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Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his government have implemented bold defence, diplomatic and economic policies against the challenges to the status quo order posed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and increased Chinese assertiveness. What do these policies unveil about Japan's strategy and response to the transformed strategic environment? This article argues that the Kishida government has upgraded Japan to a front-line guardian of the status quo order. To achieve its front-line role, the Kishida government has consolidated Japan's deterrence policy, namely focusing on two main pillars—military and rules. To ensure Japan's frontline role is sustainable, this policy paper makes three recommendations: Japan must develop strategic clarity and clear operational plans on how to respond to a regional contingency, such as the Taiwan Strait; Japan must resolve domestic problems that prevent the increase in defence spending to 2 per cent in the period to 2027. Japan's role as a front-line state to protect the status quo order is very much dependent on the availability of resources that would be provided by this increase in defence spending; Japan should re-energize its efforts towards east Asia through a sustained diplomatic, economic and security means. This is important in securing support for Japan's preferred vision of regional and global order from not only like-minded partners and friends in east Asia, but also China. Japan's approach should underscore how the extant status quo order benefits all states, including China, especially in terms of spreading economic prosperity, development and connectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China's economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers' concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]