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Executive Order No. 14008 mandated that U.S. federal agencies and departments develop Climate Change Adaptation Plans to enhance the nation's resilience to climate change. Invasive species are documented to reduce the effectiveness of climate adaptation and mitigation actions. In spite of this, only eight of the 26 federal plans directly reference invasive species, and just four meaningfully consider the reciprocal impact of invasive species on climate adaptation efforts. To ensure that climate adaptation planning and processes are effective with associated benefits for biodiversity conservation, a gap analysis of the Climate Change Adaptation Plans was conducted. Five key recommendations were developed that would transform how invasive species are considered within them. Examples of how invasive species have been included in some of the plans are provided, with suggestions for agencies that did not include invasive species on how they might do so, to illustrate that dedicated efforts in prevention, detection, and management of invasive species can safeguard carbon sequestration, protect communities and infrastructure, and minimize economic and biodiversity losses. Although developed based on U.S. federal plans, these recommendations can be used by state and local, as well as international, jurisdictions tasked with implementing climate‐adaptive policies to build resilience across multiple sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National climate policies have generated a considerable body of research in academic literature. Focusing on the little-studied case of France, this article examines the way in which, in this country, the State has drafted its latest low-carbon strategy (SNBC). Drawing on approaches such as ‘bureaucratic politics’ and ‘administrative capacity’, it questions the ability of the administration responsible for writing this document (and thus defending the climate cause) to make its voice heard within the political-administrative arena. Based on an in-depth sociological study, this article shows that this administration found itself in a position of ‘powerlessness’, due to three main factors: instrumental (the limited scope of the tool, reflecting an initial will to reduce its impact), organizational (the subordinate position of this administration within the bureaucratic hierarchy) and political (weak support from government). The result is a contested strategy, unlikely to bring about a credible roadmap to implement the necessary changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the realm of climate policy, issues of environmental justice (EJ) are often treated as second-order affairs compared to overarching sustainability goals. We argue that EJ is in fact critical to successfully addressing our national and global climate challenges; indeed, centering equity amplifies the voices of the diverse constituencies most impacted by climate change and that are needed to build successful coalitions that shape and advance climate change policy. We illustrate this perspective by highlighting the experience of California and the contentious processes by which EJ became integrated into the state's climate action efforts. We examine the achievements and shortcomings of California's commitment to climate justice and discuss how lessons from the Golden State are influencing the evolution of current federal climate change policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last two decades have seen an increase in climate financing channelled to the Global South from multiple sources, putting a spotlight on climate finance coordination challenges in recipient countries. However, the climate finance coordination debate has largely been centred at climate finance provision at the global level. Emerging literature has called on recipient countries to establish effective climate finance coordination mechanisms. Yet, the calls have not clarified what accounts for an effective coordination mechanism. This paper addresses the gap by analyzing stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination in Kenya. Kenya has instituted a legal and institutional framework to guide climate finance coordination, but challenges of coordination persist. Using the political economy framework, the paper analyzes political economy factors influencing stakeholder perceptions and climate change policy implementation to identify political contestations that need to be reconciled. Data is drawn from relevant literature, 29 key informant interviews and 4 focus group discussions at the national level in Nairobi and at the sub-national level in Turkana County. Deductive thematic analysis is adopted for coding and analyzing data. Results indicate that different ideologies, interests, incentives, politics, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of an effective climate finance coordination mechanism and climate policy implementation. The operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund are the most contested. The paper calls on policy actors to reconcile political issues of contention for recipient countries to institute coordination mechanisms that gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from stakeholders. Underlying political economy factors including different ideologies, interests, politics, incentives, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination as well as climate change policy implementation. The consequential political contestations need to be reconciled; otherwise, the established coordination mechanism is less likely to gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from climate change stakeholders. This calls for meaningful and extensive stakeholder engagements and consensus building to minimize contention, particularly over the operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund in Kenya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Societal transformations for addressing climate change are intensely contested and at risk of resistance and backlash to ambitious policy action. But they are frequently modeled through heuristics such as S‐curves which abstract from such conflicts, assuming increasing returns to scale as a driver of transformations. This is the case even while scholars accept the presence of political conflict in transformation processes. Within political science and allied disciplines, the notions of policy feedback and policy coalitions have been deployed to understand how such political conflicts may be understood. But these approaches risk gravitating toward an instrumental design impulse that inadvertently downplays conflict. We argue that policy action for societal transformations should be re‐conceptualized as an unfolding series of battle‐settlement events whereby heated episodic political struggles over a certain policy object or issue play out and eventually settle in ways that structure future debates while nonetheless remaining indeterminate and open to challenge or reversal. Such an approach reflects the varied empirical experiences of climate policy action to date which include both accumulation and reversal. It also helps explain trajectories of change that are discontinuous and lurching in contrast to common images of transformation as progressive and cumulative. We illustrate this approach through two cases of unfolding societal transformation on climate change: coal phaseout in the United Kingdom and renewable energy uptake in Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine the ways in which the futures of climate change and the climate change policy process are constructed as narratives—both explicitly and implicitly—in two different yet interconnected contexts that shape public climate discourse and debate: foresight‐based political decision‐making and journalism. The featured case is the National Energy and Climate Strategy of Finland for 2030. We employ and expand the Narrative Policy Framework to better understand the co‐existent, implicit narratives of the future in the contexts of policy and media. We construct two co‐existing yet contradictory underlying narratives of the future of climate change and climate policy. Our approach reveals that the prevailing master narrative of a desirable future is challenged by a co‐existing counter narrative where policies in the energy and climate strategy prioritize shorter‐term policy interests over climate change. Building on these findings, we argue that, in climate policy communication, communicators convey futures through narratives—both explicitly, as descriptions of what is perceived, hoped, and anticipated to happen, and implicitly, as the sum of the parts included and