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Examines Charles Peirce's discussion of relations in papers and manuscripts written in and before 1867 to elucidate his considerations to the development of a logic in relations. Reasons behind the importance of the early works on relations; Kinds of relation; Details of a relation of equiparance.

Focuses on a theological argument for fatalism. Question over the true existence of free will in relation to the omniscience of God; Independence of the logical premiss to the theological premiss; Variety of reactions to the theological argument.

Focuses on the confusion arising from the grammar used and the logic of what expressions are expressed. Controversy over the grammar of tenses; Interpretation of schematic forms in traditional Aristotelian logic; Discussion on singular suject-predicate propositions.

The article focuses on prediction logic and quasi-independence in empirical evaluation of formal theory. In the paper by researchers D.K. Hildebrand, J.D. Laing and H.L. Rosenthal, a paradigm for the statement and empirical evaluation of a class of propositions predicting specific relations between qualitative variables was proposed. The approach represents a substantial departure from traditional modes of analysis. Consequently, it is not surprising that one encounters resistance and misunderstanding in those who work in different traditions. The lengthy critique of the paper by researchers L.A. Goodman and W.H. Kruskal, henceforth G&K, illustrates the inappropriateness of evaluating the paradigm using traditional perspectives. G&K operate in two contexts: measures of association and multiplicative models for probabilities in cross-classifications. The primary objective in the paper discussed by G&K was to design a general model that provides a distinct and operationally interpretable measure of the prediction success attained in a population by any logically distinct proposition stated, a priori, in the prediction logic.

This article focuses on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS). EPPS consists of 225 two-option, forced-choice items. Eighteen EPPS items were selected on an a priori basis, so that a variety of traits was represented, several of the statements were repeated in different items, and as many as possible of the traits would be judged to be more desirable in men than in women, or the reverse. Subjects were undergraduates enrolled in introductory a state-supported 2-year college in the suburbs of New York City, New York.

The effects of the form of the function relating criterion values to cue values and of the validity of the cue upon the subjects' hypotheses in probabilistic inference tasks were studied in a factorial experiment with two levels of cue validity (rCE = A5, and rCE = .90), and four function forms (positive linear, negative linear, inversely U-shaped, and U-shaped). The results were consistent with a hypothesis sampling theory, and the relative frequencies of four basic hypotheses could be predicted from earlier results with respect to the relative strengths of those hypotheses. The results also showed that the correlation between the hypotheses stated by the subjects and the rules extracted from their judgments by means of polynomial regression was higher for linear hypotheses than for nonlinear hypotheses. The correlation was quite low, however, also for linear hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of joining or not joining a (faculty) union is analyzed via a simplified analogy. The effects of group size are discussed and it is shown that the decision structure is an n-person prisoner's dilemma. Several Possible solutions to the dilemma are discussed but the ultimate solution appears to be more a matter of social ethics than logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compares an interpretation of the paper 'Illustrations of the Logic of Science,' by C.S. Peirce with the essential characteristics of the pragmatic vindication of induction. Exposition of the relevant parts of "Illustrations'; Difference between Peirce's conception and the pragmatist's conception of the problem of induction; Ways in which Peirce's approach to the problem of induction might prove fruitful for contemporary philosophical discussion.

Reveals a network of trimorphic relations which inheres in Charles Peirce's basic set of operators for triadic logic. Characteristics of dualism; Properties of duals that are analogous to those of classical logic; Use of bracket-free notation.

Focuses on the components of the metaphysics of philosopher Alfred North Whitehead in an attempt to clarify his concept of the theory of concrescence. Description of a metaphysical system according to Whitehead; Uses of logic in metaphysics; Construction of the entities of geometry on the basis of regions of space-time.

Distinction between accidental and nonaccidental universe conditionals and category of thirdness from philosopher Charles Peirce. Ultimate forms of expression of statements that describe phenomena; Problems of selectivity in scientific explanation; Sets of conditions and laws which lead to a deduction of the explanandum.

Speculates about the possible motivation behind the triagic logic developed by philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Evidence supporting the conclusion that Pierce's marginal notes gives matrix definitions of triadic logical operators; Ways in which the concept of relative duality might be introduced; Derivation of mathematical equations.

Criticizes the employment of the doctrine of the categories by C.S. Peirce, arguing that Peirce is not justified in claiming a priori that every field of discourse can be divided by trichotomy into exactly three exhaustive and mutually exclusive classes.

