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Using microdata from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU‐LFS) and aggregate indicators of labour market institutions, this article compares the job quality of native and non‐native workers across European countries and analyses the impact of the institutional settings on the job quality differential between both groups. The LFS is used to measure a job quality index for the period 2005–2017. We find that some immigrant groups fare worse than natives, the contribution of the "composition effect" to explain this differential is large, and the institutional framework affects the immigration gap in job quality. In particular, some labour market institutions (more centralized wage bargaining, stricter employment protection legislation) tend to be detrimental for immigrants relative to natives, while integration policies seem to work well in reducing these differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2004/2007 EU enlargements rendered CEE citizens legally equal to EU labour market participants. However, CEE migrants still face 'racialisation' and segmentation in North-Western European labour markets. Similar processes might extend to EU-South migrants, giving rise to a division of labour, whereby CEE and EU-South migrants end up in poor-quality, low-pay jobs. We compare the labour market integration of recent intra-EU migrants (EU8, EU2, EU-South, EU-West/EEA) in the UK, Germany and Denmark. Using labour force, microcensus and register data, we model quantitative and qualitative integration through labour force participation and wages. We find no significant differences in labour force participation between nationals and migrants in the UK. Whilst in both Denmark and Germany, the labour force participation of EU-migrants is significantly lower. Notwithstanding differences in migration trends, labour markets and welfare regimes, we find evidence of a division of labour along occupational and industry lines − that translates into wage differences. EU-West/EEA migrants occupy better jobs (even outperforming nationals), followed by EU-South and CEE migrants. In Denmark and Germany, EU8 and EU2 migrants' wages are lower than those of nationals even after controlling for differences in occupations. These findings suggest that inequalities across the EU are reproduced rather than converging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European debates on immigrant integration focus on employment because of its implications for assimilation. Although studies show that Sub‐Saharan African immigrants are most disadvantaged across Europe, cross‐national analyses do not examine labour force participation (LFP) or control for selection into the labour force before estimating employment, calling these results into question. Furthermore, studies rarely discuss visible minority status or gender making it unclear whether (1) country‐context matters for African LFP and employment and (2) visible minority status matters differently by gender. I use French and Spanish census data to determine whether Sub‐Saharan Africans are most disadvantaged in new and traditional receiving countries. My results indicate that country‐context matters, but previous employment findings likely reflect variation in LFP. Despite smaller penalties to migration characteristics in Spain, Sub‐Saharan African men are the only group significantly less likely to be employed in Spain, indicating that they experience unique barriers to job access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Second-generation Turkish immigrants make up an increasingly important segment of European labour markets. These young adults are entering the prime working ages and forming families. However, we have only a limited understanding of the relationship between labour force participation and parenthood among second-generation Turkish women. Using unique data from the Integration of the European Second Generation survey (2007/08), we compared the labour force participation of second-generation Turkish women with their majority-group counterparts by motherhood status in four countries. We found evidence that motherhood gaps, with respect to labour force participation, were similar for majority and second-generation Turkish women in Germany and in Sweden; however, there may be larger gaps for second-generation mothers than for majority women in the Netherlands and France. Cross-national findings were consistent with the view that national normative and social policy contexts are relevant for the labour force participation of all women, regardless of migrant background. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Opportunity and gender equality are among the fundamental principles that European Union law is based upon. The EU is obliged to promote this principle in all the actions it enterprises. The studies conducted at the level of EU member states high-lighten diverse and multiple cases of both direct and indirect discrimination, gender motivated or otherwise, one of the most important forms of discrimination being nationality based. Immigrants are more exposed to discrimination compared to the "natives" and women immigrants even more. In this study, we focus our research on immigrants within the EU and merely secondarily on third country national immigrants. In an attempt to reduce discrimination under all its aspects, the EU has adopted the Strategy for equality between women and men for the 2010 - 2015. In this Strategy, the EU has set certain objectives through which the UE evaluates the means member state use to accomplish, implement, monitor and evaluate their actions. Romania, in its quality of member state, has adopted, at its turn, a strategy in the field covering 2014 - 2017 and proposed a number of accomplishable objectives through different key-actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Migrant care work has emerged as an increasingly important solution to the challenges of growing eldercare needs in both the private and the public sphere. Migrant workers are employed in domestic services in Southern European and in some continental European countries, and they are a significant part of the work force in the formal care sector in many national contexts. The article provides an exploratory cross-country analysis of the phenomenon. After assessing the extent of migrant care work based on individually contracted workers in the domestic sector vs. organization-based care workers in nine European welfare states, it investigates which conditions sustain specific national patterns. Using fuzzy-set analysis the article demonstrates how the intersection of care, migration and employment regimes shapes different patterns of migrant care work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After