excluded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, there has been increasing research interest in individuals' support of and resistance to climate and environmental policy instruments. However, there is an empirical bias in the literature, as few studies have been conducted in low-income countries. Based on a survey with 4,766 respondents we identify the level of public acceptability for climate policy instruments and their determinants in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda). While our sample is not fully representative of the East-African population, we capture highly educated individuals in urban areas, who are likely to have a large influence on policy processes. In line with previous studies in other contexts, we find that higher education and climate change concern are linked to the acceptability of policies aimed at reducing fossil fuel consumption. Specifying how the revenue from a climate tax or subsidy removal would be used, almost doubled the support for these policy instruments. In contrast to earlier studies, we find that investments in social programmes, not environmental programmes, was the revenue specification that increased the acceptability the most. One possible explanation would be that in a context where poverty is more prevalent, social issues are more salient to people. We also find weak associations between trust in government and the acceptability of climate policy instruments in East Africa and large heterogeneity across the five focal East African countries. Besides establishing an empirical foundation for future research on climate policy support in East Africa, the study provides essential policy insights: Investing in education and improved information, contributing to increased awareness and understanding of climate concerns, can potentially increase support for climate policy proposals also in the East African context. Earmarking revenues from climate policy instruments for social programmes may also significantly boost support. However, as our study is not fully representative of the population in the five countries and relies on stated preferences, which may be subject to different biases, the results should be interpreted with caution. In a sample skewed towards more urban and educated East-Africans, specifying how the tax revenue would be used more than doubled the acceptability for climate taxes. Investments in social programmes was the revenue specification that increased the acceptability for climate taxes the most. Earmarking revenue use may be a way to increase carbon tax acceptability in East Africa. Investing in education and improved information contributing to increased awareness and understanding of climate concerns, can potentially increase support for climate policy proposals. The acceptability of a climate tax on fuel is lower than the acceptability of a quantity-based regulation on fossil fuel across the urban, well-educated and potentially politically influential population in East Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elected politicians and civil servants are key in developing climate policy. The articles in this special issue investigate factors that induce politico-administrative actors to adopt climate policies and dismantle anti-climate policies to advance decarbonisation. Politico-administrative actors have predominantly expanded climate policy and raised policy ambition in recent decades. However, economic crises and weakening public support may cause dismantling of climate policy and hamper policy ambition. Against this backdrop, articles in this special issue also study factors that propel climate policy dismantling. Together, the contributions show that interactions between politico-administrative actors and publics, organised interests, and international organisations shape climate and anti-climate policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how exposure to energy transition and climate policy vulnerability influence popular support for more ambitious climate policy. Moreover, it explores whether this relationship depends on a person's generalized and political trust. Comparing data from surveys in Germany and Switzerland, the findings reveal that perceived exposure to energy transition positively influences climate policy support, while individual climate policy vulnerability decreases it. For individuals with higher levels of trust, exposure helps enhance the positive effect (subjective exposure) or dampen the negative effect (policy vulnerability). These results underscore the importance of incorporating trust and subjective perceptions into climate policy frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Trump was elected as US President and given the opportunity to implement his campaign promise of withdrawing the country from international climate change agreements, it sparked fears of a knock-on effect of non-commitment from other states that could result in the Paris Agreement's dismantlement. This article examines public opinion – which often influences governments' policy decisions – collected in early 2017 in 38 countries on his proposed withdrawal from international climate change agreements. On top of important individual-level predictors, disapproval of his proposal was higher in liberal democracies and countries that depend less on fossil fuels for electricity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a thorough examination of methane capture from Polish coal mines, contextualized within the framework of the European Union's (EU) climate policy objectives. Through a strategic analysis encompassing the interior of coal mines, the surrounding environment, and the macro environment, this study elucidates the complex dynamics involved in methane emissions and capture initiatives. The key findings include a declining trend in absolute methane emissions since 2008, despite fluctuations in coal extraction volumes, and a relatively stable level of methane capture exceeding 300 million m3/year since 2014. The analysis underscores the critical role of government support, both in terms of financial incentives and streamlined regulatory processes, to facilitate the integration of methane capture technologies into coal mining operations. Collaboration through partnerships and stakeholder engagement emerges as essential for overcoming resource competition and ensuring the long-term success of methane capture projects. This paper also highlights the economic and environmental opportunities presented by methane reserves, emphasizing the importance of investment in efficient extraction technologies. Despite these advancements, challenges persist, particularly regarding the low efficiency of current de-methanation technologies. Recommendations for modernization and technological innovation are proposed to enhance methane capture efficiency and utilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change has been on the national agenda since the late 1970s, yet until recently, little progress had been made at the federal level because of the dominance of the fossil fuel industry within the policy subsystem. In this article, we use multiple streams approach with process tracing methods to examine why significant climate policy was able to pass in 2022, despite growing polarization, when previous attempts had all failed. We examine two key case studies, the failure of Waxman-Markey in 2010 and the success of the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022. In 2010 some climate organizations were hesitant about cap and trade as a policy mechanism to address climate change and failed to stimulate advocacy in their grassroots. Since then, climate groups rallied around an alternative policy approach, which involves investing in clean technology inspired by the Green New Deal. Activists built significant power within the Democratic Party, evident in climate policy remaining prominent on the policy agenda at the beginning of Biden's presidency. Moreover, media outlets have improved their coverage of extreme weather events by tying them to climate change. In short, the political dynamics changed with growing grassroots climate advocacy, motivating citizens to elect Democratic leaders capable of passing climate legislation and keeping climate high on the policy agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a state-of-the-art global general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of an International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF) proposal for the coordination of global climate policy. With the ICPF proposal, countries would implement a carbon price floor that is differentiated according to their level of development. The price floor could be implemented by an actual