Extricates the position of John Dewey regarding his logical theory. Discussion on the chapters contributed by Dewey to 'Studies in Logical Theory'; Distinction given by Dewey between aesthetic and cognitional experiencing; Analysis of the subject matter of thought considered from the third standpoint.

Examines the nature of the logical interpretant of the logic of concepts from philosopher Charles Peirce. Recognition of the inadequacy of an essentially sensory theory of thought and meaning; Ultimacy of the logical interpretant; Distinct factors or elements to be found in any interpretative structure.

Presents the theory of inquiry of John Dewey in a way which makes clear its relations to absolute idealism. Statement of his instrumentalistic theory of knowledge; Dissolution of the distinction between pure and applied logic; Acknowledgement by Dewey of the force of the idealistic argument.

Proposes to examine the problem of real potency in Charles S. Peirce's position in order to show that far from relegating everything to the future, it provides an important key to understanding Peirce's philosophy. Difference between the language of possibility and the language of actuality; Problem of the relation of actuality and possibility within the present; Objection of Peirce to pure intellectualism.

Discusses Charles Peirce's systems of existential graphs known as systems of logic. Family of logical systems developed by Peirce; Reason why Peirce went through the effort of developing the graphs; Concept of mathematica reasoning.

Examines the hypostatic and factorial categorial scheme of C.S. Peirce. Explanation of the fragmentary work of Peirce; Varied accounts of the categorial scheme; Characterization of the categories in terms of modes of being; Preliminary qualification of the categorial scheme.

Comments on philosopher Chung-ying Cheng's view on induction. Argument for a frequency theory of induction; Discussion on Charles Peirce's view on induction.

Illustrates that functionally complete triadic logics can be constructed using either phi or psi. List of Charles Peirce's triadic operators; Logicians to whom Peirce credited his logical operators.

Comments on Soviet philosopher Yuri K. Melvil's view of Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatism. Errors of fact and of interpretation with Melvil's view; Details of Peirce with his contributions to the logic and philosophy in Melvil's view of science; Discussion on Peirce's fallibilism.

Focuses on the origin of triadic logic of the sentential calculus formulated by philosopher Charles Peirce. Possible operators which are definable by matrices of triadic logic; Analysis of indeterminacy regarding pragmaticism; Importance connection between tychism and triadic logic.

Discusses issues related to Charles Peirce's analysis of normative science. Connection between Peirce's form of pragmatism and the normative sciences; Analysis of Peirce's earliest presentations of the divisions of normative science and their inter-relation in his book 'Minute Logic'; Relation of ethics to logic; Discussion on esthetics.

Examines the second-intentional logic of philosopher Charles Peirce regarding his philosophy of notation. Overview of the icons of algebra; Application of existential and universal quantifiers; Kind of higher-order quantifier in handling of identity; Principle of the existence of a special sum.

Features scholar Charles S. Peirce and his contributions to the study of logic. Background of Pierce; Information on the theories of Peirce; Role of Juliette, wife of Peirce, in propagating his theories about logic after his death.

Focuses on the difference of the analysis conditions of inquiry of philosopher Charles Peirce from his formal analysis of logic. Introduction of the notion of information; State of information concerning a middle term in the two pre misses of a syllogism; Application of the conditions to the analysis of psychological phenomena, such as perception, emotion and error.

The article reports that Section 115(g) of the Internal Revenue Code as applied in recent years raises the current-day counterpart of problems soundly warned against by Adam Smith: The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty. The touchstone then in applying Section 115 must be whether the distribution in acquisition of stock has caused a significant change in the position of the recipient relative to other shareholders or to the corporation.

The article reports that in the Paradoxes of Legal Science, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo dealt with the problems of rest and motion, stability and change, particularly as they are reflected in the law. As he said, "The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of the law." The solutions currently reached on the problem of jurisdiction for divorce will first be set forth, and then the closely related question of the recognition of divorce decrees will be considered.

Focuses on the innate and learned elements of geography. Choice of time scale for climatology; Consideration of social and cultural difference in habits of location and techniques of orientation; Unification of the geography of the world by human logic and optics.

Explores the connection between law and logic. Description of the nature of the common law; Proposition of substantive law; Opposition to the charge of negligence.

