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This paper attempts to understand how and why China has been portrayed as the primary military threat in Taiwanese security discourse through an examination of offence-defence theory. It is based on the premise that those events or factors that one identifies as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. The paper first introduces the protracted debate among the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, the 'Pan-Blue' opposition parties and US officials and analysts over the 2004 Special Defence Budget controversy. In defence of its arms procurement program, the Chen Shui-bian administration resorted to a particular mode of interpreting danger, that is, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in China's favour and thus it is imperative to correct the imbalance through fielding the weapons systems provided by Washington. The paper then explores the underlying assumption of that pervasive interpretation in the official articulation of Chinese military threat in Taiwan and the United States, which holds that offensive advantages make war more likelyâ??a principal hypothesis of offence-defence theory. Rather than questioning the methodological ambiguities about how to define and measure the 'offence-defence balance', the paper argues that it is precisely these ambiguities that make China's threat image in Taiwan possible. The special budget case is indicative as to how Taiwan's defence policy is better understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of a peace-loving Taiwanese identity contrary to the belligerent Chinese than as an instrument to build and maintain a capable defence posture against potential attacks from the mainland. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of economic sanctions in Taiwan's decision to reverse its nuclear weapons efforts. Sanctions have long been derided as an ineffective tool of foreign policy, particularly in "high politics" issues such as nuclear weapons programs. Contrary to the prevalent view, in this paper I demonstrate that economic sanctions led to nuclear reversal in Taiwan through the "compellence" mechanism. Drawing on the literature on coercive diplomacy, the paper concludes that Taiwan's dependence on the United States for its very survival facilitated successful US coercion to reverse its nuclear weapons program. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the United States remained interested in Taiwan’s security in the post-Cold War era? Recent critiques of the American military presence in East Asia maintain that Washington developed an imperial mindset with respect to the region during the Cold War, a perspective that sustained interest in forward deployment following the Soviet Union’s demise. As an American Cold War ally, Taiwan was naturally included in this neo-imperial project. In this paper, I offer an alternative view, focusing on two critical episodes in the history of U.S.-Taiwan relations: the Sino-American normalization negotiations in the late 1970s and the confrontation over Taiwan in the mid-1990s. Drawing upon historical materials as well as interviews with key U.S. officials from the Carter and Clinton administrations, I argue that the U.S. has refused to abandon Taiwan as a result of interests created through several decades of close interaction. Moreover, rather than sustaining U.S. hegemony in East Asia, the American relationship with Taiwan has seriously complicated Washington’s pursuit of broader strategic goals in the region. Accordingly, notwithstanding recent interest in American empire among neo-conservatives, the persistence of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan reflects the long history of close association more than neo-imperial ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

Study will determine the external and internal influences on the Eisenhower adminstration in its making of U.S. policy toward Tibet. Using the Kegley-Wittkopf model, research will focus on foreign influence from external sources such as China, India, Taiwan and the Tibetans themselves. Internally, the study will determine which governmental, societal, role and individual sources influenced Eisenhower in determining policy outcomes. It is hoped that the study will further illuminate U.S. foreign policy deliberations and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study that attempts to understand American military posture in East Asia within the context of a U.S.-Japan-China-South Korea-Taiwan pyramid, where the U.S. plays the role of benign leader at the apex. It explores some military arrangements contemplated by the U.S. It examines five official documents made to the public since the inauguration of U.S. President George W. Bush including the "Quadrennial Defense Review Report."

The article looks at the future of cross-strait relations after the election of fourth-generation leaders in China in 2002. It cites that China has adopted a cool dealing strategy toward Taiwan after Chen Sui-bian was elected President in 2002 and condemned the defensive referendum proposed by the president. It argues that maintaining status quo in Taiwan Strait is the key to pursue the stability and peace in the strait. It explains the factors that resulted to the conflict in Taiwan Strait and the role played by the U.S. concerning the issue.

The article focuses on preventing tension in the Taiwan Strait. It cites that an outbreak of military conflict in the channel would have consequences for regional stability and the global economy. The first security priority for the second term of U.S. President George W. Bush will be preventing the conflict due to changing status quo as well as increasing urgency. One of the reasons why Taiwan is of considerable significance to the U.S. is that U.S. support for Taiwan is closely tied to U.S. interests in fostering newly established democracies.