carbon price or other policies with equivalent stringency. Implementing such a joint effort would be a big step towards aligning global emissions with the Paris Agreement. The study highlights three main findings. First, the ICPF is progressive in terms of emission reductions and demands considerably more effort from high-income countries (HICs). Unlike proposals based on equity principles, however, it requires neither extremely high emission reductions from HICs nor massive financial transfers. Second, the differentiated carbon prices cost only an additional 0.3 percent of global GDP compared to a global uniform carbon price. Third, the ICPF can be as effective as border carbon adjustment (BCA) mechanisms at preserving competitiveness of HICs despite the differentiation in carbon price floors. This means, there would be no need for BCA with an ICPF. Compared to a BCA, HICs can avoid the administrative burden and low-income countries (LICs) will not face the cost of BCA. As a first step to global climate policy, a sectoral ICPF for the EITE sector could be introduced. It would address competitiveness concerns almost as well as the full ICPF. An International Carbon Price Floor (ICPF), with carbon price floors differentiated by development level, would incur only small economic costs compared to baseline economic growth. The ICPF would allow for international burden sharing, with HICs incurring higher cost than middle – and low-income countries. The ICPF reduces distortions to competitiveness as much as BCA, so that no BCA would be necessary. A 'sectoral ICPF' in energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors would be effective against leakage and loss in competitiveness and would thus be an attractive alternative to border carbon adjustment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the effects of three events with major importance for climate policy on energy sector stocks: the Paris Agreement, the Trump election and presidency, and the Biden election. By combining event studies with impulse‐indicator saturation methods, we show that the Paris Agreement and the election of Mr. Biden benefited renewable industries, while the election of Mr. Trump had negative effects. For fossil fuel industries, the effects were largely the opposite. Despite Trump's efforts to eliminate environmental regulations, his presidency did however witness a decrease in both US coal production and consumption, while natural gas and oil consumption increased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introductory article we address the concepts of “common goods” and “multilevel governance” from a theoretical perspective, while at the same time, the different contributions to this monographic issue of the journal Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas are presented. A series of articles which, as will be seen, deal with particular cases in which, against the common backdrop of environmental sustainability, sectoral policies are deployed on the basis of relational governance patterns and focused on the specific issues of water and the fight against climate change. As can be seen in the development of the text itself, the management of uncertainty and complexity emerges as a recurrent and crucial theme, justifying different institutional mechanisms to achieve consensus, where possible, involving a variable number of actors and territorial levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the role of expectations and monetary policy in the economy's response to climate actions. We show that in a stochastic environment, without the standard assumption of the perfect rationality of agents, there is more uncertainty regarding the path and the economic impact of a climate policy, with a potential threat to the ability of central banks to maintain price stability. Market beliefs and behavioral agents increase the trade-offs inherent to the chosen mitigation tool, with a carbon tax entailing more emissions uncertainty than in a rational expectations model and a cap-and-trade scheme implying a more pronounced pressure on allowance prices and inflation. The impact on price stability is worsened by delays in the implementation of stringent climate policies, the lack of confidence in the ability of central banks to keep inflation under control, and the adoption of monetary rules tied to expectations rather than current macroeconomic conditions. Central banks can implement successful stabilization policies that reduce the uncertainty surrounding the impact of climate actions and support the greening process while remaining within their mandate. • This work investigates how expectations can shape a green transition. • Without fully rational agents impacts of climate policy are more uncertain. • Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade's drawbacks are enlarged by non-fully-rational agents. • Delayed action and low credibility in central banks cause major inflationary pressure. • A reactive monetary policy can reduce uncertainty on climate policies' impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon costs impact both the input side of economic sectors, as fossil inputs are used as raw materials, and the output side, as CO2 emissions are paid for in the form of emission allowances. The effectiveness of climate policies depends heavily on the total cost of fossil inputs and emissions, but the input side has typically been ignored so far. The aim of this paper is to present a model that quantifies the total private costs associated with the carbon use of economic sectors. The model presented in this paper is based on an environmentally extended input-output analysis. Total private carbon costs include costs associated with fossil inputs, including both energy and non-energy use, as well as costs associated with carbon emissions. China provides an instructive example, as its economy is heavily dependent on fossil energy sources. The results of the presented model highlight the problem of conflicting energy and climate policies. Reductions in input-side costs may offset the rising costs of carbon emission costs enforced by the climate policy. This article represents a stride in that direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Media representations of the future are a key component of climate change and energy policies. This study integrates media analysis with futures studies and focuses on the media framings and representations of futures related to key national-level energy and climate strategy documents. It utilizes qualitative content analysis of online news articles of Finland's national public broadcasting company committed to high-quality journalism. The results show that a more multifaceted coverage of climate action increased during the study period of 2015–2020, especially in terms of frames and future scenario archetypes, and indicate gradually widening awareness of climate risks. However, climate change has been framed as an isolated policy area, and climate change mitigation and adaptation remain framed as subordinate to economic policy targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After tentative efforts during the 1990s, the past two decades have seen a rapid increase in the number of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions mitigation policies, initially in a few frontrunner countries and more recently spreading globally. Over the same period, GHG emissions have continued to rise, but the rate of growth has recently slowed. Are mitigation policies having an effect? To explore this question, we review and synthesize the empirical literature on the impact of mitigation policies on three key outcomes: GHG emissions, proximate emission drivers like energy intensity and land use, and low-carbon technologies. Our key contribution to the available literature lies in establishing an empirically based track record of climate action, focusing on methodologically sound ex post studies. We find that mitigation policies have had a discernible impact on emissions and multiple emission drivers. Most notably, they have led to reductions in energy use, declines in deforestation rates, as well as cost reductions and capacity expansions of low-carbon technologies in many instances. Furthermore, implemented policies to date are likely to have reduced global emissions by several billion tons of CO2eq per year compared to a world without mitigation policies. In the light of current ambitions on climate action falling short of what is required to limit global warming to the Paris temperature goals, we conclude that there is ample evidence of policy instruments with demonstrable impacts, but that efforts need to be hugely strengthened and expanded. Also, far more