accession to the EU, we observed strong wave of emigration of Polish workers to the EU partners. Polish emigration rose from about 1 million before accession to a peak of 2.2- 2.5 million emigrants. The EU member states, which were among the most important destinations for Polish emigrants, included: the UK (690 thousands), Germany (490 thousands), Ireland (200 thousands), the Netherlands (98 thousands). Contrary to the popular opinion, the Poles are not the most mobile people among the European nations: in Poland emigration represents about 2% of the working population, less than in Lithuania (3,1%), in Cyprus (3%), in Romania 2,5% and, in the long run, much less than in Portugal (9%) and in Ireland (8,2%). Polish emigrants were mainly young, energetic and well educated people, who found jobs especially in the construction sector, in agriculture, in the simple services field - in the restaurants and the hotels of the host country. The main reason for emigration was an economic one: lower wages in Poland than in the EU-15 member states and lack of jobs in Poland. Although these waves of emigration had some negative consequences upon the Polish economy (for example the brain drain in the field of medicine and computer science, while some branches of industry and services started to complain about the lack of adequate labour force on the local market), the yearly transfer of money from emigrants to their mother country was higher than 2 billion euro, and even reached 4,1 billion in 2007, which benefited the Polish economy. After the financial crisis in 2008, more and more Polish people lost their jobs abroad and began to return to Poland. Among the Polish emigrants in UK, one third declared their willingness to come back to Poland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing high levels of temporary migration between Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union (EU) have highlighted a number of concerns relating to the eastern enlargement of the Union. While much of the debate has focused on the destinations, we use Slovakia as a case study to explore economic implications for the countries of origin of highly skilled migrants. First, the paper examines estimates of the scale of“youth brain migration”, comparing survey-based and expert-opinion estimates with our own estimate based on reconciling labour market and educational data. This identifies a substantial loss of graduate workers from the labour force through migration, accounting for a potentially significant proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Second, we consider whether such migration will constitute“brain drain/overflow” or“brain circulation”: in other words will it be temporary or permanent? In some ways, however, this is a false dichotomy, for there are strong links between initial temporary migration and intended permanent migration, explored here through a survey of the motivations and social networks of returned migrants. Third, we address the ability of national states to intervene to mediate such losses. We generally concur with other commentators on the need for a multi-scalar and multi-functional approach, focusing especially on economic development. However, we are pessimistic about the likely speed of economic convergence and, moreover, argue that initial temporary migration (with implications for permanent migration) will continue to be driven by non-economic goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued that Europe needs more immigrants to restore its age structure and its work force. Even if low European fertility continues, decline in the work force is relatively modest in the medium term and is considerably lower than the potential reserve labor force in Europe. It seems eccentric to propose the resumption of immigration for low-grade labor when there are 15 million unemployed in Europe, most under age 25 and many themselves immigrants, especially since future demand for labor emphasizes high skills. A resumption of general immigration to ensure population stabilization would require inflows much higher even than those previously considered unacceptable. Instead, attention should be given to making it easier for women to combine their desires for children with those for work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses various perspectives of immigration from receiving countries. Western Europe and the Gulf opted for a policy of admitting temporary rather than permanent migrants because they see manpower shortages as temporary. Western European governments assumed that the labor shortages of the 1950s and early 1960s would end when those born immediately after the war entered the labor force. Some sociologists and economists have suggested deeper structural explanations for the use of temporary foreign workers. One is that foreign workers can be a cushion in economies with fluctuations in employment. Another reason for admitting guest workers rather than permanent migrants is that the countries of Western Europe and the Gulf believed that they could thereby avoid becoming ethnically plural societies.

Since World War II, migrant labor has contributed significantly to Western Europe's economic growth. Initially, industries recruited and hired migrant workers to overcome labor shortages and downward demographic trends within the domestic work force. Since the recession of the mid-1970s, however, migrant labor has faced increasing job loss and restricted entry to many Western European countries. Throughout the postwar period, state immigration policy has supported industry, initially by assisting in the recruitment, and more recently, facilitating the repatriation of migrant workers. Economic and social disparities between developed core and underdeveloped peripheral countries are linked to international labor mobility. Certain sectors in the core benefit from the reserve labor force while emigration from peripheral countries partially contributes to these countries' economic problems. These issues are explored through a case study of the employment of North Africans in the French automobile industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A year or so ago, economic analysts were frantic about Europe's "baby bust," an idea that appears to have travelled across the Atlantic from the U.S. Analysts advised that they must "breed for Europe" or import millions of immigrants to forestall economic collapse due to rising pension obligations and a shrinking workforce. These proposals are now recognized as politically unacceptable. Moreover, they provide no solutions. Falling birth rates and aging populations are nothing new to Europe — life expectancies have doubled in less than two hundred years and birth rates have been falling for more than a century.