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The effects of climate change on marine ecosystems are causing cascading impacts on livelihood, food security, and culture through fisheries. Such impacts interact and exacerbate the effects of overfishing on marine social‐ecological systems, complicating the rebuilding of ecosystems to achieve desirable and sustainable ocean futures. Developing effective pathways for ecosystem rebuilding requires consideration of the co‐benefits and trade‐offs between ecological and social dimensions and between fishing sectors. However, the effects of intensifying climate change on such co‐benefits or trade‐offs are yet to be well understood, particularly in regions where ecosystem rebuilding is urgently needed. We applied a numerical optimization routine to define the scope for improvement toward the Pareto‐frontier for ecological robustness and economic benefits of the northern South China Sea (NSCS) and the East China Sea (ECS) ecosystems. These two ecosystems were used to represent over‐exploited low‐ and mid‐latitude systems, respectively, and the optimization aimed to improve their status through fisheries management. We find that the ECS ecosystem has the possibility of increasing the economic benefits generated by the fisheries it supports under climate change by 2050 while increasing the uncertainty of achieving biodiversity objectives. Nevertheless, climate change is projected to reduce the scope to restore ecosystem structures and the potential economic benefits in the NSCS ecosystem. This study highlights the contrasting impacts of climate change on the co‐benefits/trade‐offs in ecosystem rebuilding and the benefits obtainable by different fishing sectors even in neighboring ecosystems. We conclude that consideration at the nexus of climate–biodiversity‐fisheries is a key to developing effective ecosystem rebuilding plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is shifting the distribution of fish stocks that straddle between exclusive economic zones (EEZ), challenging transboundary fisheries management. Here, we examine the projected sharing of jointly managed transboundary fish stocks between Canada and the United States. We hypothesize that ocean warming will alter the sharing of fish stocks between the two countries, and that such changes will intensify under a high carbon emission scenario. We look at the specific cases of the International Pacific Halibut Commission that manages Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and a resource sharing arrangement in the Gulf of Maine for cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), and yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea) to discuss the management consequences of shifts in transboundary stocks. We rely on multiple Earth system models' simulations and species distribution models to estimate the change in catch potential and stock share ratio of each transboundary stock in the 21st century under two climate change scenarios. Results show that, even under a low emission scenario, most transboundary fish stocks sharing ratios, i.e., the proportion of the total catch of a fish stock taken by a given country, will change by 2050 relative to present. The overall reduction in catch potential, in addition to the changes in stock-share will further exacerbate trade-offs between changes in species catch potential. Such trade-offs in the Atlantic and Pacific regions will be amplified if a high emission scenario is followed, relative to a low carbon emission scenario. Based on the simulation results, we examine possible solution options to reduce climate risks on transboundary fish stocks and fisheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We apply the concept of threat points in game theory to explore the stability of current joint management arrangements for shared transboundary fish stocks between Canada and the United States. We use three examples to explore the effects of projected impacts of climate change on the productivity and distribution of these stocks between the exclusive economic zones of the two countries. The three stocks that we study are: Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea) within the Gulf of Maine, and Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in the Pacific Coast. We define a threat point as the payoffs that the fisheries in Canada and the United States take home given the current management agreement between the two countries. This is an application of John Nash's threat point, defined as the minimum payoffs that each player in a game theoretic model must receive for the solution to a cooperative game to be stable, which is usually the outcome of a noncooperative game. First, we compute the threat points, that is, the current profits that Canada and the United States derive from the three shared stocks, respectively. Next, we build an ensemble of climate-marine ecosystem and economic models and use them to determine how climate change is likely to change current profits received by each country relative to the shifts in their threat points. We find that in some cases the profits obtained by fisheries in Canada and the United States would change under climate change both in absolute and relative terms resulting in relative changes in threat points. These relative changes in threat points serve as the basis for our discussion of the stability of current transboundary management agreements between Canada and the United States for these important shared stocks in the face of climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]