attention is required to policy monitoring, evaluation, and learning so as to strengthen the basis for future policy and the attribution of its impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes and compares the climate policy and transformation pathways of the forerunner cities Turku (Finland), Groningen (The Netherlands), Rostock, and Potsdam (both located in Germany). Our study combines an international comparison of cities located in three different countries with a national comparison of two German cities. This research design is based on the assumption that national context matters. We argue that the chances for scaling local experiments between cities are particularly high among matching cities, which resemble each other. Such cities have the capability to learn by matchmaking, nationally as well as internationally. All four cities are mid‐sized cities of roughly the same size located in advanced democracies in northern and continental Europe. Moreover, within their countries, all four cities have acquired the reputation of being forerunners in the area of climate policy. First, we focus on a comparison of the four cities and identify the strengths and weaknesses of their climate policies. Second, we assess the scaling potential of local experiments, in particular institutional and organizational innovations, integrative and participatory approaches, and leadership. Third, we analyze actual scaling between the two German cities, which share the same national context. More generally, we explore how matching cities can develop from local pioneers to internationally acknowledged leaders, which have the ability to upscale successful local initiatives, nationally as well as internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, the United States has shown a sometimes conservative and sometimes radical pendulum in its position on several key subsidiary climate treaties. For example, in 1997, the United States Congress refused to approve the Kyoto Protocol signed by former US vice president Al Gore. In 2015, President Obama used executive power to bypass Congress to sign the Paris Agreement. In 2017, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement. These seemingly confusing behaviors actually reflect the contradictions and conflicts in the formulation of climate policy of the United States. Using neoclassical realism theory as the analytical framework, the authors of this paper explore how such several key variables as leader image and perception, partisan politics, and civil society and lobbying groups shape the climate policy of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To achieve the goals of reaching peak carbon emissions and carbon neutrality, it is necessary to rely on a sound climate policy system. Climate policy serves as a crucial first step in coping with climate change. Despite the rapid climate policy diffusion in China, regional imbalance is still prominent, which means that its climate policy diffusion follows multiple paths and mechanisms. To explore the diffusion paths and diffusion mechanisms of China' s climate policies, this study drew on theories of policy diffusion such as the vertical impact model, the horizontal impact model, and the internal decision model and put forward the diffusion model of China' s climate policies based on relevant practices in the country. The empirical test of provincial spatial panel data from 2007 to 2019 showed that: ① China' s climate policy diffusion was affected by the 'top-down path' and the 'horizontal diffusion path,' while the 'bottom-up path' did not exist. The 'top-down path' and the 'horizontal diffusion path' also had a common effect, but the direction of action depended on the way central government interventions were conducted and the interaction between peer governments. ② Pilot promotion, geographical diffusion, and competition diffusion constituted the mechanisms of China' s climate policy diffusion. The central government drove climate policy diffusion through guided 'pilot promotion' rather than mandatory 'policy pressure.' 'Geographical diffusion' and 'competitive diffusion' could drive the diffusion of climate policies among peer governments. ③ Different diffusion paths corresponded to different diffusion mechanisms. The 'top-down path' worked through 'pilot promotion' rather than 'policy pressure.' The low ranking of the climate agenda and the principle of adjusting measures according to local conditions were the main reasons for the lack of policy pressure. The mechanisms of the horizontal diffusion path included 'geographical diffusion' and 'competitive diffusion.' The essence of 'geographical diffusion' was policy learning and policy imitation in similar environments. The study reveals the general law of China' s climate policy diffusion, which not only enriches policy diffusion theories but also provides a useful reference for the construction of China' s climate policy system. In addition, the study expands the object of the analysis of policy diffusion from a single policy to multiple similar policies, providing new insights for the study of policy diffusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This policy-oriented article explores the sustainability dimension of digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI). While AI can contribute to halting climate change via targeted applications in specific domains, AI technology in general could also have detrimental effects for climate policy goals. Moreover, digitalisation and AI can have an indirect effect on climate policy via their impact on political processes. It will be argued that, if certain conditions are fulfilled, AI-facilitated digital tools could help with setting up frameworks for bottom-up citizen participation that could generate the legitimacy and popular buy-in required for speedy transformations needed to reach net zero such as radically revamping the energy infrastructure among other crucial elements of the green transition. This could help with ameliorating a potential dilemma of voice versus speed regarding the green transition. The article will further address the nexus between digital applications such as AI and climate justice. Finally, the article will consider whether innovative governance methods could instil new dynamism into the multi-level global climate regime, such as by facilitating interlinkages and integration between different levels. Before implementing innovative governance arrangements, it is crucial to assess whether they do not exacerbate old or even generate new inequalities of access and participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, an unexpected public actor has joined climate activists' forces: central banks increasingly care about and act on climate change. Their (potential) contribution to the climate-neutral economy is immense, as they possess vast institutional resources to influence investment in the economy. Central banks' advocacy is puzzling, as they put their legitimacy at risk by stepping outside their mandates and area of expertise. To explore this puzzle, I study why and how climate change came on the agenda of the Dutch central bank, one of the first movers among central banks. By opening the black box of organizational politics within central banks and building on unique interview data, I show how the policy shift of the Dutch central bank can be traced back to a small group of policy-seeking staff. This process-tracing case study contributes to our understanding of transformative change in climate policy in particular and public policy more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and Paris Agreement (PA) are highly complementary agreements where each depends on the other's success to be effective. The GBF offers a very specific framework of interim goals and targets that break down the objective of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) into a decade-spanning work plan. Comprised of 10 sections – including a 2050 vision and a 2030 mission, four overarching goals and 23 specific targets – the GBF is expected to guide biodiversity policy around the world in the coming years to decades. A similar set of global interim climate policy targets could translate the global temperature goal into concrete policy milestones that would provide policy makers and civil society with reference points for policy making and efforts to hold governments accountable. Beyond inspiring climate policy experts to convert temperature goals into policy milestones, GBF has the potential to strengthen the implementation of the PA at the nexus of biodiversity and climate (adaptation and mitigation) action. For example, the GBF can help to ensure that nature-based climate solutions