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It is widely claimed that civil society associations such as NGOs enable the disadvantaged to address issues of weak governance. Yet, existing research suggests that NGOs have a problematic relationship with the poor and, in turn, have a limited impact on the political participation of marginalized groups. This paper will examine the question how NGOs relate to their clients by analyzing Indian NGOs' decision to pursue legal activism in the form of public interest litigation (PIL). The nature of PIL allows an entire population group to seek redress, and hence, presents an effective venue for accessing the state. In India, PIL has developed into a useful tool to enhance marginalized groups' political participation and to promote the legal activism of NGOs. This paper will provide insight into why and when NGOs use PIL to pursue basic human rights on behalf of the poor and disadvantaged, and whether these marginalized groups are the intended beneficiaries of NGOs' legal activism in the first place. Instead of identifying NGOs merely in terms of civil society agents who thicken political development, this paper will analyze NGOs as self-interested actors with specific political motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to highlight how the imagery of Hindu women (which has been discursively utilized by the BJP to support its nationalist/ communalist agenda) is also being used by the party to support a ?Pakistan-centric/ communalized? version of Indian nuclearisation, in defense of a Hindu rashtra. Building upon existing feminist (Chakravarti 1993; Bagchi 1995; Sinha 1995; Chowdhry, 1998; Sarkar 2000; and Gupta 2001) and non-feminist (Nandy 1983 and Chatterjee 1995) scholarships that have demonstrated the centrality of gender in the context of anti-colonial as well as post-colonial India?s nationalist identity formation, I explore in this paper a discursive relationship between a Hindu patriarchy, its quest for Hindu nationalism, and gender and the ways in which this patriarchy, which I term in this study as a Brahmanical/ cultural patriarchy, uses women as markers of communal differences to sustain India?s nuclearisation. Far-fetched or indirect as it may seem on the surface, I explore how this construct of a Brahmanical/ cultural patriarchy based on the fictitious assumption that ?men can do no wrong to women be Hindu or Muslim by religion,? (Chowdhry, 2000:107) both uses and (ab)uses the image of Hindu women to establish Pakistan as a threat to India and bestows upon the Indian state as a patriarchal institution the task of protecting the status of women in India. I argue that, that what makes the case of Indian nuclearisation unique is the Brahmanical/ cultural violence undergirding Indian nuclearisation-- making the issue a matter of cultural sensitivity experienced by the nation, with special imbrications on gender. A corollary of this, which forms the concluding section of this paper, is the Indian state?s role under the political leadership of the BJP in maintaining a communalized, militarized, and a Hindu patriarchal violence at three inter-connected levels, namely between gender (ordering of Hindu women by Hindu men), communities (bordering between Hindu and Muslim communal identities), and inter-state (Othering between India and Pakistan) identities. I argue that this demarcation of identities (which I term in this study as ?Ordering, Bordering, and Othering?) is an outcome of the BJP?s Brahmanical/ cultural patriarchy, to sustain a nuclear India. This is a part of my Ph.D Dissertation which is in progress. If you have any questions concerning this ongoing project, or an updated manuscript of this, then please feel free to contact me at Runa.Das@nau.edu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his works on ‘ecoviolence’, neo-Malthusian theorist Thomas Homer-Dixon claims that population pressure on renewable natural resources, and especially pressure on cropland, can lead to resource scarcities if economic and political conditions are unfavorable. He further assumes that collective violent action can erupt as a result of such scarcities. Previous empirical studies addressing this field fall in either of the categories of cross-national large-N surveys or qualitative case-studies. And while studies belonging to the former category largely have failed to support the neo-Malthusian conflict scenario, studies belonging in the latter have frequently been criticized for lack of case control. This paper will combine the strengths of the two traditions and seek to explain differences in conflict propensity between regions within one country in a statistical model including demographic, environmental, political and socioeconomic characteristics as explanatory variables. India is mentioned by Thomas Homer-Dixon as a particularly vulnerable state because of high population growth, serious water scarcity, cropland fragmentation, erosion, deforestation and desertification. He claims that these factors threaten to cause major internal violence or disintegrate the whole state. The aim of this paper is to empirically explore whether demographic change and environmental characteristics may account for some of the variation in conflict propensity experienced by Indian states or districts over the 1950-2000 period. In addition to the neo-Malthusian concern over population growth and density, two additional demographic characteristics that are frequently argued to have important security implications, the existence of ‘youth bulges’ and unequal growth rates between different ethnic groups, will also be addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has a long-standing interest in the political events of South Asia. This paper focuses on the continuity and change in the nature of U.S. hegemony in this region after the end of Cold War, and more particularly after September 11. Having witnessed the collapse of the state in Afghanistan and the potential for state failure in a nuclear Pakistan, the concerns relating to this region are extensive. Religious fundamentalism, social and political instability, cross-border terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental crisis are just few of the problems addressed in the paper. The variety of potential dangers emanating from this region makes this region and U.S. policy towards it a paramount concern for both theory and practice of international relations. At the theoretical level, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the continued use of the neo-realist theory is justified, based on its record of past policy successes and failures. One of the core arguments against neo-realism is that its level of analysis is too rigid, thus failing to recognize internal constraints in state affairs, particularly the social and cultural factors. After examining the foundation and application of the neo-realist policies of the U.S. toward the region, this paper evaluates the success or failure of U.S. policy in terms of addressing the important concerns of the region. This evaluation is based on an analysis of the stated goals compared to the results of policy actions. The paper concludes with suggestions for a more realistic understanding of the problems in South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shortcomings in meeting national energy policy objectives as well as threats posed by climate change put pressure on Indian energy politics to consider alternative options such as enhanced renewable energy deployment. The challenge is how to assist emerging economies such as India to leapfrog a polluting development path by facilitating the transition to alternative sources of power generation. The research question tackled in this paper hence asks how and to what extent new modes of governance such as the CDM contribute to 'greening' India by facilitating the diffusion of renewable energy? Ecological modernisation theories argue that deviating from conventional development paths is possible and emphasise the potential for leapfrogging development stages. The central argument of this paper holds that international policy instruments such as the CDM contribute to greening Indian energy policy firstly by enhancing renewable energy deployment through technology transfer and secondly by instilling a political re-orientation through norms diffusion. Yet, the embeddedness approach cautions against overly optimistic assessments arguing that and alternative development path is possible, however, under the conditions that context conditions and path dependencies are given due consideration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After decades of neglect, the Indian Government is today actively courting the over 20-million strong Indian diaspora. Responding to constraints posed by its post-1991 financial crises and on-going market reforms, New Delhi was led to re-evaluate the diaspora's potential, recognizing it as a valuable asset to further its transformed economic and foreign policy interests.While governmental mechanisms to explore the diasporic potential, such as remittances, bank deposits and