Search

Expectancy-valence models of work motivation are frequently tested with survey methodology. This paper deals with the reliability and construct validity of various questionnaire measures of expectancy-valence components. Measures of (a) valence, (b) instrumentality, and (c) expectancy were given to a sample of 171 Air Force trainees on two occasions. The results indicated that reliabilities of the three 'components of the model were fairly low and that different measures of the same component were not highly correlated. it. was concluded that using questionnaire measures to test expectancy-valence models is inappropriate until better measures are developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expectancy theories of work motivation specify a multiplicative relationship between valence of job outcomes (V) and expectancy (E) that effort will lead to these outcomes. But both E and V are typically measured using scales lacking a rational zero point and thus at best interval in nature. Multiplication of such scales is theoretically not a meaningful operation. This paper demonstrates that transformations of E and V scales which change only the location of the nonmeaningful zero point can greatly alter obtained correlations between E × V and measures work motivation or effort. Two potential solutions to this problem are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes and integrates research concerned with a long-neglected topic in psychology: the relationship between conscious goals and intentions and task performance. The basic premise of this research is that an individual's conscious ideas regulate his actions. Studies are cited demonstrating that: (1) hard goals produce a higher level of performance (output) than easy goals; (2) specific hard goals produce a higher level of output than a goal of "do your best"; and (3) behavioral intentions regulate choice behavior. The theory also views goals and intentions as mediators of the effects of incentives on task performance. Evidence is presented supporting the view that monetary incentives, time limits, and knowledge of results do not affect performance level independently of the individual's goals and intentions. A theoretical analysis supports the same view with respect to three other incentives: participation, competition, and praise and re- proof. Finally, behavioral intentions were found to mediate the effects of money and "verbal reinforcement" on choice behavior. It is concluded that any adequate theory of task motivation must take account of the individual's conscious goals and intentions. The applied implications of the theory are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following four papers are modified versions of papers delivered in a symposium titled "The Role of Financial Compensation in Managerial Motivation" held during the Spring, 1965 meetings of the Midwestern Psychological Association. Dunnette presents an instrumental model of managerial motivation and discusses its implications for research on the motivational effects of compensation. He also reviews research related to Preferences (motives) most often found to be salient for managers. Lawler summarizes previous research on the effects of secret salary policies on manager satisfaction and presents results of another recent study showing that policies of pay secrecy have several costs not generally recognized. Secrecy apparently blurs managers' perceptions of what others earn; they overestimate the salaries of peers and of subordinates and this can lead to greater pay dissatisfaction and the belief that job performance is rather unimportant in determining pay. Weick reviews the psychological literature bearing on the effects of insufficient rewards on the intensity of effort. He reviews evidence in support of the relationship, postulates several properties of experimental procedures to explain the effects, and suggests that propositions from frustration or cue-utilization theory may afford the most parsimonious explanation of the relationship. Finally, Opsahl provides an overview of current, knowledge about managerial compensation and its effect on managerial job behavior, and suggests areas in need of further intensive research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]