are implemented with full consideration of biodiversity concerns, of the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and with fair and transparent benefit sharing arrangements. In sum, the GBF should be mandatory reading for all climate policy makers. The 2022 Kunming-Montreal GBF and the PA are synergistic and complementary. The PA puts significant pressure on Parties to engage in ambitious climate action, however, it lacks a clear framework of interim targets and measures that converts temperature goals into policy milestones; this in turn does not allow concrete evaluation of progress and creates barriers to action. In this context, the GBF could inspire climate policy makers or experts to create a strategic, non-binding framework document that formulates interim goals and measurable climate policy targets for the next decade. The GBF and PA are also connected through policy and implementation linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the effect of strategic ambiguity and heterogeneous attitudes towards such ambiguity on optimal mitigation and adaptation. Pessimistic players tend to invest more in mitigation, while optimists favor adaptation. When adaptation is more expensive than mitigation, three types of equilibria can obtain depending on the level and distribution of ambiguity aversion: (i) a mitigation equilibrium, (i i) an adaptation equilibrium and (i i i) a mixed equilibrium with both adaptation and mitigation. The interaction between ambiguity attitudes and wealth distribution plays a crucial role for the aggregate environmental policy: a wealth transfer from pessimistic to optimistic agents increases total mitigation. A similar result applies to the choice of an optimal mitigation subsidy, which is shown to increase in optimism, but decrease following a transfer of income towards the more optimistic players. Finally, we show that under strategic ambiguity, the introduction of a non-binding standard can impact agents' beliefs about their opponents' behavior and as a result lower total equilibrium mitigation. Our results highlight the necessity to consider attitudes towards strategic ambiguity in the design of economic policies targeting climate change. They might also shed some light on the slow rate of convergence of environmental policies across countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States government has indicated a desire to advance environmental justice through climate policy. As fossil fuel combustion produces both conventional pollutants and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, climate mitigation strategies may provide an opportunity to address historical inequities in air pollution exposure. To test the impact of climate policy implementation choices on air quality equity, we develop a broad range of GHG reduction scenarios that are each consistent with the US Paris Accord target and model the resulting air pollution changes. Using idealized decision criteria, we show that least cost and income-based emission reductions can exacerbate air pollution disparities for communities of color. With a suite of randomized experiments that facilitates exploration of a wider climate policy decision space, we show that disparities largely persist despite declines in average pollution exposure, but that reducing transportation emissions has the most potential to reduce racial inequities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the host country of the 26th United Nations Climate Conference, the United Kingdom (UK) fully carried out climate diplomacy at the conference, and intended to promote the green concept in the international community through diplomatic means, which shows its greater ambition in international climate governance. However, the UK, as the source of the Industrial Revolution, has not always followed the so-called green norms in history. In the interaction with the EU norms after joining the European Community, the UK gradually developed from an "opponent" of green norms to an "advocate" of green norms. After "Brexit", the British government did not stop at the previous green norms of the EU, and further gave the green norms a special brand of the UK on this basis. At present, during the term of Boris Johnson's government, the green norms shaped by the UK have been basically formed and disseminated within a certain mechanism. In this paper, based on the normative power theory and relevant historical facts, how the UK has shaped international norms and obtained normative power through a series of climate policy will be discussed, and some enlightenment to China's participation in the construction of international norms system today will be obtained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation of societies and economies towards climate neutrality is a highly complex multi-sectoral and multi-level challenge. This paper examines the multi-level dimension of climate policy with particular reference to the European legal framework and the example of Germany. It analyses how regional and local governments are engaged and whether, in this regard, the existing arrangements of multi-level climate governance can be considered adequate and effective. In the light of the basic principles of federalism theory and in view of the - failed - German multi-level approaches to energy transition it is concluded, in particular, that federal climate governance must build not only on European and national objectives but also on regional and local climate targets and policy planning schemes as a means of both ensuring sufficient transformation efforts and preserving as much autonomy as possible for regional and local communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research suggests that public support for climate action can be increased by bundling environmental policy with social and economic programs – the Green New Deal being one of the most widely known iterations of this strategy. Yet, party cue theory suggests that public support for the policy will be shaped by the strong Democratic associations of the proposal. In a preregistered survey experiment conducted among 1,203 residents of the rural western United States, I find strong evidence that the phrase 'the Green New Deal' functions as a partisan cue, lowering support for a bundled climate policy among rural residents by 9.1 percentage points. This depressive effect is robust even when framing around region-specific climate impacts is added to the survey question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses Ethiopia's planned climate adaptation interventions and the barriers that impede implementation of adaptation policies at the local level by using the case study of Raya Azebo district. Data was collected through reviews of policy documents, focus group discussions with farmers and interviews with relevant government actors. Results indicate that climate change is addressed in various policy documents but there is limited progress in implementation of these policies. The study identified various barriers to climate adaptation policy implementation which included a lack of financial resources, poor coordination among institutional actors and local actors' low technical capacities for addressing climate change. The study contributes to the literature of climate change policy planning and implementation in low-income and lower-middle-income countries and suggests measures to overcome the existing barriers to climate change adaptation policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thus far, attempts to link the emissions trading schemes (ETS) of countries with heterogenous climate policies have failed. Despite the adoption in Glasgow of a long-awaited rulebook for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, heterogeneous linking remains politically challenging to achieve – but why is this? We explore this question, with a focus on Northeast Asia. We surveyed Chinese, Japanese and Korean experts involved in negotiating the Paris Agreement Article 6 Rulebook, to test how feasibility, confidence and willingness affect the specifics of linking in the region. Our results reveal differences in perceptions among countries and subcategories of agents involved in the policy process. We identify three different political barriers to linking in Northeast Asia: an institutional resistance barrier, predicated on administrative challenges; a governance-sharing barrier, which reflects the difficulties of resolving complex sovereignty questions; and an environmental integrity barrier, based on a lack of confidence between partners in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a conceptual framework for climate policy engagement that is focused on building