bonds, had already been in place since the 1970s, they were mainly ad hoc and opportunistic, restricted at ensuring minimal conditions for a continuous inflow of foreign exchange. This strategy rapidly lost effectiveness and gave signs of exhaustion by the end of the 1990s, Overseas Indians also beginning to organize transnationally and reclaim more than mere economic incorporation.A more sophisticated (Government-initiated) diaspora policy thus emerged after 2001, reshaping the terms of engagement in a more balanced way: in return for contributing with financial capital, know-how and philanthropy, as "catalysts" to India's economic development and global affirmation, People of Indian Origin and Non-Resident Indians worldwide are now offered extensive cultural and symbolic capital, and celebrated as privileged members of the "global Indian family".Yet, as India's post-colonial constitutional, legal and political apparatuses and culture remain committed to a strict territorial delimitation of the nation (e.g. by explicitly prohibiting any form of dual citizenship, and by electorally disenfranchising its non-resident citizens), the Government was forced to innovate, in order to satisfy the mounting diasporic demands. It has been doing so by developing a set of mechanisms and incentives for partial extraterritorial incorporation and representation, including the Overseas Citizenship of India, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, and an array of specialised rights which differentiate the diasporic from the resident Indian. Focusing this policy dilemma, this paper thus argues that by seeking to govern its diaspora, the Indian government has not only been passively permitting the erosion of prevailing understandings of citizenship and territoriality, but also actively producing novel forms of diasporic attachment to the increasingly deterritorialised nation. The consequences of this process to the study of International Relations - which this paper seeks to identify - cannot be exaggerated, given also the rapid proliferation of similar politics of extraterritorial incorporation and state-diaspora negotiations in other regions of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some leaders choose foreign policies that flout the constraints posed by international structures? This paper argues that leaders possess varying beliefs about their state's proficiency in different areas of foreign policy, or "national efficacy beliefs." When sufficiently strong, these beliefs inspire leaders to act boldly, even when international structures offer incentives for restraint. Strong martial efficacy beliefs inspire leaders to challenge more powerful opponents on the battlefield, while strong moral efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to engage in costly forms of cooperation even when the relevant international institutions are weak. In constrast, weaker senses of martial and moral efficacy produce policies that are much more sensitive to structural constraints. The paper outlines how this framework can explain why the foreign policies of both China and India have become more conservative over the past six decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what circumstances do nuclear weapons permit or foster sub-nuclear conflict? A substantial literature addresses the question, whose most frequently cited answer is the "stability-instability paradox." The term has become a catch-all for almost any association between nuclear weapons and sub-nuclear conflict, but is rarely defined, leaving unclear the character of conflict nuclear weapons allegedly permit or foment, the conditions under which this dynamic occurs, and the mechanism by which is operates. This paper seeks to remedy these shortcomings in three steps. It clarifies the original concept. It explores way in which the original concept can be strengthened. And it seeks to remedy the concept's incompleteness. The discussion is illustrated with reference to the historical record of nuclear-armed states, particularly India and Pakistan, whose conflict-ridden relationship and mutual acquisition of nuclear weapons make them especially useful illustrative cases. The paper primarily aims to provide a richer set of deductively derived concepts, not themselves a complete answer to the question of when nuclear weapons permit or foment conflict, or the broader question of what shadow nuclear weapons cast over sub-nuclear conflict, but a necessary step toward a more comprehensive answer to these questions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

HIV/AIDS is considered not only as the greatest global public health disaster but also as the biggest "development challenge" of the twenty first century affecting the most economically productive population and threatening development achievements in many areas. How HIV/AIDS as a disease entered in the development discourse making it the primary agenda of development in the Third World? How neoliberal globalization as a complex socio-economic, cultural and political process has shaped the discourses of development and HIV/AIDS in the developing countries? This paper explicates some of the complex issues surrounding the above questions and suggests that part of the answer lies in the way Third World countries have been historically produced through development discourses as "underdeveloped," and the way in which HIV/AIDS was later repackaged as the disease of the poor and a direct fallout of "development." Implicit in this argument, we use the notion of "discourse" of a disease that took place in the First World through which "truth" and so "power" was produced. By producing such truths, developed countries created a field of intervention over the developing countries through which "power" could be exercised. Thus HIV/AIDS as a development agenda is primarily Eurocentric that has been universalized through neoliberal globalization. Using an international political-economic approach to the study of disease and development, this paper explicates how the discourses of development and HIV/AIDS facilitated by a process of neoliberal globalization have affected the HIV prevention and care efforts in Third World societies with special reference to India. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper conceptualises security as a (meta)discourse of violence that masks violence in the name of counter-violence, killing in the name of protection. As the case of Hindutva in India illustrates, violence against minorities is normalised in the name of personal, communal, national and even international security. The will to secure the Self has as its corollary the will to insecure the Other, the desire to control and use violence. Using the example of anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002, the paper examines some of the ways in which a stereotypical image of Muslim men (the figure of 'The Muslim') is seen as constituting the danger against which the Hindu body politic needs to be secured. The violence against minority Muslims is facilitated and justified in the name of achieving security for the Hindu Self at individual, community, national as well as international levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The academic study of international relations in South Asia is, for the most part, derivative and stultified. Most university departments rely on outdated and archaic syllabi. It is derivative in that much of what is imparted is drawn from early Amercian international relations scholarship or obtained from the canons of British diplomatic history. Scholarship for the most part remains descriptive, hortatory and atheoretic. The reasons for this aritdity in the study of international relations across the region cries out for an explanation. The answers are complex and are rooted, in part, in the British colonial history of the subcontinent. Most university faculty were trained in the British diplomatic history tradition and were only partially exposed to key currents in American social science scholarship in the sub-field of international politics. At another level, until recently, few individualsof any intellectual calibre, entered the study of international relations as opportunities in the fields of teaching, research and practice were exceedingly limited. Consequently, most individuals simply replicated the work that their mentors imparted and frequently in less sophisticated ways. Finally, policy makers, again until very recently, rarely, if ever, sought the advice of academic specialists. Instead, following the British civil service traditions, preferred their own counsel and relied on diplomatic precdents and practices. All these features are currntly changing as the principal power in the region, India, is now becoming more prosperous. More talented individuals are entering the sub-field, American social science methods are now percolating into university syllabi and increasing numbres of academics have American university degrees. Policymakers are also now more attuned to rely on academics for policy-relevant advice. This paper will explore the changing epistemological bases