The episode of Chen Shui-bian transit diplomacy bypassing the United States and his earlier decision to put the National Unification Council and Guideline into abeyance in 2006 had put Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship into serious tests. It remains to be seen if Taipei's most recent steps of renaming some state-owned enterprises may escalate into tensions as before. While Chen's New Year address and state visit to Nicaragua via US homeland in 2007 caused little problem for the State Department, the PRC's discontent remained evident. It was against this backdrop that the paper was proposed.This paper examined the role the US played in the institutionalization of the status quo across the Strait from a sociological new institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way did the United States help institutionalize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how did the US act through "cross-Strait peaceful co-development" institution to shape the interest or identity of Beijing and Taipei?It was maintained that there existed an ongoing institutionalization process through which the US constructed the status quo that was supported with varying degree by Beijing and Taipei. The three joint communiqués and the TRA could be seen as setting the first stage of institutionalization through formal codification which emphasized the peaceful process in any attempt for final resolution by both sides. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the CSPCD institution by the Americans, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. They normally uphold such core values as "prosperity," "stability" or "peace," and help sustain the regulative, normative or cognitive elements of the CSPCD institution. The main purpose is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, interests or identity of Beijing and Taipei. It was also argued that although the detailed record of what the institution has achieved was certainly mixed, there appears to be an overall tendency for Beijing and Taipei not to incessantly challenge the status quo. As such, it might be concluded that the institutionalization of status quo was considerably effective, though not completely successful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on Chinese foreign policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula and the consequences of these policies for Asia-Pacific security. Northeast Asia is a strong-hold of the US alliance system and China's near abroad, thus affecting China's influence on global security. If China cannot accommodate the region into its overall foreign policy strategy, its suggestions for a post-Cold War security order are likely to appear unconvincing to the international community. The paper emphasizes the weaknesses inherent in China's contemporary foreign policy strategy, thereby pointing to the possibility that China might fall into the rank of secondary powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we will examine U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. Much empirical evidence showed that the policy toward the Taiwan Strait slightly changed during Bush?s first term. After elaborating the subtle change of U.S. policy, we will attempt to interpret such change from the modified structuralism perspective. Different from neo-realist?s assumption of international anarchical status, we adopt neoliberalist?s view of international institutions existing in the international system. However, we don?t agree with the neoliberalist?s assumption that states seek their absolute interests. Instead, we accept neorealist?s survival prerequisite for states. Therefore, we identify the world as a hierarchical system and states seek their relative gains in this system. We further set the hierarchical system into two levels, the higher one and the lower one. According to Waltz?s structural theory, we claim only strong powers can have the capability to play on the higher level, while weak states are staying on the lower level of the international system. Any great power is gaming with other great powers on higher level and with weak states on lower level. Through such interactions on two levels, the great power can get interests from both. However, if the interests from the higher level are in conflict with those from the lower level, the great power, weighing its great power counterparts over the weak states, will discard the interests from the weak states. Our testing scenario centers the U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. To fit this model, the U.S. and China are two powers staying on the higher level and Taiwan stays on the lower level. Previously, the U.S. were trying to get interests from both levels and keeping the ?double track? policy. However, two events change the balance among the three players: 9/11 attack and Taiwan?s independent referendum. These events lead to a conflict of the interests from China and Taiwan and the previous ?double track? policy does not work well. Thus, in order to keep interests from the higher-level partner -- China, the U.S. chooses the strategy to sacrifice its lower-level interests from Taiwan by stopping Taiwan?s willing of independence behind the referendum. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite repeated U.S. claims that its policy toward relations across the Taiwan Strait is ?consistent? and ?clear,? in actuality its policy has long been one of ?strategic ambiguity.? It is widely recognized by scholars and policy-makers alike that the so-called Taiwan question is the most potentially explosive issue in U.S.-P.R.C relations.What is the strategic ambiguity policy all about? What role has it played in influencing the equilibrium outcomes of cross-Strait relations in the past three decades? How are the dynamics of the ?strategic triangle? consisting of the United States, Mainland China and Taiwan to be understood? How effective in preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait is U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity likely to be in the future? Few studies, if any, have provided theoretical answers to these questions. This paper tries to develop a game theoretic model which may provide tentative answers to these interesting, unresolved questions. Supporters of the ?strategic ambiguity? policy argue that it has successfully kept the Strait free of conflict: on the one hand, Mainland China always has to take into account the possibility that the United States might intervene if it were to attack Taiwan, and on the other hand, Taiwan always has to think twice before ?going too far? (such as declaring formal independence from the mainland). The policy, it is said, has served U.S. national security interests and has effectively accommodated changes in cross-Strait relations in past decades. There are opposing opinions, however. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have rendered one of the major imperatives for a U.S.-China rapprochement and compromises on Taiwan?the basis of the strategic ambiguity policy?obsolete. Moreover, the democratization of Taiwan and the increasing military threat if faces, such as the deployment of missiles by Mainland China aimed at Taiwan, have brought new variables into the equation. Taiwan?s thriving democracy has added ideological values and moral imperatives to the U.S. commitment of defending the island. The increasing military threat from Mainland China, meanwhile, seems to have strengthened the argument for an increasing commitment to Taiwan?s defense, either in the form of more military sales or coordination between U.S. and Taiwan militaries. A continuing ambiguity in U.S. policy, so the arguments goes, will encourage PRC militancy and frustrate Taiwan?s determination to resisting aggression, and may be prone to disrupt the delicate equilibrium. Above all, it seems to compromise the U.S. moral imperative of defending democratic values.Our model shows that the policy of strategic ambiguity helps preserve the status quo and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The strategic ambiguity policy is a defensive strategy in nature, well-suited at deterring both Mainland China and Taiwan from deviating from equilibrium strategies. In the long run, the strategic ambiguity policy, however, needs to be supplemented, if not replaced, by more imaginative policies in order to successfully manage the Taiwan issue. For example, the United States could be more forthright in proposals that help to eliminate potential conflicts of interest, such as proposing that Mainland China renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue in exchange for Taiwan?s pledge not to pursue independence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In alliances, the weaker more dependent ally should act according to a logic of deference and non-confrontation vis-à-vis its stronger ally due to power and material asymmetries. However, alliance theory is under-specified in why or when weaker players c ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]