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This article calls for gerontologists to engage with visual methods in qualitative research as an innovative tool for community-engaged research that has potential to advance social justice in gerontology. Reflections about using visual methods from the intersectional standpoint of the authors, 3 younger women of color, are presented. In Working the Hyphen , J. Yeh shows how interpersonal dynamics are fundamental to visual methods and that attention to identity can provide new insights into aging while also reconstituting existing power dynamics that researchers must carefully consider. In Employing Elicitation Techniques With Experts , L. Reyes discusses how a colonial lens limits understandings of civic participation and erases contributions of Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) older adults, proposing that elicitation techniques offer opportunities for BIPOC older adults to contribute their expertise to the research process and dissemination of findings beyond an academic audience. In Pedagogy and Practicality , H. S. Versey describes promises and complexities of scaling visual methods on multiple levels—teaching future generations of researchers the philosophy and practice of photovoice; negotiating university and community relationships through a service-learning project; and navigating identity between herself, her students, and research participants. In sharing our self-narratives, we integrate reflexivity into the research process and challenge power dynamics in knowledge construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to show how intellectualists can resist objections by contesting the idea that practical knowledge is difficult to transmit via testimony. It outlines examples which suggest that the practical knowledge attributed by knowledge-how-to ascriptions is difficult to relay through testimony. The difference between practical knowledge and knowledge-that is explained.

The essay seeks to situate a nai¨ve realist account of visual experience within the framework of German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Topics covered include the argument that this view is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects, and the conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant.

Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular action is intelligent depends, in part, on whether it was produced by an exercise of skill. These claims promote a picture of intelligence that is in tension with a strongly intellectualist picture, though they are not in tension with a number of prominent claims recently made by intellectualists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We all learn about the mistake of treating ‘nothing’ as if it were a term standing for something; but is it a mistake to treat it as an empty term, denoting nothing? We argue not, and we introduce ‘zilch’, defined as ‘the non-self-identical thing’, as a term which is empty as a matter of logical necessity. We contrast its behaviour with that of the quantifier ‘nothing’, and illustrate its uses. We use the same idea to vindicate Locke’s, Descartes’ and Hume’s handling of ‘nothing’, and we show how Heidegger’s ‘das Nichts nichtet’ comes out as logically true. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The interplay of introduction and elimination rules for propositional connectives is often seen as suggesting a distinguished role for intuitionistic logic. We prove three formal results concerning intuitionistic propositional logic that bear on that perspective, and discuss their significance. First, for a range of connectives including both negation and the falsum, there are no classically or intuitionistically correct introduction rules. Second, irrespective of the choice of negation or the falsum as a primitive connective, classical and intuitionistic consequence satisfy exactly the same structural, introduction, and elimination (briefly, elementary) rules. Third, for falsum as primitive only, intuitionistic consequence is the least consequence relation that satisfies all classically correct elementary rules. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author discusses the two approaches to the paradox of knowability or the Church-Fitch argument, including denying that knowledge distributes over conjunction and moving to a typed logic. He argues that neither of the approaches works. He further argues that a Church-Fitch argument can be run with an assumption weaker than distribution of knowledge over conjunction. He adds that a modified Church-Fitch argument can be constructed in a typed logic.

The article discusses the concept behind knowledge from falsehood (KFF). It cites the examples given by author T. Warfield on inferential knowledge based on falsehood. Warfield argues that the resistance strategies considered in KFF cases will not succeed. The author argues that an inferential knowledge is counterfactually dependent on the falsity of a relevant premise.

Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at things. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the authors' views on David Rosenthal's concept of mental ownership. Rosenthal has argued that the proper way to characterize mental ownership is being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. It details Rosenthal's objection to the authors' distinction between conscious presence and mental ownership.

In philosophical logic necessity is usually conceived as a sentential operator rather than as a predicate. An intensional sentential operator does not allow one to express quantified statements such as 'There are necessary a posteriori propositions' or 'All laws of physics are necessary' in first-order logic in a straightforward way, while they are readily formalized if necessity is formalized by a predicate. Replacing the operator conception of necessity by the predicate conception, however, causes various problems and forces one to reject many philosophical accounts involving necessity that are based on the use of operator modal logic. We argue that the expressive power of the predicate account can be restored if a truth predicate is added to the language of first-order modal logic, because the predicate 'is necessary' can then be replaced by 'is necessarily true' We prove a result showing that this substitution is technically feasible. To this end we provide partial possible-worlds semantics for the language with a predicate of necessity and perform the reduction of necessities to necessary truths. The technique applies also to many other intensional notions that have been analysed by means of modal operators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russell's version of the multiple-relation theory from the Theory of Knowledge manuscript is presented and defended against some objections. A new problem, related to defining truth via correspondence, is reconstructed from Russell's remarks and what we know of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory. In the end, understanding this objection in terms of correspondence helps to link Russell's multiple-relation theory to his later views on propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James Conroy's Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Imagination, Education and Democracy implies three main aims: first, to celebrate aspects of imagination in education and politics; second, to challenge defensive closure in varieties of discourse, especially in the language of economic and monetary management in education and politics; and third, to open up, for reciprocal enrichment, situations and discourses pertaining to consideration of state funding for religiously affiliated schools. Liminality, characteristic of thresholds and borders, calls for interpretation and mediation, as well as appreciation of uncertainties. Liminality of imagination is explored in contexts associated with this third aim, but also in other kinds of context associated with the first two aims. As well as offering critical assessment of the book, this review article indicates some scope for interpretation and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to Hoeltje I concede the main point of his first section: for each logical truth S of the object language, it is a logical consequence of the Davidsonian theory of meaning I offered in my paper that S is logically true, contrary to what I asserted in the paper. However, I now argue that a Davidsonian theory of meaning may be formulated equally well in such a way that it not a logical consequence of the theory that S is a logical truth. Nonetheless, the revised theory of meaning will still ‘entail’ in a wider sense that S is a logical truth, for we can prove by induction on the consequence class of the revised theory that S is a logical truth. So far, my disagreement with Hoeltje is over the more charitable interpretation of a passage from Davidson. I close by arguing that Davidson was mistaken on one point, a theory of meaning will entail a threefold distinction among the sentences of the object language, not a two- fold distinction as he claimed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines a case wherein there are beings whose mental capacities are infinite in two respects. Ability of the beings to be able to bear in mind infinitely long linguistic items and to hold infinitely many linguistic items before their minds; Argument that in combining the abilities, they are capable of reasoning with infinitely many, infinitely long linguistic items.