the social conditions conducive to support for climate policy. Despite the ongoing scientific and social cases being made for climate action, social divisions remain in some contexts such as Australia and the United States. The success of climate policies depend in part on the general social support base for that solution, with public polarisation acting as a barrier. Dominant communication models have tended to rely on one-way strategically focused communication to exert influence with the aim of shifting one's attitudes. However, there is a need to extend such approaches to go beyond strategic messaging and instead establish the social conditions necessary for policy support. Drawing on diverse literature and framing theory, a new engagement model for climate policy is proposed which centres around a goal of relationship-building between actors to facilitate productive discussion on climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the development of the mix of EU climate policy instruments and the level of climate policy integration (CPI) in the twenty-first century. Complementing established criteria of ambition and stringency, analysis of the instrument mix and CPI enables a fuller assessment of the transformational potential of EU climate governance. We argue that both have significantly advanced towards matching the 'super-wicked' nature of the climate challenge, although important gaps and challenges remain in addressing all relevant sectors, barriers and drivers. First, EU climate governance has 'thickened' through a stepwise layering of various economic, regulatory, procedural, and informational instruments. Second, this thickening has gone hand in hand with an expansion and strengthening of CPI. The European Green Deal promises to further complement the instrument mix and to universalise and prioritise CPI, but major initiatives remain to be proposed and realised for the Green Deal to propel the needed comprehensive transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most governments aim for net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050, but none know fully how to get there. The papers in this special issue examine the role of climate governance for climate action, addressing three research questions: a) what characterizes enduring climate governance, b) which factors drive climate governance developments, and c) how can these be sustained within the polity? In this introductory article, we present three ideal-typical models of climate governance that provide answers to these questions. The models are, respectively, the market failure, the socio-technological transition, and the public support models. Political science, as a discipline, is ideally suited to contribute to the further development of the public support model, which bears much promise for sustaining the climate and energy transition. The models and the special issue's contributions highlight two concepts as crucial regarding climate governance: complexity and consensus. These concepts can be mutually constitutive: policy packages addressing the complexity of the climate question, including its (heterogenous) societal dimensions, will have a greater chance of being more efficacious and less contested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate economists have long been concerned with setting the price of carbon emissions, which can provide a good basis for making climate policy decisions and be an effective incentive to reduce emissions. Nowadays, more and more countries have to pay for carbon emissions in the form of taxes or quota purchases, and the so-called internal carbon pricing of emissions has appeared and is spreading rapidly in the environmental management tools of large companies. This article provides an overview of the theory and practice of carbon pricing, its different applications and price developments. Official prices are expected to move closer to economically 'correct' values as climate policy tightens, and the main goal of corporate carbon pricing is to prepare companies for these changes. This article shows where this process is currently taking place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indigenous Peoples gain prominence in global climate change debates. Nevertheless, their involvement in national climate governance remains marginal. This article analyses the consideration of Indigenous Peoples' participation in the Chilean climate governance through an ethnography of the state conducted between 2017 and 2020. A documentary review of national climate policy between 1995 and 2020, participant observation and 41 semi-structured interviews were conducted. The findings show that, although recent progress, Indigenous Peoples' participation does not meet the standards of intercultural participation. Nor are there mechanisms in place to enable collaboration and to position Indigenous Peoples as agents in the face of climate change. The Chilean case illustrates the type of recognition given to Indigenous Peoples in international climate policy, and therefore its analysis allows for the identification of barriers to effective collaboration. As long as these barriers remain unaddressed, an increase in Indigenous Peoples' vulnerability is at risk. We also lose the opportunity to promote the institutional transformation processes necessary to respond to climate change. More efforts are needed at the national level to enhance Indigenous Peoples' participation in the UNFCCC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional analysis of China's policy experimentation has focused on the role of central–local relations and rotating leaders in shaping the local agenda-setting process. Less is known about the role of less mobile mid-level local bureaucrats who serve as bridges in the implementation process. This paper examines why some cities have performed better than others at implementing and maintaining low-carbon policy experiments. Drawing on a comparison of four case cities and over 100 expert interviews, I argue that the availability of bureaucratic entrepreneurs and their resource mobilization capacity determine the level of local engagement in climate policy experimentation. This study shows that the institutionalization of local policy experiments is not only driven by the central government or rotating top local leaders but also by bureaucratic entrepreneurs who help policy experiments survive periodic changes in the bureaucracy. The findings have important implications for the fulfilment of China's 2060 carbon neutrality pledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change has revived the debate on growth‐versus‐environment. In line with this, recently it has been proposed to shift the target focus of IPCC scenarios from emissions to post‐growth. We argue here that this confounds ends and means, since while reduction of growth may be an outcome of good climate policies, it should not be a goal in itself. In fact, a post‐ or degrowth goal would mean an ineffective and costly way to reduce emissions. Instead, we suggest that the debate about pursuing economic growth versus achieving climate goals will become more transparent and policy‐relevant through refocusing scenarios from targets to policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review the state of knowledge concerning international CO2 emission transfers associated particularly with trade in energy-intensive goods and concerns about carbon leakage arising from climate policies. The historical increase in aggregate emission transfers from developing to developed countries peaked around 2006 and declined since. Studies find no evidence that climate policies lead to carbon leakage, but this is partly due to shielding of key industrial sectors, which is incompatible with deep decarbonization. Alternative or complementary consumption-based approaches areneeded. Private sector initiatives to trace and address carbon emissions throughout supply chains have grown substantially but cannot compensate for inadequate policy. Three main price-based approaches to tackling carbon leakage are potentially compatible with international trade rules: border adjustments on imports, carbon consumption charges, and climate excise contributions combined with emissions trading. We also consider standards and public procurement options to tackle embodied emissions. Finally, we discuss proposals for carbon clubs involving cooperation among a limited set of countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's relative disregard for the economic, geopolitical and climatic concerns of its peripheral Eastern countries has contributed to making the war in Ukraine possible. Its consequences are now returning in the form