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Through a proprietary dataset of listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we establish a positive link between firms' financial technology (Fintech) business and their corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Such a link can be more pronounced among firms of stronger political connections, lower agency costs, and better internal control. Enhanced supply of bank loans, internal capital market, public scrutiny, and firms' strategic differences are underlying the link. Fintech business may also effectively curb firms' corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) behaviour. Fintech business may have become a strategic endeavor to sustain long-term economic growth in the digital age. • Fintech business positively contributes to firm CSR practices. • The impact is strengthened by political connections, lowered agency costs, and internal control. • Bank loans, internal capital market, public scrutiny, and strategic differences are underlying elements. • Fintech business also curbs corporate social irresponsibility behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research is not conclusive whether information asymmetries or managerial discretion are the cause of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper examines the effect of family firms' governance heterogeneity on firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity in Brazil. The Brazilian economic and corporate governance context present several idiosyncratic features, including weak minority shareholder protection, an underdeveloped capital market, macro-economic uncertainties, the presence of controlling shareholders (especially families), and the excessive use of control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing us to explore in greater detail the drivers of investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with a highly entrenched family presence (divergence between corporate control and voting rights coupled with family management) than in less entrenched family firms. This result emerges primarily due to financial constraints from asymmetric information, rather than agency problems of free cash flow from abuse of managerial discretion. Our findings shed new light on the role of excessive control rights in investment decisions, allowing family managers to reallocate capital to cope with financial constraints in times of economic uncertainties. • Family entrenched firms reduce the investment-cash flow sensitivity. • Entrenched owners are stewards in times of economic uncertainty. • Underinvestment due to information asymmetries seems to prevail. • There is no evidence of private benefits of control in family entrenched firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]