Studies J. Stanley and T. Williamson's argument that the all know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Argument that Stanley and Williamson's paper is a defense of Intellectualism, which is a well-entrenched framework for the study of mind, especially in linguistics and developmental psychology; Suggestion that Intellectualism was and is a response to Behaviorism; Stanley and Williamson's reevaluation of G. Ryle's attack on what he called "the intellectualist legend".

It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such reasons are of the wrong kind. This is what I set out to do, after illustrating the objection more thoroughly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the anxieties being expressed in the UK and elsewhere about the lack of impact that philosophy now has on education are nothing other than the inevitable manifestation of a fundamental intellectual disorder deeply rooted in our contemporary understanding of the philosophy of education. In trying to substantiate this claim, the paper offers an historically informed philosophical analysis of how philosophy is related to education and education to philosophy that concludes by clarifying how any debates about the current problems and future development of the philosophy of education ought to proceed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frege attempted to provide arithmetic with a foundation in logic. But his attempt to do so was confounded by Russell's discovery of paradox at the heart of Frege's system. The papers collected in this special issue contribute to the on-going investigation into the foundations of mathematics and logic. After sketching the historical background, this introduction provides an overview of the papers collected here, tracing some of the themes that connect them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Syntax precedes truth-theoretic semantics when it comes to understanding a logical constant. A constant in a language is logical iff its sense is entirely constituted by certain deductive rules. To be sense-constitutive, deductive rules governing a constant must meet certain conditions; those that do so are sense-constitutive by virtue of understanders' conditional dispositions to feel compelled to accept certain formulae. Acceptance is a cognitive formula-attitude. Since acceptance requires understanding, and a formula can contain more than one occurrence of logical constants, this account involves a ‘local holism’, but no circularity. I argue that no logical constant is ambiguous between a classical and a constructive sense; but I allow that one constant may have distinct classical and constructive ‘semantic values’. A logical constant's sense helps to determine its semantic value, but only together with certain constraints on satisfaction and frustration; it seems that the latter must include ‘convention T’-style schemata. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that a prima facie plausible, uniform way of solving the logical paradoxes fails. The proposed solution starts from the observation that in many cases the proof of the contradiction which is the paradox, goes via the proof of an assertion. This suggests that a uniform way of avoiding the paradoxes is to reject the reductio principle. This move, perhaps not so plausible at first, gains strength from many considerations. The reductio principle is, under weak assumptions, equivalent to the law of excluded middle.

The symbols 0 and P are well established in the literature of deontic logic as signifying respectively the operators `obligatory' and `permissible'. There is not, however, agreement on theft syntactic function in deontic wffs. For though there is general agreement in treating them as sentence-forming operators, several suggestions have been made concerning the kinds of expression upon which they may operate. In his pioneering 1951 paper author G. H. von Wright treats them as operating on what be calls "names of acts", such expressions as `theft' and `murder', though not on names of instances of these. Thus OA symbolises. "The act named by A is obligatory'.

Examines the logic of evaluation. Various evaluative procedures; Factor that supports evaluative judgments; General logical form of evaluative argument; Reasons why there is a wide divergence of analyses of evaluative logic; Main accounts of the logical status of evaluative statements.

The article discusses Rene Descartes' ideas and theories on "thought". In his "Second Meditation," Descartes questions himself as a living being, the need for identification. Accordingly this leads to doubting and understanding as being kinds of thinking. Feeling is meant to be different from thinking. Awareness was also included as apart of thought. Intellectuals like J.S. Mill also took perceiving as a part of thinking. In Descartes' views cogitatio is intellctualistic and cognitive, with a reflective mental act involved.

The notion of common knowledge is of interest because it raises problems about the complexity of the cognitive states which one can sensibly attribute to finite self-conscious creatures when they confront one another. Common knowledge is of interest also because we need to invoke it in explaining the rationality of certain actions, namely those co-operative enterprises of which many conventional social practices, including language, seem to be examples. In what follows nothing hangs on the use of the word knowledge in the phrase common knowledge. The account one seeks is to be of a structure which can accommodate the mediaeval "common knowledge" that the Sun circles the Earth. What is primarily at issue is the nature of the propositions people can entertain, the routes of perception and inference by which they might come to have confidence in those propositions and the manner in which theft beliefs contribute to justifying their actions.

Argues against the claim that the conclusion, moral judgments cannot be hypothetical imperatives, is an unquestionable truth. Character of necessity associated with moral considerations; Distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives; Elements of moral considerations which give them their special status.