of energy dependence and economic instability on the Union as a whole and the risk of economic crisis and deindustrialisation. This should prompt a re-assessment of the EU's strategy towards its eastern neighbours, particularly in the energy and climate policy field. This evaluation starts from the issue of control over cheap energy as a key material foundation of state and interstate power. On this basis, we analyse the struggle between Russia and the European core states over Ukraine in terms of the ability to extract an economic surplus through the unequal exchange of energy. The current escalation should be understood as an attempt by the Russian petrostate to preserve the economic basis of its regime, which is threatened by the prospect of a low-carbon transition in Europe. We conclude that a massive acceleration of the transition away from fossil fuels is the key to economic, geopolitical and climate stabilisation, highlighting possible policy instruments the EU could use to secure its production system and protect citizens' security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Soils are an enticing reservoir for nature-based climate solutions, but long timescales are required to store amounts of C of relevance to mitigate warming acknowledging its impermanence. Scientific clarity on the controlling factors in soil C persistence should help to disambiguate debates related to permanence in the climate policy domain. However, another contributing factor that is lacking in this debate is a way to compute the climate benefits of C in terrestrial ecosystems over time in the same units as greenhouse gas emissions. We use a case study approach here to demonstrate the use of the metrics of carbon sequestration (CS) and climate benefit of sequestration (CBS) with the aim of assessing the contribution of simultaneous emissions and uptake on radiative forcing. We show how this new computational framework quantifies the climate benefit achieved in two different agricultural systems, one a managed tropical perennial grass system in Hawaiʻi, USA and the other a boreal (cold-temperate, semi-humid) agricultural soil from long term amendment trials in Sweden. Using a set of computations, we show how C inputs and persistence interact to produce different levels of radiative forcing at relevant time frames, which could greatly help to clarify issues of carbon permanence discussed in climate policy. Temporary soil C storage could help to decrease peak warming provided that ambitious emission reductions are part of the portfolio of solutions; the CS and CBS framework gives us a way to quantify it based on biogeochemical understanding of soil C persistence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nepal's transition to federalism in 2015 involved a significant redistribution of authority across three levels of government, with a greater level of autonomy granted to provincial and local levels. We examine multi-scale climate policy and politics in Nepal, focusing on three elements that are important for policy development and implementation: (a) the authority to make decisions; (b) the knowledge and expertise to develop and implement policies; and (c) the ability to access and mobilize resources, primarily external funding, by government bodies at different levels. Our findings show that the newly decentralized local governments are constrained in their ability to develop and implement climate change-related policies and practical responses by a mismatch between the authority granted to them and existing institutional capabilities. These governmental bodies have limited opportunities to develop, access and mobilize knowledge of climate and development and financial resources, which are needed to put new policies into action. Based on this analysis, we argue that decentralization of governmental authority is not likely to produce effective climate policy outcomes if this mismatch remains unaddressed. The ability of the provincial and local governments in federal Nepal to respond to climate change has been constrained by a pervasive mismatch between authority granted and institutional capabilities, in terms of opportunities to access and mobilize knowledge and financial resources. The devolution of power is not adequate for effective climate change responses; rather, there is a need to strengthen the institutional capabilities and opportunities of the decentralized local governments to address climate change. Formal allocation of authority is always blurred in practice, as agencies at different levels of governance engage in power struggles within and beyond formally delineated boundaries. This suggests the need for more operational clarity on policy implementation procedures. There is a need for a clear exchange of knowledge and a flow of resources to the level where responsibilities lie to respond to climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German Federal Climate Change Act includes binding annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets for the economic sectors energy, industry, buildings, transport, agriculture and waste. For sectors that fail to meet their targets, climate policy measures have to be implemented immediately. However, some sectors may only have achieved their targets thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, while others may have missed their targets because of COVID-19. For policy making, it is therefore important to disentangle the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic from the effects of policy and other drivers on emissions. In this paper, the effects of the pandemic on GHG emissions in Germany in 2020 are estimated at the national level and at the levels of the economic sectors. Counterfactual emissions are estimated here based on autoregressive econometric models, thereby distinguishing between different factors of emissions based on decomposition analysis. The findings at the national level suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic lowered GHG emissions in 2020 in Germany by about 41 Mt CO2-eq (5.15%) compared to counterfactual emissions. Accordingly, about 58% of the reduction in emissions between 2019 and 2020 in Germany may be attributed to the pandemic. The findings at the sectoral level imply that without the COVID-19 pandemic, all sectors with the exception of the transport sector, would have met their emissions target in 2020 as set in the Federal Climate Change Act. The transport sector would have missed its emission target in 2020 without COVID-19, suggesting that existing policies were not strong enough to bend the curve of emissions trends sufficiently down. In contrast, the buildings sector failed to meet its target in 2020 because of COVID-19, prompting immediate climate policy measures in this sector. The COVID-19 pandemic lowered greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Germany in 2020 by 5.5% compared to counterfactual emissions and accounted for about 58% of total estimated reductions between 2019 and 2020. Without COVID-19, all sectors but the transport sector would have met their emissions targets. Climate policy response should take into account the effects of extraordinary events like COVID-19 suppressing GHG emissions based on counterfactual emissions because failure to implement measures early on may turn out to be costly in the medium term once the transitory emissions reductions no longer occur. Counterfactual emissions should be considered prior to crediting emissions surplus or deficit to subsequent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate politics and governance across the globe involve an increasing number of interest groups such as from business and civil society. Against this backdrop, it matters a great deal whether interest group mobilization is able to influence climate policy-making. First, there is an increasing number of climate policy supporters like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and green businesses lobbying in favour of additional climate policies. Second, there is also strong mobilization of groups from energy-intensive and fossil fuel industries lobbying against potentially costly climate policies. In this paper, we investigate the potential effects of these mobilization patterns. More precisely, we ask whether there is any systematic effect of competing interest group mobilization on national climate policy production. To this end, we harness arguments from literatures on interest group mobilization and climate policy-making. Empirically, we exploit a comprehensive global dataset on the adoption of national climate laws and interest group mobilization (over 4,000 organizations) between 1997 and 2016. The results show that the