Examines the proposition that logic can answer all the questions which judges are compelled to answer. Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' reference to the "notion that the only force at work in the development of law is logic" as fallacious; Professor Thayer's distinction between law and logic; Principle which gives judgment the effect of law; Power of a judge to decide a case according to his view of the general good.

A transportation network algebra is developed as a set of definitions and rules of logic needed to create a useful, integrated theory for systematic design and development of networks. A network is viewed as the output of the physical components of the transportation system. The algebra is based on the concept of a direct trip as a function, and an indirect trip as the result of the composition of these functions. Special forms of network addition are developed and theorems related to the properties of networks are proved. The algebraic operations and theorems permit the composition and decomposition of networks and the systematic, efficient, and sequential generation of networks and their evaluation. The theorems are on some of the properties to be used in their evaluation, such as: connectedness, coalescence, and the criticalness of stations and trips. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists need to recognize the distinction between objective and subjective status inconsistency. Objective inconsistency may be defined in terms of an arbitrary manipulation of an individual's status ranks, or it may be defined in terms of the normative expectations linking together the various status dimensions. Subjective inconsistency, on the other hand, involves asking the respondent to decide for himself whether or not he is inconsistent. When objective inconsistency is defined in terms of arbitrary mathematical manipulations, the relationship between these two components of inconsistency (i.e., objective and subjective) is basically an empirical question. However, when objective inconsistency is defined in terms of the normative expectations in a population, and when the respondent shares these expectations, we propose that these two components of inconsistency will be identical. Conversely, they will not be identical when the respondent does not share these expectations. Finally, the implications of defining inconsistency in terms of normative expectations are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THIS PAPER sets forth a way of integrating major theoretic viewpoints that deal with human social phenomena. In developing this scheme, my principal aim has been to discover useful ways in which such viewpoints complement each other, rather than ways in which they contradict each other. There are two reasons for choosing such an aim. First are the convictions that no single current theory or viewpoint is an adequate representation of the full range of sociological interest; that none is right about all aspects of social life, but that each is right about some aspects;¹ and that when it comes to doing a given empirical research, sociological analysts often draw upon ostensibly conflicting theories for hypotheses and interpretations. These vague apprehensions suggest that it may not be necessary, after all, to be unswervingly loyal to one particular theory; that a systematic assessment of complementarities among theories may be useful in understanding the theories themselves and in applying them to empirical research. In other words, an eclectic student of sociological theories may quite legitimately prefer "the Jain logic of ancient India, with its doctrine of syadvada: that every proposition is tree only up to a point, in a manner of speaking, in certain respects .... [as] in the Jain legend of the seven blind men and the elephant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the problem of prediction in sociological research. Perhaps the most inviting current methodological problems inherent in use of case materials in sociological research rest in attempts to extend the base for systematically derived generalizations from individual cases to classes of cases. In the idiographic frame of reference the ends of scientific generalization are understanding and powers of prediction and control pertinent to the behavior of a single case; in the nomothetic frame of reference the ends of scientific generalization are understanding and powers of prediction and control pertinent to cases grouped categorically. Some argue that actuarial predictions concerning given populations do not reveal which intra-class individual will be involved in predicted behavior. The chance of successful prediction relative to an individual's behavior, whether this is recognized or not, is dependent upon logic and manipulation identical with those relative to prediction by classes.

The article focuses on the new philosophy of science known as "the unity of science movement." This philosophy is professionally known as "logical positivism" or "logical empiricism." This new philosophy is not another philosophy in competition with older philosophies such as realism, idealism, pragmatism, etc. It is a philosophy of science in the broad sense of the word, representing a synthesis of the better parts of all these philosophies, condemning each in so far as it is either incomplete or an over-generalization of a limited and, therefore, inadequate part of the scientific method. Rationalism is not false; it is inadequate. Any philosophy appears to be false when a relatively minor concept has been proposed as a fundamental principle. Those who believed rationalism to be adequate have over-generalized. According to logical empiricism the same can be said of many other philosophies. They are over-generalizations when compared to scientific methodology. Unlike most syntheses of ideas in the past, the unity of science movement is taking place by a community of scientists and not by one man such as an Aristotle, an Aquinas, a Leibniz, etc.

Cites that natural law theorists in political and legal philosophy evolved their concepts of "what ought to be" from the factual "what is". Opposition to Natural Law based on the contention that no postulate in the world "ought" could logically be derived from any statement in the world of "is"; Consideration of the state of mutual dependence by members of the society; Establishment of inductive conclusions; Demonstration of the value of the means in relation to the value of the end.

