1. Tax Policy Centralization and Veto Players: Argentina and Brazil in the 1980's & 1990's.
- Author
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Irizarry Osorio, Hiram José
- Subjects
- *
FISCAL policy , *TAXATION , *POLITICAL science - Abstract
This paper provides an explanation of changes in tax policy centralization taking the Argentine and Brazilian experiences during the 1980s and 1990s as the cases of analysis. We make use of two different measures of centralization: central government taxation weight and level. The former gauges the relevance of the central government with respect to the total amount of taxes collected; while the latter gauges at the capacity of the central government to collect taxes with respect to the economy as a whole. We base our explanation on a contingent application of veto players theory. This paper scopes the differential advantage, but not exhaustion, of central governments and partisan leverage in taxation matters in Argentina and Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s. It underscores the complexity of the subject of study and becomes suspect of automatic a priori expectations. Therefore, it strives to underscore relevant interaction and contingent characteristics (e.g., partisan alignment, discipline, and strength and leadership characteristics) embedded within a general theoretical framework. We demonstrate that a reduction in the number of veto players occurred in Argentina (1989) and Brazil (1986-88), which help us explain the concurrent behavior in taxation in both cases. Thus, by underscoring the prevailing interests during the reform events, executive-central government (Argentina) vis-୶is legislative-sub-national governments interests (Brazil), we are able to explain the greater Brazilian decrease weight-, but greater Argentine increase level-wise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2005