increasing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to national climate policy production. Climate policy opponents are able to weaken this effect, but are hardly able to block new climate laws. The results add to our understanding of climate politics focusing on the role of business organizations and NGOs. This is highly policy relevant for both analysts and practitioners given that the Paris Agreement relies heavily on national policy efforts. The growing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to the adoption of additional climate laws. The positive effect of climate policy supporters is weakened but rarely blocked by climate policy opponents, such as those from the fossil fuel industry. The effect of lobbying over climate policy needs to be assessed in its competitive context, that is by considering how political support and opposition on climate policy interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Designing policy for climate change requires analyses which integrate the interrelationship between the economy and the environment. We argue that, despite their dominance in the economics literature and influence in public discussion and policymaking, the methodology employed by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) rests on flawed foundations, which become particularly relevant in relation to the realities of the immense risks and challenges of climate change, and the radical changes in our economies that a sound and effective response require. We identify a set of critical methodological problems with the IAMs which limit their usefulness and discuss the analytic foundations of an alternative approach that is more capable of providing insights into how best to manage the transition to net-zero emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union climate policy and the subsequent energy transition are expected to cause fundamental changes in individual EU countries, their economies, and industrial sectors. Furthermore, in order to achieve them, high financial outlays are essential. The main purpose of the article is to present a comparative analysis of the pace, directions, and main factors of the energy transition in Poland and Spain against the changes in the EU energy and climate policy. In particular, the subject of the study is the changes in the fuel structure of electricity generation (energy mix) and the changes in the concentration of energy generation. The analysis concentrates on Poland and Spain against the background of the group of EU27 countries. The study adopted a long-term perspective (1990–2020). The methodology used taxonomic measures of variability of structures and measures of concentration, as well as measures of descriptive and mathematical statistics. The result of the research proves that the EU common climate and energy policy has explicitly accelerated changes in the energy mix, both in the EU27 and in the studied countries, including those traditionally based on coal. The concentration analysis demonstrated an increase in diversification resulting in a significant increase in the share of renewable and low-carbon sources. The taxonomic analysis additionally proved that there was a parallel process towards making the energy mix of the studied countries more similar to the EU27. The limitation of the research is the adopted triangulation arrangement of the studied structures (EU27, EU15, countries that accessed the EU after 2004), enforced in this pilot research, but possible to expand the field of perception in subsequent research. What serves as a proof of the originality of the study is the fulfilment of research gaps in the long-term study of the degree of changes in the concentration of the energy mix structure of EU countries, and especially the study of the degree of intensity of its similarity. The application value of the study is its use in the energy policies of countries traditionally based on coal for the indication of the taken position, the goals, and ways to achieve them based on the experience of other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Enhancing the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is an important exercise to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement also recognizes that support to developing countries in this regard will help them to aim for higher climate ambition. The role of international support programmes in the NDC enhancement process is crucial but is not often covered in scientific research. Consequently, the factors driving a country's decision to apply for NDC-related assistance have also not yet been fully explored. Acknowledging the research gap, this paper framed and tested multiple hypotheses to evaluate the impact of potential factors on the likelihood of a country applying for assistance to enhance its NDCs. For this, a logistic regression method was employed. Data from the two initiatives coordinating the technical and financial assistance worldwide, namely the Climate Action Enhancement Package (CAEP) and Climate Promise, were reviewed for this purpose. The CAEP program is financially supported by Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. This study identifies the level of socio-economic development and the population's exposure to air pollution as key factors which influence the likelihood of applying for assistance under CAEP and Climate Promise in developing countries. Further, the presence of democratic aspects in the form of governance may also influence this choice. Finally, this study discusses the results and associated policy implications for countries receiving assistance to enhance their NDCs. Developing countries with relatively low socio-economic development are more likely to apply for assistance to enhance their NDCs. The assistance is designed to help them to build capacities to develop and implement future climate policies. Air pollution and climate change issues are interconnected. Exposure to air pollution is a potential indicator that can influence the NDC enhancement process in developing countries. The assistance for enhancing NDCs will lead to NDC targets that are well-informed and are aligned with national and sub-national development priorities with realistic prospects of implementation. Climate vulnerability and net trade do not influence the decision-making process to apply for NDC enhancement assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the most well‐known traits of the Obama presidency are his rhetorical skills and reliance on administrative action to push forward policy in the face of an unresponsive Congress. This is particularly notable for climate change, where Obama used the tools of the administrative presidency to make policy and rhetoric to build public support for these actions. To this end, the authors examine how President Obama rhetorically constructed and rationalized his use of the Environmental Protection Agency to implement federal climate change regulations via the federal Clean Power Plan. The authors use a rhetorical analysis to examine President Obama's speeches from 2009 through 2015 that explicitly or implicitly reference climate change, greenhouse gases, and the Clean Power Plan, but also related topics, such as energy policy and climate agreements. The authors find that Obama relied on polysemy and the locus of irreparable in his speeches to sale the urgent need for administrative action on climate change. Conclusions suggest that the use of rhetoric and administrative action from the White House are key to how federal climate policy has been constructed in the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate policy is expected to consider the current state of science. As populist radical right parties (PRRP) become elected members of parliaments, they have a greater influence on integration processes between science and politics. The aim of the paper is to show that instead of generally rejecting climate science, PRRPs appeal to 'alternative expertise' and politicize scientific knowledge. With our empirical analysis of public hearings, plenary meetings and press statements discussing Germany's Climate Package between 2018 and 2020, we show that the AfD uses expertise that suits their political interests very selectively and arbitrarily supporting either scientific outsider positions or positions that only pretend to be scientific. We argue that populist strategies weaken trust in scientific expertise by undermining democratic institutions for knowledge integration in climate governance. Therefore, a clear separation between research and politics together with transparent and formal scientific knowledge integration processes are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]