The article focuses on Wesley Hohfeld's views on various legal issues. One of the great temptations of the law, is to reason logically in matters that are not susceptible of logic. There is only one unit in the law, as thus formulated, and that is a human being, every human being and nothing but a human being. Hohfeld mistakenly insisted that privilege is not always to be called a "right" at all. This unfortunately contradicts so fully established a usage both in law and literature, that it is idle to suppose that any terminological reform will overcome it. It is, therefore, impossible, unless one wishes to rewrite a good part of English literature, to refuse the term "right" to these situations. A restated Hohfeldian analysis may safely discard a great many of the detailed terms that Hohfeld used inadvertently, and even some which he apparently regarded as of high importance.

Discusses principles of classification of law. Influence of formal logic; Purpose of the classification of law; Choice of material to be classified; Theories of the basis of classification; History of classification with a 19th century example from Puchta's "Institutionen"; Classification in the civil law.

This article presents information related to the judicial doctrine of philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. To understand Hegel's philosophy of right and of the State, it is necessary to understand the fundamental principles of his philosophical system as a whole, to which it is closely related. It is not a simple matter to explain it, in as much as it is singularly obscure. All historians of philosophy agree in believing that what especially characterizes Hegel's philosophy is the absolute identification of the intelligible and of the real, of logic and of metaphysics, of the forms of thought and of the laws of nature.

This article presents information related to the Declaration of the Rights of 1789. This doctrine, the most complete and concise expression of which may be found in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, is built in solid logical fashion. If one admits the premise, all the conclusions that are drawn from it follow logically. But the premise may well be contested. The foundations of the doctrine are singularly fragile; and the guarantees that it pretends to give the individual against the arbitrary acts of the State appear very precarious.

Addresses the issue of over-emphasis of the logical element in the law. Legal figures in the U.S. who criticized the over-emphasis of the logical element in the law; Suggestive parallel that can be drawn between the functions of the law and of natural science; Instances showing confusion between actually existent and logically necessary rules of law.

The article presents the reply of the author to the criticism of his paper "Causation and Theory Construction," published in the March 1972 issue of the journal "Social Science Quarterly." According to the author, researchers Herbert L. Costner and Hubert M. Blalock, invoke an empirical criterion to judge logical validity; but logic has nothing to do with the empirical truth of propositions, and that point bears directly on their rules for relating symbols. Had Blalock and Costner not confused utility and logical validity, there would be no argument. At one point Blalock and Costner indicate that a theorist need only assume close relations to justify the sign rule, but elsewhere they say "if those conditions are met." If so, the criterion ignores the point that the empirical validity of the premises may be unknowable directly. At one point Blalock and Costner undertake to describe the "mathematical form of causal models and how this form corresponds to one common notion of a causal relation." But the "mathematical form" of causal models requires no further explication; rather, the issue is correspondence between that form and a conception of causation.

This article is intended to be a discussion of a few passages of Aristotle's "de interpretatione," in which the philosopher deals with the notion of simplicity of a proposition and with certain relations holding between several types of predicates contained in a proposition. It is the aim of these remarks to clarify Aristotle's view of the problems just mentioned and, secondly, to venture an explanation of one of the questions raised in terms of modern linguistics.

Dreams of six subjects with postencephalitic complete loss of memory for recent events were compared to dreams of control subjects with intact memory. The incidence of dreams decreased with the memory defect. Furthermore, the dreams were shorter, simpler, reality bound, lacked daily residue and emotional depth, and followed secondary-thought-type logic. They were stereotyped and repetitious. Instead of symbolically elaborated new attempted solutions for recent conflicts, these dreams contained the memory of events the subjects experienced before the onset of the memory defect. In each instance, the remembered event once offered a relief for a physiological need, similar to the one that precipitated the dream. Assuming that the mechanism of dreaming remains intact in these subjects with permanent memory loss for recent events, the results suggest that dreams of subjects with intact memory combine two processes: 1) a sensory stimulus of internal origin (e.g., an organic need) may serve as a decoding signal resulting in retrieval of an old memory trace; and 2) processes connected with perception and encoding the memory of recent events contribute the daily residue and the newly created symbolic elaboration of the daily residue, and old memory traces under an emotional impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]