of international relations scholarship in India and to some degree in the other states of South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that non-elite popular sentiment?often referred to as ?hearts and minds??is central to understanding ethno-religious nationalist movements in India and Kashmir. The emphasis is on ?critical events? in the history of the two movements which illustrate the centrality of mass, popular, non-elite agency. It argues also that standard constructivist understandings, especially those emphasizing ?discourse? as cause of politicization and mass mobilization do not satisfactorily explain the resonance, effectiveness and demand for ethno-religious and nationalist rhetoric. Finally, a qualified hypothesis is put forward that non-elite agency in ethno-religious nationalist movements in South Asia is consistent with theory developed in the field of social psychology, especially ingrouping theory, and that that work can constructively inform the political science of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India has an advanced legal system in which Engliah common law has adapted well to the local environment and developed in complexity, much in the way that scholars of the common law would predict. Kenya, on the other hand, also with a common law system developed under a British colonial administration, has a legal system which has not adpated well to the culture and environment. For example, in Kenya at independence there were three specific laws which directly affected property ownership. Currently in Kenya there are still just those three laws. Why did legal development and change occur in India and not Kenya? This paper will examine the two cases from a comparative perspective using archival resources as well as interviews to explain why the common law has not taken hold and adapted in the Kenyan context as it did in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Indian policymakers are pursuing a larger governance role in international organizations in order to have a larger say in shaping the rules that govern international interactions in specific issue areas. In the short term, they are trying to maximize the diplomatic and negotiating resources they have by focusing on institutions in which they have been members. In seeking this enhanced global governance role, they are constrained by the international environment within which they operate as well as domestic constraints such as coalition politics and administrative capacity. The research is based on interviews with key decision-makers and stakeholders, archival research based on government documents, newspaper articles and speeches by key players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strengthening of relations between India and the United States has been one of the most significant developments in world politics over the past decade, as both sides have come to perceive convergent interests encompassing democratic pluralism, regional security, and trade and development. The peak (to date) of the new "strategic partnership" has been an unprecedented civilian nuclear agreement, initiated in 2005 and concluded in 2008. This paper will analyze recent developments to assess the current state of U.S.-India relations, with a special emphasis on New Delhi's perceptions, hopes, and concerns relating to the transition from Bush to Obama. Given the intensification of the partnership under Bush, and the Democratic Party's traditional nonproliferation positions, some analysts had expected a cooler American bearing toward India under an Obama administration. Until the end of his first year, Obama had placed relatively little emphasis on the relationship, as the global financial crisis and other issues have competed for the new administration's attention, and as its South Asia policy has been preoccupied by instability in "Af-Pak." Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's highly successful November 2009 visit to Washington seems to have alleviated New Delhi's fears that the U.S.-India partnership was beginning to falter. Going forward, India should be less given to treat Obama's "Af-Pak" policy as a proxy for his bearing toward India, especially now that the administration has implicitly acknowledged India's stature as a rising global power and has backed away from earlier indications that it intended to apply American diplomacy to broker a settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom regards India's contemporary approach to foreign policy is underpinned on the central theme of change. Strategic engagement is a mantra that has come to replace the traditional moorings of non-alignment. Scholars and practitioners alike argue that since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Government came to power in 1998, a normative shift took place. 'Pragmatism' opposed to 'age-old ideals' came to inform policy. Yet, a detailed assessment of India's response to the US request to contribute troops in 2003, an under-studied case, demonstrates that in fact, the BJP-led leadership were far more restrained in there interactions with US officials than commentators make out. This paper, based on extensive interviews with key bureaucrats, politicians, and negotiators both in India and the US, attempts to re-assess what now seems to be understood as the conventional wisdom in both countries. It makes the case that rather than change per se; India is undergoing a process of cultural change. This is not a question of newer ideas replacing older ideas regards foreign policy, but rather the meshing of older and newer ideas. Embedded are tensions and knots that both the case study make clear have not yet been unravelled by India's policy/political elite across party lines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The System of Rice Intensification (SRI) is a novel approach to rice cultivation that is claimed to be both more productive and more sustainable than conventional methods. Such claims have been challenged or dismissed by many rice scientists, however. Furthermore, the technical features of SRI are not precisely defined. Nevertheless, despite the lack of clear and unequivocal endorsement by science, practices labelled SRI have spread widely and quickly to many rice-growing regions, including various areas of India. SRI's spread could be seen as surprising, in a context where formally institutionalised efforts to promote recommended technologies and sound management practices often meet with limited success in changing farmers' behaviour. SRI's spread can perhaps best be explained by viewing it as a social movement, as much as a set of particular practices or technologies. In that respect, from its beginnings in Madagascar during the 1970s, SRI appears to represent a form of grassroots innovation that emerged and spread through networks operating outside the hierarchies of formal agricultural science. This paper explores the important lessons that SRI may therefore hold, regarding the drivers and dynamics of technical change in agriculture and particularly with regard to the relationship between formal/scientific and informal/practical kinds of expertise. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, it is argued that the enthusiasm of the literature on transnational environmental activism about globalization as a new political opportunity structure for anti-systemic social movements is overly optimistic. The emphasis of this body of literature on virtual spaces of resistance, the importance of information dissemination, cross-boundary alliances, global-local linkages and grassroots representation overlooks the fact that the emerging networked forms of environmental governance set out the boundaries for the agency of environmental activists. In short, the multilevel network strategy of environmental movements guides them towards what we call the 'Post-Political Trap': the very structure of the typical multistakeholder governance arrangements prevents radical political action that goes beyond the stakeholders' post-political environmental consensus. This argument is illustrated by the struggle of the Indian Environmental NGO Toxics Link for environmental justice around the recycling of Electronic Waste in India. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can social scientists best explain why courts of last resort have relaxed standing requirements in environmental litigation? How do these changes in legal doctrine impact the pursuit of environmental justice? This paper seeks to address these queries in three stages. First, I survey theories of legal norm change that may prove useful in explaining shifts in legal doctrine. Second, I compare the development of environmental rights and locus standi in the United States, India, and Japan. Third, I assess the extent to which shifts in standing rules in each case can be understood through globalization of law theories or norm entrepreneurship. I conclude by offering that (1) the norm of increased judicial access in environmental litigation is likely to continue to expand due to the growing internationalization of environmental issues; and (2) the study of the globalization of law may offer important insights regarding the future of international environmental justice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global water scarcities promise to pose an increasing threat to human populations in the near future, and there has never been a more necessary moment for the creation of an encompassing global water management solution. Of course, the form and function of such a solution presents unique political and theoretical challenges for policymakers and scholars alike. For its part, the United Nations advocates Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), a voluntary regime that establishes a set of regulatory goals for water usage, as the solution to the world's water woes. Implementation experience suggests, however, that the theoretical foundations underlying IWRM are often unsuccessful in practice, and India's Ganges River Basin provides an example of this theory v. implementation disconnect. IWRM's theoretical framework calls for the decentralization of environmental governance, the definition of water as a common-pool resource, and the creation of a negotiated regime to mitigate a dilemma of common interest, each of which fail to work in the case of the Ganges. This paper, then, offers an explanation as to why the theory underlying the IWRM regime is insufficient for successful implementation within the context of India's unique water scarcity issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of the other great power - India, and how these two Asian great powers - India and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these two very different Asian giants with a complex relationship view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This paper examines how Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the rise of China and their assessment of the feasibility of Indo-Chinese partnership ("Chindia") or rivalry by employing a mixed-method research strategy, combining secondary literature research, elite interviewing, and direct observation conducted over the summer of 2008. It analyzes the Indo-Chinese relationship through three paradigms - geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We often imagine that countries with nuclear energy programs are nuclear weapons states waiting to happen. Yet there are multiple ways that states can enhance their nuclear security, even when they possess the requisite technology for a weapons program. They may undertake diplomatic efforts to reduce the level of threat, they may seek shelter under an ally's nuclear umbrella, and they may adopt unilateral military measures, up to and including the development of a nuclear arsenal. Over the past five decades, India has engaged in all three of these approaches. Since India's pursuit of nuclear weapons is already well-documented, this article focuses on its efforts to elicit nuclear restraint from other states through diplomacy and to seek the protection of nuclear-armed allies. Drawing on archival documents and interviews in New Delhi and Mumbai, it documents how Indian leaders eventually became disillusioned with these two alternatives to nuclear armament. In doing so, it depicts India's emergence as a nuclear power not simply as a response to regional threats, but also as the result of dissatisfaction with alternative paths to nuclear security. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of this finding for possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in nuclear energy in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the Indian government's response to the outbreak of separatist violence in Nagaland and Mizoram in the state of Assam. Not only were these insurgencies the Republic of India's first experience with the phenomenon of separatist insurgency, they were among the most severe. They required an untested government and military to adapt to a form of political warfare with which they had little experience. Through a process of trial and error, India developed an approach to political violence in the Northeast that would guide its response to future insurgencies.The Indian government's approach was characterized by the use of military force to smother the insurgents and physically separate them from their supporters, while simultaneously making political concessions to co-opt moderate elements of the population. In particular, the Northeastern experience highlights the need for dissatisfied élites to be able to realize their ambitions by working within, not against, the existing political system. The Indian approach in these two cases was also characterized by a heavy emphasis on nation building and bolstering the capacity of governing institutions in under-administered areas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trade policies of Brazil, India and South Africa have significant historical similarities: these countries are original WTO members; they adopted import-substitution industrialization; promoted neoliberal reforms; have been playing important roles in their regional contexts; and, more recently, they have also formed alliances and coalitions (IBSA, G20) in order to increase their capacity to influence the trade regime. At the same time, they are intensifying bilateral and regional ties which are different in scope and degrees of institutionalization. The result is that, despite of having similar roles which are derived from their status as middle powers, these three countries have developed different strategies concerning their trade policy. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyze comparatively the trade policies of Brazil, India and South Africa in the multilateral and regional environments. Our contention is that there are significant differences in their conduct on those two levels, in such a way that it is not possible to establish a fixed pattern of trade policy amongst middle powers, at least not amongst these three. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by the debate about the rising power of Southern countries, most notably the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), we critically examine whether it inhibits the potential for the transformation of North-South relations within the global political economy. We argue that these new North-South-relations are much more characterized by similarity and complementarity rather than challenge.This paper analyzes both the regulation of money and production for Brazil, China and India, as well as the ideologies by which they legitimize their orders in international arenas such as the IMFC and the IMF Board of Governors. Such a combined examination of both material and ideational structures reveals that, beyond the rhetoric of contestation, these countries share much of the politico-economic common sense within the G7. In effect, these countries align to the Post-Washington Consensus on how to regulate order in the political economy. This "tolerant liberalism" is able to incorporate any substantial different order stemming from emerging powers. The "challenge" of Southern economies thus does not bring about any substantial change which would not have been on its way within the G7 anyway. Furthermore, it does not enhance the potential for developing countries to pursue independent development strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While almost a decade old, Ted Hopf's observation that the democratic peace is an observation in search of a theory still has some validity. In particular, the mechanisms behind the observed lack of war between democracies are poorly understood, making it difficult for scholars to provide a compelling explanation. While there has been some innovative work, particularly with respect to learning and the ability of an increasing number of democracies to cement democratic norms, Müller and Wolff note that normative and structural explanations are monadic explanations for a dyadic phenomenon. Underappreciated in the existing work is the role of identity and the importance this has for driving the democratic peace. With a focus on developing a dyadic democratic peace mechanism and using a case study approach, this paper utilizes the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to examine how identity plays out in the U.S. response to the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs. It finds that in fact identity does play a significant role in how security policy is constructed. The potential implications of this finding, particularly on policy, are significant. If the democratic peace does rely on identity to trigger the constraining norms that limit the escalation of conflict to violence, it is unlikely the democratic peace can be spread by force and it is possible that states nominally democratic can be excluded from the community of democracies if their behavior or significant other aspects of their perceived identity are at variance with the accepted democratic identity standard. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998, a considerable scholarly literature has compared deterrence in South Asia with the historical U.S.