Search

Examines the logical relation between the Is and the Ought that was weaker than entailment, and indeed neither deductive nor inductive. Prominent post-1950s examples of claims that Is-like statements can support Ought-like statements; Argument that the support that some primarily descriptive statements give to normative conclusions looks like logical support; Reasons why some forms of support have an affinity to logical relations.

Argues that equivocation described as a fallacy is not a logical concept but an epistemic one. Claim that the arguments of one who equivocates is not logically flawed but is unpersuasive; Assertion that only arguments which are unpersuasive in a certain way involve equivocations.

Logic ought to guide our thinking. It is better, more rational, more intelligent to think logically than to think illogically. Illogical thought leads to bad judgment and error. In any case, if logic had no role to play as a guide to thought, why should we bother with it?The somewhat naïve opinions of the previous paragraph are subject to attack from many sides. It may be objected that an activity does not count as thinking at all unless it is at least minimally logical, so logic is constitutive of thought rather than a guide to it. Or it may be objected that whereas logic describes a system of timeless relations between propositions, thinking is a dynamic process involving revisions, and so could not use a merely static guide. Or again the objection may be that there is no such thing as logic, only a whole variety of different logics, not all of which could possibly be good guides. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A brinkmanship crisis with two-sided incomplete in formation is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining in which each state is uncertain of its adversary's resolve. The sequential crisis equilibria are characterized explicitly and used to analyze the influences of resolve, misperception, and the status quo on escalation and crisis stability. The description of brinkmanship as a contest of resolve is found to be misleading: the state with the greatest resolve may not prevail in the crisis; a state may be less, not more, likely to prevail the greater its resolve; and a states' expected payoff may be less, not more, the greater its resolve. Moreover, reducing misperception may destabilize a crisis. Surprisingly, increasing the stake a potential challenger has in the status quo may not make a challenge less likely. Finally, crises involving severe conflicts of interest are shown to be less likely than crises not entailing a severe conflict of interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]