a preliminary defense of the mix and match approach. We outline a number of arguments for the claim that time and hypertime must share a common nature and find them all wanting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Reuter, Seinhold and Sytsma (Analysis , 2019) put forward an implicature account to explain the intuitive failure of the pain-in-mouth argument. They argue that utterances such as 'There is tissue damage / a pain / an inflammation in my mouth' carry the conversational implicature that there is something wrong with the speaker's mouth. Appealing to new empirical data, this paper argues against the implicature account and for the entailment account , according to which pain reports using locative locutions, such as 'There is a pain in my mouth', are intuitively understood as entailing corresponding predicative locutions, such as 'My mouth hurts.' On this latter account, the pain-in-mouth argument seems invalid because the conclusion is naturally understood as entailing something which cannot be inferred from the premisses. Implications for the philosophical debate about pain are also drawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I defend a contextualist interpretation of authenticity in musical performance: we judge a performance as authentic not in respect of a stable set of requirements but according to contextually determined factors. This solution is the natural outcome of an independently supported ontological account of musical works: Musical Stage Theory. The aim of the paper is to give new momentum to the debate concerning the notion of authenticity and to challenge a monistic interpretation of authenticity: there is not one authenticity but many. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Underlying much current work in philosophy of imagination is the assumption that imagination is a skill. This assumption seems to entail not only that facility with imagining will vary from one person to another, but also that people can improve their own imaginative capacities and learn to be better imaginers. This paper takes up this issue. After showing why this is properly understood as a philosophical question, I discuss what it means to say that one imagining is better than another and then discuss the kinds of imagination training and techniques that might be employed in an effort to get better at imagining. The discussion of these techniques draws insight from consideration of other skills-based activities, as well as from consideration of the creation of art and our engagement with literature and poetry. Over the course of this discussion, we also gain further insight into the nature of imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to their locations, has recently been defended in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. One of the most powerful arguments in its favour is the so-called argument from harmony. There is a certain harmony between material objects and their locations. Necessarily, if material object x is located at a spherical region, x is spherical. Necessarily, if material object x is located at region r , any part of x is located at a part of r. Supersubstantivalism offers a straightforward explanation of such harmony. By contrast, dualism , the view that material objects are distinct from their locations, does not offer any explanation and should regard harmony principles as unexplained coincidences. In this paper I put forward a theory, which I shall call the 'Inheritance Theory', that does provide a straightforward explanation of harmony on behalf of dualists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A call for papers on philosophy and songs or singing is presented.

The article focuses on a fall 1926 incident involving Miriam Stephenson, a Lawrence College sophomore, who wrote a paper on George Bernard Shaw's 'philosophy and religion.' Shaw's response, a note calling her an "ingenious young liar" and suggesting a career in journalism, is examined. The topics include the incident itself, Shaw's unconventional response, and the implications for Stephenson's future, potentially in journalism.

The position of immoralism in analytic aesthetics and the philosophy of art holds that a work's moral defects can sometimes contribute to its artistic value. This position has suffered massive criticism in recent years. In support of immoralism, I present in this paper a new argument by examining immorality in the artistic genre of transgressive art. I argue that in the category of transgressive art, due to the nature of immorality that is a transgressive and liberating force against morality's authority, being immoral can contribute directly to an artwork's artistic value by contributing to the realization of its artistic aim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely agreed that reactive attitudes play a central role in our practices concerned with holding people responsible. However, it remains controversial which emotional attitudes count as reactive attitudes such that they are eligible for this central role. Specifically, though theorists near universally agree that guilt is a reactive attitude, they are much more hesitant on whether to also include shame. This paper presents novel arguments for the view that shame is a reactive attitude. The arguments also support the view that shame is a reactive attitude in the sense that concerns moral accountability. The discussion thereby challenges both the view that shame is not a reactive attitude at all, suggested by philosophers such as R. Jay Wallace and Stephen Darwall, and the view that shame is a reactive attitude but does not concern moral accountability, recently defended by Andreas Carlsson and Douglas Portmore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pain, failure and false beliefs all make a life worse, or so it is plausible to think. These things and possibly others seem to be intrinsically bad—no matter what further good comes of them they make a life worse pro tanto. In spite of the obvious badness, this is difficult to explain. While there are many accounts of well-being, few are up to the challenge of a univocal explanation of ill-being. Perfectionism has particular difficulty. Otherwise, it is a theory that has quite a lot in its favour. This paper proposes a new valuation scheme for perfectionism, the tripartite scheme, which affords perfectionism the resources to give a comprehensive account of robust bads and has further additional advantages for the view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper, we elaborate upon David Lewis' account of subject matter. Lewis' proposal is simple and elegant but lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis' but also includes an attractive characterisation of sentential subject matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the notion of pearl diving as a metaphor for historical methodology is explored as a possible conceptual contribution to pedagogical thinking and practice. Pearl diving in the thinking of Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin refers to a process of bringing to life and coming to terms with a fragmented past, and requires of the thinker a form of Homeric impartiality. This they contrast with the processual and functional modern understanding of historiography, where events and things are subsumed by a causal linearity. According to Arendt and Benjamin, our past cannot be understood as though in one piece, but should rather be engaged as fragmented and crystallised into events—or pearls—which can be retrieved and can help us to illuminate our past and to understand our present. This paper considers what such an approach would entail for pedagogical theory and practice, as well as for the work of the pedagogical thinker and the teacher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While some of Paulo Freire's readers understand his pedagogy as a rejection of any and all directive teaching methods, there are many scholars who do recognise Freire's emphasis on teacher directiveness in its appropriate form. In light of this tension between directiveness and dialogue, it seems that students of Freire must inevitably come to a crossroads: is Freire's pedagogy directive or is it not? However, even this question does not get at the more critical dilemma: if Freire's pedagogy is directive, is such directiveness incompatible with Freire's overwhelming emphasis on egalitarian dialogue? This paper establishes three readings of the issue of directiveness in Freire and ultimately provides an exegetical defence of what is termed the compatibilist reading—that directive teaching, properly construed, is compatible with dialogic teaching in Freirean pedagogy. The question this paper seeks to answer is how Freire can have it both ways. In sum, Freire undeniably supports teacher directiveness and philosophically justifies directiveness as compatible with problem‐posing education through his concepts of virtue education, utopia and criticality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If artworks and their aesthetic properties stand in constitutive relationships to historical context and circumstances, so that some understanding of relevant facts is involved in responding to a work, what becomes of the intuitive view that we see artworks and at least some of their aesthetic properties? This question is raised by arguments in both aesthetics and art history for the historical nature of works of art. The paper argues that the answer needs to take philosophy of perception into account. The principal development that has shaped philosophy of perception in the last thirty years—explaining perceptual experience in terms of contents that represent that such-and-such is the case—is directly relevant to key arguments for the historical nature of art because contents can represent complex kinds and properties. Conceptual realism is especially well-suited for explaining perception of artworks and aesthetic properties because it emphasizes that forms of understanding—in the sense of capacities, abilities and techniques—are involved in perceptual engagement with individual objects and instances of properties. To make this case, the paper examines influential arguments for the historical nature of art and aesthetic properties by Arthur C. Danto and Kendall L. Walton; and examines art-historical discussions by Michael Baxandall, Linda Nochlin and T. J. Clark. The paper argues that the aesthetic properties of an artwork depend on human intentional uses of properties, colours and contours among them, and such uses may themselves be aesthetic. The Wittgensteinian notion of use is contextual and historical, and uses are perceptible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]