-Soviet context, illuminating similarities as well as important differences. However, one potentially fundamental difference has not been sufficiently scrutinized: recent India-Pakistan crises have played out under a deepening U.S. engagement in South Asia, whereas the Cold War superpowers had no comparable recourse to third-party intervention. Though the possibility of intervention may help stabilize the regional deterrent balance, it might also have the opposite effect: either Pakistan or India--or both--may have incentives to exaggerate their confrontational intentions (through bellicose rhetoric or low-level force use) in order to raise American fears of a nuclear war, in the hope that U.S. intervention might lead to an outcome more favorable to their regional interests. The potential danger of such a strategy is that neither of the principals can neatly compartmentalize the audience for its conduct: rhetoric or action intended to raise the stakes for the U.S. may inadvertently cross an ill-defined "red line" for the adversary, and thus trigger an escalatory response. This paper will argue that South Asian deterrence is a dynamic situation in which both principles have experimented with escalation, at least in part, to "scare Uncle Sam"--Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil War, and India in a 2001-02 major military mobilization along the international border--only to see the strategy backfire and the U.S. intervene in ways that temporarily limited rather than expanded their strategic options. It will also examine the relevance of Timothy Crawford's concept of "pivotal deterrence" to the contemporary South Asian context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India has a decade-long experience with independent regulatory agencies in public services as an institutional transplant from the industrialized world. Introduced at the behest of international donor agencies, regulators in India are intended, somewhat naively, to provide an apolitical space for decision making to assuage investor concerns over arbitrary administrative actions, and thereby stimulate private investment. In practice, regulators have had to negotiate a terrain over which the state has continued to exercise considerable control. Regulators have also been been shaped in their functioning by national and sub-national political traditions and by administrative and political practices. The result is a hybrid institutional form that combines politics as usual with intriguing new, and unanticipated, opportunities for political intervention.This paper will explore the origins of electricity regulation as a form of institutional "isomorphism." It will then compare the regulatory experience in India's electricity sector across two Indian states to understand the implications of transplanting regulatory agencies in the global south. An examination of the process through which regulatory decisions are reached illustrates how existing bureaucratic and technocratic networks, transplanted procedures, and administrative cultures combine to conservatively manage long-standing political tensions around electricity. In seeking to manage those tensions, regulators often take decisions - on tariff setting, for example - based on a political reading that belies the technocratic narrative on which institutional credibility rests. At the same time, civil society groups ranging from residential associations to professional associations to individuals are using newly created regulatory spaces to structure a more deliberative decision process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and when do politically influential interest groups influence national economic policymaking? A well elaborated formal political economy literature suggests that macroeconomic and public policy outcomes vary when opposed partisan coalitions?representing, for example, either business or labor?come to control the executive and other high policymaking positions. Yet existing partisan models have not always traveled well when applied to developing country and historical cases, arguably because most such models assume that the underlying political system is an advanced industrial democracy. Opportunistic models of political economy also present problems when applied outside the OECD. I propose a model that accommodates political variation along two dimensions. First, politically dominant partisan coalitions may be either rightist/conservative or leftist/developmentalist. Second, the scope of national political participation may be low, medium, or high. The result is six types of national political regimes, each of which generates strong incentives to incumbent leaders to prefer certain types of national economic policies. Appendix I outlines the application of this framework to predicting choices of national financial architectures across historical and developing country cases. Appendix II sketches a research design focusing on policies for national financial ?reform? in Brazil and India from the early nineteenth century to the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's rapid economic growth over the last decade has been coupled with a Maoist insurgency that competes for the allegiances of rural populations with the state. In response to the threat, the Government of India has securitized development, using public works programs in an attempt to sway locals away from Maoist allegiance. However, these areas are also home to massive iron, coal, and steel factories that drive India's growth. This study uniquely aimed to address the lack of local-level analysis and the lack of a robust dataset by merging previous qualitative fieldwork with disparate conflict data sources at the district level to explore different potential explanatory variables for the Maoist insurgency, including the relationship between development works, violence, and natural resource extraction. We find that while effective implementation of development programs like NREGA may indeed be loosely related to the suppression of violent activities in districts affected by the Maoist conflict, it is the presence of significant mining activity that is the best predictor of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that the First Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 in which the majority of 29 states were outspokenly aligned—the number of "neutralists" varies from 3 to 10 according to one's count of fellow travelers and what one decides to do with the communists—was a conference of the nonaligned states or "gave birth" to nonalignment is a kind of Paul Revere's ride of our postcolonial age. And many if not most of the men representing those states would likely have responded to claims of a unity or alliance of color with blank or uncomprehending stares or else would have smiled politely and moved on. To simply the argument just a little, in the six months or so before the Colombo powers agreed to hold the Asian-African conference, and as they negotiated the list of invitees, the functionaries of the Eisenhower administration let their fears run wild. They were haunted by what H.W. Brands describes as, but never critically dissects and distances himself from, "the specter of neutralism." They were also haunted by the specter of race, but Brands is like many others predictably silent about the coarse and dismissive treatments of various leaders and peoples that fill the declassified dispatches, telegrams, and memoranda of conversations. Both American obsessions have histories that predate Bandung by decades. Nothing speaks to the fantastical nature of the accounts leading up to Bandung more than that none of them proved true. No delegate ever seriously argued that what united peoples of disparate religions, regions, and commitments was something called race or color. Color was a fact for some, not for some others, but for no one was it what united them. To the contrary, many rejected the idea that color mattered. They called it racialism and warned against appealing to it as a dangerous and retrograde step. Nehru, for one, detested such talk. Meanwhile Nehru's efforts to exclude discussion of what many at Bandung saw as the highest stage of imperialism in the guise of the Communist Information Bureau failed. State after state refused his entreaties to denounce NATO, SEATO, and the like. His rivals would gloat over the first would be leader of the Third World's failure to dominate the conference. The British and the American policymakers celebrated their victory at the meeting's end. But they credited it to their successful behind-the-scenes support for their "friends" rather than to their own original, wild exaggerations of the forces at play. They would continue to conjure the same, increasingly intertwined phantom twin of a third force of colored peoples suffering psychological inferiority complexes many more times in the year or two ahead. There is little gain in the fact that, now, decades later, as the postcolonial theorists return unselfconsciously to the images that Eisenhower, Eden, Dulles, Godfrey Huggins of Rhodesia and others first used in the run up to Bandung, they cast these in what to them appears a more positive or hopeful light. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sept 11 represented a true water-shed in World history. While the World at large came to acknowledge the seriousness of the problem that threatened existing World order and civilization, the menace had become almost routine in some parts of the World incl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27 March, 2009, President Barack Obama unveiled the much awaited 'Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy' or AfPak. This was the end product of the first sixty-day inter-agency strategic review undertaken by the new American administration. As explained by General James Jones, the US National Security Advisor (NSA), the "cornerstone of this strategy" was that it was a regional approach. For the first time since 2001, the US was to treat Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries "with one challenge in one region": that of degrading the ability of terrorist groups ensconced in the AfPak geography to plan and launch international terrorist attacks. A few days later, Prime Minister Gordon Brown published the British government's comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Much like the American document, the British version also spoke of the challenges faced by these two different countries with "shared problems of insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism and the drugs trade." The key task for both administrations was to craft a "coordinated strategy". From the outset, the AfPak encapsulation highlighted the central role Pakistan is expected to play in stemming the insurgency tide along the Durand Line. At the onset of the War in Afghanistan, the top Taliban leadership along with their Al Qaeda counter parts evaded the wrath of US military prowess and shifted base to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and Balochistan. The preceding Republican administration paid little attention to the dynamic of a shared insurgency straddling both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, not the least because of a shift in resources and attention to Iraq. However, the centrality of Pakistan eluded no one in the new President's inner coterie. To be sure, in the run-up to the US Presidential elections in 2008, Senator Obama argued that "Iraq was a diversion from the fight against the terrorists" behind 9/11. He made clear that the US needed to "refocus" efforts on Afghanistan and Pakistan: the "central front" in the war against Al Qaeda. Indeed, according to General Stanley McChrystal, President Obama's newly appointed Commander of both US and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the equation were quite simple: "stability in Pakistan" was considered "essential", not the least for Pakistan's sake, but also because it would "enable progress in Afghanistan." The bottom line was that the inter-related characteristic of the AfPak equation led Washington's South Asia specialists to conclude that "Afghanistan cannot succeed without success in Pakistan, and vice versa." As the McChrystal report outlined, "Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan". This of course is a matter of both conventional wisdom and dilemma. Given that for a whole range of political and strategic reasons large-scale military operations across the border into Pakistan is not an option, the central question is what it would take to convince the Pakistani government, and more pertinently the military, to take action against violent militancy based in Pakistan? After all, as McChrystal did not hesitate to add, the "senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)." Inducing Pakistan to pay greater attention to insurgent groups undermining the counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan has proven to be both complicated and multi-faceted. Between January 2009 and 2010, the US and the UK sought to develop and operationalise a three-pronged strategy. First, development and economic aid to Pakistan was increased. Second, joint US-Pakistani military training programes were expanded... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Federations promise to provide autonomous, representative governance that is flexible enough to overcome potential internal conflict resulting from the dual stresses of governing diverse populations and power overreach. India is the world's biggest federation, but also hosts the most violent revolution in modern history against a federal state. 150,000 people are dead or displaced since 2004 in the war between the Communist Party of India-Maoist and India's government. Conflict management efforts led not to resolution but catastrophe across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand as state responses contradicted each other and the center's efforts. The differences illustrated how institutional mechanisms of decentralization create, sustain, and otherwise alter internal revolutionary conflicts that cross subunit boundaries. Three unique characteristics come into play when federal governments tackle revolutionary conflict: use of their subunits as policy laboratories, exacerbation of state-subunit fissures, and empowerment of local elites who put political self-interest above conflict resolution. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How have the Inter-Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations taken the task of "Education for All" in their hands and how much successful has been their journey so far?United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) leads ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A comparative analysis of the Indian Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations (Dec. 2006) and the U.S. Army's and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Field Manual. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In studying national and state identity, scholars have primarily focused on official or political discourses as evidence of identity construction. More recently, Ted Hopf has underlined the importance of popular culture in examining societal discourses of Soviet and Russian state identity. By looking at portrayals of minorities in Chinese and Indian movies and visual arts we extend Hopf's framework in two ways. First, both China and India have significant heterogeneous, illiterate and poor parts of their population, rendering textual sources less useful as the primary means to study identity. Second, we want to see what types of culture are generated by the state as opposed to internal and external others. By looking at popular culture in a democracy and a non-democracy, we can assess to what extent popular culture is manufactured by the state or is representative of societal discourses. Through an analysis of significant films and art in the post-cold war period, we show how popular culture both reflects and is used as a means to carve out state identity with relation to 'internal' others, such as Muslims and the rural poor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced by pressures to increase energy supply as pre-requisite for sustained economic growth and secured social well-being, the Government of India seeks to harness all available energy sources for power generation. By 2012, the Indian Government envisions a 10% contribution of renewable energy sources to power generation out of which 7% has been achieved so far (Planning Commission, Government of India 2006). Looking at the geographical distribution of renewable energy deployment in India a bias towards certain Indian states is apparent. Since this spatial disparity cannot be attributed to the availability of natural resources, questions about driving factors and conditions for private participation in the renewable energy sector arise.This article aims to look closer at the contextual conditions determining private sector participation in renewable energy deployment. As for an empirical background, the wind sector in the states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala is analysed. The central argument put forward states that mono-theoretical approaches are not sufficient to explain contextual determinants for private sector engagement. Thus integrating insights from Political Sciences and Relational Economic Geography will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of determinants and drivers for private sector participation in renewable energy deployment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic insurgencies have received less scholarly attention than colonial or ideological insurgencies—even as they have become the predominant form of insurgency following the decolonization process and then the end of the Cold War. In the face of ethnic insurgencies, what determines the effectiveness of the various counterinsurgency strategies adopted by host states? Are democracies more likely to succeed by pursuing some kinds of counterinsurgency strategies rather than others? Theory indicates that multiple counterinsurgency strategies, if thoroughly implemented, can defeat ethnic insurgencies. Host state regime type—particularly democracy—is important as a constraint on the will to employ and thoroughly implement some counterinsurgency methods. Democracies are most likely to defeat ethnic insurgencies by employing more cooperative or "balanced" strategies. While such strategies employ economic and political inducements and rely on local ethnic elements to help fight the insurgents, they also depend on a credible host state commitment to sustain the counterinsurgency for as long as it takes to win. Case studies of India's multi-phased counterinsurgency efforts in Punjab and Kashmir offer some preliminary evidence in support of this theory. In both Punjab and Kashmir, early counterinsurgency efforts relied on less discriminate campaigns conducted by central armed forces or by illegitimate local proxies. The outcomes were strengthened insurgencies. In both cases, the Indian state adapted by seeking the cooperation of legitimate local moderates in more discriminate counterinsurgency efforts. These later, "balanced" strategies were more effective. This was particularly true in Punjab, where conditions for local cooperation were more favorable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American hegemony has passed its peak. The twenty-first century will see a more multi-polar international system. Yet Western European countries may not be the United States' main foils in decades to come. Four new poles of the international system are now widely known in the business and financial press as the "BRICs economies" (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Does the concept of "the BRICs" have meaning within a rigorous political science framing? From the perspective of an economic liberal employing neoclassical assumptions to understand the world economy, the category's justification is surprisingly weak. In contrast, a political or economic realist's framing instructs us to focus on states that are increasing their relative material capabilities—as each of the four is. Finally, within a liberal institutionalist's mental model, the BRICs countries are a compelling set, yet one with a deep cleavage between two sub-groups: large emerging powers likely to remain authoritarian or revert to that state, and those that are securely democratic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of ‘national identity’, especially with respect to its relevance in the analysis of contentious politics and international conflicts, has gained increasing prominence in a variety of academic and scholarly work in the field of international relations. However, the bulk of this scholarship has adopted a structuralist stance in trying to understand this concept such that national identity is understood as an essence or thing divorced from the social context in which it is (re)produced. Focusing on the India-Pakistan conflict as emerging from national identity projects identifying the other as enemy, I argue that a structuralist approach ought to be abandoned in favor of a relational one in the theorization of national identity. I propose a relational methodology of national identity that understands it as a project of self-other bounding practices. According to this perspective, national identity projects are understood as embedded moralities in-process that are always emerging within social interactions rather than as imagined communities that have already been fully formed. To this extent, a national identity project represents an ongoing rhetorical achievement of a social network that is concerned about its accountability to both self and others. I argue that such an approach can provide us with a more analytically meaningful understanding of the relationship between national identity and international conflict. This paper proceeds in three sections. The first recapitulates major perspectives on national identity and their shortcomings. I utilize the second section to outline a relational methodology of national identity projects. The third, and final, sectionof this paper applies this methodology to understanding the India-Pakistan conflict by exploring how it emerges in bounding practices. This discussion includes primary fieldwork conducted with individuals who migrated to Pakistan in August 1947 when British India gained independence. I have taken this panel as an opportunity to begin working on the second chapter of my dissertation project. Both this chapter and my dissertation project are in its initial stages which is why I have not uploaded this paper onto the ISA archive. If you are interested in receiving a copy of this paper please e-mail me at kiran.pervez@american.edu. I will be happy to send you an updated version. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the nature of globalization in India is more than just understanding an economic definition of poverty - it includes an understanding of the culture and history of India and ways in which globalization means adding layers of complexity within India, not simply replacing one India (traditional) with another (modern). This paper situates the economic liberalization policies of the Indian government from the early 1990s to the present in the context of the larger globalization debate. The paper then puts the context around which the economic reforms were taken within India's recent development history. After understanding this greater context the paper reviews several recent studies that have examined whether the economic growth in India has come at the expense of growing inequality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The genomics revolution in biology has spawned a new politics, with strikingly similar themes from California to Gujarat. The spread of biotechnology internationally continues on an accelerating curve upwards. Developmental states in China, India and Brazil promote the technology to make their agriculture competitive with that of richer nations. Equally, resistance in an international civil society escalates with the increasing number of crops, acres and farmers involved with genetically engineered organisms. Property is one strand of this contentious politics. Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have become a flash point of mobilization of civil society against corporate globalization. Concentration of property rights in powerful multinational firms with no incentive to find solutions to problems of poor farmers in poor countries and potential for monopoly profits at the expense of poor farmers both figure prominently in the critique of genetic engineering in developmental terms. Worse, appropriation of intellectual property in biota of the global South is held to threaten poor societies for the profit of firms in the global North. This paper explores the ground realities related to these political claims. It argues that the oppositional critique reifies intellectual property ? in the form of ?patents? ? in a way that has proved inconsistent with behavior of actors on the ground in India and other countries. Property is here conceptualized as a relationship between actors; the outcome cannot be derived logically but must be investigated empirically. In the absence of the much critiqued ?terminator technology,? reverse ?biopiracy? seems not only fairly easy to accomplish, but popular in farming communities. This move by farmers puts them in conflict, objectively, with some, but not all, NGOs that claim to represent their interests. The paper will discuss outcomes from a national case study in terms of differentiations of property that make sense theoretically, from hard to soft and from common to private. It will conclude with suggestions about what the divergence of interests between farmers and NGOs means for representation and political power in rural areas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) signed in 1992 establishes three objectives: conservation of biodiversity, its sustainable use, and the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources. Based on the sovereign rights of states, the CBD recognizes the right of states to regulate the access to their genetic resources and benefit sharing (ABS). ABS is viewed as the means to allocate benefits to both countries rich in biodiversity (provider countries) and their indigenous and local communities. This allocation is, inter alia, perceived as the compensation for the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge; hence as the allocation instrument to balance the shift in property rights. This study argues that fairness in ABS governance requires that parties to an ABS arrangement should have a fair procedure in creating the conditions of the arrangement. This study also argues that equity implies that parties to an ABS arrangement are equitable in the negotiations power. In this context, equity means, inter alia, that parties recognize the existing claims on property rights in a reciprocal way. However, experiences in the design of national and regional ABS legislations show that provider countries face difficulties in their national regulatory efforts. The current implementation efforts can be categorized as non-regulation, catching-up regulation, and over-regulation. Furthermore, it is also suggested that the problems provider countries face at the national level have rather an international character that requires changes in the international policy. The aim of this paper is to determine under what institutional conditions can the CBD be implemented to enable fair and equitable allocation of benefits? In this context, the paper focus on the relationship between property rights on genetic resources and fairness and equity in governance of ABS. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the Dalit (Untouchable) Movement’s recent participation in transnational networks against casteism and neoliberal globalization. It first looks briefly at the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa as a model by which the Dalits use global public spaces as means of mobilizing, creating public awareness, and public advocacy for their causes. Second, and more importantly for this paper, it examines Dalit participation at the World Social Forum (WSF) and the overall Global Justice Movement in its struggle against casteism and neoliberal globalization. Of necessity this paper explores the dynamic between the global and the local. In the past decade as India has opened itself up to the forces of corporate globalization there has been a counter trend, the formation of complex counter networks of new social movements, non-governmental organizations, and disadvantaged minorities. The counter networks use a wide array of political opportunity structures both internally and externally to contest corporate globalization and casteism. This paper in particular analyses the networking process of the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) focussing on its ability to form networks on a variety of levels and its involvement with the WSF starting in 2001. The paper stresses the centrality of the “local”, “place”, as a means of understanding the dynamics of social movements within an Indian context including the consequent decisions to “go global” as one means of affecting the domestic policies of the Indian state. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a critical look at contrasting North/South perspectives on globalization. Its major focus is on one of the established shapers of globalization in the North, the UK, and one of the major new growth economies in the South, India. Global processes such as the move of service sector work, including call centres, from North to South between the two economies identify them in relation to one another. But how should we think about such transitions and the ways in which they map associated trajectories for the future? What do such changes say about issues of equality and inequality across North/South and how are factors of gender playing out on both sides? What are the key contrasts between the UK and India as information societies and how are questions about uneven development being addressed? This paper considers such areas based on the co-authors long-standing research on different aspects of globalization. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After an extended crisis escalation period in the India-Pakistan conflict, a new security environment conducive to having peaceful dialogue has been created. Such positive climates were created by both states in the past, but did not endure. Is the present thaw different from the old ones? The paper argues that although leadership initiatives were taken previously by the Indian and Pakistani leaders, a serious pressure from a third party??the US in particular??in generating a thaw was absent in the history of the conflict. While the US made efforts to deescalate India-Pakistan crises in the past, such as the 1990 and 1999 crises, the conflicting states did not always welcome such measures. Today India and the US have common interests in a number of issues and containing terrorism of any form is their top priority. With the US pressures on Pakistan since the 9/11 attacks to crack down on terrorism, the former set the stage for a thaw in the South Asian conflict. Additionally, the US-led war on Iraq sent strong messages to India and Pakistan, forcing them to realize that without stability in the relationship the US could intervene in the internal affairs of South Asia. A bilateral conflict resolution is preferable to them than an alien-imposed one. Although such pressures may not resolve the conflict, the thaw may be prolonged. Email: skhan@aucegypt.edu [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States such as India and South Africa that are materially preponderant in a regional system often exert ambiguous and inconsistent foreign policies towards their region and on the world stage. This makes their regional role a matter of constant and ongoing debate among politicians and scholars. And while the international community often has high expectations about the leadership qualities of these states, secondary states in the region alternate between demanding moderation and requesting the assumption of special responsibilities, especially in economic terms. In this paper I will show that much of this debate arises from an inappropriate application of conventional theories of hegemony that expect the assumption of leadership and/or domination from a state that is preponderant within a system of international politics. These theories fail to acknowledge the special position of regional hegemons at the nexus of regional and global politics. Regional systems are by definition open, politically contingent systems that are embedded in the larger global system. Thus, the aim of this study is to provide an attempt of theory-building in this highly contested field. Criteria to assess the 'hegemonicness' of regional powers are developed and as well as a framework of explanatory factors that are suspected to provide an answer to the question of "When and under which circumstances do regional powers establish a regional hegemonic system". ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the initial spread of the nuclear weapon within the western hemisphere, the spread of the nuclear weapons has been curtailed to some extent. In the 60th year of the successful development of this weapon the original nuclear club comprising of United States of America, Russia (Erstwhile U.S.S.R.), France, United Kingdom and China have grown by only two new countries namely, India and Pakistan. However, the question that arises is that if states such as Brazil and Argentina could renounce their nuclear weapons program, then why did states such as India and Pakistan go ahead and develop the same. The striking aspect of this situation is that all four countries have been designated as developing countries, and hence faced similar challenges in their quest to find a place within the world political order. Thus, I plan to attempt to answer this paradox in this paper based on the case studies of Argentina and Brazil to explain why they renounced their nuclear weapons program and compare it to the case studies of India and Pakistan to elucidate the absence of the factors identified by me, as a result of which they pursued a nuclear weapons program. The case study methodology will evaluate the various social, economic, political and cultural factors that enabled some of these countries to renounce nuclear weapons development while the absence of these factors resulted in countries such as India and Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons programs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how the rapid economic growth in Bangalore (India), in particular due to Foreign Direct Investment in the IT industry, is causing a mass and collective cosmopolitan lifestyle transformation (grounded on consumption) among the urban middle class youth in Bangalore. Subsequently, it attempts to provide intellectual grounds for empirical research on whether the Bangalore techie transformation may or may not be reflective of more deep-rooted cultural change in an ancient society. In order to examine the possible deep-seated effects of the conspicuous, cosmopolitan consumption patterns, I argue that one should examine more grave decisions about ones personal life, such a dating and marriage choices, which indicate shifts away from the centrality of the family, and or shifts in hierarchal decision making with in the family as an indicator of possible superficial or profound change. In essence, I hypothesize that because the notion of a strong family structure is what gives cultural meaning to Indian society, any significant trend that undermines the family?s role in important decision-making is an indicator of profound cultural change. Accordingly, the following examines whether the economic shift in Bangalore is simply a consumption craze or the path to a cultural revolution. First, I spend some time examining Bangalore transition to Silicon Valley followed by discussion on demographic shifts and consumption patterns. I then provide a model for a closer examination of cosmopolitan lifestyles as a precursor for a cultural revolution. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]